New from the Project on Defense Alternatives

Forceful Engagement:
Rethinking the Role of Military
Power in US Global Policy

Re-Envisioning Defense:
An Agenda for US
Policy Debate & Transition

Charts for Download
Monthly Terrorism Fatalities Before & After 9/11 Fatalities Due to Terrorism Worldwide 2004-07 Global Views of the USA World Opinion and US Military Power Military Personnel Overseas	Percent Active Component Military Overseas Post-Cold War US Defense Spending World Military Spending Federal Debt as Percentage of GDP 1940-2007

Preface: A Litmus for New Leadership

Barack Obama's picks for his national security team signal an effort to establish a new bipartisan consensus on US security policy. The putative political advantages for the new administration and the Democratic Party are obvious: by situating themselves within a redefined "center", they might deny Republicans their most effective wedge issue. Of course, achieving a stable domestic consensus on security policy is not the same as devising a policy that actually works. And nothing would be worse than forming consensus around an unsustainable or ineffective posture.

What matters most are the lessons that the new administration gleans from the failed efforts of its predecessors. The first among these is perhaps the most difficult to fully grasp and take to heart: The United States has been using its armed forces and military power well beyond the limit of their utility. We are now experiencing not just diminishing returns, but negative ones. Thus, the nation finds itself paying more and more for less and less security.

The military effort expended these past eight years has been, by any measure, prodigious. But, in no area of concern has it produced much in the way of reliable progress. Indeed, the world seems less stable and more polarized today than it did in 2001. And anti-Americanism is at a level not seen since the Vietnam war years.

The Iraq and Afghanistan operations have demonstrated that the world's "sole superpower" cannot -- by its current methods -- reliably stabilize two destitute and dejected nations comprising only one percent of the world's population, despite the investment of nearly 5,000 American lives and more than $850 billion. What General David Petraeus once asked of the Iraq war -- "Tell me how this ends" -- still pertains, despite the reduction in violence there. The same question might be asked of the Afghanistan war and, indeed, of the "war on terror" as a whole, which seems to be on a road to nowhere.

Setting a new course in policy begins with acknowledging that America's recent emphasis on military action and instruments has been, on balance, counter-productive. Looking to the future, the next administration must be more realistic about what can be reliably accomplished by these means. This applies not only to counter-terrorism efforts, but also to efforts to stabilize troubled regions of the world and prevent the emergence of new threats.

It has become something of a mantra among reformers that the United States needs to "re-balance" its security "tool kit". But it is not enough to simply "plus up" the diplomatic side of engagement. Rolling back the current emphasis on military action and instruments is a prerequisite to greater success in diplomatic efforts. This, because what most divides the United States from those it proposes to lead is the issue of when, how, and how much to use force and the armed forces.

More generally, the next Administration needs to lead the nation in reappraising its defense posture and investments. Despite the expenditure of more than $7 trillion since 1992, and more than ten years of talk about "military transformation", America's armed forces are not yet especially well-adapted to the new security environment. Efforts to prepare and defend in all directions have dissipated American power and have left the nation less prepared to deal with what is actually emerging. Presently, the United States is responsible for nearly half of all military spending worldwide. And yet, our present and future Secretary of Defense argues that this is simply not enough -- which should lead all of us to suspect that either our resources are being misspent or our objectives misconceived.

Achieving real change in US security policy will not be easy. Our present posture and preferences are well rooted ideologically, institutionally, and politically. Nonetheless, the experiences of the past eight years (and more) provide a powerful argument for a sea-change in policy. For now, a minimum goal is that the inauguration of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States should mark the renewal of the national debate on security policy and not its end.

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