Will China come to pose a peer military threat to the United States? The Obama administration’s 2012 Strategic Defense Review and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) turn on this eventuality. Both the so-called “Asia pivot” and the evolving Air-Sea Battle (ASB) operational concept are meant to preclude it. But they may serve to precipitate it, instead.
by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Report #21, 14 November 2012. 9 tables. The appendix provides an additional 18 tables and charts addressing personnel, force structure, and budgets.
➪ PDF ➪ summary PDF ➪ appendix of tables and charts PDF.
Argues for a new balance among the various instruments of national power reflecting today’s strategic conditions. Taking a realistic view of security needs, the report advocates a military 20% smaller than today’s. It advances a “discriminate defense” strategy that would focus the military on cost-effective missions and save $550 billion more than official plans over the next decade.
by Carl Conetta, 01 November 2006. ➪ HTML ➪ PDF. An edited version of this analysis appeared in the July 2006 issue of the World Policy Journal with the title Dissuading China and Fighting the ‘Long War’ (PDF).
The 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review advanced two new strategic vectors for the US armed forces – one targeted a putative “global Islamic insurgency,” the other put America on a collision course with China.
by Carl Conetta, World Policy Journal, 01 July 2006. ➪ PDF
The 2006 US Defense Review advanced two new strategic vectors for the US armed forces – one targets a putative “global Islamic insurgency”; the other puts America on a collision course with China.
(A longer version of this article was published in November 2006 under the title The Near Enemy and the Far: The Long War, China, and the 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review.)
“’Environment shaping’, the other ascendant element in the new strategy, prescribes a more active peacetime use of military power to influence the course of strategic affairs. It encompasses not only traditional deterrence, but also the goals of discouraging other nations from even trying to compete militarily with the U.S. and of ‘preventing the emergence of a hostile regional coalition or hegemon’ Key to achieving this novel “preemptory” deterrence is the maintenance of a robust U.S. regional presence, a daunting degree of U.S. military superiority, and a technological edge that no prospective competitor could hope to diminish.”
Based on the strategic objective of a core area coalition defense (i.e. Persian Gulf, Korea, and Europe) this memo takes the reader step by step through the logic of force sizing and structuring and modernization requirements to arrive at a robust and consistent alternative to the Bottom-Up Review force posture.
By Carl Conetta, 07 November 1996.
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This article outlines the factors influencing and distorting military planning (with special attention to the 1992-1996 period.)
In the early years of the post-Cold War era, the US defense establishment set out to formulate a new military posture. This was supposed to reflect the new strategic environment and pursue the opportunities afforded by advances in information technology. The result, however, was a “new” posture closely resembling the old, writ somewhat smaller. It was to be progressively bolstered by cutting-edge technology inputs. However, while remarkably expensive, these inputs would only partially fulfill their promise, while exhibiting varying degrees of reliability and sustainability. Soon the USA would be spending as much and more inflation-adjusted dollars on its armed forces as during the Cold War. Also driving requirements and budgets upward would be the adoption of new strategic goals, roles, and missions exceeding those of the Cold War period.
Over subsequent decades, the tension between purported military requirements and resources constraints would grow acute, while the armed forces found themselves over-extended worldwide and mired in seemingly endless wars, despite their presumed (and costly) advantages. How did US defense policy come to this point? The Development of America’s post-Cold War Military Posture shows how dysfunctional planning assumptions and processes can easily lead to dysfunctional policy.
Reviews a key planning study contributing to US post-Cold War strategic thinking and force planning, revealing critical shortcomings in the planning scenarios and simulations that continue to shape US defense policy. Individual sections address the “two war” standard of sufficiency, the persistence of “Central Front” logic, and assessments of the requirements for strategic airlift and combat aircraft modernization.