Economic Development and
Asian Security[1]
Economic Advisor
US Pacific Command
Introduction
At first glance, Asian economies appear
to be performing well. Asia's economic performance
looks poised for sustainable economic recovery. Exports are rising, consumer
demand is picking up, currency reserves are healthy, inflation is non-existent
and interest rates are low. Does this mean Asia has recovered from the Asian
economic crisis? Are the Asian economic development strategies solid and on
track? Are the economic reforms complete? Unfortunately, many of the key
economies in the region have unimpressive economic development strategies.
Others have adequate blueprints but can not implement economic reforms. Worst of all, the Asian economic superstructure rests on too much
financial quicksand.
In this paper we
will start by taking a conceptual and historic look at economic development.
Then we'll look at two strategically important countries in the region: China
and North Korea. China is currently enjoying strong economic growth but is
struggling with financial problems that could undermine its long-term economic
development. North Korea's economy is
failing and is resorting to nuclear brinkmanship in an attempt to coerce
economic concessions out of the international community. In the last section we
conclude with thoughts on the links between economics and security.
Competing Models of
Development
Many years ago David Ricardo
explained why it was in the comparative advantage of two countries to engage in free trade even if one country had an
absolute advantage in the producing the two products these countries are
considering trading.[2] In other
words, Ricardo's model explains why free trade is a positive sum game in which
both sides gain from trade and enjoy what former US Secretary of Treasury
Lawrence Summers used to call "shared prosperity." In contrast, Raul
Prebisch and his dependency theory argued that free trade hurt the economies of
developing countries. Prebisch advocated an inward-looking economic development
strategy in which developing countries would pursue a protectionist strategy,
in which they would frequently substitute local production for imports.
For a few years after World War II, the four Asian
tigers -- Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan -- ignored Ricardo and
tried import substitution economic development strategy. Their national
economic performance was dismal. In the 1970s the Asian tigers began to open up
their economy to freer trade and foreign investment.[3]
Their economic growth was so impressive that the World Bank called it an
economic miracle.[4] The World Bank attributed their impressive
economic performance to an economic strategy that basically embraced
globalization (or the free movement of goods and capital).
China is another example of a country that pursued
globalization, albeit in a less complete way. Like the Asian tigers, China
successfully followed an export-led growth strategy.[5] In just two decades China reduced poverty
and raised its living standards by opening its doors to the global economy.
Back in 1975 570 million Chinese were living on less than $1 a day. Just over
two decades later China showed spectacular results. By 1998 China had reduced
poverty to 220 million people.[6]
In contrast to China's open door policy, India
followed the Raul Prebisch ideas and pursued an inward-looking economic
development strategy that kept its doors closed to globalization. It thoroughly
discouraged international trade and the free flow of capital. Such protectionism was a dismal failure. In
1975 India had about 400 million poor people living on less than a dollar a
day. Two decades later India had about
the same number of poor people it had when it began import substitution
industrialization. In short, a globalizing China strengthened its economic
security and a protectionist India weakened its economic security.
2nd Generation
Reforms
Unfortunately, China and many other Asian countries
have been resting on their laurels. After doing the "easy" economic
reforms of opening up to the world, they have failed to implement its
microeconomic reforms fast enough to replace the old industrial and banking
institutions with free market institutions. As a result, they are struggling to
climb to the next plateau of economic security.
To help us understand the need for second generation
economic and financial reforms, it might be useful to understand the nature and
extent of the conceptual problem. Let's begin with a simple strategy, context,
and performance analytical framework. While generalizing is always dangerous,
it's clear that too many Asian countries start with the social context. They
seek social harmony. That means overly rigid labor markets and little stomach
for corporate bankruptcy. They follow financial socialism to achieve social
harmony and to allow SOE losers to save face. The core problem boils down to
banks recklessly allocating money, which in turn produces a mountain of bad
loans. Too many bank resources are channeled toward inefficient, loss-making
companies. The banks make soft loans
to their favorite corporate losers with little or no expectation SOE borrowers
will ever repay the loans. In the process, national savings and wealth are
destroyed. The mountains of NPLs have now caused a credit crunch (no money for
private sector) and a hot political issue all across Asia.
To solve this mess, there must be a fundamental overhaul
in the core philosophy that's used to allocate capital. In a nutshell, creative destruction and risk
taking must replace financial socialism and moral hazard. Asian countries must
stop bailing out insolvent banks that reject a commercial credit culture. That
merely rewards and perpetuates bad behavior, enriches failing bank managers and
shareholders and punishes the innocent and beleaguered taxpayer. Healthy,
market oriented private banks and corporations need to replace the 4 deadbeat
state run banks. NPLs should be sold at true market value (a few pennies on the
dollar) to viable domestic or foreign banks.
SOE borrowers that cannot turn a profit need easy exit and access to
prompt bankruptcy procedures to allow assets to be transferred to greener
pastures. That lets banks give money to those entrepreneurs with a fighting
chance of making money and creating new and commercially viable jobs.
Of course each Asian economy is
somewhat unique. Therefore it is important for us to have a clear appreciation
for the social and political context in which economic decisions are made in
each country. To capture this uniqueness, we'll look at two strategically
important economies: China and North Korea. We'll take a look at the economic
strategies that drove the economic performance. We'll analyze what went right
and what went wrong with these strategies. In the case of North Korea, we'll
suggest more promising new economic strategies to generate growth. In the case
of China, we'll suggest ways to avoid financial turmoil and sustain China’s
current prosperity.
China
China’s is struggling with strategic uncertainty. On
the one hand, China's economy is currently performing well. FDI is pouring into
China, exports are strong, GDP is rising and coastal manufacturing is booming.
Unfortunately, this visible economic success is arguably not sustainable.
That's because the economy rests on financial quicksand. The banking crisis is potentially worse than
Japan's. A fiscal crisis also is looming not far down the road. Unemployment and social unrest are rising in
rural and urban areas. Corruption is
pervasive throughout the society. A communist dictatorship shows no signs of
solving these problems.
On the positive side, China is the world's workshop.
Foreign investors have rapidly shifted a large chunk
of global manufacturing capacity to China. In many ways, China is capable of
producing almost anything. What's the
attraction? Why manufacture in PRC? For starters the quality and dedication of
the labor force is superb. In addition, the supply of this labor force also
appears virtually inexhaustible. 150 million migrant workers seek jobs in
booming cities along the coast. About half the 400 million people employed in
farming are surplus to requirements and are available for manufacturing in the
future.
This surplus labor supply drives down
wages. Chinese
manufacturing workers make $ 150 a month, a fraction of what their counterparts
make in Singapore, Malaysia, & Mexico.
Due to low wages, Chinese goods – toys, textiles, consumer electronics,
semiconductor chips, etc. – are now cheaper than anywhere else in the
world. But China's not just “a low-tech
sweatshop.” It's also high-tech. IBM, Intell and
other foreign R & D companies are migrating in large numbers to China.
That’s because Chinese intellectual talent is second to none. China is emerging as a research and
development hothouse in such fields as information technology and
automation. So is it time to celebrate
the economic strength and power of China as a rising economic superpower?
Unfortunately, Beijing still has a long way to go to
abandon the old communist economic system. The impressive economic
superstructure cited above rests on financial quicksand. Technically insolvent state owned banks
continue destroy wealth by transferring the savings of Chinese workers to sick
and inefficient state owned enterprises (SOEs) which frequently produce goods
nobody wants. While Beijing has closed some SOEs, it has not systematically
created the essential foundation (i.e. free market laws and institutions)
necessary to transfer millions of unemployed workers from the old state run
economy to a new entrepreneurial capitalistic economy.
Fixing the collapsing financial system is arguably
the greatest challenge for the Communist Party leadership. The banking crisis endangers PRC
achievements from 20 plus years of reform. Failure to clear a massive overhang
of bad loans and halt further risky lending invites a banking crisis that
threatens economic growth. Healthy banks are crucial to maintaining shift
toward a free-market economy and safeguarding the deposits of hundreds of
millions of hard-working savers.
For the leadership, this is far from an arcane,
abstract economic debate. Survival of the Communist Party political leadership
is at stake. A financial meltdown would be a catalyst for political and social
upheaval. For foreigners, a banking
crisis at the very least would endanger an accumulated $450 billion in foreign
investments in China. What's needed is a "big bang," drastic overhaul
of the financial system.
China's alarming non-performing loan (NPL) problem
in its state run banks is arguably even worse than Japan's NPL problem. In Japan bad loans are estimated at 8% to
10% of GDP. In China bad loans in China are estimated at 37% to 50% of China's
GDP.[7]
Half the loans for PRC state run banks go to insolvent SOEs. Worse still, such
Chinese financial instability appears to be worsening. China is adding to the
NPL stocks at a significant and alarming rate.[8]
To get another sense for the magnitude of the
Chinese bad loan disaster, let's compare PRC's bad loan mess with the S $ L
debacle in the US. S & P says NPL disaster will cost China some $ 518
billion or 43% of China's 2002 GDP to clean up. In stark contrast, the US S
& L bailout a decade ago only cost $ 160 billion or just 3% of US GDP. Only
the worst cases such as Indonesia after the Asian economic crisis even approach
the scale of China's current problems. Beijing feels is has little choice but
to inject more capital to bail out the banks at a time when govt. debt is
ballooning to sustain high short term growth.
If we add huge welfare and pension payments,
Beijing's financial liabilities are over China's $1.1 trillion annual GDP. The
ratio of real public debt to GDP has already climbed to about 139%.[9]
That’s over twice what the Maastricht alarm bell (debt to GDP ratio of 60%)
says is financially unstable.
In addition to the mountain
of bad loans in the banking system, China faces a daunting list of other
spending demands. These include:
·
Standing up a costly welfare/unemployment system to accommodate
rural unemployment that has soared to over 100 million and urban unemployment
that has risen to 16 million to 18 million.
·
Creation
of an expensive pension system for an aging population (90 million people over
65 by 2003).
·
Sharply increasing infrastructure spending that is required for
developing the impoverished western part of the country.
Most bad loans are to state-owned enterprises (or SOEs) that can't or won't repay their borrowings. Credit continues to flow to insolvent SOEs and the mountain of bad loans keeps growing despite official claims that NPL levels are declining. In essence, Beijing cannot fix the banks until it either helps out major borrowers or cuts them off. So private business, the economy's future, is being starved of bank credit.
One clear signal that the leadership senses danger
is that Beijing is signaling that the big 4 state-run banks are going to a huge
capital injection. Will it work? Beijing has tried to clean up the banking
system twice before. Both bailouts failed. Why? AMCs are mostly just
redistributing the problem, not solving it. AMCs resolved less than 15% of
their portfolios, often through dubious debt-for-equity swaps that do little to
change management behavior.
Unfortunately, Beijing is reluctant to take a
"big bang" approach to banking reform. Drastic action to halt lending
to delinquent borrowers and foreclose on SOEs would lead to a surge in
unemployment, a risk the party can't afford.
Since 1998, Beijing has been willing to lay off as many as 30 million
state workers. To avert financial
crisis, it would have to lay off millions more. It feels it cannot risk the
social chaos and political instability that might spring from halting soft
loans that keep insolvent state enterprises from collapse. Despite private
sector rhetoric at 16th Party Congress, Beijing still believes in
its unshakable responsibility to have the state run banks support SOE losers.
So it's unrealistic to expect that a genuine credit culture -- in which the
criteria for lending are commercial rather than social -- will emerge in China.
Thus NPLs are likely to pile up.
The problem is this financial socialism is not sustainable
and can not deliver enough commercially viable jobs in the private sector. As
long as China grows at a 7% clip, it can create 8 million new jobs. Sound good?
Not in China. China must create 20
million new jobs in the urban sector alone each year for the next 4 to 5 years.
In a market society, consumer sovereignty provides
the demand for manufactured goods, which in turn define the number of
manufactured jobs that are needed to produce the goods. But in China, things
work differently. The communist party
plans how many jobs are needed, regardless of market demand. As a result, the
government pays for the millions of redundant SOE jobs with tax revenues and
bank credit. The government feels that high fiscal deficits and high
non-performing loans are a "necessary evil" or the price for societal
stability.
But the day of reckoning is fast approaching for
this financial socialism. And the dominos are starting to fall. Surplus jobs
are causing an over-supply of almost everything. That causes price wars, which
in turn creates deflation. The deflation reduces corporate profitability and
increases the # of bad loans in the banking system. As bad loans rise, the
chances of financial meltdown also rise unless decisive action is taken to
avert the turmoil.
DPRK's Nuclear
Brinkmanship
At first glance, the North Korean nuclear stand off
with the US amounts to a dangerous non-proliferation issue. But the nuclear
crisis is not simply about the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The
crisis is also a North Korean struggle for economic survival.[10]
As North Korea ratchets up its game of nuclear brinkmanship, it is seeking
concessions -- such as a non-aggression pact and normalized relations -- from
the US that it considers vital to its fledgling program of economic reforms and
its effort to keep its economic development strategy afloat.
Fact is North Korea is a failed state. And the DPRK
may well be reaching the end of its economic muddling through period. Its
economy is on the verge of collapse. Up till now,
DPRK has tried to muddle through with donor aid. It's now clear to Kim Jong il
that this approach no longer works. Much of the population remains
malnourished. Infant mortality has soared. Life expectancy has shrunk. Because of aging machinery and energy
shortfalls, factories are barely operating.
In an effort to improve a weak economy,
Kim Jong il took a number of bold steps towards a market economy back in July
2002. The economic reforms increased prices for rice, diesel, and other staple
goods and ended rationing for some products, devalued the foreign exchange
rate, legalized private farmer's markets and made state owned enterprises
responsible for their own profits and losses.
On the positive side, the reforms are a
de facto NK admission that the old system is a loser. DPRK is trying to change.
Unfortunately, NK is clueless about free market economics. The economic reforms actually made economic
problems worse by unleashing runaway inflation. Worst of all, DPRK premature
and hasty economic reforms actually increases NK economic vulnerabilities and
makes a systematic collapse (economic chaos) more likely.
In this regard, Kim Jong il is totally
in the dark about the pace and sequence of economic reforms as the economy moves
from a planned economy to market economy. DPRK has started to liberalize
prices and privatize some farms. But it has failed to create essential free
market laws and institutions to orchestrate such things as macroeconomic
stabilization (tightening up the fiscal and monetary policies). As a result,
too much money chasing too few goods and services is creating runaway
inflation, making it even more difficult for the NK people to afford enough
food to survive. In other words, DPRK has done too much, too fast in the areas
of liberalization and privatization without a) a solid framework of free market
laws and institutions and b) macroeconomic stability.
To be sure, the
donor community has provided lots of energy and food aid in the past to DPRK.
But Pyongyang has always seen this donor aid as emergency assistance to avert
an economic crisis that would threaten South Korea's economy. Donors would give the North Koreans just
enough aid to avoid an economic collapse but never the kind of developmental
aid to strengthen the economic foundation of the DPRK economy.
It's time for the
international community to seriously consider going beyond emergency assistance
to avoid DPRK collapse. It's time to
open the door for the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) -- IMF, World Bank and ADB -- to work with the North Koreans to
formulate the long-term economic development of the DPRK economy. The IFIs
would be helping DPRK with economic transition to the free market and help
rebuild the North/South infrastructure.
In this regard, North Korea may even consider moving troops to building
special economic zones. The vision is to turn swords into plowshares.
The first step would be for Washington to
take North Korea off the terrorism list. That would open the door for IFI
intervention. The USG and the IFIs could transform the nuclear crisis into an
opportunity to --
·
Shape the
pace and sequencing of economic reform in North Korea and thus strengthen their
sustainability,
·
Work with
South Korea to strengthen Korean economic integration and
·
Make sure
the process is done the way the Chinese did it (economic reform without
threatening the NK regime’s survival).
In this sense, Korean unity is more like European
integration (surrendering economic and financial sovereignty without
threatening political sovereignty) than it is German unification, which created
political unity as well as economic and monetary unity.
Of course, economic development is not a
silver bullet. A US non-aggression pact and normalization of relations with NK
would also have to accompany the economic development initiative. But interestingly enough, the non-aggression
pact would also have an economic objective to it. The US security guarantee
would allow NK to reduce defense spending, which has placed an enormous burden
on its economy. Plans would include cutting its 1.1 million strong military by
300,000 soldiers. ROK says the former soldiers would be employed to man
factories in the proposed special economic zones supported by foreign investment.
In any event, steady movement toward
more economic freedom in North Korea is a noble goal even if the military
issues cannot be resolved. But as we use economic relations to build a
reservoir of goodwill with DPRK, (as France and Germany did in the ECSC, EC,
etc., after WW2), the USG finally has a fighting chance of solving mutual
problems across the board.
Economic/diplomatic relations with North Korea will not guarantee
success. But it's unrealistic to think that the USG can solve the difficult
nuclear stand-off and other contentious military issues with DPRK in a
diplomatic and economic vacuum.
If no action is taken, the teetering
North Korean economy could well collapse.
The costs of such a "policy of drift" would be staggering. The
question of an economic transition from a planned economy to a free market
economy would become a here and now issue for any new North Korean leadership
and/or the South Korean government. To minimize the costs of North Korea's
economic transition, thought must be given to the pace and sequencing of
economic reforms. The phasing of the economic reforms can be divided into four
broad sequential categories:
a)
Macroeconomic stabilization,
b)
Redefining the role of the state,
c)
Liberalizing prices and
d)
Restructuring ownership and privatization.
Macroeconomic stabilization is a
prerequisite for most of the other reforms. Successful stabilization comes from
balancing total domestic demand with total domestic production so as to keep
prices relatively constant and predictable. In the North Korean context, this
means curbing both hidden inflation (which manifests itself in long lines and
shortages), as well as the overt inflation that has recently been unleashed in
the country. An effective stabilization
plan consists of tightening fiscal and monetary policy. The growth of the money
supply needs to be curbed and budget deficits need to be less than 3% of GDP.
The role of the state needs to be
redefined. North Korea must create, virtually from scratch, a network of modern
laws and institutions, without which a market economy cannot function. In this regard, North Koreans need to learn
good commercial and businesslike practices. Old politically motivated
investments in NK that lack a basic economic and commercial logic must be scrapped.
An unemployment and pension system must also be
created to absorb surplus labor and curb potential social unrest.
A free market oriented economy also
requires a strong financial and legal foundation. Frankly, the legal and
financial infrastructure for economic cooperation is just as important as the
money. Over time, technical assistance
to help develop more modern capabilities in these areas and many others will be
an important part of the strategy to realize the future vision articulated at
the Summit. To a large extent, the success or failure of North Korea’s economic
transformation will also turn on how the International Financial Institutions
(IFIs)—IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank—interact with the key
countries that play pivotal roles on the Korean peninsula.
Once essential legal and institutional changes are
in place, North Korea must go beyond their limited price reform and dismantle
the complex system of centrally controlled prices and allowing them to reflect
relative scarcity. Prices also have to
be "imported" from the world economy though trade liberalization.
Finally, external sector liberalization is not complete until the new NK
leadership takes decisive steps toward currency convertibility. The exchange rate is heavily overvalued,
which undermines the competitiveness of North Korean exports. The official
exchange rate is about 2 Won to the dollar, while the unofficial rate is 200.
Without proper pricing, it will be impossible to proceed very far with real
economic rehabilitation or cooperation with potential trading partners.
Freeing prices in North Korea produces
signals that tell the economy how its resources can best be used. But unless
those resources (e.g. productive assets) are privately owned, those signals
will be ignored. Therefore, privatization of state owned enterprises and
liberalization are inseparable. In
addition, private entrepreneurs have incentives to preserve and hopefully
enhance the value of their assets. In contrast, the managers of NK state
enterprises faced no financial discipline because a soft state budget could
always bail out inefficient state enterprises.
A new North Korean leadership that would
arise after the collapse would likely welcome these economic reforms. But the
NK leadership will also be under enormous popular pressure in both Koreas for
at least social and economic integration. Even if political unity could be
postponed, the costs of economic integration would arguably be much higher for
South Korea than they were for West Germany.
The South would have to absorb a population of poverty-shattered,
malnourished Northerners at a cost of tens of billions of dollars annually for
a decade or more -- rolling back the South's standard of living by more than
10%.
That said, the new NK leadership could minimize
these costs if they avoid the same pitfalls the Germans fell into at the time
of German unity. For instance, Bonn pandered to East German consumers,
overvalued the Ostmark (East German currency) at the time of monetary
conversion, created virtual wage parity between East and West Germans, and
destroyed the competitive position of all East German producers. These
mistakes, in turn, triggered huge subsidies for collapsing East German
industries. The West Germans over-borrowed to pay for unity mistakes, opted for
an irresponsibly loose fiscal policy (high budget deficits), which was
inflationary. The Bundesbank offset inflationary pressures with high interest
rates (monetary death grip), which in turn triggered a deeper recession in
Europe, European financial chaos and political disunity in Europe.
In short, the hasty, hysterical German unification
process was initially what Bundesbank President called a "a
disaster." To avoid a similar macroeconomic disaster, Seoul and Pyongyang
must do two things: opt for a realistic monetary conversion rate and keep NK
wages realistically low.
Given the fact that a North Korean
economic collapse would catapult the transformation of the North Korean and
Korean economic integration from a distant thought to a here and now issue,
every effort should be made to avoid a haphazard process. If key actors choose
to procrastinate planning for economic transition and economic integration, the
USG could find itself both flat-footed and reacting hysterically. That would be a recipe for economic disaster
for Korea and the rest of Asia -- as it was in Europe at the time of German
unity. If that occurs the world would look to the USG for the distasteful job
of crisis management. A better strategy
would have been careful and early planning for economic integration and policy
coordination as a means of crisis prevention.
Economics and
Security
Economic and financial weakness is a serious
political/military source of concern for four at least reasons.
1st,
this economic and financial weakness makes these economies more vulnerable to
financial turmoil.
2nd,
the economic insecurity can rapidly lead to social and political instability.
3rd,
the economic weakness makes these economies more vulnerable to geopolitical
shocks.
4th,
economic weakness might convince the leadership of a failed state that it has
no stake in globalization and the status quo and has nothing to lose by
attacking its neighbor (as was the case when Iraq attacked Kuwait in order to
garb Kuwaiti oil fields).
Therefore it's important to keep in
mind the connections between economics and defense. Economic developments often drive military decisions. At the same
time, economic prosperity can not take place in a war zone. If the events of 11
September have taught us anything, they have brought home the fact that
economics and security are inexorably linked. For instance, money provides the
oxygen for terrorist operations. We must block the funds to curb terrorist attacks.
In addition, we must address the environment that makes terrorism possible. Too
often, poverty is a breeding ground for terrorism.
The primary mission of the U.S.
military is always to fight and win America's wars. But we can never fall back into
a reactive mode, waiting passively for the next conflict to break out. We have
a vested interest in preventive defense. Reducing poverty and investing in
social and economic development strengthens comprehensive security. Through
PACOM theater security cooperation programs, we form partnerships with other
Asian countries and other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance,
disaster relief and other building blocks for economic reconstruction and
development. This economic instrument of power helps to reduce the social and
economic injustice that in turn fans incendiary conditions for military
conflict. In this sense, building prosperity and creatively avoiding military
conflict via preventive defense is far better than the most decisive military victory.
Terrorism in SE
Asia
For the past year the risk of radical Islamic
terrorism against western embassies and corporations in SE Asia has been
rising. The car bombing of a Bali
nightclub on 12 October 2002 punctuated the nature and extent of the terrorist
threat in SE Asia. The Bali blast also exposed a new front emerging in the
fight against Islamic extremism in the region. The Bali blast raises anxiety levels. In economic
terms, this amounts to a terror tax on the Asian economy.
In this regard, the increased fear of
terrorism adds to business costs. So
the costs for insurance and corporate security go up. The threat to energy
firms means increased security around production facilities and pipelines. Consumer confidence falls. So consumers take fewer trips to the mall.
Business confidence falls. Foreign buyers of Indonesian textiles, shoes and
furniture like to visit these factories without fear of terror attacks.
Unemployment rises. If foreign buyers lose confidence in Indonesia as a safe and
reliable supplier importers would buy fewer goods. Indonesians would lose jobs
and social unrest could ensue. Terror
hurts the investment image of SE Asia as a whole. So foreign investors get
jittery and look for greener pastures elsewhere. Tourists stay away, thus
worsening the slump of an embattled travel industry still reeling from
9/11.
While the USG case for war against Iraq is
persuasive at the White House, Malaysia's Mahathir and many other moderate
Asian leaders - who provide strong support to US led GWOT -- view a US led war
against Iraq as tantamount to a US war against Islam. This pervasive
misperception that a war against Iraq is tantamount to a US war against Islam
undermines the GWOT in 2 ways:
·
The
terror threat rises in SE Asia as increasing #s of moderate Moslems turn more
radical and support extremists.
·
At
the same time, pro-US Moslem governments in SE Asia weaken and may well lose
the political will to collaborate with the US in the GWOT.
The US could increasingly find itself isolated in GWOT, with US CT forces spread too thin to be effective. We need stronger and more credible IO to disconnect the perceived linkage between a US war against Iraq and the "US war against Islam" misperception.
The Primacy of Oil
Fear of terror and fears of a war with Iraq has
contributed to the spike up in the price of oil to almost $40 a barrel (in
March 2003). Any prolonged US led war against Iraq would trigger an even higher
spike up in global oil prices. Asia is
woefully exposed to any spike-up in oil prices. In fact, no other region of the world is as vulnerable to soaring oil
prices as Asia.[11] Why? Asia relies more heavily on
energy-consuming manufacturing for its growth than the West. A war driven
increase in the crude oil price, say a 40% and would depress world growth. A US led war against Iraq and the likely
spike-up in oil prices would therefore have a negative impact on the economic
interests of most the countries in the Asian region. The energy price hike could pose a high opportunity cost, by
forcing oil-consuming Asian states to boost energy spending at the expense of
investment. The net effect of an oil spike up could well pose a long term-drag
on Asian productivity.
In addition, the oil spike up eats away
at consumer spending power. Depressed
consumer spending could dampen corporate earnings. The worry is that falling
corporate earnings could eventually take almost 2% off overall profit
growth. While a persuasive case can be made for the US led
war against Iraq for national security reasons, US allies and friends see an
economic down side. A US led war against Iraq would threaten growth prospects
around the world, but especially in Asia. The following factors would hammer Asian
economies: a higher oil price, greater investor risk aversion and a downturn in
US demand for Asian exports. In particular, war against Iraq would undermine
business and consumer sentiment in the US. That would be transmitted up the
export supply chain. To make matters worse, the rising terror in SE Asia and a
possible war against Iraq takes place at a time when a faltering US economy is
likely to drag down Asian economies.
Successful economic development strategies are
necessary to attain a peaceful security environment in Asia. The failure of North Korea’s economic
development strategy and its nuclear brinkmanship are grim reminders of how
quickly arcane economic matters can threaten regional security. In contrast, China’s successful transition
from Maoism to a large stake in the global capitalist economy strengthens peace
in the region. But China’s serious financial problems are a painful reminder
that prosperity can never be taken for granted. Finally, fear of terrorism since 9/11 and fears of war against
Iraq show us how an unstable security environment undermines prosperity.
[1] The views in this paper represent the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of either the US Pacific Command and/or the U.S. Government.
[2] David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, London, John Murray, 1821.
[3] See Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1991.
[4] The World Bank, The East Asian Economic Miracle, New York, Oxford University Press,1993.
[5] See William H. Overholt, The Rise of China: How Economic Reform is Creating a New Superpower, New York, W.W. Norton, 1993.
[6] Leif Rosenberger and Mark Harstad, Asia Pacific Economic Update, Honolulu, HI, US Pacific Command, 2000, p. 73.
[7] Source: The 37% figure comes from CLSA, a respected Hong Kong brokerage.
[8] Source: CLSA.
[9] Source: CLSA
[10] Financial Times (FT), London, 13 January 2003, p.4.
[11] The two exceptions are Indonesia and Malaysia, which are both new oil exporters.