China's
National Insecurity:
Old
Challenges at the Dawn of the New Millennium
Dru
C. Gladney
Foreigners and the
Chinese themselves typically picture China's population as a vast monolithic
Han majority with a sprinkling of exotic minorities living along the
country's borders. This understates
China's tremendous cultural, geographic, and linguistic diversity -- in
particular the important cultural differences within
the Han population. This ignores the fact that China is
officially a multi-national country with 56 recognized
"nationalities." More
importantly, recent events suggest that China may well be increasingly insecure
regarding not only these nationalities, but also its own national
integration. China is now seeing a
resurgence of pride in local nationality and culture, most notably among
southerners such as the Cantonese and Hakka who are now classified as Han. These differences may increase under
economic pressures such as inflation, the growing gap between rich and poor
areas, and the migration of millions of people from poorer provinces to those
with jobs. Chinese society is also under pressure from the officially
recognized minorities such as Uyghurs and Tibetans. For centuries, China has held together a vast
multicultural and multiethnic nation
despite alternating periods of political centralization and
fragmentation. But cultural and linguistic cleavages could worsen in a China
weakened by internal strife, inflation, uneven growth, or a post-Jiang struggle
for succession. The recent National
Day celebrations in October, celebrating 50 years of the Communist Party in
China, underscored the importance of China's many ethnic peoples in its
national resurgence.
At the beginning
of the last decade, not a single observer of international politics predicted
that the former Soviet Union would now be fragmented into a melange of strident
new nations and restive ethnic minorities.
When Russian troops marched on Grozny in hopes of keeping what remains
of its former empire together, few analysts drew parallels to China's attempts
to reign in its restive minorities.
China is thought
to be different. Cultural commonality
and a monolithic civilization are supposed to hold China together. While ethnic nationalism has generally been
absent from Western reporting and perspectives on China, the peoples of the People's
Republic have often demonstrated otherwise.
Continuing separatist activities and ethnic unrest have punctuated
China's border areas since a major Muslim uprising in February 1996, that led
to bombings in Beijing, and frequent eruptions on its periphery.[1] Quick and violent responses to thwart
localized protests, with 27 "splittests" reportedly killed in an
uprising in December 1999 outside of Khotan in southern Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, indicates rising Chinese concern over the influence of
separatist sentiment spilling over from the newly independent Central Asia
nations into China's Muslim areas, where more than 20 million Turkic Uyghurs,
Kyrgyz, Kazaks and other Muslims are a visible and vocal reminder that China is
linked to Eurasia. For Uighur nationalists today, the direct lineal descent
from the Uighur Kingdom in seventh century Mongolia is accepted as fact,
despite overwhelming historical and archeological evidence to the contrary, and
they seek to revive that ancient kingdom as a modern Uyghuristan.[2] Random arrests and detentions continue among
the Uyghur who are increasingly being regarded as China's Chechens. A report in the Wall Street Journal of the
arrest on 11 August 1999 of Rebiya Kadir, a well known Uighur business woman, during
a visit by the United States Congressional Research Service delegation to the
region, indicates China’s suspicion of the Uyghur people continues.[3]
China is also
concerned about the "Kosovo effect," fearing that its Muslim and
other ethnic minorities might be emboldened to seek outside international (read
Western) support for continued human rights abuses. Just prior to its National Day celebrations last October, the
State Council hosted its first 3 day conference on "the nationalities
problem" in Beijing, and issued a new policy paper, "National
Minorities Policy and its Practice in China."[4] Though this White Paper did little more than
outline all the "good" programs China has carried out in minority
areas, it did indicate increasing concern and a willingness to recognize
unresolved problems, with several strategic think tanks in Beijing and Shanghai
initiating focus groups and research programs addressing ethnic identity and separatism issues.[5]
But ethnic
problems in Jiang Zemin's China go far deeper than the "official"
minorities. Sichuanese, Cantonese,
Shanghainese, and Hunanese cafes are avidly advocating increased cultural
nationalism and resistance to Beijing central control. As the European Union
experiences difficulties in building a common European alliance across these
linguistic, cultural, and political boundaries, we should not imagine China to
be less concerned about its persistent multi-culturalism.
If the Holy
Roman Empire were around today, it would look much like China. Two millennia ago, when the Roman Empire was
at its peak, so was the Han dynasty -- both empires barely lasted another 200
years. At the beginning of the last
millennium, China was on the verge of being conquered by the Mongols, and
divided by a weakened Song dynasty in the south and the Liao dynasty in the
north, whose combined territory was equal only to the five northern provinces
in today's PRC. Indeed, it was the
Mongols who extended China's territory to include much of what is considered
part of China today: Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria, Sichuan, and Yunnan. China has been divided over the last two
millennia, longer than its been unified; can it maintain national unity until
the next century? History suggests
otherwise. Indeed, with the
reacquisition of Macao in late 1999, China is the only country in the world
that is expanding its territory
instead of reducing it. Will China be
able to continue to resist the inexorable forces of globalization and
nationalism?
Just as
linguistic diversity within China leads Chinese linguists such as John
DeFrancis to speak of the many Chinese languages, attention to cultural
diversity should force us to give further weight to the plurality of the
Chinese peoples in national politics. A
former American President once claimed to know the mind of "the
Chinese." This is as farfetched as
someone claiming to know the European mind.
Have any U.S. policy-makers spent time talking to disgruntled
entrepreneurs in Canton and Shanghai, impoverished peasants in Anhui and Gansu,
or angry Central Asians in Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet? While ethnic diversity does not necessitate
ethnic separatism or violence, growing ethnic awareness and expression in China
should inform policy that takes into account the interests of China's many peoples,
not just those in power. China policy
should represent more than the interests of those in Beijing.
Officially,
China is made up of 56 nationalities: one majority nationality, the Han, and 55
minority groups. The peoples identified as Han comprise 91 percent of the
population from Beijing in the north to Canton in the south and include the
Hakka, Fujianese, Cantonese, and other groups (MacKerras 1994: 25). These Han
are thought to be united by a common history, culture, and written language;
differences in language, dress, diet, and customs are regarded as minor and
superficial. The rest of the population is divided into 55 official
"minority" nationalities that are mostly concentrated along the
borders, such as the Mongolians and Uyghurs in the north and the Zhuang, Yi,
and Bai in southern China, near southeast Asia. Other groups, such as the Hui
and Manchus, are scattered throughout the nation, and there are minorities in
every province, region, and county. An active state-sponsored program assists
these official minority cultures and promotes their economic development (with
mixed results). The outcome, according to China's preeminent sociologist, Fei
Xiaotong, is a "unified multinational" state (Fei 1981: 20). But even
this recognition of diversity understates the divisions within the Chinese
population, especially the wide variety of culturally and ethnically diverse
groups within the majority Han population (Honig 1992). These groups have
recently begun to rediscover and reassert their different cultures, languages,
and history. Yet as the Chinese worry
and debate over their own identity, policymakers in other nations still take
the monolithic Han identity for granted.
The notion of a
Han person (Han ren) dates back centuries
and refers to descendants of the Han dynasty that flourished at about the same
time as the Roman Empire. But the concept of Han nationality (Han minzu) is an
entirely modern phenomenon that arose with the shift from the Chinese empire to
the modern nation-state (Duara 1995: 47).
In the early part of this century, Chinese reformers had been concerned
that the Chinese people lacked a sense of nationhood, unlike Westerners and
even China's other peoples such as Tibetans and Manchus. In the view of these
reformers, Chinese unity stopped at the clan or community level rather than
extending to the nation as a whole. Sun Yat-Sen, leader of the republican
movement that toppled the last imperial dynasty of China (the Qing) in 1911,
popularized the idea that there were "Five Peoples of China"--the
majority Han being one and the others being the Manchus, Mongolian, Tibetan,
and Hui (a term that included all Muslims in China, now divided into Uyghurs,
Kazakhs, Hui, etc.). Sun was a Cantonese, educated in Hawaii, who feared
arousing traditional northern suspicions of southern radical movements. He
wanted both to unite the Han and to mobilize them and all other non-Manchu
groups in China (including Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims) into a modern
multiethnic nationalist movement against the Manchu Qing state and foreign
imperialists. The Han were seen as a unified group distinct from the
"internal" foreigners-- within their borders the Manchus, Tibetans,
Mongols, and Hui--as well as the "external" foreigners-- on their
frontiers, namely the Western and Japanese imperialists. Dikotter (1992) has argued a racial basis
for this notion of a unified Han minzu, but I suspect the rationality
was more strategic and nationalistic -- the need to build national security
around the concept of one national people, with a small percentage of
minorities supporting that idea. The
Communists expanded the number of "peoples" from five to 56 but kept
the idea of a unified Han group. The Communists were, in fact, disposed to
accommodate these internal minority groups for several reasons. The Communists'
1934-35 Long March, a 6,000-mile trek across China from southwest to northwest
to escape the threat of annihilation by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT)
forces, took the Communists through some of the most heavily populated minority
areas. Harried on one side by the KMT and on the other by fierce
"barbarian" tribesmen, the Communists were faced with a choice
between extermination and promising special treatment to minorities--especially
the Miao, Yi (Lolo), Tibetans, Mongols, and Hui--should the party ever win
national power. The Communists even offered the possibility of true
independence for minorities. Chairman Mao frequently referred to Article 14 of
the 1931 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitution, which "recognizes the
right of self- determination" of the national minorities in China, their
right to complete separation from China, and to the formation of an independent
state for each minority. This commitment was not kept after the founding of the
People's Republic (Gladney 1996: 60-75). Instead, the party stressed
maintaining the unity of the new nation at all costs. The recognition of
minorities, however, also helped the Communists' long-term goal of forging a
united Chinese nation by solidifying the recognition of the Han as a unified
"majority." Emphasizing the difference between Han and minorities
helped to de-emphasize the differences within the Han community. The Communists
incorporated the idea of Han unity into a Marxist ideology of progress with the
Han in the forefront of development and civilization, the vanguard of the
people's revolution (Gladney 1994a: 97). The more "backward" or
"primitive" the minorities were, the more "advanced" and "civilized"
the so-called Han seemed and the greater the need for a unified national
identity. Cultural diversity within the Han has not been admitted because of a
deep (and well-founded) fear of the country breaking up into feuding
warlord-run kingdoms as happened in the 1910s and 1920s. China has historically
been divided along north/south lines, into Five Kingdoms, Warring States, or
local satrapies, as often as it has been united. Indeed, China as it currently
exists, including large pieces of territory occupied by Mongols, Turkic peoples,
Tibetans, etc., is three times larger than China was under the last Chinese
dynasty, the Ming, which fell in 1644. Ironically, geographic "China"
as defined by the People's Republic was actually established by foreign
conquest dynasties, first by the Mongols and finally by the Manchus. A strong,
centralizing Chinese government (whether of foreign or internal origin) has
often tried to impose ritualistic, linguistic, and political uniformity
throughout its borders. The modern state has tried to unite its various peoples
with transportation and communications networks and an extensive civil service.
In recent years these efforts have continued through the controlled infusion of
capitalistic investment and market manipulation. Yet even in the modern era, these
integrative mechanisms have not produced cultural uniformity.
Although
presented as a unified culture--an idea also accepted by many Western researchers--Han
peoples differ in many ways, most obviously in their languages. The supposedly
homogenous Han speak eight mutually unintelligible languages (Mandarin, Wu,
Yue, Xiang, Hakka, Gan, Southern Min, and Northern Min). Even these subgroups
show marked linguistic and cultural diversity; in the Yue language family, for
example, Cantonese speakers are barely intelligible to Taishan speakers, and
the Southern Min dialects of Quanzhou, Changzhou, and Xiamen are equally
difficult to communicate across (Norman 1988: 27). Chinese linguist Y. R. Chao
has shown that the mutual unintelligibility of, say, Cantonese and Mandarin is
as great as that of Dutch and English or French and Italian (Chao 1976:
83). Mandarin was imposed as the
national language early in the 20th century and has become the lingua franca,
but like Swahili in Africa it must often be learned in school and is rarely
used in everyday life in many areas. Cultural perceptions among the Han often
involve broad stereotypical contrasts between north and south (Blake
1981). Northerners tend to be thought
of as larger, broader-faced, and lighter- skinned, while southerners are
depicted as smaller and darker. Cultural practices involving birth, marriage,
and burial differ widely; Fujianese, for example, are known for vibrant folk
religious practices and ritualized re-burial of interned corpses, while
Cantonese have a strong lineage tradition, both of which are far almost
non-existent in the north. One finds radically different eating habits from north
to south, with northerners consuming noodles from wheat and other grains, open
to consuming lamb and beef, and preferring spicy foods, while the southern diet
is based upon rice, eschews such meats in favor of seafood, and along the coast
is milder. It is interesting in this
regard, that Fei Xiaotong (1989: 12) once argued that what made the Han people
different from minorities was their agricultural traditions (ie., minorities
were traditionally not engaged in farming, though this failed to take account
of groups like the Koreans and Uyghur who have farmed for 1400 years). Yet Fei never considered the vast cultural
differences separating rice-eaters in the South from wheat-eaters in the North. This process of national unification based
on an invented majority at the expense of a few isolated minorities is one
widely documented in Asia and not unique to China (see Gladney 1998).
China's policy
toward minorities involves official recognition, limited autonomy, and
unofficial efforts at control. The official minorities hold an importance for
China's long-term development that is disproportionate to their population.
Although totaling only 8.04 percent of the population, they are concentrated in
resource-rich areas spanning nearly 60 percent of the country's landmass and
exceed 90 percent of the population in counties and villages along many border
areas of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Yunnan. While the 1990 census recorded 91 million minorities, the 2000 census
is estimated to report an increase of the minority population to be 104 million
(Zhang Tianlu 1999).
Shortly after
taking power, Communist leaders sent teams of researchers, social scientists,
and party cadres to the border regions to "identify" groups as
official nationalities. Only 41 of the more than 400 groups that applied were
recognized, and that number had reached only 56 by 1982. Most of the nearly 350
other groups were identified as Han or lumped together with other minorities
with whom they shared some features for generally political reasons. Some are still applying for recognition, and
the 1990 census listed almost 750,000 people as still "unidentified"
and awaiting recognition--meaning they were regarded as ethnically different
but did not fit into any of the recognized categories. In recognition of the minorities' official
status as well as their strategic importance, various levels of nominally
autonomous administration were created --five regions, 31 prefectures, 96
counties (or, in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, banners), and countless
villages. Such "autonomous" areas do not have true political control
although they may have increased local control over the administration of
resources, taxes, birth planning, education, legal jurisdiction, and religious
expression. These areas have minority government leaders, but the real source
of power is still the Han-dominated Communist Party--and as a result, they may
actually come under closer scrutiny than other provinces with large minority populations
such as Gansu, Qinghai, and Sichuan.
While autonomy seems not to be all the word might imply, it is still
apparently a desirable attainment for minorities in China. Between the 1982 and
1990 censuses, 18 new autonomous counties were established, three of them in
Liaoning Province for the Manchus, who previously had no autonomous
administrative districts. Although the
government is clearly trying to limit the recognition of new nationalities,
there seems to be an avalanche of new autonomous administrative districts.
Besides the 18 new counties and many villages whose total numbers have never
been published, at least eight more new autonomous counties are to be set up.
Five will go to the Tujia, a group widely dispersed throughout the southwest that
doubled in population from 2.8 to 5.8 million from 1982 to 1990.
The increase in
the number of groups seeking minority status reflects what may be described as
an explosion of ethnicity in contemporary China. Indeed, it has now become
popular, especially in Beijing, for people to "come out" as Manchus
or other ethnic groups, admitting they were not Han all along. While the Han
population grew a total of 10 percent between 1982 and 1990, the minority
population grew 35 percent overall--from 67 million to 91 million. The Manchus,
a group long thought to have been assimilated into the Han majority, added
three autonomous districts and increased their population by 128 percent from
4.3 to 9.8 million, while the population of the Gelao people in Guizhou shot up
an incredible 714 percent in just eight years. Clearly these rates reflect more
than a high birthrate; they also indicate "category-shifting" as
people redefine their nationality from Han to minority or from one minority to
another. In interethnic marriages,
parents can decide the nationality of their children, and the children
themselves can choose their nationality at age 18. One scholar predicts that if the minority populations' growth
rate continues, they will total 100 million in the year 2,000 and 864 million
in 2080 (Zhang, ibid). China has recently begun to limit births among
minorities, especially in urban areas, but it is doubtful that authorities will
be able to limit the avalanche of applications for redefinition and the
hundreds of groups applying for recognition as minorities.
Why it popular
to be "officially" ethnic in 1990s China? This is an interesting question given the negative reporting in
the Western press about minority discrimination in China. If it is so bad to be a minority in China,
why are their numbers increasing? One
explanation may be that in 1982 there were still lingering doubts about the
government's true intent in registering the nationalities during the census.
The Cultural Revolution, a ten-year period during which any kind of difference,
ethnic, religious, cultural, or political, was ruthlessly suppressed, had ended
only a few years before. By the mid-1980s, it had become clear that those
groups identified as official minorities were beginning to receive real benefits
from the implementation of several affirmative action programs. The most
significant privileges included permission to have more children (except in
urban areas, minorities are generally not bound by the one-child policy), pay
fewer taxes, obtain better (albeit Chinese) education for their children, have
greater access to public office, speak and learn their native languages,
worship and practice their religion (often including practices such as
shamanism that are still banned among the Han), and express their cultural
differences through the arts and popular culture. Indeed, one might even say it
has become popular to be "ethnic" in today's China. Mongolian hot
pot, Muslim noodle, and Korean barbecue restaurants proliferate in every city,
while minority clothing, artistic motifs, and cultural styles adorn Chinese
bodies and private homes. In Beijing,
one of the most popular new restaurants is the Thai Family Village (Dai Jia Cun), which offers a cultural
experience of the Thai minority (known in China as the Dai), complete with
beautiful waitresses in revealing Dai-style sarongs and short tops, sensually
singing and dancing, while exotic foods such as snake's blood are enjoyed by
the young Han nouveau riche. As predicted,
it is not unusual to learn of Han Chinese prostitutes representing themselves
as Thai and other minorities to appear more exotic to their customers (Gladney
1994a). Surprisingly, the second-most
popular novel in China in 1994 was The History of the Soul (Xin ling shi),
which concerned personal and religious conflicts in a remote Muslim region in
northwest China, written by Zhang Chengzhi, a Hui Muslim from Ningxia. This rise of "ethnic chic" is in
dramatic contrast to the anti-ethnic homogenizing policies of the late 1950s
anti-Rightist period, the Cultural Revolution, and even the late-1980s
"spiritual pollution" campaigns.
Foreign policy considerations have also
encouraged changes in China's treatment of minority groups. China has one of
the world's largest Muslim populations--nearly 20 million, more than the United
Arab Emirates, Iraq, Libya, or Malaysia--and has increasing contacts with trade
partners in the Middle East and new Muslim nations created on its borders.
China provides the Middle East and Central Asia with cheap labor, consumer
goods, weaponry--and increasing numbers of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca (Gladney
1994b). These relations will be jeopardized if Muslim, especially, Uyghur,
discontent continues over such issues as limitations on mosque building,
restrictions on childbearing, uncontrolled mineral and energy development, and
continued nuclear testing in the Xinjiang region. Foreign policy considerations
also argue for better treatment of Korean minorities, since South Korean
investment, tourism, and natural resources have given China's Koreans in
Liaoning and Manchuria a booming economy and the best educational level of all
nationalities (including the Han). Another factor has been international
tourism to minority areas, including the "Silk Road" tourism to Xinjiang
and marketing of package tours to the "colorful" minority regions of
Yunnan and Guizhou for Japanese, Taiwanese, and Southeast Asian Chinese tour
groups. The most striking change in China's policy toward a single minority as
a result of international relations has been the initiation, just after the
improvement in Sino-Israeli relations in 1992, of discussions about granting
official nationality status to the Chinese Jews (Youtai ren), once thought to have disappeared entirely. As Sino-Israeli relations improve, and China
seeks increased tourism dollars from Tel Aviv and New York, one would assume
the Chinese Jews will once again reappear as an official nationality in
China.
The creation of
several new nations on China's Central Asian frontier with ethnic populations
on both sides of the border has also made ethnic separatism a major concern.
The newly independent status of the Central Asian states has allowed separatist
groups in Xinjiang to locate some sources of support, leading to over 30
reported bombing incidents in the Xinjiang Region in 1999, claimed by groups
militating for an "Independent Turkestan." At the same time, freer
travel across the Central Asian borders has made China's Muslims well aware of
the ethnic and political conflicts in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, and also that
many of them are better off economically than their fellow Muslims across the
border. Several meetings of the
"Shanghai Five" (PRC, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia)
since April 1997 have concluded treaties strengthening border security and the
refusal to harbor separatist groups. In
April 1999, Kazakhstan returned 3 Uyghurs accused of separatism to China. Beijing's challenge is to convince China's
Muslims that they will benefit more from cooperation with their national
government than from resistance. In the south, a dramatic increase in
cross-border relations between Chinese minority groups and Myanmar (Burma),
Cambodia, and Thailand has led to a rising problem of drug smuggling. Beijing
also wants to help settle disputes in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar because of
the danger of ethnic wars spilling over the border into China. In Tibet,
frequent reports of ongoing resistance and many arrests continue to filter into
the media despite the best efforts of Beijing spin control.
Not only have
the "official" minorities in China begun to assert their identities
more strongly, pressing the government for more recognition, autonomy, and
special privileges, but different groups within the so-called Han majority have
begun to rediscover, reinvent, and reassert their ethnic differences.
With the dramatic economic explosion in South
China, southerners and others have begun to assert cultural and political
differences. Cantonese rock music, videos, movies, and television programs, all
heavily influenced by Hong Kong, are now popular throughout China. Whereas
comedians used to make fun of southern ways and accents, southerners now scorn
northerners for their lack of sophistication and business acumen. And, as any
Mandarin- speaking Beijing resident will tell you, bargaining for vegetables or
cellular telephones in Guangzhou or Shanghai markets is becoming more difficult
for them due to growing pride in the local languages--and non-native speakers
always pay a higher price. Rising
self-awareness among the Cantonese is paralleled by the reassertion of identity
among the Hakka, the southern Fujianese Min, the Swatow, and a host of other
generally ignored peoples now empowered by economic success and embittered by
age-old restraints from the north.
Interestingly,
most of these southern groups traditionally regarded themselves not as Han but
as Tang people, descendants of the great Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.) and its
southern bases (Moser 1985). Most Chinatowns in North America, Europe, and
Southeast Asia are inhabited by descendants of Chinese immigrants from the
mainly Tang areas of southern China and built around Tang Person Streets (tang ren jie). The next decade may see the resurgence of Tang nationalism in
southern China in opposition to northern Han nationalism, especially as
economic wealth in the south eclipses that of the north. There is also a newfound interest in the
ancient southern Chu kingdom as key to modern southern success. Some southern
scholars have departed from the traditional Chinese view of history and begun
to argue that by the 6th century B.C., the bronze culture of the Chu spread
north and influenced the development of Chinese civilization, rather than this culture
originating in the north and spreading southward. Many southerners now see Chu
as essential to Chinese culture, to be distinguished from the less important
northern dynasties--with implications for the nation's economic and
geopolitical future. Museums to the glory of Chu have been established
throughout southern China. There is also a growing belief that northerners and
southerners had separate racial origins based on different histories and
contrasting physiogenetic types, that are influenced by highly speculative 19th
century notions of race and Social Darwinism (see Mair 1999). There has also been an outpouring of
interest in Hakka origins, language, and culture on Taiwan which may be
spreading to the mainland. The Hakka or "guest people" are thought to
have moved southward in successive migrations from northern China as early as
the Eastern Jin (317-420 A.D.) or the late Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.)
according to many Hakka (who claim to be Song people as well as Tang people).
The Hakka have the same language and many of the same cultural practices as the
She minority, but never sought minority status themselves--perhaps because of a
desire to overcome their long-term stigmatization by Cantonese and other
southerners as "uncivilized barbarians" (Blake 1981). This low status may stem from the unique
Hakka language (which is unintelligible to other southerners), the isolated and
walled Hakka living compounds, or the refusal of Hakka women during the
imperial period to bind their feet. Nevertheless, the popular press in China is
beginning to more frequently note the widely perceived but difficult-to-
establish rumors of the Hakka origins of important political figures (even Deng
Xiaoping, Mao Zedong, Sun Yat-sen, former party general secretary Hu Yaobang,
and former president Ye Jianning). People often praise Zhou Enlai by stressing
his Jiangnan linkages, Lee Kuan-yew as a prominent Hakka statesman, and even
Chiang Kai-shek is lauded as a southerner who knew how to get money out of the
United States.
China's very
economic vitality has the potential to fuel ethnic and linguistic division,
rather than further integrating the country as most would suppose. As southern
and coastal areas get richer, much of central, northern, and northwestern China
is unlikely to keep up, increasing competition and contributing to age-old
resentments across ethnic, linguistic, and cultural lines (see Wang, et. al.,
1998). Southern ethnic economic ties link wealthy Cantonese, Shanghainese, and
Fujianese (also the majority people in Taiwan) more closely to their relatives
abroad than to their political overlords in Beijing. Already provincial
governments in Canton and elsewhere not only resist paying taxes to Beijing but
also restrict the transshipment of goods coming from outside across
provincial--often the same as cultural--lines. Travelers in China have seen an
extraordinary expansion of toll roads, indicating greater interest in local
control. Dislocations from rapid
economic growth may also fuel ethnic divisions. Huge migrations of "floating populations" estimated to
total over 150 million nationally now move across China seeking employment in
wealthier areas, often engendering stigmatized identities and stereotypical
fears of the "outsiders" (wai
di ren) within China. Crime,
housing shortages, and lowered wages are now attributed most to these people
from Anhui, Hunan, or Gansu who are taking jobs from locals, complaints similar
to those in West Germany about the influx of Easterners after reunification.
Reports that 70 percent of those convicted of crimes in Beijing were
"outsiders" have fueled criticisms of China's increasingly open
migration policy (Fei Guo 1999). The
result of all these changes is that China is becoming increasingly decentered. This is a fearsome prospect for those
holding the reins in Beijing, and perhaps was a factor in the decision to crack
down on the June 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. At that time central authorities had begun
to lose control of a country they feared could quickly unravel. That such fears have not eased is shown by
a the increased calls during the National Day celebrations for National Unity
and the efforts to reduce corruption.
Worker and peasant unrest reported throughout China cut across and may
at times exacerbate cultural and ethnolinguistic differences between the haves
and the have-nots, who in today's China are often and increasingly interacting
along lines marked by multiethnic diversity.
While ethnic
separatism will never be a serious threat to a strong China, a China weakened
by internal strife, inflation, uneven economic growth, or the struggle for
succession after Deng's death could become further divided along cultural and
linguistic lines. It was a southerner, born and educated abroad, who led the
revolution that ended China's last dynasty; and when that empire fell,
competing warlords--often supported by foreign powers--fought for local turf
occupied by culturally distinct peoples. And, the Taiping Rebellion that nearly
brought down the Qing dynasty also had its origins in the southern border
region of Guangxi among so-called marginal Yao and Hakka peoples. These events
are being remembered as the generally well- hidden and overlooked "Others"
within Chinese society begin to reassert their own identities in addition to
the official nationalities. At the same time, China's leaders are moving away
from the homogenizing policies that alienated minority and non-northern groups.
Recent moves to allow and even encourage the expression of cultural diversity,
while preserving political unity, indicate a growing awareness of the need to
accomodate cultural diversity. This will be important to watch over the next
two years as China prepares to incorporate Hong Kong, a city that operates on
cultural and social assumptions very different from those of Beijing.
The construction of Chinese national
identity has always been tentative. In
June 1989, while China's future hung in the balance, there was significant
concern over which armies would support Deng's crackdown: those based in
Sichuan, Hunan, Canton or Beijing, all with their own local concerns. The military has since been reshuffled and
somewhat downsized, attempting to uproot any local attachments and
professionalize the command structure.
However, this only underlines the growing importance of regional and
local ties. China, as of now, is a
unified country militarily, and perhaps, politically. As a result of Jiang's continuance of the Deng Xiaoping reforms,
it is increasingly less unified economically.
Yet how can China continue to withstand the forces of globalization and
nationalism without a government legitimated through popular elections,
transparency in the political process, adherence to the rule of law, and good
governance?
Last November,
an ambassador from one of China's friendliest Muslim nations remarked privately
to this writer that by the end of the next decade China would be divided into 9
republics. Historians debate whether a
foreign threat has been the only thing that has held China together. Now that the encirclement doctrine, upon
which Nixon and Kissinger built the Sino-American alliance, is no longer valid,
and containment has been replaced by improving US-China relationship based on
an "engagement" policy, China faces its only enemies from
within.
The Chinese
press reported more than 5000 organized social protests in 1998 alone, with
many more in 1999, culminating in the widespread Falun Gong uprising and crackdown. Most of these protests have been organized
by labor unions and peasant associations, but increasingly ethnic and religious
groups, such as the Falun Gong, have begun to speak out. Provincial governments in Canton and
elsewhere have continued to resist paying taxes to Beijing, as well as restrict
the transshipment of outside goods across provincial, and often cultural lines,
to the extent that China is becoming dangerously decentered -- a fearsome
prospect for those holding the threads in Beijing, and perhaps the main reason
for the recent rush to finalize international border agreements with Russia,
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and most recently, Vietnam.
Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan predicted that there will be 50 new countries in 50 years. The trend began with the Soviet Union in
1991 and has continued throughout much of Africa and Asia, particularly
Indonesia. Why should China be immune
from such global diversification? While
ethnic separatism alone will never be threatening enough to pull a strong China
apart, a China weakened by internal strife, inflation, uneven economic growth,
or the struggle for (un)democratic succession, could certainly fragment along
cultural and linguistic lines. Ethnic
strife did not dismantle the former Soviet Union; but it did come apart along
boundaries defined in large part by ethnic and national difference. The generally well-hidden and over-looked
"Others" within Chinese society, the Cantonese, Shanghainese,
Sichuanese, and Fujianese, are beginning to reassert their own identities in
addition to the "official" nationalities on China's borders. Increasing Taiwanese nationalism has caused
great consternation in Beijing, an "internal" ethnic nationalism that
few Chinese nationalists can understand.
The rising politics of difference are of
concern not only in Lhasa and Urumqi, but in Canton and Shanghai as well. The "Kosovo effect" may very well
turn into the "Chechnya effect" where ethnic groups, especially
Muslims, are stereotyped as separatists, and "cleansing" is launched
as an internal affair. The problem for
China, however, is that many of its internal threats may not come from official
nationalities who are more easily singled out by race or language. China's Chechnya, like Indonesia's Aceh
problem, may very well come from within its own peoples who seek economic and
political advantage. The next decade
promises to be as momentous for China as the last for Europe and Russia.
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[1]
See the recent critical report,
Amnesty International, Peoples Republic
of China: Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region (London, 21 April 1999)
[2] The best “Uighur nationalist” retelling
of this unbroken descent from Karakhorum is in the document “Brief History of
the Uyghers”, originating from the Eastern Turkestani Union in Europe, and
available electronically at <www.geocites.com/CapitolHill/1730/buh.html>.
For a recent review and critique, including historical evidence for the
multi-ethnic background of the contemporary Uighur, see Dru C. Gladney,
“Ethnogenesis and Ethnic Identity in China: Considering the Uygurs and Kazakhs”
in Victor Mair (ed.), The Bronze Age and
Early Iron Age People of Eastern Central Asia: Volume II (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of Man, 1998),
pp. 812-34. For a discussion of the recent archeological evidence derived from
DNA dating of the dessicated corpses of Xinjiang, see Victor Mair,
“Introduction” in Victor Mair (ed.), pp. 1-40
[3] Wall
Street Journal, Ian Johnson, “China Arrests Noted Businesswoman in
Crackdown in Muslim Region”, 18 August 1999
[4]
China State Council, "National Minorities Policy and its Practice in
China", Beijing, October 1999.
[5]
The China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), under the
State Council, has initiated a "Nationality Studies Project" in order
to examine security implications of China's minority problems (Chu Shulong
interview, November 14, 1999).