Wars & Military Operations

Disappearing the Dead: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Idea of a “New Warfare”

by Carl Conetta, PDA Research Monograph #9, 18 February 2004.  ➪ PDF ➪ summary PDF  ➪ HTML  ➪ summary HTML

 

Collateral in Iraq
Examines the Pentagon’s treatment of the civilian casualty issue in the Iraq and Afghan wars, reviews the “spin” and “news frames” used by defense officials to shape the public debate over casualties, and critiques the concept of a “precision warfare” as misleading.  Case studies include the Baghdad bombing campaign. An appendix provides a comprehensive Guide to Surveys and Reporting on Casualties in the Afghan and Iraq Wars.

The Wages of War: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) (summary) by Carl Conetta. PDA Research Monograph #8, 20 October 2003. How many Iraqis died in the 2003 Iraq war? What are the implications for stability in Iraq, the war on terrorism, and the “new warfare”? The report estimates the total number of Iraqis killed in the 2003 war, based on hospital and burial reports, combat statistics, and battlefield testimony from both sides. Uniquely, the report distinguishes noncombatant and combatant civilians. And it compares the experience of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Desert Storm. With two appendices: Appendix 1. Survey and assessment of reported Iraqi combatant fatalities in the 2003 War and Appendix 2. Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 1991 Gulf War.

Catastrophic Interdiction: Air Power and the Collapse of the Iraqi Field Army in the 2003 War

(printable PDF version) by Carl Conetta. PDA Briefing Memo #30, 26 September 2003. Examines how air power helped bring about the collapse of the Iraqi Republican Guard and regular army in the 2003 war. Compares the air campaigns of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Desert Storm, and estimates combatant casualties due to air interdiction in the 2003 war.

Burning Down the House: How the Iraq War Will Affect the International System

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) by Carl Conetta. PDA Briefing Report #15, 06 May 2003. Nothing could be worse for arms control prospects and international stability than the widespread impression that military activism and unilateralism are on the rise. This puts a premium on re-militarization and discourages de-militarization.

Disarming Iraq: What Did the UN Missions Accomplish?

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) by Carl Conetta. PDA Briefing Memo #27, 25 April 2003. A review of the evidence finds that while UN disarmament missions contributed substantially to disarming Iraq and increasing confidence, they also left substantial residual uncertainties. However, the disarmament missions served to tightly constrain Iraq’s WMD capability and undercut its effectiveness and standard military deterrence would have acted to keep this residual threat in check.

Inspecting Iraq: A Record of the First 40 Days

(HTML version) compiled by the Project on Defense Alternatives, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 04 January 2003. With war and peace hanging in the balance, what evidence of prohibited weapons have UN inspectors found in Iraq? This compendium of press reports provides a thorough review of the UNMOVIC inspections through 4 January 2003.

The “New Warfare” and the New American Calculus of War

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Memo #26, 30 September 2002. US methods of warfare have changed substantially since the Cold War’s end. So have the norms governing the use of force. Since 11 September 2001 there has been an increased impetus to more fully exercise US military primacy and test the promise of the new warfare. Unfortunately, this impetus has not been matched with adequate analysis of either the new methods or the new norms of war.

First Strike Guidelines: the case of Iraq

(HTML version) by Charles Knight, PDA Briefing Memo #25, 16 September 2002 (revised and updated 10 March 2003, postscript added 01 March 2004). Assesses how the case of Iraq measures up within a set of guidelines for preemptive counterproliferation developed by the director of the Air Force Counterproliferation Center. Includes extensive notes with links to material relevant to making an informed decision about war. The original 16 September 2002 edition is available in a PDF version and a HTML version.

Bush Raises the Stakes in Iraq

(HTML version) by Charles Knight, PDA Commentary, 03 July 2002. Argues that President Bush’s declared policy of “regime change” for Iraq destroys the incentives of deterrence and increases the risk of U.S. troops being exposed to Iraq’s defensive use of chemical weapons. Distributed by The Global Beat Syndicate and posted on the Foreign Policy In Focus.

The Pentagon’s New Budget, New Strategy, and New War

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta. PDA Briefing Report #12, 25 June 2002. Examines the new US military strategy as codified in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and practiced in the Afghan war. The report contrasts the new QDR with its 1997 predecessor, paying special attention to the Bush administration’s “new concept of deterrence.” Published in Hegemonie oder Stabilität: Alternativen zur Militarisierung der Politik, edited by Volker Kröning (MdB), Lutz Unterseher, and Günter Verheugen (Hrsg.) Bremen: Edition Temmen, August 2002.

Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to combat al-Qaeda and the new terrorism

(HTML version) (PDF version) by Carl Conetta. PDA Briefing Memo #23, 25 June 2002. The memo outlines a “strategy of dislocation” for defeating the new terrorism. Al Qaeda is analyzed as a “distributed transnational network” that uses terrorism in order to catalyze political-cultural polarization and mobilization. Published in Hegemonie oder Stabilität: Alternativen zur Militarisierung der Politik, edited by Volker Kröning (MdB), Lutz Unterseher, and Günter Verheugen (Hrsg.) Bremen: Edition Temmen, August 2002.

Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan war

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) (summary) by Carl Conetta, PDA Research Monograph #6, 30 January 2002. Why the inadvertent effects of the war are now overtaking the intended ones. Includes appendices addressing: the war’s impact on the humanitarian crisis; the missing political framework for American action; the source of power and the strategy of the Taliban; and the limits of the Bonn agreement and the challenges facing the interim government.

Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Report #13, 18 January 2002. Examines the extent and causes of civilian bombing casualties in the Afghanistan war and explores why the civilian casualties were higher than in the Serbia/Kosovo campaign despite fewer bombs dropped. Includes appendices: estimation of civilian bombing casualties: method and sources; resolving discrepancies in casualty accounts.

Beyond bin Laden: The Temptations of a Wider War

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Memo #22, 28 September 2001. Offering a review of US military options in response to 11 September, this article rejects large-scale attacks on Afghanistan due to their likely negative impact on regional stability and international cooperation. As an alternative it proposes smaller-scale military operations against the bin Laden network combined with multinational law enforcement activities worldwide.

What Justifies Military Intervention?

(HTML version) commentary by Charles Knight, 27 September 2001. Examines the problems for international security associated with U.S. military intervention abroad. Includes a Postscript on the “war on terrorism” (revised 01 March 2002) and Selected Readings on the doctrines of Just War, Total War, and Strategic Bombing (revised 01 March 2002).

Disengaged Warfare: Should we make a virtue of the Kosovo way of war?

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Memo #21, May 2001. Offers a critical perspective on “strategic precision attack” in US warfighting plans and doctrine, tracing this tenet to “risk aversion” and America’s diminished stake in distant conflicts. While the concept of “strategic precision attack” promises to avert battlefield risks, this memo argues that in the end it transplants the risk to the strategic level.

Rotocraft for War: Descending on a Military Dilemma

(HTML version) by Dr. Lutz Unterseher, PDA Briefing Memo #19, May 2001. Offers a critical assessment of the value of combat helicopters in modern war with examination of the technical characteristics and limits of combat helicopters, the doctrine for their use, and issues of cost. Case studies include the Gulf War, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.

Alleged ‘Carrier Gap’ is Out to Sea

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, PDA Briefing Memo #15, 30 April 1999. The April 1999 re-routing of aircraft carriers to support operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans inspired alarm about the effect of the move on America’s military presence in the Pacific. However, the assertions of a serious gap in carrier coverage are groundless. Alarmism about redeployment misjudges the effect of the move on the military balance in Northeast Asia and betrays a disregard for the one feature of aircraft carriers — their flexibility — that is supposed to give them unique strategic value worthy of their prodigious cost.

Air Power Promises and Modernization Trends after Operation Desert Storm

by Alan Bloomgarden and Carl Conetta, Dec 1994.
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This article first appeared in 1994 in a slightly edited form in Hawk Journal, the annual publication of the Royal Air Force Staff College.

The expectation of an airpower revolution began in earnest soon after victory in the first US-Iraq Gulf War, 1990-1991. Drawing extensively on official and outside expert assessment of airpower in “Operation Desert Storm,” this article critically reviews the evidence for an airpower revolution while summarizing a range of contemporary opinions on the issue.

Specifically, the article examines three claims advanced by airpower enthusiasts at the dawn of the post-Cold War period: that the Gulf War experience suggests greatly expanded options for limited-aims “raiding missions,” strategic bombing campaigns, and airpower dominance over the ground battle (using improved battlefield interdiction and close air support.)

Included are summaries of the extensive Gulf War Air Power Survey and other surveys of the war which provide an unsurpassed view of the war’s dynamics.  It also examines the technologies, contemporary and in development, central to the putative airpower revolution.

air power