Carl Conetta, 31 May 2023. Full text ⇒ HTML – PDF
Western leaders and Kyiv pledge to “stay the course” despite Russian nuclear threats. But does western brinkmanship in the Ukraine war depend on denying there is a brink? This short article examines “nuclear threat denialism” and its function in war policy. It explores Moscow’s most likely but occluded nuclear option and the unique danger it represents. And the post examines the relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the current conflict.
Carl Conetta, 02 May 2023. see article ⇒ HTML or PDF
The war has been a disaster for Ukraine, but also a calamity for the world. This brief article provides a concise overview of the war’s profound global effects, beginning with the combatants’ cost in lives and treasure. Beyond this it assesses the war’s impact on global trade and economy; energy and food price inflation and their effects on poverty, hunger, and mortality; the redirection of humanitarian and official development assistance; the total sum of aid to the Ukrainian war effort, and the estimated cost of postwar reconstruction and recovery. Also examined is the war’s effect on global defense spending. The article also provides copious citations to support further inquiry.
The probability of Russian nuclear use related to the Ukraine war is rising – but why? Neither Washington nor Brussels fully apprehend the risk.
by Carl Conetta, 02 Feb 2023 – Full report: HTML or PDF Summary: HTML or PDF
This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
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by Charles Knight, 17 October 2022
The Ukraine War presents a more dangerous nuclear risk than the Cuban Missile Crisis and demands more careful rationality and restraint by Russia and the US. Can we 
depend on that rationality and restraint? Probably not.
However, there are some things that the US and NATO can do to reduce the probability that Moscow will opt to use nuclear weaponry. This article lists those steps.
The article also explains why any remaining “stable mutual deterrence” between the US and Russia is presently extremely fragile. It concludes:
The US/NATO war effort in Ukraine must remain deliberately limited. Beyond that, we must resist the usual war fevers (beset with visions of victory over evil) that take nations toward total war.
The short answer is “no” – but there is more to the issue than that. A closer look at the road to war illuminates paths to a negotiated end
by Carl Conetta, 10 June 2022
With no end in sight, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is an unfolding catastrophe for Ukraine, the region, and the world. Besides increasing battlefield death and destruction, the war and how it is being fought promise global economic recession, severe food crisis, a surging flow of refugees, pandemic revival, and a transnational flood of illicit military weapons and munitions.
This essay looks at the policies that shaped the contention leading to war, and that increased the likelihood of conflict. It looks at the effects of NATO expansion and military activism, the “color revolutions” in Ukraine, the disposition of Crimea, the rebellions in Ukraine’s east, the Minsk process, Putin’s revisionism, Russia’s security concerns, and how the USA and Europe responded to the intensifying friction between Moscow and Kyiv. Through closely examining the policies conditioning the conflict, this analysis aims to identify potential “exit ramps” for all involved.
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by Carl Conetta, updated 02 April 2022
How do the two sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict compare in terms of personnel and equipment losses? These seemingly objective measures are subject to an intensive propaganda war. This brief analysis examines multiple sources of data to find that the combatants are actually not far apart in the percentage of equipment attrition they have suffered. And Russian personnel fatalities are likely in the range of 3,500 (April 2). Contrary to the messaging of the two sides, both would seem able to sustain combat for a considerable time longer. Unfortunately, as Russian forces have transitioned to a heavier, more firepower-dominant mode of warfare, Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure are suffering more death and destruction. While this might argue for increased emphasis on war containment and diplomatic efforts, the most evocative messaging on the western side emphasizes Russian miscalculation and fumbling, Ukraine’s adept resistance, and the promise of war termination via increased investment in the war.
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by Carl Conetta, 21 Feb 2022
The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. The short essay examines them both, asking how did we get here? It concludes with the question: Is it harder to live with autonomy for the Ukrainian rebel areas than it is to face regional war?
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Carl Conetta, 14 Feb 2022
Moscow will act when and if it declares that the West has escalated contention rather than responding positively to its entreaties – principally those regarding NATO expansion and implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Recent US/NATO troop deployments and weapon transfers to Ukraine may already count as relevant escalation. Russian forces surrounding Ukraine stand at an exceptionally high level of readiness and significantly exceed the scale of previous deployments. A full-scale invasion aiming to seize the whole of Ukraine seems unlikely. Indeed, Russian action may involve no more than large-scale conveyance of weapons and munitions to the rebel areas, possibly along with an influx of “volunteers.” Several other options ranging between these two are discussed in the essay.
by Carl Conetta, 26 Jan 2022
The basic elements of a solution to the Ukraine crisis are ready at hand – and have been since Feb 2015. These are the provisions of the Minsk II Protocol. This Reset Defense blog post reviews the impediments to Minsk II implementation and suggests a way forward. The key to progress is cooperation among the outside powers supporting the Ukraine contestants (i.e., Kyivv government and rebels). These benefactors must make their material support contingent on the near-term implementation of Minsk II. Another key element missing from the current agreement is the provision for a substantial peacekeeping and monitoring force to oversee the demilitarization of the area, temporarily control its external and internal borders, and secure an election.
by Charles Knight, initially published by the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, 22 December 2021.
This article reports on South Korean President Moon’s latest peace initiative, which has achieved an agreement “in principle” by the U.S., North Korea, China, and South Korea to negotiate an “end-of-war declaration.” Recently, the U.S. appeared to have modified its nuclear disarmament approach, accepting that “step by step” is the realistic way to proceed. A few article excerpts:
A step-by-step approach requires give and take, [implying] that the U.S. might ultimately have to settle for some tempering of the North’s nuclear arsenal rather than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID.)
…a strategy of waiting patiently for sanctions to force Pyongyang’s capitulation…overlooks how existentially critical nuclear weaponry has become in North Korea’s strategic calculus. Without an adequate national security alternative, Pyongyang will most likely choose to suffer indefinitely under the economic pain of sanctions, however severe.
Alliances cannot and do not last forever. To endure from one era to another, they must adapt and change. If Washington returns to old habits of leveraging its hegemonic will to control affairs on the Korean Peninsula, it may reap the unintended consequence of hastening the end of the alliance.
Can the United States escape the vortex of its 20-year war?
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by Carl Conetta, 09 Sept 2021.
This article assesses the calamitous end of America’s 20-year war and the effort of US interventionists to use public distress about the airport chaos to blunt and distract from an adequate appraisal of the war that produced it.
The war was defined from the start by an impossible mission shrouded in misinformation. Intelligence agencies failed to give useful intelligence over a span of not just 4 months, but 20 years. And the article asks, Can we escape the political and strategic dynamics that produce and sustain such wars?
It concludes by examining how some Western powers are now looking to continue the conflict via other means. Against this, the author proposes a stability-oriented approach that would energetically explore areas of possible US-Taliban cooperation, a new positive context in which areas of difference might be productively addressed.
by Carl Conetta, 19 June 2021
What is causing the uncertainty about when US ground forces will exit Afghanistan?
The Biden administration insists that logistical factors explain its breach of the 2020 US-Taliban agreement, which reset the exit date from May to September. Logistical factors were also used to explain why the date may be moved back to July. Actually, logistical issues explain neither. Using current data and historical precedent, this short analysis shows why.
An alternative explanation for the delay is that it gave Washington more time to pursue some of its unfinished goals regarding Afghanistan. In this, the lingering troop presence serves as leverage.
What goals? Improve Kabul’s military posture, polish plans and preparations for US forces to “fight from afar,” and pursue dramatic new international initiatives aiming to lock the Taliban into a cease-fire, peace settlement, and government reform plan substantially defined by the USA. This high risk-gambit won’t succeed, but it might prolong the conflict and America’s involvement in it.
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By Carl Conetta, Reset Defense Blog, 04 February 2021.
This article (with extensive bibliography) surveys, at the 20-year mark, the consequences of the US regime change, occupation, and nation-building exercise in Afghanistan. Drawing on US DOD and congressional research agency reports, media investigations, and NGO analyses it anchors the broad public impression of full-spectrum failure. It reviews the human and financial costs of the war, the failures of reconstruction, and the ongoing dysfunction of Afghan governance.
America’s debacle in Afghanistan, which echoes the Soviet failure during the 1980s, indicates that nations are not the type of thing that can be built according to a foreign blueprint, and especially not at the point of a gun. Outsiders lack the knowledge, indigenous roots, legitimacy, and degree of interest to prevail. Indeed, their very presence is provocative, especially given differences in language, religion, and culture.
Why is withdrawal so difficult? The article concludes that domestic political and institutional considerations are more important than any strategic rationale or cost-benefit analysis. Once committed, no political or military leader, nor the Pentagon cares to own responsibility for failure. And hubris generates an endless succession of imagined “new paths” to success. But as success proves forever elusive, so does withdrawal. In a perverse sense, it is persistent failure that keeps America mired for decades in this and other desultory wars.
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by Charles Knight, 31 January 2021.
Nations wise enough to opt out of a cold war with China will emerge as winners, while those that sign on to the struggle will reap decline and perhaps the whirlwind of war.
by Carl Conetta, Reset Defense Blog, 3 December 2020
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Commentary on “Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan: Washington Perspectives on a US-Taliban Agreement” – A US Institute of Peace panel w/ Michèle Flournoy and Stephen Hadley, February 18, 2020
by Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher, Lit Verlag, Munster, Germany, April 2020.
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Chapter: “A Path to Reductions of Conventional Forces on the Korean Peninsula” by Charles Knight.
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Varied incremental steps that embody and signal the accumulating commitment to a minimally acceptable common political future for Korea are key to this process. Progressive reduction of cross-border invasion threats through mutual confidence building force restructuring will constitute a virtuous circle of reinforcement for a changed relationship. [Through the] accumulation of the sunk costs of iterative reciprocity North and South Korea will arrive at a point where the demonstrated commitment to smaller restructured military postures is sufficient to allow rapid progress toward a stable level and disposition of arms compatible with a new peaceful political relationship. ~ Knight
Die Konfrontation auf der Halbinsel, mit offensivir Oreintierung und Bereitschaft zur Praemption, impliziert Stabilitatsrisiken. Diese werden noch erhoht durch Entwicklung und Einfuhrung prazier ballistischer Raketen, welche die Illusion nahren, den Gegner im Konfilktfall ‘enthaupten’ zu konnen. ~ Unterseher
by Henri Féron and Charles Knight, The National Interest, 27 June 2019. ➪ PDF ➪ HTML
[To begin a process of reciprocal iterative conventional forces reductions] South Korea might announce that it would put into reserve status a few thousand of its Marines and then look for a reciprocating move by the North. It is not important that the move is of like kind. It could consist, say, in the standing down of a class of missiles or artillery. The point is that the move should signal something of value which can then be read to encourage another move by the other side.
by Lutz Unterseher, PDA Guest Publication, April 2019.
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This paper by German military analyst Lutz Unterseher first assesses the relative conventional military power and potential of North and South Korea, then suggests a number of military restructuring steps the U.S. and South Korea can take to reassure North Korea of its security in the context of denuclearization. Unterseher calls for “…a genuine structural change, shifting the capabilities of the [allied] forces in the direction of a stable, non-provocative defense.”
If we can assume that the drive to generate unconventional [nuclear] instruments of deterrence is a response to the lack of options in the conventional realm, it would make sense to come up with policy recommendations aiming to lessen northern concerns.
by Charles Knight, a version of this article appeared in The National Interest on 19 February 2019. We have published a modestly revised version on this website in February 2022.
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The United States will strengthen its Korean alliance while opening many paths to an acceptable political future for Korea by fully supporting its ally in building out the aspirations for Korean peace found in the Panmunjeom Declaration.
by Lutz Unterseher, PDA Guest Publication, August 2018. ➪ PDF
Secretary-General Gorbachev’s astounding and pivotal speech to the UN General Assembly in December of 1988 announced substantial reductions and defensive restructuring of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe.
Lutz Unterseher, living at that time in Bonn, West Germany, was a leading developer of the concepts of the confidence-building restructuring of armed forces intended to reduce East-West military tensions and improve crisis stability. There is no doubt that some of these concepts were influential with Soviet officials in Gorbachev’s closest circles. This article is Lutz Unterseher’s recollection of some of his most consequential interactions with Soviet analysts and diplomats in the several years before Gorbachev’s announcement of the force reductions and restructuring.
by Charles Knight. This was a comment to an article by Duyeon Kim, “How to tell if North Korea is serious about denuclearization,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 October 2018, midway between the Singapore Summit and the Hanoi Summit. ➪ HTML
… productive negotiations must take account of North Korea’s de-facto status as a nuclear weapon state and its core security interests.
by Charles Knight, The Diplomat, 14 September 2018. HTML
“Denuclearization, if it occurs, is a long-term project. It will not happen in the case of Korea unless there are very substantial reductions and redeployments of conventional weaponry and military units on the peninsula.
“Just think of North Korea’s long-time substitute for nuclear weapons — its thousands of artillery pieces dug in and aimed toward Seoul. And these days South Korea has hundreds of conventionally-armed rockets aimed at key facilities in the North. All of this has to change, in a step-by-step reciprocal and verified process as trust builds. This is the hard part of making peace. It takes time and persistent will.”
by Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives, 01 May 2018. ➪ PDF
The April 27, 2018 Inter-Korean Summit was a visibly cordial event. At its conclusion, North and South Korea released a Declaration of Peace, Prosperity, and Unification. This paper reviews a selection of key sections and phrases in ‘The Declaration’ with attention to understanding their implications for the goal declared by both parties of ending ‘division and confrontation’ on the peninsula and for addressing the overhanging issue of denuclearization. Notably, both parties strongly assert their rights as Koreans to take leadership in this task.
“Much will depend on U.S. readiness to negotiate and its willingness to adapt to the changing international conditions in northeast Asia. With an improvement of U.S.-North Korea relations, tensions in the region will not disappear, but instability will be more manageable and there will be less risk of a war engulfing Korea and beyond.”
“In the past periods of temporary normalization of relations, the two Koreas separately and jointly tried to promote denuclearization initiatives. Many people across the globe have mistakenly thought about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as only pertaining to nuclear disarmament of North Korea. But what about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea [withdrawn in 1991], the inclusion of nuclear weapons in joint exercises, and the nuclear umbrella guarantee extended to South Korea by the U.S. ever since the Korean War? A nation that enjoys (or suffers from) such nuclear-umbrella guarantees does not qualify as “non-nuclear.” From this perspective, South Korea has long been nuclear, and it was the U.S. that first made the Korean peninsula nuclear.”
by Charles Knight, U.S.News & World Report, 20 February 2018.
“North Korea is most likely to agree to verifiable arms limitations if there is a credible path for them to significantly improve their national security, end sanctions and achieve international political normalcy, including ultimately diplomatic recognition from the U.S.
“This is a rare moment in international relations when the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea have a common interest in limiting the further development of North Korea’s nuclear force. Every reasonable avenue should be explored for making common cause to prevent war while also achieving a realistic degree of limitations on North Korea’s nuclear and missile arms.”
by Charles Knight, Center for International Policy, 02 February 2018. ➪ read full post PDF
Most interlocutors thought that there is almost no chance that the presently stringent sanctions can force the DPRK to agree to disarm. The Chinese and the Russians generally believe that the maximal concession that sanctions can win from the DPRK is an agreement to freeze their warhead and missile development — particularly inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development — in return for some combination of confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and progress toward political normalization. The North Koreans will not give up the nuclear weapons they already have… at least not until there is permanent peace on the peninsula and the US is no longer understood to be an enemy.
“[T]he basis of regional cooperation that can make North Korean denuclearization possible… is the interest shared by the United States and China in a stable peaceful Korean Peninsula and in halting and then reversing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. With the stakes for millions of people in the region so extraordinarily high, our leaders and our diplomats must be prepared to work with keen will and open minds to identify the paths to peace and mutual security – and then leaders must boldly walk them.”
by Charles Knight, Huffington Post, 03 February 2016 HTML
“A cold war framework for our relations with China, Russia, and any other powers that might eventually align with them will almost certainly result in the addition of $200 to 300 billion in annual U.S. security expenditures. It would also very significantly divert the energies of Americans from many social and environmental goals. The U.S. will end up deferring domestic investments needed to sustain its economic strength.”
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by Charles Knight, Lobe Log, 19 September 2015.
A review of the well-informed and insightful study by M. Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Security Forces will not hold, and the implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2015.
The most serious deficit of the Afghan National Security Forces…is its lack of motivation in comparison to the Taliban. One of the primary lessons unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that soldiers in the armies we create, train, and equip are simply not willing to fight and die for weak, corrupt, illegitimate governments.
~ M. Chris Mason
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esentation by Charles Knight on a panel sponsored by the Economists for Peace and Security at the Allied Social Sciences Association conference in Boston, MA, 04 January 2015. Others on the panel included: James Carroll, Richard Kaufman, Robert Skidelsky, Allen Sinai, and Stephen Walt.
by Carl Conetta, 30 May 2023.