Concepts for Army Transformation: A Briefing for the Transformation Task Force

 by Col. Douglas A. Macgregor, 2001.  PDF

Col. Macgregor offers a vision of a modular Army comprising various types of basic combined-arms units that would be much smaller than today’s divisions, but larger and more capable than today’s brigades. This is an Army that is not only rapidly-adaptable and rapidly-deployable but also “joint” and “combined” from the bottom up. 

Can the United States Spend Less on Defense? — Toward a Smaller, More Efficient, and More Relevant US Military

(HTML version) PDA Briefing Memo #17, October 2000. Examines issues of threat assessment, strategy, and force management, identifying options for moving toward a smaller, less expensive US military. It concludes that in several ways current US strategy is unnecessarily ambitious and that the armed forces are poorly adapted to present day needs. It suggests adjustment in several areas, including regional war preparations, military presence abroad, and the diplomatic activity of the US military. The memo also proposes a variety of structural reforms to increase the efficiency of the armed forces.

The Armed Forces: “used too much and supported too little”?

(HTML version) by Charles Knight, PDA Commentary, September 2000. George W. Bush campaigned for the presidency saying the “military suffers from back-to-back deployments, poor pay, shortages of spare parts and equipment, and rapidly declining readiness.” In evaluating this claim it is worth examining each of the four specifics that Governor Bush offered as evidence. This commentary provides a guide to the pertinent evidence as collected, organized, and analyzed by the Project on Defense Alternatives in its 1999 study of readiness issues in the Air Force.

U.S. Military-Strategic Ambitions — Expanding to Fill the post-Soviet Vacuum

(HTML version) by Charles Knight, PDA Commentary, adapted from a panel presentation at the Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y.C, 14 June 2000. When seeking to explain why defense budgets are growing again, it is often said that U.S. policy-makers have not yet moved beyond the Cold War frame and are preparing for the proverbial “last war.” Such a vantage glosses over an important change that has taken place in the last decade. The new national defense policy is not simply a lesser version of the old policy. Rather, its security goals are very much more ambitious than during the Cold War and these ambitions drive budgets higher.

Europe’s Armed Forces at the Millennium: A Case Study of Change in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany

(HTML version) by Dr. Lutz Unterseher, chair, International Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS), PDA Briefing Report #11, December 1999. Many European nations are re-thinking their post-Cold War military requirements in light of NATO’s new strategic concept and the experience of the Kosovo war. This article analyzes the process of defense restructuring and modernization in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. In each case, it offers an overview of current military posture and closely examines the plans for change in force structure, equipment procurement, and personnel policies, attending to various constraints on defense planning, including military traditions, economic conditions, and domestic politics.

Slovenian Security in the European Perspective

(HTML version) by Anton Grizold and Ljubica Jelusic, September 1999. Examines the development of this new nation’s security establishment and policy in the light of Slovenian history, cultural attitudes toward the state, the military, and alliances. Places the development of security policy in the social/political and economic context of Slovenia’s efforts to join NATO and the EU and includes analysis of Slovenian public opinion on these issues.

Interventionism Reconsidered: Reconciling Military Action With Political Stability

(HTML version) by Lutz Unterseher, September 1999. When troops trained, structured, and equipped for traditional peacekeeping are employed in missions such as the protection of humanitarian sanctuaries and convoys under acute threat they are not prepared for forceful measures sufficient to deal with and discourage military challenges. This paper discusses what would constitute “adequacy” of force that does not have a character or magnitude that compromises the primacy of political conflict resolution. A revised version of a paper was contributed to a 1999 workshop held at the University of Melbourne’s Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues on the topic, The Ethics of Armed Intervention.

The Coming Transformation of the Muslim World

(HTML version) by Dale F. Eickelman, July 1999. by permission of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), Philadelphia, PA, USA. This essay provides insight into forces of change in Muslim societies that contain seeds of reconciliation with Western culture and political practice. It is worth taking note of the opportunities therein for relations of respect and peace, and for avoidance of the great ‘clash of civilizations’ famously predicted by Samuel Huntington.

Alleged ‘Carrier Gap’ is Out to Sea

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, PDA Briefing Memo #15, 30 April 1999. The April 1999 re-routing of aircraft carriers to support operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans inspired alarm about the effect of the move on America’s military presence in the Pacific. However, the assertions of a serious gap in carrier coverage are groundless. Alarmism about redeployment misjudges the effect of the move on the military balance in Northeast Asia and betrays a disregard for the one feature of aircraft carriers — their flexibility — that is supposed to give them unique strategic value worthy of their prodigious cost.

The Readiness Crisis of the U.S. Air Force: A Review and Diagnosis

(HTML version) (summary) by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, PDA Briefing Report #10, 22 April 1999. By some accounts, the Air Force is suffering from a systemic readiness crisis brought on by a combination of post-Cold War defense retrenchment and increased operational activity. PDA’s examination of the Air Force’s recent readiness problems and of longer-term trends in readiness and optempo finds little to support this view. Neither talk of crisis, nor crisis spending are warranted.

Military Strategy Under Review

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, Foreign Policy In Focus, Volume 4, Number 3, 01 January 1999.  HTML | PDF

“’Environment shaping’, the other ascendant element in the new strategy, prescribes a more active peacetime use of military power to influence the course of strategic affairs. It encompasses not only traditional deterrence, but also the goals of discouraging other nations from even trying to compete militarily with the U.S. and of ‘preventing the emergence of a hostile regional coalition or hegemon’ Key to achieving this novel “preemptory” deterrence is the maintenance of a robust U.S. regional presence, a daunting degree of U.S. military superiority, and a technological edge that no prospective competitor could hope to diminish.”

Nato Expansion: Costs and Implications

(HTML version) A presentation by Carl Conetta to the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, Cambridge, MA, USA, 23 July 1998. The expansion of NATO is as fateful an initiative as any undertaken in the past 200 years, calling to mind the decisions made at the 1814 Congress of Vienna and at Versailles in 1919. It is peculiar and disconcerting, then, that the questions this initiative inspires remain so elementary: Why expansion? And, To what effect? At what cost, financial and strategic?

Defense Sufficiency and Cooperation: A US Military Posture for the post-Cold War Era

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives briefing report, 01 March 1998.  ⇒ HTML  ⇒ PDF
This study presents a comprehensive and coherent US military posture option for a fifteen-year period beginning in 1998. While maintaining continuity of key aspects of US security strategy, it finds ample opportunity for further reductions in forces size and consequently in budget. Includes specification of force structure, equipment holdings, deployment, modernization plans, and defense budgets.

Dueling with Uncertainty: the New Logic of American Military Planning

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, February 1998. ➪ HTML PDF

 

wild cards

Examines how the new planning concepts and methods adopted by the Pentagon since 1992 have led to military requirements disproportionate to real threats and have supported overweening ambitions for the application of military power. A version appeared in the March/April 1998 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists as “Inventing Threats.”

Wanting Leadership: Public Opinion on Defense Spending

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, January 1998. Since 1982 significantly more Americans have supported cuts in defense spending than have supported increases. After 1994, when President Clinton called for “no further cuts in spending,” the portion of Americans supporting increases has risen somewhat. Surveys uphold the key role of leadership in the formation of public sentiments about defense-related issues finding that a solid majority of the public would support relatively deep cuts in the Pentagon budget if the President and Congress proposed them.

Asia Pacific Tilts to West: Limit Offensive Weaponry, Boost Arms Control

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, commentary originally published in Defense News, 31 March – 06 April 1997.
➪ HTML

Examines the pattern of military spending in the Asia Pacific region since the Cold War and makes recommendations for U.S. policy. Based on data and analysis from Post-Cold War US Military Expenditure in the Context of World Spending Trends.

Framework for Constructing a “New Era” Alternative to the Bottom-Up Review

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, February 1997.
➪ HTML

 
Based on the strategic objective of a core area coalition defense (i.e. Persian Gulf, Korea, and Europe) this memo takes the reader step by step through the logic of force sizing and structuring and modernization requirements to arrive at a robust and consistent alternative to the Bottom-Up Review force posture.

Post-Cold War US Military Expenditure in the Context of World Spending Trends

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, PDA Briefing Memo #10, January 1997.
➪ HTML
➪ summary

Based on a review of official world military spending data, this study finds evidence that the strategic position of the US and its allies has improved immensely relative to the potential threat states. It also looks at regional trends and offers a perspective on the new and ambitious regional military strategy of the U.S.

The Development of America’s post-Cold War Military Posture: A Critical Appraisal

By Carl Conetta, 07 November 1996.
➪ HTML
➪ PDF

This article outlines the factors influencing and distorting military planning (with special attention to the 1992-1996 period.)

In the early years of the post-Cold War era, the US defense establishment set out to formulate a new military posture. This was supposed to reflect the new strategic environment and pursue the opportunities afforded by advances in information technology. The result, however, was a “new” posture closely resembling the old, writ somewhat smaller. It was to be progressively bolstered by cutting-edge technology inputs. However, while remarkably expensive, these inputs would only partially fulfill their promise, while exhibiting varying degrees of reliability and sustainability. Soon the USA would be spending as much and more inflation-adjusted dollars on its armed forces as during the Cold War. Also driving requirements and budgets upward would be the adoption of new strategic goals, roles, and missions exceeding those of the Cold War period.

Over subsequent decades, the tension between purported military requirements and resources constraints would grow acute, while the armed forces found themselves over-extended worldwide and mired in seemingly endless wars, despite their presumed (and costly) advantages. How did US defense policy come to this point? The Development of America’s post-Cold War Military Posture shows how dysfunctional planning assumptions and processes can easily lead to dysfunctional policy.