CH INA'S & ROW ING MILITARY POWER: PERPECTIVES ON SECURITY, BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

E dited by Andrew Scobell and Larry M.Wortzel

September 2002

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FOREW ORD

The tenor of U.S.-Ch in a relations for much of the first year of the ach inistration of President 6 eorgeW. Bush was set by a crisis that need not have occurred How the situation was handled and eventually resolved is instructive. It tells us about a beleaguered communist leadership in the buildup to major generational transition (scheduled for late 2002 and early 2003) and the mettle of a chemocratically elected U.S. government tested early in its tenure by a series of foreign policy crises and a carefully coordinated set of charastating terrorist strikes against the continental United States.

The way the April 2001 crisis on H ainan Island was resolved must be chalked up as a success for the United States. The key was W ashington's ability to convince Beijing that holding the air crew was hurting, and not advancing, Chinese interests. That is something Beijing seems not to have grasped when, without warning, the EP-3 success hy swept down onto the runway in Haikou, bringing a treasure trove of super-secret electronics and 21 Americans, who looked at first to be valuable bargaining drips. With the plane and the crew, China seem ecltohold the best cards and behave daccordingly. The top leaders who Ambassach Joseph Prucher had tried to cultivate cidnot return his calls, and Chinese President Jiang Zem in, after dem and ing an apology from Washington, left for a Latin American tour. Let the Americans stew in this for awhile, Jiang's message seem ecltobe

But W ashington m anaged to reduce the value of those bargaining drips. This w as cone, first, by m aking dear that no substantive concessions would be made to secure their release, and, second, by persuading Beijing that continuing to hold the Americans would bring real camage to Chinese interests. As indignation mounted in the United States, economic changers began to loom on China's horizon. The Beijing government, after all, counts on a rising stanchard of living to limit dissent, and even a brief loss of access to the American market could be dam aging. Nor did Asian neigh bors rally to support China. They worry, mostly in private, about Beijing's growing military strength and assertiveness. The State Department boy cotted Chinese embassy functions and Secretary of State Colin Powell, while offering regrets and concolences – even eventually sorrow over the loss of the Chinese pilot – showed no indination to consider the apology China dem anded

Them ost sensitive nerve in Beijing, how ever, may have been the Olympics. Having the games in their capital is a dierishedChineseaspiration, and when members ofCongress began organizing against it as the crisis developed, the Chinese embassy took the unusual step of sending rather snippy letters to the offenders. Only releasing the hostages couldpossibly remove the very real threat, and even then not with certainty. HenceBeijing's decision to send theorem hom e, which, once made, began the search for a linguistic form ula to explain it. Washington had not, in fact, apologized, but we could not prevent Beijing from pulling some of what we had said out of context and presenting it through state controlled media as being, in fact, the apology China's leaders sough t. That, plus the usual "hum anitarian considerations," provided sufficient cover to end theorisis.

Am ericans were rem incled that the Chinese are not always their friench. Despites on ereal economic progress, the regime still often becomes confrontational with its own people and with other countries. The United States must treat it with pruchance and respect, hectging against changers even as it seeks to promote positive chareloopment. By the same token, China has been reminched that W ashington cannot be relied upon to yield when the two states collicke. Our growing economic interests in China and our hopes for a future positive relationship with China would be negatively affected if our funchamental American national interests or our commitments to chemocratic frienchs and allies in Asia are challenged by China.

During the period that the Chinese changed course, from seeking concessions to seeking an exit, the United States

calm ly follow ed procedures. First the Am bassacbr, then the Secretary of State- and briefly the Vice President- took the spotlight to deliver an authoritative "no" to the dem and for apology. Skilled State Department wordsmiths cobbled together a precisely crafted letter that gave China cover, but no more President Bush droreographed all of this, mostly behind the scenes, and earned our applause President Jiang seems to have concluded that them atter should behandled expeditious ly with divilians, not the PLA taking the leadin the negotiations. Once the Hainan Island Incident was resolved and strategic darity was emphasized on Taiwan, the U.S. moved swiffly to put economics at the top of our agenda, and China's entry into the W TO become the first priority.

This volum e, com prisedofp apers originally presented at a conference heldat Carlis le Barracks in September 2001, helps to put the liain an Island incident in the broader context of China's strategic aspirations and its growing military capabilities. I am proud to be a prime initiator of this conferenceon the People's Liberation Arm y, which has been an annual event for more than a decade Lasty ear's conference's co-sponsors were the American Enterprise Institute, the HeritageFoundation, and the U.S. Army WarCollege. For the fourth consecutive year, the W ar College's Strategic Studies Institute is publishing the proceedings. The nine chapters in this volume, all written by leading experts, cover a diverse set of important topics: East Asian perspectives on China's security an bitions, the status of the Chinese ballisticm issile program and regional reactions to U.S. m issile defense initiatives, and Ch in a's ever-improving conventional military capabilities. I commend China's Growing Military Power to you.

> AMBASSADOR JAMES R. LILLEY Senior Fellow American Enterprise Institute

CHAPTER1

CH INA'S RESPONSE TO A FIRMER AMERICA

Andrew Scobell Larry M.Wortzel

President 6 eorge W. Bush m acheit dear as a candidate for office that U.S. policy tow ardChina "will require tough realism." Presidential Candidate Bush's speech on September 23, 1999, at the Citadel, the military college of South C arolina, foresh active each is firm approach to Beijing. In that speech, Candidate Bush recalled for the American people that "in 1996, after som e tension over Taiw an, a Chinese general rem incled America that China possesses the means to incinerate Los Angeles with nuclear m issiles."² Bush follow edup in a speech in Sim i Valley, California, with the warning to China that it is a "com petitor, not as trategicp artner," that the United States would deny the right of Beijing to impose their rule on a free people (Taiw an), and that the United States would help Taiw an defend its eff.³ If e also made dear early in the cam paign that hew ould pursue ballisticm issile defense for the United States.⁴ Thus, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing had early notice that they would not be dealing with a President William J. Clinton who considered China to be a "strategic partner" of the United States.

For Beijing, this was a very different America. Under Clinton, U.S. foreign policy was generally more solicitous of Beijing. Defense officials ran off to Chinawith packages of "deliverables" that the Chinese had come to expect out of meetings in which the United States sough the ore dialogue and cooperation between the arm echforces of each country. Clinton responded to China's March 1996 missile launches off Taiw an with two American aircraft carrier battle groups.⁵ However, oncethe Taiw an elections wereover later that month, Clinton dispatched National Security Council and State Department officials to Taiw an to encourage the leaders of that is land to work harder at getting along with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Thus policy seem edito vacillate between a firm foreign policy line tow ard China and one that sought top lacate the Chines eleadership when it com plained about the U.S. position.⁶

Once Bush took office, Beijing dispatch eclsuccessively high er-level diplom ats to Washington-form er am bassaches, foreign ministry officials, and advisers to Chinese President Jiang Zem in- to gauge the White House's position on China and Taiw an. This culm inated in the visit to Washington of Vice Premier Qian Qich en on March 20, 2001. The Chinesew ere clear on onem ajor point: they worked hard to deliver them essage that the sale of the A egis-dass guided missile destroyer to Taiw an by the United States was "unacceptable" and, in Beijing's eyes, am ounted to the creation of a new alliance among the United States, Taiw an, and Japan.

The Bush position on Taiw an was dear. He did not back away from h is can paign position that "we'll help Taiw an defend itself." The President and h is appointees at the Departments of State and Defense, pointing to the largescale buildup of ballisticm issiles on the Chinese coast opposite Taiwan, also made sure that Beijing understood that the United States would meet its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 98-6) to provide Taiw an adequate defensive arm s and services to respond to the Chinese th reat.

On April 1, 2001, during a michair intercept by the ChineseNavy, a ChineseF-811 fighter aircraft collided with an unarmed American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft operating in international airspace in the South China Sea.

The American aircrew was detained by China for 11 days and subjected to lengthy and unpleasant interrogation. Chinam adeexpansive daim s about its sovereign territory, insisting that the entire exclusive economic zone, 200 miles off the Chinese coast, was its own. The United States insisted that China's territorial aters and sease xtended out 12 m iles, consistent with international law. This incident, and the treatment of the aircrem, probably did m ore to convince the President and the American people that firm ness was the only way to deal with Beijing than any other action or statem ent from either capital. From the perspective of m any in the United States, the actions and rh etoricofth eChinesegovernment were confirmation that Beijing did not have friendly intentions tow ard Washington. The release of the crew and, eventually, the aircraft is seen as the successful outcome of firm ness coupled with flexibility and superbinteragency coordination from them ostsenior officials in W ash ington to the members of the actual negotiating team on Hainan Island In the face of this, Chinese truculence gave way to Chineseprage atism.⁷

On April 25, 2001, after 100 days in office, President Bush restated that the United States will help Taiw an defend itself, and in a television broadcast went further, saying that the United States will "dow hatever it takes" to defend Taiw an against Chinese aggression. Lest anyone misinterpret just how serious President Bush was about that statement, it was repeated for emphasis. In St. Petersburg, Florida, on March 11, 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, speaking to an audience that induced Taiw an's Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming, reiterated Bush's plecte.

Security Policy.

Under the Clinton administration, military-to-military contacts between China and the United States were treated as routinem atters. In a num ber of ways, the "Engagement Policy "of the United States Pacific Command also treated military contacts with China as more or less routine, even desirable, despite concerns expressed in the Congress. From Capitol Hill, many conservatives expressed concerns that such contacts were only helping the People's Liberation Army (PLA) learn more about U.S. defense establishment plans and systems, with no reciprocity from the Chinese side. That, too, dranged with the Bush ach inistration.

Soon after assum ing h is post, Secretary of D effense D onald Rum s feld conclucted a review of m ilitary contacts with C h ina. That review concluded that the United States should cease pursuing m ilitary contacts or engagement with C h ina as a matter of routine practice. Instead, future U.S.-C h ina m ilitary contacts and exchanges would be conclucted on a case by case basis, with decisions in line with U.S. interests. Contacts should benefit the United States and should not strength en the PLA.

BallisticMissileDefense.

One of Candidate Bush's strongest foreign policy and defense positions during his presidential cam paign was to call for a ballistic missile system that would defend forw ard-deployed American forces, U.S. allies, and the hom elandofth eUnitedStates. In Sim i, California, hesaid: "We still, how ever, need m issile defense system s-both theater and national. If I am commander in dief, we will develop and deploy them .¹⁷⁸ Of course, the implicitmessage in this was that the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union had to be reexamined Two years later, in December 2001 at the Citadel, President Bush m adeit explicitly dear that the United States m ust m ove bey ond the ABM Treaty. Since June 13, 2002, the United States is no longer be constrained by that treaty. This m eans that ABM testing can go ah ead against warh eads of any speed and with interceptors of full capability. The United States can also work on cooperative program swith

friends and allies as well as conduct testing at sea; things that were prohibited under the ABM treaty.

China saw this coming, and Beijing's security planners were not happy about the turn of events. At a conference on arm s control in Beijing, China, September 14-15, 2000, representatives from China's arms control community argued that any attempt at developing a ballistic missile defense system in the United States "is inherently destabilizing and will foster a world wide arm srace"¹⁰ The Chinese attendees argued that China was the primary target of ballisticm issile defenses, and a United States goal w as to seek "absolute security and military superiority."¹¹ U.S. ballisticm issile defenses have never been "aim ed" at another country. They are aim ed at incom ing m issiles. Noneth eless, from the time that the U.S. Congress directed theDepartment of Defense (DoD) to explore ballisticmissile defenses in Asia in the Fiscal Year 1998 "Strom Thurm ond" DefenseAuthorization Act, to the time that President Bush assum edoffice Beijing repeated these arguments in nearly every international and bilateral forum it could A year after Bush assumed the presidency, China's representatives continued to argue that the ABM Treaty constitutes "the corners tone of international strategics tability."¹²

From the time of the Presidential campaign, the incoming Bush administration made it dear that its approach to Chinaw ould differ from Clinton's and perhaps even differ from that of Bush's father, the 41st President of the United States. A fter the election, to the surprise of some in China and the United States, President Bush actually follow edthrough on the principles hehad expounded in h is campaign speeches. This surprise was the result of a failure to recognize the firm commitment to principles on the part of President Bush and seniormembers of his administration stemming from their deeply-held conservative Realpolitik beliefs.¹³ China's reaction is the focus of the drapters in this book.

Ch ina's Reaction.

This book was developed against the backdrop outlined in the first section of this introduction. The conference organizers sough t to cap ture the dranges in China, not only in terms of the toric, but also in military obdrine, training, and hardwarepurch as es, in response to Bush's firmer tone Of course, we recognize that Beijing had already taken note of the dep loyment of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan during the 1996 Strait Crisis. But as noted above, this strong message was soon diluted by more condiliatory moves from the Clinton administration toward Beijing. As a result, the firmness displayed by Washington in early 1996 was not perceived as a permanent shift in institutionalized approaches to American security policy on China.

Then there was the accident in Belgrade Despite all of the U.S. apologies, investigations, and fact-finding commissions, many in Beijing, particularly in the PLA and the intelligence community, remain suspicious that the bom bing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1998 was not an accident.¹⁴

In this volume, some of the best analysts of contemporary China assess how Beijing has reacted, and can be expected to react, to the changes in United States foreign policy. The authors exam ineChineseperceptions of theUnitedStates, American security and foreign policies in Asia, and the effects of those policies on the Asia-Pacific region.

In drapter 2, Dr. David Finkelstein, Director of Project Asia at the Center for Naval Analyses, examines security relations between China and the United States from the events in Kosovothough America's reaction to the attack on the United States by terrorist forces of the al-Qaecha network. Finkelstein argues that the United States has serious worries about China's activities in four vital areas: Taiw an, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery means, the intentions of China's military modernization programs, and whether China is attempting through diplomacy to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region.

In Finkelstein's view, although Bush and Jiang were able to improve U.S.-China relations, and to convey the impression that in the war on terrorism at least, Washington and Beijing seeey eto-eye, therewas not much substance in the Bush visit to China in October 2001.¹⁵ But a reduction in tension has some value in and of itself, according to Finkelstein, because increased tensions between the United States and China complicates uch other key U.S. security concerns as stability on the Korean Peninsula and the prosecution of the war on terrorism.

Finkelstein conducts that there remains deep-seated mutual distrust between China and the United States, particularly an ong m en bers of the security establish m ent in both countries. In Beijing, a num ber of influential security thinkers appear to have concluded that the ultim ate objective of United States policies is to obstruct China's rise as an orerida and powerful nation. Therefore, "U.S. policies in the region are increasingly filtered through a set of lenses [in Beijing] that are already calibrated to ensuresom e distortion." More and more Chinese security thinkers are concluding that the United States II ants to "dh angeCh ina," to "deterCh ina," and to "collect intelligence on China." Finkelstein argues that the depth of this m is trust, which is to a certain extent m utual, is reason enough tom aintain som esort of security dialogue aim edat dispelling m isperceptions and avoiding conflict.

In Chapter 3, Hideaki Kaneda, a retired Vice Achi iral in Japan's Maritim e Self Defense Forces, addresses China's growing military power and its significance for Japan's national security. Kanedamakes the point that China has used its own military strength to advance territorial daims, while ignoring the sovereignty and jurisdiction of other nations in the East China Sea and South China Sea. He outlines what he characterizes as a methodical effort by China's navy to eventually control "biological and nonbiological resources in China's peripheral waters." The resources Kanecka sees as the object of China's goals are primarily undersea gas and petroleum deposits, but also fishing grounds to secure food supplies.

Them ajor security component of Beijing's strategy is a "near-water defense" of the "first island drain" stretching from the Aleutian Islands, across to the Kuriles, the Japanese Islands, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippine Islands, and Borneo. Kaneda notes that many of China's territorial daims, the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, fall with in the perimeter of this "first island drain." If ealso argues that control of the waters with in this area gives Beijing not only the resources it needs, but also the strategic position to bring military power to bear on Taiwan with reduced fear of outside intervention.

Kanechabelieves Japan must call form ore transparency in Chinese defense policy. If e also argues that Chinam ust be prepared to come to agreements that permit joint exploitation of undersea resources by the countries with competing daims. As early confidence building measures, Kanechaseeks to involve China in regional efforts to provide for maritime safety, combat piracy, stop chug transfers, control and end the tracke in persons, and work to control environmental pollution. If e takes a firm position on resisting any expansion by China, and insists that Japan must be ready to counter any illegal reconnaiss ance efforts by the Chinese navy in Japan's territorial waters. Finally, he calls for a firm U.S.-Japan alliance as a counter to China's expansionary tenchencies.

In Chapter 4, Anatoly Bolyatko of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies in Russia discusses how in military obctrine and exercises the PLA has reacted to the incoming Bush ach inistration. Bolyatko predicts that, as joint military exercises are conclucted between the United States and its East Asian allies in Korea and Japan, and as the United States moves forward with a "missile defense shield," Chinawill reactby producing thousands of missiles, aircraft, and tanks. If e believes that such production will stress China's military-industrial base, but that such stresses can be tolerated by the Chinese economy. If is condusion is that Chinawill seek to be more effective at force projection and defense in the Asia-Pacific region and will strength enits forces against Taiwan, but will not seek to become aw orldmilitary power, as was the Soviet Union, with the capability to conduct military operations outside East Asia.

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stokes of the U.S. Air Force explains China's reactions to the Bush ach inistration's plans for developing a ballistic missile defense system to protect deploy edU.S.m ilitary forces, Am erican friends and allies, and the U.S. hom eland As Stokes notes in Chapter 5, China's campaign against the U.S. with chawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty dates to well before the Bush ad inistration took office. But as a candidate for office. Bush and is security advisers madeit dearth at the United States II ould pursue these defenses. Stokes sees China's developm entandm odernization of its own strategicm issile forces as "an integral part of PRC coercive strategies." W hether discussing China's theater-level missile program s, short-range m issiles, or intercontinental m issiles, Stokes believes that any American missile defenses, however m odest, are perceived by Beijing as having "serious implications for the viability of its nuclear deterrent and for its expanding inventory of conventional short and medium range ballisticm issiles."

Beijing's ballistic m issile forces are a political and m ilitary "trum p card" intended to stem any m oves form ore autonom y and international recognition from Taiw an, and also lim it the freechm of action of the United States to respond to contingencies not only in the Taiw an Strait, but in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Stokes notes, Beijing fears that, if viable ballisticm issile defenses are deployed, the command and control and itecture for these systems could turn into a "de facto" alliance if Japan, South Korea, the United States, and Taiman integrate their missile defense programs.

Stokes predicts that Taiw an will adopt a combination of passive defensive measures to complicate PRC targeting, while Chinesemilitary planners will develop better plans to absorb and reconstitute forces after a PRC first strike America's with chaw all from the ABM Treaty on June 13, 2002, hands China's diplom ats a defeat of monumental proportions. Russia not only accepted the end of the ABM Treaty, but also agreed to major cuts in the numbers of its offensive weapons. Thus the predictions of not only China's arm s control community but of the supporters of China's position in the United States ring hollow. Incleed, if there is amissile build up in reaction to the end of the ABM Treaty, it will come from China, seeking to maintain what Stokes calls a "trum p card"

In Chapter 6, Eric Md/acbn, a consultant on Asian security and form or U.S. Defense Attache in Beijing, explains in great detail the positions China has taken in reaction to the Bush presidential cam paign statem ents on m issile defense and to the actions taken by the Bush administration in its first 6 m on this in office to address China's concerns over U.S. ballisticm issile defense plans. Md/acbn outlines the efforts by the PRC arm s control and diplom atic community to so limit any American defense efforts that they would have no practical effect on China's nuclear force China's negotiators, according to Md/ acbn, "couldnot tolerate" an American missiled afense for coof 200 interceptor m issiles, but "m ight be able to tolerate 10 interceptors devoted to the defense of the American hom eland" According to Md/acbn, China's negotiators argued that one factor forcing Jiang to take a firm position is "publicopinion in China." M d/ acbn opines that the United States m ust find ways to demonstrate that it "will not be hegen onic and ust continue a chalogue with China on the purpose and extent of any U.S. ballistic m issile defense system .

Asia, too, has reacted to American ballistic missile defense plans, explains Dr. Taeho Kim, Senior China Analyst at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses. In Chapter 7, Kim add and ledges the profound dranges in the strategicenvironm entproduced by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Kim examines m issile defenses as part of a m ore com prehensive effort to transform not only the U.S. military, but also American strategy. If enotes that the Bush ach inistration's approach to security represents a radical departure from that of the Clinton administration. Kim predicts an approach that has nuances in policy and missile defense deployments in East Asia, taking into account the political sensitivities in Japan, where some are wary of going beyond the research stage, and in Korea, where the popular focus is on North Korea and its conventional forces, not on China's or North Korea's ballisticm issiles.

Colonel Susan Puska, currently U.S. Arm y Attachéat the American Embassy in Beijing, assesses Beijing's efforts at force projection in Chapter 8. She asserts that China is m odeling its own military modernization and efforts to develop advanced cap abilities based on the cap abilities of the U.S.m ilitary. To increase military capabilities, China is focusing more on power projection in peripheral areas by its ow nm ilitary, while changing training methods to increase effectiveness. Puska cocuments new scenarios for Chinese m ilitary training that focus on m eeting what Beijing sees as its main threat-the forces of the United States. The PLA also seen s to be conscious of its own relative weaknesses in com parison to U.S. forces. Therefore it is focus ing on what it sees is the main vulnerability of the United States, a dependence on the electrom agnetic spectrum for com munication and the exchange of intelligence and threat chata.

Beijing is im proving management in the PLA, improving the quality of its own military personnel by better educating themand recruiting more qualified personnel. The PLA is also increasingly able to coordinate and use effectively reserve and militia forces. The Central Military Commission, the Chinese Communist Party's leading military body, is also trying to reduce corruption and waste. Puska conducts that today Beijing has a "rough but ready" force projection capability that will improve over time and create greater risks and costs to any country that seeks to drallenge China on its periphery.

In Chapter 9, Mr. Kenneth Allen, an expert on Chinese security at the Center for Naval Analyses, examines the d anges in the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) as itm odernizes and reform s its logisticsystem s in order to fighth igh-technology wars. In the 1990s the PLAAF began transform ing itself from a force reliant up on single brand deployment to one able to utilizem ultiplebrand es in joints ervice cam paigns, indicating a shift in the focus of the PLAAF from a primarily positional, defense oriented operation, to a more mobile, m aneuverable, preventative force, able to address local concerns and strike quickly. Allen analyzes this shift through examination of the PLAAF operational theory, logistics structure and theory, and the types of training used to implement these changes. Allen then addresses the specific d anges enacted by the PLAAF in preparation for a military confrontation with the United States. Over the last 50 y ears, Ch in a's PLAAF h as engaged in only three external cam paigns, in Korea, Taiw an Strait (1958) and Vietnam. 6 iven recent military history, the PLAAF has realized the need for a transregional strike force and has initiated the training necessary to create one W hile it is not y et dearhow effective the PLAAF would be during a real conflict, particularly if facing anticipated U.S. strategies such as interior airfield destruction, the PLAAF has made significant strides in improving pilot proficiency, sortie generation and sustainability, logistical support, com m unications, and intelligence Thus, Allen conducts

th at, while the PLAAF may not currently beable to field a rapid strike force of any threat to the United States, it is making definite progress in this direction.

Each of the authors has effectively captured them ain trenck in regional security in East Asia. The terrorist attacks on the United States, and the subsequent war on terrorism, only increased American resolve to deploy a ballistic missile defense. They also brought about the deployment of American forces on China's western periphery, something that was not foreseen in the days before the attack on the United States. The trenck outlined in this book, therefore, have perhaps played them selves out over amorecom pressed time frame But the eassessments by each author hold up, and provide some framework for understanding how Beijing may react to the firmer positions taken by the United States.

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER1

1. George W. Bush, "A Period of Consequences," Charleston: The Citadel, September 23, 1999. h ttp://citadel.edu/pao/address/pres_bush.htm I.

2 The remarks, which have been attributed to General Xiong Guangkai, were made in a private conversation with a former U.S. government official, Ambassacbr Chas. W. Freeman, and should not carry the weight of an official Chinesestatement. Moreover, according to Freem an, these words were not couched as a threat and should be evaluated in the context of an extended off-the record discussion between him selfand the Chinesem ilitary official. See Am bassacbr Chas. Freem an, "Did China Threaten to Bom b Los Angeles?" Proliferation Brief, Vol. 4, March 22, 2001, available at www.ceip.org/ files/publications/proliferationbrieff 04 .asp?from =pubtype, and Allen S. Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950-1996, and Taiw an," International Security, Vol. 26, Fall 2001, pp. 129-130. In Scobell's view, Xiong's comments should be seen as providing important insights into the m indet of Chinese m ilitary dite perceptions of U.S. strategic priorities and the existence of an "asymmetry of motivation" between Beijing and Washington on Taiwan. See Andrew Scobell, China's Use of Military Force Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March, New York: Cam bridge University Press, 2003, forth com ing, drapter 8. Zhu Chenghu, then as enior colonel in the PLA serving at China's National

D efense University and now am ajorgeneral, repeated the warning that Americans face the threat of nuclear attack from China in the event of a response by the United States to an attack on Taiwan. See *Jiefangjun Bao*, February 28, 2000 and Larry M. Wortzel, "Should the United States Feel Threatened by China's & rowing Role in the International Military-Political Arena?," *The Retired Officer*, December 2000, p. 35.

3 George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Simi Valley, CA, November 19, 1999.

4. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/2000debates/ 2ndebate1.html.

5. ChineseExerciseStrait961: 8-25 March 1996, Washington, DC: OfficeofNaval Intelligence, May 1996.

6. For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of Clinton's China policy, see David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001.

7. John Keefe, "A Taleof TwoVery Sorries'," Far Eastern Econom ic Review, March 21, 2002, pp. 30-33 Significantly, China also concluded that its handing of the indicent was virtually exemplary. Chinese analysts insist that Beijing handled the situation in a mature, measured way and demonstrated the effectiveness of China's "crisis management ability." See, for example, the discussion in "Thinkers' Forum : Midair Collision and the Future of Sino-U.S. Relations," Zhongguo Pinglun (tong Kong) June 1, 2001, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service China, June 21, 2001.

8. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," November 19, 1999.

9. George W. Bush, "Bush at the Citadel," Charleston, SC, December 11, 2001. *www.dosnews.com*.

10. Evan S. Medieros, Rapporteur, US-China Arms Control and Nonproliferation Cooperation: Progress and Prospects, Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, October 2000, p. 19.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

12 L i D aozh ong, "An Interpretation of Challenges Im posed by U.S. Unilateralism on International Multilateral Arms Control Regime," *Peace*, No. 61, D ecem ber 2001, p. 19. 13 See, for example, Ancher Scobell, "Crouching Korea, Hicken China: Bush Achinis tration Policy Toward Pyongyang and Beijing," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XL II, No. 2, March /April 2002, pp. 314-315. Scobell contends that Bush appears to see China not somuch as a strategic competitor but rather with uncertainty about whether it is a friendor foe. The President's thinking about Chinamight be called "strategic am bivalence" *Ibid.*, pp. 363-364. This am bivalence was likely only reinforcedas the result of the war on terrorism and the two face to face meetings in late 2001 and early 2002 with Jiang in Shanghai and Beijing, respectively.

14. On Chinese suspicions about the Belgracebon bing and Chinese suspicions about U.S. intentions generally, see Andrew Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2002, pp. 18-19.

15. The authors of this introduction would add that, like the Bush-Jiang talks in Shanghai and Beijing, there was not much of substance that can eout of the H u Jintaovisit to the United States at the invitation of VicePresident Cheney in May 2002 On the Bush-Jiang talks, see, for exam ple, Scobell, "Crouching Korea, Hicken China," p. 359.

PARTI: PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA'S SECURITY AND MILITARY POWER

CHAPTER 2

TH E VIEW FROM BEIJING : U.S.-CH INA SECURITY RELATIONS FROM KOSOVO TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

D av idM. Finkelstein

Introduction.

On October 19, 2001, Presidents 6 eorge W. Bush of the United States and Jiang Zem in of the People's Republic of China (PRC) had their first face to face meeting on the fringes of the Asia-Pacific E conomic Council (APEC) meeting in Shanghai after almost a year of increasingly strained bilateral relations. What was originally scheduled to be a full-blow n sum mitmeeting, to include avisit by Bush to Beijing, was curtailed to a half-day of talks due to the unforeseen and tragic terrorist attacks on the United States on Septem ber 11.¹

By all accounts, the meetings went well enough. The official Chinese press diaracterized the discussions as "constructive and fruitful" and held in a "friendly and candidatm osphere."² In their joint press conference, Bush readily agreed with Jiang that the discussions were useful and that the two menhad "avery goodmeeting."³ Both men agreed to improve relations. Jiang called for "constructive and cooperative relations," as didBush, who acceed the word "candid" to the construct.⁴

The usual "deliverables" that are associated with and often anticipated as a result of these types of U.S.-China summits were modest. But given many months of tense relations and the events of September 11, Bush and Jiang were able to accomplish two key objectives: establish a baseline dialogue from which to attempt to improve relations, especially security relations, andpublidy present a "united front" on the issue of the war on terrorism. In the future, these two threachs may become increasingly interwoven as operations in Afghanistan continue. Inched, for both countries, the war against terrorism will only magnify the importance of placing U.S.-China relations, especially security relations, on an even keel.

For China, the next few years will witness a significant leadership succession - the accession to power of the "Fourth 6 eneration" of leaders in 2002 These are them en whow ill have to grapple with the increasingly difficult task ofpushing forw ard econom icands tructural reform s, while m anaging the social and political dislocations attendant to those reform s. They will have to move forward with the developm ent of China's western region, tackle the internal problem s plaquing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and m anage the issues associated with W orld Trace Organization (WTO) entry. All of this will begoing on while China ill be increasingly placed under the international m icroscope in the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics. Moreover, the Taiw an issue is becoming more complex for Chinese leaders as political developments and domestic politics in Taipei become more complicated Androw that the United States is actually prosecuting military operations in a country with which Chinash ares a land border - alw ays a high order Chinese security concern-Beijing now has a serious stake in not being cut out by W ashington. China simply cannot afford a confrontational relationship with the United States at this point in time if it can be avoided

Needless to say, a confrontational relationship with China will not serve U.S. interests either. Especially because of the cam paign in Afghanistan and the global nature of W ashington's war on terrorism, stable bilateral relations between the United States and China are am ust. The issue of terrorism notwith standing, strained security relations with China serves no ends if it can be avoided Increased U.S.-China tensions will only unnerve W ashington's allies and friench in the Asia-Pacific region. An unstable relationship could have a celeterious impact on U.S. business and trace interests at a time of economic uncertainty. Increased tensions could complicate key U.S. security concerns in East Asia, such as them aintenance of stability on the Korean Peninsula and especially across the Taiw an Strait. Overall, worsening bilateral relations with China could become an unencing foreign policy distraction to a Bush Whitell ouse that needs to focus its foreign policy energies on the war against terrorists.

At the same time, due to a growing mutual distrust that has evolved within the two security establishments over the past few years, security differences between the two nations will be the most drallenging area in which to repair relations and move themforward

U.S. concerns vis-à-vis China are well know n. For the m ostpart, U.S. w orries on the security fronth averevolved around the following four key issues. First, growing concerns that Beijing is prepared to use force to resolve the Taiw an issue "sooner rather than later," basedon a calculus that few in the West can daim to understand with any degree of certainty.⁵ Second, U.S. concern about Chinese proliferation behavior. Third given the lack of defense transpareng in China, uncertainties in the United States as to the intentions behind China's military modernization program s- conventional and nuclear. And fourth, questions in the United States as to whether China would like to see the U.S. military pushedout of the Padific or at least pulled back.⁶ All of these issues are critically important to the regional security interests of the United States. On a 4-tier scale of national interests – (1) survival, (2) vital, (3) m ajor, (4) peripheral – they rate in the vital and m ajor categories. This is not insignificant.

Likewise, in Beijing, the "U.S. factor" in the Chinese national security calculus appears to have grown even greater than in the past. Over the past few years, the perceived "challenges" to Chinesenational sovereignty and security interests posed by the security policies of the United States – real or imagined on their part – are being viewed by a good number of Chinese security analysts with increasing alarm. Whereas, one could argue, U.S. security concerns about China range backwards from "vital" to "major," many Chinese see U.S. drallenges as ranging upwards from "major" to "vital" and, in some cases, even "survival." This trend is extremely worrisom eiftrue

Becausem ostAm erican analysts arealready well aw are of the Chinese security policies that give pause in the United States, the assignment given this student by the conference organizers was to identify the Chinese concerns-which arenot always self-evident. The author of this drapter, therefore, will review the growing uncertainty, concern, and angst with which Beijing has viewed the United States over the past coupleofy ears. Hew ill attempt to view the world through Chinese eyes. Hew ill attempt convey the Chinese analytic framework vis-à-vis the United States-an analytic frame of mind, if you will-as well as specific policy concerns.

The best way to cb so is to review for reachers the serious national security debates that have taken place in Ch in a in the very recent past that, in many ways, have been chiven by Ch in ese angst about the United States. The author will present an overview of the very significant national security debate that took place in Ch in a in 1999 in the afterm ath of NATO's Kosovo intervention.⁷ Hew ill touch briefly on the April 2001 E P-3 incident, and address the "America debate" that was unfolding in Beijing as of the sum merof 2001, just prior to September 11. Finally, the author will speculate about the concerns Chinese analysts might have as they view the security implications of the American campaign in A fight anistan, and presumably, the war against terrorism bey ond

A caveat at the outset is in order. It is important that the Chinese Weltanschauung be fully understood and explained, especially as it concerns the United States. If owever, obing so obes not imply agreement.

1999: K os ov o and the "G reat Peace and D evelopment D ebate."

Overview. From March 1999 through the late fall of 1999, a national security debate took place in China. It was rem arkable on two counts.

For the first time since 1985, Deng Xiaoping's basic assessment of the state of the international security environment—that "peace and development" (# ping YuFazhan) were the trends of the times—was seriously questioned and intensely scrutinized Ofkey significance, the efficacy of China's foreign policies and the validity of China's national defense policies were especially subjected to fervici internal debate.

These condress on that this was aremarkable or entwas that this was likely the first times ince 1949 that Chinese foreign policy and defense policy were openly discussed and debated in the government-controlled media as matters of public concern-to induce criticisms of government policies by the general populace

Jucging from the Chinesepress, during the height of the debate (the summer of 1999) almost every literates ector of the China polity was apparently engaged in a media free for-all on foreign policy and defense issues. This included intellectuals, middle class entrepreneurs, students, and even Chinese government analysts who took to the eop-edpages, radio call-in shows, and TV round tables.⁸

Public discourse revolved about the state of the world, China's place in it, the state of Chinese security, as well as what the government in Beijing should cb about these issues and about the United States.

The proxim at e cause of this debate was NATO's military intervention in Kosovo in March 1999. NATO's errant

bom bing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrace in May added fuel to the debate. If one ever, behind these issues were long-simmering Chinese concerns that the post-ColdW ar international order was not unfolding as Chinese international relations theorists hadpredicted The debate, especially the internal debate, was also chiven by increasing Chinese concerns about U.S. strategic intentions and policies in the post-ColdW ar order in general, and towards China in particular.

A tits most fundamental level, the debate that took place in 1999 was about how the Chinese government should assess the state of the unfolding international security environment. But most important, it was about the implications of that assessment for China's external security.

The overarching question was simple: had China's external security situation function entally deteriorated as a result of NATO's intervention in Kosovo? This question brough t others to the surface W hat did other global and regional security developments portend? And should China adjust its domestic priorities, its foreign policies, or its defense policies?

On the diplom atic front, for exam ple, questions were raised as to whether the Chinese government had been placing too much emphasis on cultivating the "developed world" – especially the United States – instead of the "developingworld," which ith adtraditionally emphasized? Others asked whether the government was becoming involved in international affairs that were too far removed from China's traditional, more narrow ly defined national interests. In effect, this question asked whether the central leadership was walking away from Deng Xiaoping's oft-quoted dictum that in foreign affairs "Chinash ould keep a low profile and never take the lead"

On the issue of national defense modernization, some voiced concerns that the "U.S.-led" Kosovo intervention was evidence that China could no longer afford to continue to

subjugate defensem odernization to econom ic development. In deed, some argued that it was now time to place equal emphasis on the two.

As weshall see, it was not just the Kosovo intervention that made this an issue. Other issues simmering in the backgroundwere at work, and it is important to point out that those who saw a need for enhanced military defense were not just in the People's Liberation Army (PLA): they were as likely to be found in dvilian ministries and their affiliated institutes.

But at the heart of the debate in official dirdes were questions about the United States as a world actor in general, W ashington's specific intentions tow ard China, and the future of U.S.-China relations. Indeed, alm ost all Chineseon every side of the debate were able to agree that any deleterious dranges in the international security environment and any degradation of China's own security were a function of the actions and intentions, real or perceived of the United States.

By most accounts, the "U.S. question" in particular was the most contentious issue debated internally by Chinese government analysts and other officials. As one Chinese put it, "The Chinese reaction to Kosovo created the political atmosphere that unleashed a debate by those unsatisfied with PRC policy toward the U.S." At a certain point in the discourse, the question of whether confrontation with the United States was inevitable became the centerpiece of discourse Other questions revolved about how to deal with the United States and the traceoffs between cooperation and confrontation with Washington.

In the lexicology of Chinese analyses, all of these issues and others were captured by asking whether "peace and development" was still "the key note of the times."

To grasp the significance of the question, one must understand the implications of questioning the validity of "peace and development" as the "key note of the times" (*sh iclai zh uti*). Doing so requires a step back to recall M ao Zecong's assessment and D eng Xiaoping's reversal of that assessment. In China these assessments are not mere exercises in theoretical discourse they are the starting point for justifying or rationalizing specific national policy decisions.⁹ Therefore, a review of the differences in domestic, foreign, and military policies justified by the very different assessments made by M ao and D eng provides a historical context with which to view the debate of 1999.

The Maoist Line "War and Revolution." In the 1960s and 1970s, the Maoist assessment of the international security environment was commonly stated as "war and revolution" (*zh an zh eng yu gen ing*). This was a result of the perceived military threats to China from the United States and especially the Soviet Union after the break between Moscow and Beijing. It was also a function of the ideological lens through which Maoviewed the world

As a result of this assessment, China's security posture and its domestic policies were characterized by keeping the Chinesenation and the PLA on awar footing, perpetuating "dass struggle" with in China, and pursuing a foreign policy focused on the "socialist camp" and there rolutionary "Third World" For the most part, China remained "dosed" to the capitalist world

As we know, this assessmenth adaprofound impact on the economy and society. The combined requirements of being on a war footing and Mao's ideological imperatives resulted in an autarkic economy; an emphasis on heavy inclustries moved in land the perpetuation of the policies of the communization of agriculture and inclustry; and the near-destruction of the national bourgeoisie

For its part, the PLA was toldto expect "early war, major war, and nuclear war." This meant maintaining a massive defense establishment, relying on "People's War" as a military strategy, and a belief that "superior" political will could overcome the advanced technologies of potential opponents. It also perpetuated the high ly elevated status of the PLA in the Chinese polity.

The Dengist Line "Peace and Development." In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping began taking China dwn a path of bold drange. Deng's reassessment of the "key note of the times" provided a critical ideological basis for them yriadofsea-drange reforms that would ensue. It also was the justification for a drange in national priorities. By 1985 Deng had reversed the Maoist assessment completely.

Where Maosaw "war and revolution" as the context for international security, Deng acknow ledged the changes in superpower relations and China's own prospects. Deng's reassessmentheld that "peaceand development" (hepingyu fazhan) more correctly described the trends in the world The Dengist view held that, in spite of the continuing dangers to Chinaposed by wars and conflicts, the possibility of a world war was remote, the chance of a nuclear war between the superpowers was slight, China did not face the prospect of imminent invasion, and China would enjoy at least 2 decades of a peaceful international environment

The policy dianges derived from this assessment are well known. Domestically, "economics as the central task" replaced "class struggle as the key link." In foreign relations, China began to seek contact and good relations with the capitalist world as well as the socialist camp, and with developed countries as well as developing countries. "Reform and opening up" (gaige yu kaifeng) became the major thrust.

In the area of defense policy, the PLA was taken offaw ar footing and shifted on to a prolonged period of "peacetime arm y-building," thus initiating the reforms of the Chinese military that persist today: namely moving toward a (relatively)leaner, but more technologically advanced PLA. Just as importantly, Dengplaced military modernization as the last priority in his "Four Modernizations." At an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission in June 1985, Deng explained his reassessment to his generals. While recognizing the changers that persisted, he asserted that "thew orld forces for peace are growing faster than the forces for war." Deng told his military leaders to be patient, to place economic construction above all else, and towait for at least 20 years. At that time China's economic strength would permit a greater emphasis on military modernization.

Fast forw and to 1999. Clearly then, the critique of the D engist assessment during the Kosovo debate engendered major implications for the broadsweep of Chinesecomestic, foreign, and defense policies. If "peace and development" were no longer the trend, what was? DidKosovo signify the trium phof the "forces for war" over the "forces for peace"? Should China raise defense modernization at the expense of economic reform? Should Beijing turn its back on the develop ecland capitalist world and focus its foreign policies on the developing world exclusively? Is conflict with the United States inevitable?

Draconian as these questions may seem, the highly drarged atm osphere in Beijing in the afterm ath of the Kosovo intervention (and especially after the errant bom bing of the PRC Em bassy in Belgrade) provided a backchop against which these types of questions could be asked and debated for the first time in many years as Chinese analysts attempted to make sense out of a post-Cold W ar international order that, from the perspective of some, now seem ed to be moving against Chinese national interests.

The degree of angst in Beijing during this period is partially explained by comparing China's successes in the preceding 3y ears, 1996-99, with events in late 1998 and in early 1999.

Prior to 1999: Ricling the Waves of SelfConfidence Between 1996 and late 1998, Beijing had every reason to feel new ly confident in its place in the world order, especially inforeign affairs.

- ? In the wake of the 1995-96 Taiw an Strait crises, U.S.-China relations seem eclto be back on track after the two presidential summits in 1997 and 1998. An agreement to seek a "Constructive Strategic Partnership" was announced, and President William Clinton publicly stated the "Three No's" in Shangh ai.¹⁰
- ? Nearly 10 years after Tiananm en, alm ost all foreign econom ics anctions against Chinah ad been lifted
- ? Between 1996 and 1998, a very proactive foreign policy spearh eacled by Jiang resulted in the establishment of a series of "partnerships" around the globewith key developed countries.¹¹
- ? H ong K ong's retrocession to Chinaw as accomplished, and M acao's was to be next.
- ? If um an rights issues no longer appeared to beam ajor impediment to China's foreign economic relations. Not only had Europeseem ingly lost interest in this issue but also, for the first time in many years, the United States in 1998 did not sponsor a resolution condemning China at the annual meeting of the United Nations (U.N.) If um an Rights Commission in Genera.
- ? Beijing w as m aking excellent progress in resolving border disputes with neighbors, notably Russia and even Vietnam. Moreover, the "Shanghai Five" arrangem ent between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan was well under way.¹²
- ? Chinahadreceivedaccolades from around the world for "responsible" behavior during the Asian financial crisis, and for the moment the focus of regional

concern in Asiaw as on financial recovery, not China's rise as a regional power.

? On the Taiw an front, the PRC seem ed to be on the move, and Taipei appeared to be on the defensive. In addition to obtaining the "Three No's" from the U.S. President, Chinaw as pressuring Taiw an for political talks andw aging an active diplom aticoffensive tow oo those countries thats till recognized Taipei. The loss of diplom atic relations with South A frica in 1998 was a serious blow to Taiw an in this regard

Dom estically, the situation was tolerable. China was able to weather the Asian financial crisis without devaluating its currency. Grow the was acceptable, if not as great as desired. The social dislocations attendant to economic reform seemed manageable, although concerns about labor unrest persisted

1999: A Year of D is as ters. Juxtapose clagainst 3y ears of relatively smooth sailing, the close of 1998 and the first months of 1999 brought, from a Chinese perspective, om inous developments in key areas of concern: Japan, Taiw an, and relations with the United States. Some of these events took place before the Kosovo intervention or the Embassy bombing, others afterwards. The net effect, how ever, was to raise fears among many Chinese officials and analysts that security trenck were now turning against China's interests. These events provided both a context for the clabate of 1999 and, in some cases, new impetus during the clabate.

Japan. Throughout this period (1998, 1999) developments in Japan begin to be viewed with increasing apprehension by the Chinese analytic *xitong*.

? In December 1998 the Government of Japan announced its decision to join the United States in co-research of the upper-tier Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program.

- ? In March 1999 the Japan Maritim e SelfD efense Force fired upon North Korean vessels- the first shots fired in anger by the Japanese ann ed forces since the endofW orldW ar II.
- ? The Japanese Diet ratified the Revised 6 uidelines for Defense Cooperation with the United States in May 1999, refusing to specify for Beijing whether Taiwan was included in the ambiguous phrase "areas surrounding Japan."
- ? All of this added to concerns about Japan in the wake of Jiang's less than successful visit to that country in late November 1998.

Taiw an. In early July 1999 then-President Lee Teng-hui issued his "Two-State Theory," which resulted in another "mini-crisis" in cross-Strait relations. Enough said.

United States. To one degree or another, the United States, during the debate, began to be viewed by many analysts in Beijing as the root cause of the negative trenck in Japanese and Taiw an affairs in addition to becoming a problem in its own right. What did Chinese analysts focus on?

- ? In January 1999 the Clinton administration announcedits decision to move forward on National MissileD effense
- ? In April 1999 Zhu Rongji's visit to W ashington for the expressed purpose of negotiating Chineseperm anent norm al trading relations (PNTR) and W TO membership enced in failure Indeed, in late March there had been a "mini-debate" in China as town ether Zhushouldh av egone at all, given the inauguration of the NATO air campaign against Serbia and a lack of consensus with in the Chinese bureaucracy about the types of concessions Beijing could afford to make in those negotiations.

? Through out this period, Chinese analysts began to assess that the so-called "anti-China" voices in the United States were gaining the upper hand over China policy. Some of the more prominent "data points" they dited included the "Cox Committee Report" (May) and the Los Alam os espionage case; the tabling of the Taiw an Security Enhancement Act (A pril-May); the requirement levied on the Department of Defense to publish its study on hypothetical theater ballisticm issile defense (TBMD) architectures in Asia including Taiwan; the possibility of the sale of TBMD-related ractars to Taipei (June); and the concern over China's alleged future influence over the Panam a Canal (July).

NATO and Kosovo. Then, of course, therew as the issue of Kosovo itself. Som eChineses ecurity analysts believed it established precedents for military interventions in the "internal affairs" of sovereign states and dem on strated the "will" of the United States (as viewed from Beijing) to use force "to maintain its world dominance" Kosovo shocked many Chinese into questioning whether the global trends were in fact away from war and toward China's much-touted multipolar world order- the previous analysis.

The air cam paign began in March while Jiang Zem in was in Italy, a NATO member, as part of a three-nation European visit. In deciding to intervenew ith military force, NATO sides tepped the U.N. and marginalized Security Councilmembers China and Russia. Then, in early May, the PRC Embassy was inadvertently attacked

Just as disconcerting to the Chinese were other NATO-related events. In April, NATO accepted Poland, H ungary, and the Czech Republicas new members. During NATO's 50th anniversary celebrations in W ashington, a new "Strategic Concept" was declared that induced out-of-aream issions. Also around that time (June) was the coining of the "Clinton Doctrine," which was interpreted in China as espousing the legitim acy of military interventions in sovereign nations for hum anitarian purposes. Beijing immediately thought of the implications for Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and carefully watch eddevelopments in Checkiny a.¹³

Dom esticConcerns. Even on the cbm esticfront, the first h alf of 1999 presented issues for concern with in Zhongnanhai. H igh-profile corruption cases continued to em barrass the Party; reform s of the state-ow ned enterprises were becom ing difficult to carry out; and consumer cbm and at hom ewas slow ing. If the H ong K ong press is to be believed, large scale and often-violent incidents of labor unrest continued to plague local governments on them ainland Even more unsettling were the rise in the profile of the China Democracy Party follow ing the Clinton visit to China (1998) and the "shock" of the Falun & ong phenomenon beginning in April 1999 and continuing to cby.

Overall then, in just a few months the confidence of Chinese leaders and their analysts was significantly shaken. They were no longer so certain of their place in the world order or of their assessment of world trends as favoring China's continued rise both at home and abroad

The Results of the D ebate. At the end of the day, after reams of analysis and incessant rounds of meetings, the debate re-looked many of these key issues. And by the time the Beidaihem eetings took place in August 1999 there was dosure on many of them: at least on an official level (if not intellectually).

That dosure can ein the form of a new shorth and for the state of the international security situation referred to as "The Three No Changes and the Three New Changes."

The "Three No Changes" assert the following:

- ? Peace and developm ent remain the trend in international relations and the movem ent tow ard a multipolar world continues;
- ? Econom icglobalization continues to increase; and,
- ? The major trend is toward the relaxation of international tensions.

But these three points we remodified by the "Three New Changes":

- ? Hegemonism and power politics are on the rise,
- ? The trend tow ard military interventionism is increasing; and
- ? The gap between developed and developing countries is increasing.

Clearly, these two sets of seem ingly contradictory assessments represented a comprom is eposition between thosewhowere relatively optim is ticabout long-term trencts and those who were very much focused on and concerned about near-term negative developments.

The "Three No Changes" reaffirm ed the basic thrust of D eng's earlier analysis. China did not now face "early war, major war, and nuclear war." It reaffirm ed the analyses by Chinese international relations theorists since the late 1980s that the world would *eventually* move toward a multipolar international order and that China would become one of the key poles. It also recognized the growing importance of economics in international relations. So, to a great degree, it accounted for the view softh osew ho did *not* see Kosovo and other security-related events of concern as requiring a major readjustment of the D engist assessment.

This form ulation haddred and immediate implications for Chinese domestic policies. It reaffirmed the correctness of "econom ics as the central task" and provided the continued ideological justification for the leadership in Beijing to press forwardwith the next phases of econom ic and structural reform, to include the pursuit of W TO mem bership. So when Chinese interlocutors say that "nothing dranged" as a result of K osovo, they are not being disingenuous. There was, in fact, no decision to reverse the Dengist line and the direction of comestic reform s.

However, som ething *did* diange after Kosovo. The "Three New Changes" added serious caveats to the generally positive long-term trends dited in the first part of the construct.

For one thing, the "Three New Changes" was an ach ission that previous Chinese government analyses of thenear-term trench in the international security had been much too optim istic about the *pace* of global multipolarization and much too quick to dismiss the potentially destabilizing effects that local wars and worldwide military interventions might have on China's interests.

Clearly, Beijing's much-hoped for multipolar world order was not around the corner. In addition, the new assessment certainly undercut the assertion in the 1998 DefenseWhite Paper that "the influence of arm ed conflicts and local warshad been remarkably weakened" In fact, the "Three New Changes" undercut the entire tenor of the first section of the 1998 DefenseWhite Paper.

These conduction of the plicit in the "Three New Changes" is the Chinese assessment of the root cause of the problem s facing worlds ecurity and stability.

Previously, Beijing had seen the United States as one sourceofsom eofth eproblem splaguing worlds ecurity, both econom ic and military. But there were plenty of other nations and non-national actors view eclas problem atic In thew akeofK os ov o and ah ost of otherevents since 1998, the mix of problem s remained the same But the United States and its policies were now starting to be viewed as a principal source of the seproblem s, especially for China. And by most accounts the "Three New Changes" is about the United States almost exclusively.

Of equal significance, the new assessment, and a reinforced view of the United States as a superpower "hegem on," seem editoh aveput to rest previous derigueur internal and academ ic assessments that the "comprehensivenational power" of the United States was in a slow decline- an analytic "line" that had been commonplace for at least a decade ¹⁴ The new lineseem s to be accompanied by an assessment that the United States will maintain its status as "sole superpower" for the next 20 y ears, if not longer.

At the end of the day, then, the degree to which the post-debate analysis of the international and regional security environment, and the assessment of the US, became an official "line" was reflected in the formulations in the first section of the October 2000 D effense White Paper.

The October 2000 Defense White Paper, China's National Defense 2000, provided a much more sober assessment of the trenck in international and regional security than had been articulated in the July 1998 version. Some of the assessments from the important first section of the October 2000 Defense White Paper are worth reviewing.¹⁵

- ? "In today's world factors that may cause instability and uncertainty have markedly increased."
- ? "Hegemonism and power politics still exist and are further developing."
- ? "Certain big powers are pursuing neointerventionism, neo-gunboat diplomacy, and neo-economic colonialism . . . which are seriously dam aging the sovereignty, independence, and

developm ent interests of m any countries, and threatening world peace and security."

- ? "The United Nations' authority and role in handing international and regional security affairs . . . are being seriously drallenged."
- ? "Local wars and arm ed conflicts . . . have increased again."
- ? "There are ... new negative developments... in the security of the Asia-Pacific region."
- ? "The Taiw an Straits situation . . . is complicated and grim ."

Finally, to underscore increasing concern over Chinese security, the Defense White Paper of 2000 announced the following:

... in view of the fact that hegen on ism and power politics still exist and are further developing, and in particular, the basis for the country's peaceful reunification is seriously imperiled, China will have to enhance its capability to defend its sovereignty and security by military means.

The Unique Interests of the PLA. If there was any institution in Ch ina that had a significant corporate stake in the events surrounding K osovo, it was the PLA. Needless to say, dosely watching and studying NATO's campaign against Serbia as it unfolded was a matter of intense professional interest. But the PLA had an equally large bureaucratic interest in the internal and public debate triggered by K osovo. The debate provided a window of opportunity for Ch ina's military establishment to argue publidy, and likely behind dosed cbors as well, that national defense and military modernization deserved a greater priority in overall national development than had been accorded with erto.

The arguments surrounding the need for a greater en phasis on defensem odernization by the PLA (and others) gained momentum as a result of two events: the May 1999 bom bing of the PRC Em bassy in Belgrade (in which a Chinesem ilitary attachéw as wounded), and Lee Teng-hui's espousal of the "Two-State Theory" in July 1999. In the past, such arguments by the top PLA leadership in public fora had been som en hat politically incorrect, although once in a while a senior PLA leader would make his case. For example, in 1996 Defense Minister 6 eneral Chill actian v rote a long article in CCP's official journal, Seeking Truth (Qiushi), in which he stated, "The building of national defense . . . cannot exceed the limitation of tolerance of econom ic construction, nor can it be laid aside until the economy has totally prospered."¹⁶ For the most part, how ever, in public, the top PLA leadership had for years dutifully recited the Dengist mantra that "defense m odernization m ust remain subordinate to econom ic construction." If ereal as a diance to press the case for more funding.

It should be pointed out, how ever, that publidy the top PLA leadership did not drallenge this line during the debate. As mentioned above, having the leadership of the Central Military Commission, for example, make the case in the press during such a period of emotionalism and sensationalism was likely still toosensitive from a comestic political standpoint.¹⁷ Nevertheless, there seem ed to be plenty of senior colonels and other field grade officers who were quite willing to make the arguments. Consequently, during the period of the debate the PLA's official new spaper, Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun Bao), carried an unending stream of "opinion pieces" from individual officers that warned the nation of the consequences of ignoring national defense, hypedth eth reat posed by the United States to international peace and stability, and, in some cases, argued that military m odernization should at least be equal to national econom ic construction.

In these regards, the tim ing of Kosovo could not have been better. For one thing, work on the 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005) was already under way but not yet complete. There as still a drance to press for an increase in funding. Moreover, just 8 m on this earlier, in July 1998, Jiang had ordered the PLA to divest itself of its commercial enterprises - the large corporate en pire that it had run for m any years which provided them ilitary with a source of (1) extra-buckpetary funct for soldier "quality of life," (2) employment for PLA spouses and demobilized officers, (3) supplemental operations and maintenance (O&M) funct, and () functs for equipment procurement. Not only did the PLA losem any of its corporate entities, but it didso under a doud The decision to have the military dives twas tied to evidence brought to the attention of Jiang of largescale sm uggling and corruption by som emilitary commercial entities in the south. Consequently, the Kosovo intervention, and especially the bom bing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrace, gave the PLA an opportunity to burnish its im age am ong the general public by riding the creat of nationalist sentiment as the defenders of Chinese sovereignty.

These particularistic interests aside, NATO's Kosovo intervention also crovehom etom any in the PLA onceagain justhow large a capabilities gap still existed between their own armed forces and those of the advanced Western nations, especially the United States, even after nearly a clecacle of post-G ulf W ar reform and modernization. The frustration of some military officers at the relatively low priority of military modernization in the greater scheme of national clevelopment was articulated by a general line of argument that goes like this: "Wewere told that wew ould have to be patient, that military modernization would have to await economic modernization. We have been patient for 20 years. How long must we wait?"

But the PLA rhetoric surrounding Kosovo served another important purpose It was used to high light to the Chinese arm edforces the importance of following through with the wideranging programs of reform that had been underway for the last decade. Many of these reforms – especially in the areas of force structure dwnsizing and personnel administration – had been meeting some resistance below. As Chief of the & eneral StaffF u Quany outh adpointed out ay ear earlier, grassroots units had to overcome "selfish departmentalism and overem phasis of local interests" and move forward with drange for the greater good of the PLA.¹⁸ Especially in light of the situation on Taiw an, the PLA leadership used the Kosovo intervention and the debate to lecture its own people that reform and modernization of themilitary was a serious undertaking and not merely a bureau cratic exercise.

While it is clear that military modernization was not going to supplant economic construction as the national priority, or even be equal to it in emphasis, some of these arguments by the PLA, or by others on behalf of the PLA, probably had an impact on the top Chinese leadership. Clearly, for various internal political reasons, the concerns of the PLA could not be totally ignored Consequently, not long after the PRC Embassy bom bing, rum ors abounded that the central governmenth adprovided themilitary with a large, supplemental lump-sum infusion of funct.¹⁹

6 iven the call for enhanced national defense by the PLA and others in the post-Kosovo debate, the demise of many PLA business interests, these curity assessment articulated in the October 2000 D efense White Paper, and the politics of succession, it was not too much of a surprise when in December 2000 the Chinese Finance Minister announced an increase of 17.7 percent for defense spending for 2001.

Overall then, the elebate of 1999 was an occasion for Beijing tovent, anguish, and wonder about China's national security and the future of U.S.-China relations.

Interregnum : Decem ber 1999 Through April 2001.

At an official level, "the great debate" can e to a dosein late August 1999 when the Beidaihe leadership meetings promulgated the "Three No Changes and Three New Changes." It was not until December, how ever, that the public debate in the Chinesem edia finally came to a dose. At this point in time, the central authorities apparently decided that enough public debate on the issues of national defense, national security, and Chinese foreign policy had taken placeam ong them asses. By the endof 1999, editors of them ajor new spapers were reportedly no longer accepting op-ects from their readerships or writing editorials on these issues. There were other pressing issues with which to grapple: W TO accession, the inception in February 2000 of the "GoWest" can paign, the continuing "Three Represents Cam paign," and a host of other domestic and foreign policy issues; not the least of which was the work needed to be obne on the 10th Five Year Plan, the beginning of the succession process, and the preparatory work for the 16th Party Congress.

By the sum mer of 2000, how ever, Chinese foreign policy analysts were once again running fast to keep up with events in the United States. Attention was now focused on two issues: the ongoing presidential election cam paign and the perception that American military strategy was shifting to Asia- a Chinese concern that surfaced even before the Bush election victory and the subsequently published Quachennial Defense Review (QDR) issued by the Pentagon in Septem ber 2001.

The cataly zing event for Chinese analysts wondering about a U.S. "strategic focus shift" (*zh anlue zh ongdian zh uanyi*) to Asiaw ere news reports that the U.S. Air Force desired to forward deploy stockpiles of cruise missiles to 6 uam in the summer of 2000. Chinese concerns about a "strategic shift" linger today, especially given some of the language in the recent QD R cboument. For them ost part, how ever, the Chinesecom munity of America experts was fully engaged following election politics in the UnitedStates and wondering and speculating about what would be "better for China"- a Bush or a Gore election victory. The only people likely more frustrated than the American publicat the time it took to decide finally the election winner was the corps of Chinese America experts who were probably under tremencous pressure to explain what was going on, and what the implications of a Bush or Gorevictory or defeatmeant for China. And many a Chinese institute was ted its funds in having delegations go to the United States in late November 2000 for post-election made.

After the Bush election was confirmed arguments went back and forth in China as to the implications. Cautious optim ists pointed to Bush's father, "Lao Bushe," as a probable force for an eliorating the Republican Party cam paign rhetoric Especially disconcerting to Beijing was the exportation of the Clinton-Jiang "Constructive Strategic Partnership " construct and the substitution of the "StrategicCompetitor" label. They pointedout as well that, sooner rather than later, economic realities would trium ph, and the U.S. business community would eventually weigh in. After all, Bush and som eofh is principal deputies were from corporate America. They argued as well that all administrations start out "tough" on China, and they recalled the Clinton campaign slogan about "coddling dictators." Those on the other side of the argument dism issed these lines of analysis as delusion. The trend, they argued as already dear: the United States is bent on confronting China on all fronts and the Bush victory means the ascendance of the "anti-China" elements. At the end of the day, they argued the United States was still determ ined to pursue a strategic objective of " esternizing and splitting" China.

When the EP-3 incident occurred on April 1, 2001, these arguments were far from resolved, but for them on ent they

w ere held in dieck as the PRC & overnment tried to decide w hat to cb about a situation that could quickly deteriorate It is far too early to even attempt to understand (if weever can) the calculus by w hich Beijing acted vis-à-vis the United States during the 11 days the American aircrew was detained on H ain an Island But for this student, at least, it was dear at the time and remains dear to day that comestic politics in China were paramount.

Jiang and the senior party leadership had learneds on e important lessons as a result of the errant NATO attack on the PRC Embassy in Belgrace in May 1999. Most of these lessons had to comit the edomestics cene, not international relations or U.S.-China relations. It was dear at the time of the EP-3 incident in April 2001, that Jiang would not countenance a repetition of the situation that took place after the bom bing alm ost 2 years earlier.

There were three very dear indicators of this. First, Jiang and the central leadership came out "tough" on the United States from the start. There would be no room allow edfor accusations from any quarter in China that the Party and government was unwilling or incapable of defending Chineses overeignty and dignity as was the case, som ehadargued, after the Belgrade bom bing.

Second, there would be no students marching through the streets or gathering at or besieging the U.S. Embassy as in May 1999. This, one suspects, was not somuchout of concern for the Americans as out of concern about stability on the streets of Beijing and beyond. The sensitive "May 4 th" period was much too dose at hand, as was the anniversary of the cleath of Hu Yaobang (April 15, 1989), a significant event for the student movement in the spring of 1989. And, of course, the Falun & ong problem hady et to be completely resolved

Third, unlike the immediate periodafter the bombing in May 1999, there would be no media "free for all," no great and public debates about national security policy, no criticisms of the government, and no reopening of the "peace and developm ent" question. All things considered, during the EP-3 incident, the PRC & overnm ent dem onstrated once again how capably it is able to reign-in them edia when it drooses to do so.²⁰ Relatively speaking, there was no radical editorializing that could under cut PRC governm ent positions or serve to reopen debates that had already been resolved "officially."²¹ Any bile that needed to be vented in the press could be done at the expense of the United States this time around

In other words, and overall, in the wake of the EP-3 incident, the Party this time stayed ahead of Chinese nationalism and popular indignation and was not drasing after it, as was the case after the embassy bom bing in 1999.

Post EP-3 and the Summer of 2001: Is China the U.S.'s New Enemy?

The EP-3 incident did not reopen debate on the prospects for "peacean does elopment" or thestate of the international security situation. But it did reopen the portion of the "G reat D ebate of 1999" that was them ost contentious and upon which there was the least consensus at the time: the future of U.S.-China relations.

Before the U.S. EP-3w as returned, and before Secretary of State Colin Powell even confirmed his visit to Beijing, a new debate was underway among the Chinese America-watching community. Since at least May 2001 they had apparently been engaged in another round of intense debates, sem inars, meetings, and conferences at which the issue of U.S. policy toward China was being discussed

The EP-3 incident was the proximate cause of the new roundofmeetings and discussions. But it was not the sole cause Like the unprecedented debate in 1999, the debate that began after the April 2001 incident checked up a growing list of concerns that were aw aiting evaluation. But there was one aspect of the EP-3 incident that dearly hadavery profound impact upon analysts and the general public in China (and, incidentally, upon the American public as well). Specifically, the intense news coverage of the event in the West and in China madevery public for probably the first time just how much "cat and mouse" activity was going on between the U.S. and Chinese militaries.

So as of the sum mer of 2001 the following questions were being explored in Chinese analy tic circles once again:

- ? How should China assess the current state of U.S.-China relations?
- ? What "China policy" will the Bush adh inistration adopt? and,
- ? W h at are the prospects for future relations?

Central to these other questions was "H ad the United States decided that China is the enemy and that this will drive U.S. policy tow ard China and the U.S. larger security strategy in Asia?"

As was the case during the debate in 1999, aw iderange of views among Chinese security analysts on these questions was allegedly held Moreover, as was also the case in 1999, analysts of likem in ded opinion could be found crossing institutional and bureaucratic boundaries. Some observers offered that the PRC government "learned its lesson" from the debate of 1999: although the debate was "active and intense," it was conducted in a "cool-headed and analy tic fash ion" and mostly kept out of the media.

No condusions are known to have been reached Many Chinese analysts believed that it was still too early tomake any condusions about U.S. policies or intentions toward China. At the same time many Chinese analysts were said to agreew it hageneral assessment that the trench in U.S. policies and actions toward China in the last fewm on ths h adbeen "negative." Therew as along list of datapoints that m any Chinesecited as indicating a negative trendin "Bush administration" China policy. (Again, listing these points obes not indicate concurrence) These inducted

- ? The Bush cam paign rh etoric portraying China as a "strategic com petitor," not a "strategic partner";
- ? Bush administration plans tomove an eadwith BMD (perceived to be directed partially at China);
- ? The strength ening of U.S.-Japan military relations (also perceived to be directed at China);
- ? The "loud anti-China voices" that openly point to Beijing as the next enemy, and research monographs by some U.S. think tanks (prongly perceived to represent U.S. Government policy) that propose a U.S. China policy option termed "congagement";
- ? The perception that the focus of the new U.S.m ilitary strategy is shifting from Europe to Asia and that this shift is directed against China;
- ? The U.S. desire to move doser to India;
- ? Bush's April 2001 remarks about the defense of Taiw an;
- ? Increasing arms sales to Taiw an and especially expanding military contacts with Taiw an (some Chinese analysts argue the United States is moving tow arda *defactom* ilitary alliancew ith Taipei);
- ? The recent U.S. visit by Lee Teng-hui;
- ? The belief of some Chinese analysts that the United States "pressured" Tokyo to allow Lee Teng-hui to visit Japan;
- ? The U.S. transit of Chen Shui-bian;

- ? The "attitude" of the Pentagon tow and military relations with Chinasince the EP-3 episode;
- ? The U.S. "attack" on hum an rights in China in Genera;
- ? The appointment of a State Department coordinator for Tibetan affairs and the Dalai Lamavisit; and,
- ? The general "anti-China" attitudes of some officials appointed to the new administration.

Clearly, there were some Chinese analysts who were already convinced that the United States had designated China as its next enemy. Others believed that the United States had already decided upon a "two-track" China policy that combines "economic engagement and military containment." Still others argued that Bush's China policy hady et to be decided

Not all were convinced that the future of relations was as dire as recent events would suggest. These individuals tended to argue that Beijing's and W ashington's mutual interest in stable relations for reasons of strictly selfish national interests were so strong that the "negative trend" would be arrested "at some point," that pragmatism in W ashington "would eventually prevail," and that relations would eventually improve.

For example, in late May 2001 the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) held a forum on U.S.-China relations to which various experts were invited to present their views. In summarizing the results of the conference in their journal, CICIR editors pointed out many of the challenges from W ashington. But the conferencesummary in the journal encedon a relatively optim isticnote:

Most of the participants to the forum traced the currents tate of affairs to policy guidelines of President Bush in designating Beijing a "strategic competitor" and its tilt to the Taiw an authorities in support of elements advocating "Taiw an independence." China has clearly been the target of W ashington's current enceavor at strengthening ties with its allies and pushing ah eadwith its NMD program. But all this obes not signify the last word in the Bush team 's China policy because external and internal restraints would make the Bush ach inistration return to a relatively rational course after a period of reassessments. Based on the above analysis, most participants believe that there is no need for pessim ism about the future of China-US relationship. Un avoidable contradictions and frictions cb not necessarily spell loss of control because the prices for conflicts would be prohibitively high for both parties.²²

It is difficult to say with any certainty that the above "optim istic" assessment ("hopeful" might be a better word) was representative of a majority of PRC security analysts or that it represented a commonly heldview point. Some of the actual papers that were presented at the CICIR conference seemed, on the whole, less optim istict an reported above.²³

Operation "Enduring Freedom "- Speculating About PRC Security Concerns.

Obviously, the events of Septem ber 11 dranged the entire context of the Bush-Jiang Sum mit. Although the Bush visit to China was much curtailed, the fact that the American President went to Shangh ai to attend A PE C and meet with Jiang under the circum stances was dearly a cleasion with positive impact both in China and through out the region. The meeting dearly provided both leaders the ability tom oveback on a track tow arch orestable relations. And to the degree that both menhave been constrained som ewhat by comestic politics in their approach to bilateral ties, their professed common cause in the war against terrorism enhanced the arguments for engagement on a strategic level.

At the same time, how the United States and the coalition campaign against the Taliban- and the greater war against terrorism – unfolds will be at dedwith great

care by the corps of Chinese security analysts. One can speculate that the Chinesew ill bevery wary of the potential negative collateral impact of the post-Septem ber 11 world order for Chinese security concerns in general and specific key Chinese national security interests in particular. In this final section, permit a bit of *speculation* about the negative impact Chinese security analysts *might* see in what has transpired since September 11.

Impact on Pakistan: A Key Security Partner. China daims that it has nom ilitary alliances, and in the technical sense that is quite true. But form any years Pakistan and China have been very dose security partners. Their common cause is based on shared distrust of an enduring mutual antagonist – India. But China's interests in Pakistan transcend that shared animosity.

For Beijing, Pakistan is one of many key Islam ics tates that it cultivates in order achieve some leverage in the Moslem world, owing to concerns about its own restive northwest province of Xinjiang. Pakistan's importance to Chinahas been on the rises ince January 2001. Chinahas nervous ly watched as the Bush ach inistration has re-looked previous U.S. allegations that China continues to transfer missile technologies to Islam aboud, and Beijing analysts have evinced concerns watching the new impetus in the United States for *rapprochementw* ith India.

In the blink of an eye the events of Septem ber 11 have witnessed an am azingly quick U.S. return to engagement with Pakistan. Forced to "choose" between the United States and the Taliban regimeith adhitherto supported, Islam abadmaceits choice, and Chinese security analysts cannot but woncer about the long-term implications of the reemergence of U.S.-Pakistanise curity relations for its own equities there. Moreover, should the government in Pakistan undergoits own internal dislocations as a result of its support for W ashington, Chinese interests will be open to question. If aving moved from proliferating pariah to active partner in the U.S. w ar in A fight an istan, a long-time and very dose Chineses ecurity partner now has a foot in both camps.

Impacton Sino-Russian Relations. Rapprochementwith Russia is likely the greatest Chinese foreign policy success of the post-Cold W ar (1991) period & costrategically, the endofSino-Russian animosity has resulted in Chinahaving today themost secure land borders it has ever enjoyed In July 2001, capping 10 years of steadily improved relations, Presidents Jiang and V ladimir Putin signed amajor treaty aimed at institutionalizing their "Cooperative Strategic Partnership."

While Beijing and Moscow have their own historical reasons to look askance at each other, events of the last few years have chawn them doser together politically. Both nations are function entally dissatisfied with how the post-ColdW arw orldorder has unfolded In short, the global political, economic, and military provises of the United States has been an unhappy state of affairs for each. Both nations w ant global power diffused with at least some power accruing to them – in a much - theorized multi-polar worldorder.

The convergence of political views between Beijing and Moscow has been manifold opposition to the expansion of NATO and Partnership for Peace, common cause against the strengthening of military alliances in the Padific (read U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Australia, U.S.-ROK); opposition to the U.S. National MissileD effense program; mutual support for their respective daims to sovereignty in Chechnya and Taiwan; conjoined opposition to external military interventions under the "pretext" of humanitarianism; a new-found belief in the sanctity of the U.N.; mutual concerns about instability in Central Asia, and a security arrangement of convenience in which Beijing procures military weapons and technologies unavailable to it elsewhere in return for propping up Russia's failing defense industrial complex with those purchases. In October 2001, less than 3m onths after inking the much heralced treaty, Russia seem ed to be throw ing its tacit support behind the U.S. military operations against A fight anistan by not standing in the way of American forces staging in former Soviet dients in Central Asia, and, reportedly, Moscow began to step up its arm s shipments to the opposition Northern Alliance forces.

But probably much more disconcerting from a Chinese perspective, Putin began transmitting what appeared to be serious "feelers" about actually joining NATO under certain conditions of d ange in that organization. Russias em edito realize that the tragic events of September 11 might actually bean opportunity finally to align its effin a serious way, with dignity, as an equal partner with the West after alm ost 10 y ears of Russian foreign policy lim bo. It may just beth at Putin realized this was Moscow's opportunem om ent to coso in an ay that could ultimately resuscitate Russia's faltering economy and at the same time enhance its international prestige. In clearly, the Bush-Putin meeting on the fringes of APEC in October 2001 seen ed to be reported in the western press as much more robust than the meetings with Jiang in the latter's own country. The prospects of Russia "leaning to the West" cannot be a comfortable though t in Beijing, even though revived Russian relations with the Westwould certainly not beat the expense of China in the sense that such alignments were played out during theColdW ar.

Impact on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. If rapprochement with Russia is likely the greatest Chinese foreign policy success of the post-Cold W ar period, then Beijing's second is achieving membership in the W TO. Beijing's third major foreign policy success, although less well known, was serving as the motive force behind the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001.

Originally known as the "Shangh ai Five," China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgizstan had been working togeth er since 1996 to resolve their border disputes, enhance military confidence building measures among their arm ed forces, and coordinate security work against the so-called "three evils" of "terrorism, separatism, and fanaticism" in Central Asia. In short, the SCO represents one of the post-ColdW arw orld's first new regional security architectures. And to the degree that China has been the motive force behind it, it is daim ed as a success.

In June 2001 the "Shangh ai Five" transform edits elfin to the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization," added Uzbekistan as a sixth m em ber, and form alized its intentions to pursuem ilitary security in the border regions in a multilateral fashion, to indude establishing a counterterrorism center in Bishkek and even holding out the prospects for combined military exercises in the future The importance of these initiatives to China's security interests in Central Asia is underscored by the fact that this is the first time ever that the PRC has been a form al signatory to a multinational security architecture. Moreover, should com bined military exercises ever take place it ill be the first time ever that the PLA has trained or exercised with any foreign military in anything other than the role of "advisors" or trainers – this is simply unprecedented for China.

Enter the events pursuant to Septem ber 11. Where China and Russia enjoyed com inance of presence in this critical region, there is now the obvious presence of the U.S. military – not merely as trainers or as participants in com bined exercises such as CENTRA ZBAT-97 – but in force and prosecuting a joint, and likely com bined, military offensive To the degree that the SCO served the collateral Chinese interest of keeping U.S. military forces from achieving a foothold in Central Asia, that objective has been undermined in a dear, significant, and profound way. To what degree the *defacto* presence of U.S. military forces in the region, and the obvious political and econom ic presence in the region that will persist post-com bat, will change the viability or nature of the SCO as an organization is a question that must be getting asked in Chinese analytic drdes. At am inimum, a U.S. presence in Uzebekistan in a post-Taliban Afghanistan is a real possibility, given the security assurances Tashkent has reportedly asked of W ashington in return for its very active support.

Impact on Japan. Tokyo's decision to be proactive in offering the United States logistic support by the Japan Maritim e SelfD efense Forces in the vicinity of the Indian Ocean is not going to assuage Beijing's concerns about Japan's "real security aspirations" in the region- in spiteof Prim e Minister Junich iro Koizum i's assertion that Jiang expressed his "understanding" of the rationale behind it during their meeting in Beijing in early October 2001.

Always on the alert for any indication of Japan's potential for an expanded military presence in Asia, Chinese analysts will likely view Tokyo's support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM as a codicil under which the Japanesew ill continuew hat the Chinese believe is the inexorable m arch away from Article 9 of the "Peace Constitution." (Anditm ay just beth at Beijing's concerns on this account will be buttressed by likem inded thinking en anating from Seoul.) Japan's actions in support of the United States will be seen through the lens of a continuum that includes perceived Japanese support for Taiw an in dependence, concerns about the Revised U.S.-Japan *Guidelines* for *Defense Cooperation* – especially the nebulous phrase "areas surrounding Japan," and Tokyo's co-research with Washington on upper-tier sea-based TBMD.

Im pact on Border Security. Clearly, the most obvious celeterious effect of Operation END URING FREEDOM for Chinais they ery fact that it is taking place in a country with which Chinashares a border. Stability and security in the 14 nations with which Chinashares common borders – not to mention maintaining good relations with those countries – is a priority one security issue for Beijing. Controlling events on its periphery, stability on its periphery, and ensuring there is no spill over from instability on its periphery are ongoing and historical Chinese concerns. One might point out that since 1949, China has consistently viewed instability on its periphery as a serious threat, and most of its military interventions, overt or otherwise, have been the result of the perceived need to shape wars along its border, preem pt possible aggression, or assert sovereignty along those borders.²

Theim mediate Chinese concern will be the potential for refugees to stream across the small border it shares with A figh anistan. China's second concern will be the potential for "blow back" in Xinjiang Province by non-H an Turkic Uigh urs who oppose Chineserule The third tier of Chinese concerns will be longer term – how long will the U.S. campaign last, what type of government will replace the Taliban, and how long will U.S. military forces remain in the region after the collapse of the Taliban? And, of course, as mentioned already, the impact of all of the above on the viability of the Musharaf regime in Islam abad Overall, from a Chinese point of view, it is unlikely the current U.S. campaign will be viewed as a "good thing."

Impact on National Missile Defense China's objections to the U.S. National Missile Defense Program are well known by now and need no explanation. Suffice it to say that Beijing will be concerned that the attack on the United States will accelerate the nuclear missile defense (NMD) program, not inhibit it. The best indicator of Chinese concerns along these lines is the analytic argument one could read in the PRC press post-Septem ber 11 dedaring that the terrorist attack on the United States "proved" that the greatest threat to the United States is not a so-called "roguestate" with amissile, but low-tech weapons used by nonstate actors.

The efficacy of this argument as ide, therewill be concern that in the wake of September 11 previous disagreements over NMD with certain European allies will fall by the wayside in an ongoing show of support for Washington. Also, there will be Chinese concern that the voices in the United States citing the Septem ber 11 events as "proof positive" of the need for NMD will prevail-especially now that the specter of biological weapons is no longer hypothetical. But most disconcerting, from a Chinese perspective, will be the possibility that Russian resolve on the issue of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty will start to weaken.

Overall then, while the events of September 11 and the Bush-Jiang summit have served a critical Chinese (and U.S.) security objective- namely stabilizing bilateral relations- it is not entirely dear, based quite ach ittedy on my own speculation, that the overarching prosecution of the war against terrorism waged by the United States and the potential collateral changes in the international security *milieuw* ill be seen as positive for China across the board By the time this volume is published, the international security environment may well have changed and turned over once again, and the Chinese calculus might be quite different in ways that at time of writing are impossible to speculate about.

Concluding Comments.

One constant in the U.S.-Ch ina relationsh ip that will persist and that will transcend current events, is sim ply this: there is an ple reason in both W ash ington and Beijing to seek and secure mutually beneficial bilateral relations – especially security relations.

If owever, there is a deep-seated mutual distrust between the respective security establishments on both sides of the Pacific that will not go away very soon, regardless of the pragmatics teps each nation takes on the road to better relations. This drapter, by assignment, has focused on Chinese concerns. The United States has its own set of misgivings.

If the trend in Chinese security analyses presented in th is drapter is even dose to being on them ark, then it will be very difficult to drange attitudes in Beijing. Chinese concerns about U.S. intentions are beginning to transcend specific policies in contention, transcending perhaps even theissueofTaiw an. In China, analyticm on entum has been building over the past four years that argues that the United States is inherently hostile to China and that thestrategic objective of the United States tow ardChina is nothing less than the obstruction of China's rise as a more ride and powerful nation - despites tatem ents by Bush and Powell to the contrary. Consequently, U.S. policies in the region or tow ard China its elf will be increasingly filtered through a set of lenses that are already calibrated to ensure some distortion. Thephrase, "Seeing the acorn but im agining the oak tree" com es tom in d^{2}

Relations with the UnitedStates more and more present the Chinese leadership with a growing dilemma. On one hand, a stable relationship with the United States is increasingly viewed by Beijing as one prerequisite for the success of the all-important reform agenda that faces Zhongnanhai at home. And to the degree that success ful continuing reform at home is the key to the longevity of the CCP, the "U.S. factor" plays as well, even if indirectly.²⁰

At the same time, perceived drallenges by the United States to Chinese national interests – especially those viewed as drallenges to sovereignty – cannot beignored by the Chinese leadership. One hears and reads more and more in the Chinese press about the need to uphold "the dignity" of the Chinese people, not just the sanctity of Chinese sovereignty.

The sum mit of October 2001 augurs a hop eful beginning for the two nations to renew serious strategic dialogue on the spectrum of issues that have been addressed in this drapter. But am id the pleces by the two presidents to establish new mechanisms for strategic dialogue, am id the recedication to continue mutually beneficial econom ic cooperation, in the mickt of presenting a united stand in dealing with global terrorism, there was one sum mit "basket" that was conspicuous by its absence-astatement about futuremilitary-to-military relations.

Since at least 1989 them ilitary dimension of bilateral relations has become one of the most contentious and difficult aspects of U.S.-Chinaties. It has become a comestic political issue in both Beijing and W ashington. Even in the best of times, finding a mutually satisfying military dimension to bilateral ties has been a frustrating encleavor for both parties due to growing mutual suspicion, institutional asymmetries, and competing objectives. In times of bilateral duress, military relations are the first links to be suspended in the best of times, they are the last to be put into place

Som ein the United States have argued that, with the demise of the Soviet Union, there is no longer a "strategic rationale" for the United States to engage the PLA. In Beijing, som e Chinese have also argued that the "rise of American hegem onism" has likewise undermined a Chinese rationale for engagement with the U.S. Department of Defense Detractors of military relations in the United States have complained that "the PLA does not "reciprocate" U.S. openness and that "the PLA gets more out of the relationship than does the United States." For their part, som eChinese argue that the objectives of U.S.military ties and U.S. "openness" are inherently "hostile". The United States wants "to drange China," to "deter (scare) China," and "collect intelligence" on China by using the military relationship.²⁷

All of these arguments may very well be true of the past. But it is not correct for either side to argue that there is no longer as trategic rationale for a military relationship. The fact of the matter may be that at long last, for the first time since the end of the Cold W ar, there finally *is* a strategic rationale for military-to-military contacts. And it is simply this: conflict avoidance It is dear that them ilitary forces of the United States and of China III increasingly be operating in proximity to each other. This III as shown most graphically on April 1, 2001, and the subsequent EP-3 incident. It is also dear that there is a growing distrust between the two military establishments. It is clear as III that both sides adknow ledge (sometimes quietly, sometimes publicly) the possibility of an unit anted confrontation over Tail an. These points alone are them ost pressing arguments for the resumption of military contacts, the enhancement of venues in III hich discussion of differences can take place, and new venues aim edat dispelling misperceptions.

H opefully, as the months go on, as political dialogue increases and the benefits of stable relations are seen to outweigh mutual suspicions, then wise men and sober thinkers on both sides will start searching for new and realistic ways tom anaged ifferences, and conduce that both the U.S. Arm edForces and the PLA will have a constructive role to play.

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 2

1. Cancelled altogether were the President's planneds topovers in Toky o and Seoul prior to arriving in Shanghai.

2 Tang II ongu ei, Zhongguo Xinu en She, Foreign Broadcast Inform ation Service (hereafter FBIS), October 19, 2001.

3 "U.S., Ch ina Stand Against Terrorism : Rem arks by President Bush and President Jiang Zem in in Press Availability, Western Suburb 6 uest H ouse (Shanghai, PRC)," October 19, 2001, www.whitehouse gov/news/releases (hereafter, White House).

4.WhiteHouse

5. This is a concern that has become some what heightened since February 2000 when Beijing issued its "Taiw an White Paper" that articulated the "third if." Since that time a common question debated in W ashing ton's analytic circles is whether Beijing has a "time table" for reunification. 6. For an excellent review of the actions and policies of Beijing that will continue to give pause to U.S. 6 overnment officials, see Bates 6 ill, "Powell In China: Modest Progress Will Be better Than None," International #erald Tribune, July 21, 2001.

7. For a very detailed account and analysis of the post-Kosovo debate in China, see David M. Finkelstein, China Reconsiders Its National Security: The "G reat Peace & Development Debate" of 1999, A lexanchia VA: The CNA Corporation, Country Assessment, December 2000.

8. The construction of the narrative account of the debate that follows was possible due to the high ly public nature of the debate. The Chinesepress as an invaluable source for following the edebate Most of the key Chinesenew spapers devoted space to reader comments on the key questions under contention after the bon bing of the PRC Em bassy. Examples are the PLA's Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun Bao), China Youth Daily (Zhongquo Qingnian Bao), Brightness Daily (Guangming Ribao), and People's Daily (Renm in Ribao). By most accounts, the periodical that ran the column most read and most contributed to by governmentspecialists (and most contentious in that analysts took each other on) was the Global Times (Huangiu Shibao), a subsidiary new spaper of People's Daily. The column in question was entitled "China's Counterm easures and Choices" ("Zhongguo Duice Yu Xuanze"). I an grateful to Dr. Alastair Iain Johnston of H anv ard University for bringing this column to y attention. This account of the debate was also informed by a good number of interviews as well.

9. For a superb primer on the necessity in China for having theoretical assessments of the international security environment and their evolution since 1949, see Ren Xiao, "The International Relations Theoretical Discourse in China: A Preliminary Analysis," Sigur Center AsiaPapers Number 9, Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, 2000.

10. The United States affirm edits policy of: (1) No independence for Taiw an, (2) No "One China, One Taiw an" form ula, and (3) No membership for Taiw an in international organizations that require statehood as a prerequisite form embership.

11. "Cooperative Strategic Partnersh ip with Russia" (April 1996); "Comprehensive Cooperative Partnersh ip" with France (May 1997); "Constructive Strategic Partnersh ip" with the U.S. (October 1997); "Good-neigh borly Partnersh ip of Mutual Trust" with ASEAN (December 1997); "Long-term and Stable Constructive Partnersh ip" with the European Union (April 1998); "Enhanced Comprehensive Partnership" with Great Britain (October 1998).

12 In June 2001 the "Shangh ai Five" was transformed into the "Shangh ai Cooperation Organization" and as ixth member, Uzbekistan, was added

13 As rem arkable as itm ay seem from a U.S. perspective, there was a good deal of discussion in som eCh in ese analy tic dirdes as to whether the United States would intervene in Check ny a.

14. In his excellent volume, China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000, Michael Pillsbury argues that previous Chinese political constraints precluded analysts from asserting that the "comprehensive national power" of the United States would co any thing but eventually dedine. While that may have been the case prior to 1999, the post-Kosovo debate in China dearly removed all taboos along this line.

15. Emphases added by author.

16. Chi H aotian, "Taking The Road of National Defense Modernization Which Conforms to China's National Conditions and Reflects the Characteristics of the Times--My Understanding Acquired From the Study of Com race Jiang Zem in's Expositions on the Relationship Between Building the National Defense and Economic Development," *Qiushi*, No. 8, *FBIS*, April 16, 1996. Emphasis added

17. Of interest, how ever, was a reprint of a December 1986 speech by form er Defense Minister 6 eneral Zh ang Aiping in which the venerated general warned that, even though the international security situation did not portend world war, the nation needed to remain vigilant, move forward with defense modernization, and recognize the potential threats to China's security. In retrospect, the speech, given to an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission in 1986, can be viewed as having caveated Deng's reassessment of China's security as espoused in June 1985. It was reprinted in the journal Zhanlue Yu 6 uanli (Strategy and Management), published by the Chinese Society for Strategy and Management, with the permission of the retired 6 eneral Zhang. See Zhang Aiping, "National Defense Development in Peacetime," Zhanlue Yu 6 uanli, FBIS, August 1, 1999.

18 Fu Quanyou, "Make Active Explorations, Deepen Reform, A drance Military Work in an All-Round Way," *Qiush i*, No. 6, *FBIS*, March 1998. For an overview of the PLA's programs of reform, see Finkelstein, *Ch ina's National Military Strategy*. 19. For example, see John Pomfret, "Chinese Military Uses Anniversary to Polish Its Image," *TheW ashington Post*, October 2, 1999. A coording to Pomfret, "In March (1999) an dagain over the summer, the army is said to have received billions of collars in additional funding..." Pomfret's use of the term "billions" is likely an overstatement. Know ledgeabledos ervers collagree that there was a one-time infusion in the summer of 1999 and that it was about 1.2 billion U.S. collars (USD). This figure is separate and distinct from the lump-sumpayment the PLA received in December 1998 as a result of the order to divest itself of its commercial holdings. The latter payment, according to David Shambaugh, was about 400 million USD. See David Shambaugh, *Reform ing China's Military*, Berkeley: University of California Press, for the commercial holding.

20. Clearly a scientifics an pling of the Chinese press during this period was not made by this student, and I am open to counter arguments on the issue of the Chinese press during the April through May 2001 period Buthaving just completed avery detailed study of the post-Kosovo debate, I fully expected the EP-3 incident to reopen the entire issue. It did not occur.

21. Therewere a few interesting, but rare exceptions. At least one paper tried to reopen the "peace and development debate" But it didso not by criticizing the PRC 6 overnment, but by criticizing those Chinese analysts who still "dierished illusions" about the United States. See "Cherishing Illusions A bout China-U.S. Relations Will Bring Harm To Both the Country and the People," Commentary article in 6 uangzhou Ribao, FBIS, May 16, 2001.

22 "Free D is cussion on China-U.S. Relations," in *Contemporary International Relations*, Beijing: China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, June 2001, pp. 7-30.

23 FBIS has posted some of the conference papers in translation.

21. W erecall K orea (1950), the French - Incoch inaW ar (early 1950s), the Sino-Incian W ar (1962), the U.S.-Incoch ina W ar (1960s), the northern clashes with the Soviets (especially 1969), the Sino-Vietnam eseW ar (1979), Chinese concerns about Cam boda, and in a "back to the futurem ode," Chinese concerns about the Soviets in A figh anistan (late1970s), not tomention ongoing Chinese concern about Inco-Pakistani dashes over Kashmir. W hile the Chinese likely hold no brief for the Taliban, the prosecution of a major cam paign in A figh anistan – especially onew aged by the United States – is not going to be a reassuring event from a Chinese point of view. 25. This is not just a Chinesephenomenon. It occurs in the United States as ${\tt w}$ ell.

26. This is not to suggest that the United States is the "sole" foreign factor in Beijing's comestic reform agenda. China has heched against the possibility of a prolonged period of tension with the United States. Over the past few years, it has worked to diversify and strengthen its foreign ties across the colored world, one suspects, because it realizes the "changer" of having all of its eggs in the U.S. basket when it comes to foreign investment, trace, technology acquisition, etc

27. For an in depth study of Chinese views of the military relationship, see D avid M. Finkelstein, "Engaging D oD: Chinese Perspectives on Military Relations with the United States, Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, CRM 99-0046.90, October 1999.

CH APTER 3

A VIEW FROM TOKYO: CHINA'S GROWING MILITARY POWER AND ITS SIG NIFICANCE FOR JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY

HideakiKaneda

CH INA'S AMBITION

China's Maritim e A drance.

Chinah as pursued a national strategy of consistent and active advancement toward peripheral waters. China's activity patterns, as they click in the 1970s to the South China Sea and in the 1980s to the East China Sea, have been to advance to such areas using force, while ignoring the sovereign rights and juris cliction rights of neighboring nations. Finding little or weak resistance from these countries, China strength encolores ence there by creating a fait accompli, ultimately leading to the practical control of these areas. What is the objective of China's maritime advance? The answer is the key to designing Japan's cleterrent strategy against China.

First is the econom ic aspect involved China aims to develop andutilizebiological and nonbiological resources in its peripheral waters, especially seabed oil resources. In addition, China's food and energy supply situation is rapidly deteriorating as a resultofits remarkable econom ic grow the since the adaptation of policies for econom ic revolution and the opening of China's market to the world, combined with its chastic population grow th. In particular, China's energy situation is so severe that the world's seventh largest oil proclucing nation can hardly keep up with the growing dem and, and to day China the oil proclucer has become an oil-importing consumer.

For furth ereconom iccele elopm ent, Chinam us tcontinue to secure food and energy supplies. Therefore, it becomes extremely important for China top rocure fishing grounds in the peripheral waters and adjacent seas, to acquire good quality seabed oil resources, and to secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for oil imports from the Middle East. Dependence on the seas is a logical consequence for China in order to maintain continuous economic grow th.

Second is the issue of national security. In China, naval and air forces have been built and operated as supporting forces to assist the arm y. If owever, they learned from the h is torical experience of the Qing Dynasty II hen, because of China's lack of an areness of the importance of seaponer and m aritim e rights, foreign powers usurped their sovereign and territorial rights. Based on these experiences, China adopted a dear military strategy of "near water defense," with the so-called "First Island Chain DefenseLine" being China's seadefenseline, connecting the A leutian Islands, Kuril Islands, Japanese Islands, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, Philippine Islands, and Borneo. The Senkaku Islands, daim ed by Japan, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands, over which several South-East Asian countries daim territorial rights, are induded in this First IslandCh ain DefenseL ine. Taiw an also has daim son som e of these is lands, an issue which China calls a commestic m atter. In otherw ords, China's nearw ater defenses trategy induces military force deployments to attack Taiw an and prevent counterattacks. One must not forget that the military forces that are capable of crossing the water to attack Taiw an and preventing counterattacks can certainly beusedagainst the Senkaku, Spratly, and Paracel Islands.

With the end of the Cold War, China's negotiations on national border issues and military with drawal from borders with Russia and form er Soviet Union countries in Central Asiah aveprogressedsm ooth ly and the opportunity for negotiation with India to solve border issues has arisen. China can feel secure for the moment regarding its land borders to the north and west and can reduce its arm y forces chastically, thereby generating enough reserves to shift their interests and redistribute resources to focus on their east and south ern "oceans."

Third is the shift of China's military strategy. By 1985, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had already attempted the strategic shift from a "global war" to a "local war" orientation, and after the endofthe ColdWar, shifted from a mere "general local war" to a "local war under hi-ted conditions" based on what they learned from the GulfWar. Through such strategicshifts, then General Secretary Jiang Zem in started to emphasize the "defense of maritime interests" along with the defense of sovereign rights of territorial lance, air space, and seas.

By October 2000, China had conducted largescale exercises of "all arm y exchange activities to demonstrate theresultofs cientificated nological training" incorporating the "new three attacks and three defenses" (attacks by stealth aircraft, ballisticm issiles, and arm edhelicopters, and defense by precision weapons, electronic interference, and reconnaiss ancesurveillance), which involved learning from the Kosovo air-raids as well as from "scientificated nological military training." At that time, it was noted that the exercises were "attack" oriented with the oceans as the main stage, rather than conventional "defense" oriented maneuvers.

Fourth is an intention to improve China's position in the international community. China's view toward international relationships is to break away from the situation of "one superpower and several powers" comminated by the United States and to work toward "multi-polarization," with China itselfsharing the position of one of the powerful pole leaders. China recognizes that the unstable situation of the international community will persist longer because of tensions between the m ajor countries, China's own conflicts in securing its sphere of interests, and increased incidents of regional conflicts. However, China assumes that such a situation is merely the transition toward the establish ment of a new international order, and will eventually lead to the collapse of U.S. single country dominance and the emergence of a multi-polar world with China, the United States, the European Union, Russia, and Japan as the poles. At any time in history, the China-U.S. relationship has had a mixof stability and instability factors, but in purely military terms, they are basically in a contentious relationship. From China's point of view, the path toward multi-polarization must go through the point of rivalry and contention with American military power.

The tone of logic in Ch ina that stands out these days is that the power that controls the ocean is the one that earns the right of survival and development. Moreover, there is much evidence of the importance of comprehensivemarine power and that the 21st Century will be the "Century of Oceans." The search to grow from "near water" to "open ocean" operations is already underway in the PLA. In a situation of increased confidence in the economy and limited elements of instability in national security, Ch ina's ultimate ambition appears to be preparing to step beyond the basic strategy of near water defense to secure commination over the PadificOcean, which is adjacent to its peripheral waters.

Japan's "Defense White Paper" of 2001 reported the recents triking build-up of China's military preparechess in the quality and quantity of both its navy and air force What is their ultimate objective? To speak in extremes, is it not possible toput for than y pothesis that Chinauses the excuse of capturing Taiw anto hide China's true and ultimate objective of winning a war against the United States? We, the Japanese people, must as certain China's future intentions.

Ch ina Takes a Serious Step tow ard "Multi-Polarization" – Establishm ent of the "Sh angh ai Cooperation Organization."

On June 14 and 15, 2001, the "Shangh ai Five" countries of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, and Tajikistan, with the new ly-added Uzbekistan, established the "Sh angh ai Cooperation Organization." A "Sh angh ai Five" sum m it has been heldy early since 1996, originally for the purpose of resolving border tensions between China and the Central Asian countries that had new ly arisen after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with China leading the discussion. Since they successfully agreed upon the reduction of military forces deployed to border areas, the focus has shifted tow and cooperation in the control of Is lam icextrem is ts, which has been them ajor problem of the Central Asian countries. Moreover, in recenty ears, China has used the Shanghai Five forum as a means to due the United States, as demonstrated in its appeal for ties between Russia and China, especially on international security and disamm an entissues, and against the U.S. m onopolistic control of global political, econom ic, and m ilitary affairs.

The significance of this organization for China is, on the surface, multi-national regional cooperation to control expanding Islam extrem ists. In reality, it is a way to cheal with the threat of Xinjiang separatism, which is like as nake in China's bosom, the stability of Xinjiang being essential for the realization of China's national project of the G reat West Development. Reacting even cheaper into China's intentions, how ever, one can find the possibility of China's chaire to transform this organization into an alliance against the United States and its set of bilateral alliances with regional countries, which will have a greater significance for China in the future.

Originally, China was eager to improve bilateral relationships with their continental neigh boring countries. In June 2001, China conducted the Treaty of 6 ood and

Friendly Relationship with Russia. They also concluded bilateral agreements with each Central Asian country as the fruit of the Shanghai Five process. Among major continental neighboring countries, only India has not entered into a bilateral agreement with China. However, China is attempting to improve its relationship with India, as evidenced by the re-opening of a Sino-Indian dialogue that had been halted since India's nuclear test in 1998, probably in response to the recent U.S. approach toward India.

The "Shangh ai Cooperation Organization" is the first multilateral organization begun under China's initiative Som em oderates believe this organization will develop into a moderate Association of South east Asian Nations (ASEAN)-type regional forum. Others consider that the current mem ber countries of this organization aim to "promotem ultipolarism of the world" and other countries such as Pakistan, Mongolia, and Iran will seek the opportunity to join the organization, while North K orea and Vietnam are said to show interest in it. Through this organization or its advanced form in the future, China possibly will attempt to extendits influence over avast land and water area extending from the Asia-Pacific region to South west Asia and the Middle East, with continental China and Central Asia as the central force

In addition, China is likely to use this forum to counter perceived U.S. containment against China, and in the future to confront the existing webofalliances centered on the United States, while hiding the potential to develop it into an organization similar to the Warsaw Pact at the time of the Cold War. For the moment China will use it as a platform to eliminate U.S. influence by expressing opposition to the missile defense initiative and international and regional talks led by the United States, as well as to express China's persistent daim that Taiwan, which is under the influence of the United States, is an inseparable part of Chinese territory. In this sense, how Chinaw ill react to the U.S. response against the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks may be significant.

Ch in a A im s to B ecom e a Regional Superpower-Preparechess on the Continent and A drancement Tow ard the O ceans.

What is the meaning of China's advancement toward the oceans, and improved relationships with its continental neighbors? Originally described as "ships in the South and horses up North," China is a country that has two faces: "Continental China" and "Oceanic China."

Despitehavingsom ecom esticproblems, Chinaseems to realize that it has successfully created an unprecedented stable situation in diplomatic and military relationships with neighboring countries. Moreover, China has grown from being a regional political power to becoming a regional superpower, both in name and actuality, in all political, military, economic, and inclustrial aspects, and is about to secure a position as one of the world superpowers (and the strongest in Asia), capable of threatening the U.S. monopoly. To achieve such an objective, China cannot afford to limit its interests to the continent and must have the strong maritim ecapability of an "OceanicChina."

In view of the Chinese Communist Party's position in a oneparty-ruled country, it is impossible for China to allow the United States to remain the "one ultra-superpower" indefinitely. At least, Chinawish es togain the power of "not losing," if not winning over the United States in every spectrum. Thus, China, starting with stability on the continent, steadily will promote a crive for the attainment of its secret ambition to fulfill the supreme proposition of "confrontation in the ocean" with the United States and its allied countries, with in China's unique time scale, regardless of their targeted year.

Certainly, China never makes the mistake of mentioning the possibility of direct confrontation at sea with U.S. military power. There is no need, for it has an appropriate and convenient excuse called Taiw an. A tevery opportunity, China sends out a strong warning to U.S. forces against intervention in relation to the Taiw an issue. Moreover, Chinastresses that itw ill nothesitate to confront U.S. forces if any thing happens in Taiw an. However, this is not likely to be China's true intention. Though I used the word "hypothesis" earlier, China's real intention is confrontation beyond Taiw an, not with Japan, Korea, the A SEAN countries, or Australia, butwith the United States.

To find proof of this, one only needs to look into the nature of Chinese military forces. If China seriously considers taking over Taiw an at present, what is the significance of the limited cap ability of the Chinese navy to transport troops across oceans? Unclubtedly, they have troops and equipment with a certain cap ability, so China might venture attacks on Taiw an, should the political necessity arise Yetinview of Taiw an's defense cap ability, it would be difficult for China to send troops to Taiw an's main island. The natural interpretation is that China's cap ability is only sufficient for a very limited attack, such as ballistic missile attacks against part of the main island for intimication purposes, or the attacks on Quemoy Island and Matsu Island, which China could complete before the United States could intervene.

On the oth erh and, viewing the recent direction of naval and air forcem ocernization of the Chinese arm ed forces, one can easily notice that these efforts cannot be described in terms of quality, let alone quantity, as the rational development of equipment and systems purely to capture Taiw an or defend the neigh boring seas. Wouldn't aircraft carriers, fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with sea-launch edballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) with ship-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) under development by the arm ed forces be better suited for confrontation with U.S. forces? Also, what coes China's oceanic advancement into the Pacific Ocean, inducing Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), mean? Isn't it logical to interpret these moves as China's efforts to steadily prepare to confront the United States by building up a maritime operational capability and assuming the United States and its allies are potential enemies?

ChineseWay ofWar- "BeyondLimitedWar" (Irregular andAsymmetric Tactics).

We can also see China's future prospects for the direct confrontation with the United States in its concretem ilitary strategy and tactics. The book, Beyond Limited War-Concept of War and Tactics for the Times of Clobalization written in 1999 by two Air Forcecolonels in active service of the PLA, is chawing attention in China and the United States. "Beyond limited war" means "awar that transcends any limitation" or a "war without any norms and regulations." In other words, it can be called a "forbidden strategy." The authors recommended that China implement such a strategy to confront the United States. They say "modern war is a hi-ted war, and China cannot win over the United States, which has overwhelming power, unless it confronts with them through this beyond limited war."

The book recommends seeking "irregular" war tactics that go beyond the nation, territories, methods, and war scales, inducing so-called "illegal" tactics. The authors them selves daim, "For the weaker to confront the stronger, the weaker obes not need to follow the rules set by the stronger." Am ong the items of consideration in *Beyond Lim ited War*, we need to note "asymmetric tactics." U.S. military forces are troubled with the Chinese forces' indination to regard asymmetric tactics as important. A former U.S. Am bassacher to China indicated, "China regularly adopts a unique strategy to make up for its ow n weakness and to display its strength." This concept has a common thread with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America.

This book is said to have been written without any instruction from the Chinese leadership. Some observe,

how ever, that the book has won strong support from Chinesepolitical and military leaders.

As stated above, Chinahas learned num erous lessons from the large scale conflicts involving the UnitedStates in the post-ColdW arera: the GulfW arendKosovo conflicts, and Chinahas proceededwith a great strategic conversion to "improvement of defensive combat capability under the high-tech conditions," while exerting efforts to eliminate functional shortcomings and avoiding any significant technological and operational gap. In other words, China is exerting efforts to avoid showing any decisive weakness of its ow n, while consistently being conscious of the possibility of war against the UnitedStates.

If owever, such a strategy does not provide any opportunity to win against overwhelming U.S. military power. Therefore, China pursues its own areas of superiority over U.S. weaknesses and will try to strike the weak spots of the United States. Such strategies are "irregular tactics" and "asymmetric tactics." China's recent emphasis on giber wars, for which it has madelittle effort to hide its intentions, is an example By taking such dual stances, China seems to be looking for an opportunity to ensure future victory over the United States.

JAPAN'S DE TERRENT STRATEG Y AG A INST CH INA

China's Strategy against Japan.

Now, how must Japan build its deterrent power against China? First, let the United States investigate China's strategy against Japan based on an analysis of China's political and military ambitions discussed in the previous section.

In China, there is a group that perceives the Japan-China relationship merely as a part of the power balance in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, it wishes to let Japan remain an economic giant only. To have Japan as a

political superpower or military giant is hardy acceptable for China, as its greates twish is to be the only superpower in Asia.

China's ultimate objective is to become the "unitary superpower" in the region. In North east Asia, four political poles consist of Russia, China, Japan and the United States. The Soviet Union used to be the threatening power during the Cold W ar but it collapsed, and its successor, Russia, m aintains friendly relations with China as they share the basic policy of taking a hard-line against the United States. Concerning Japan, China anticipates Japan's contribution to China's economic grow thas a economic and technology superpower, yet tries to prevent Japan from becoming a political and military superpower. For the United States, China is likely to maintain a friendly "engagement" relationship as long as the United States approves of China's economic development, which is key for China's promotion of its national power while recognizing potential rivalries in every political, econom ic, and military aspect.

For China's an bition, to become the only superpower in theregion, the greatest barrier ill bethestable and strong alliance between the United States, the world's unitary superpower, and Japan, as trong regional pole Considering a future confrontation with the United States, it will be preferable for China tom inim ize the num ber of powerful countries allied with the United States. China is likely to takeevery opportunity to break up any Japan-U.S. alliance and to attempt the alienation of these two countries. China can use several methods for this purpose, and the one with the high est probability of success is China's special tactic of "to w in w ithout fighting," that is "beyond lim ited w ar." First, Chinawill try tow eaken or lessen U.S. sentiment and consciousness to support and cooperate with Japan, then to underm ine Japan's capability and intention to support the UnitedStates. Next, Chinaw ill cam paign in Japan and the United States for the alienation of the Japan-U.S. relationship. In addition, China can make "beyond limited war" more effective by building a capability to fight an

inform ation technology ((T) war, such as giber war, tow and which China is directing its efforts. This is not the talk of som ething to come. Such a fight has already begun.

Even if Japan and the United States successfully maintain their alliance, it is most convenient for China when Japan has as many restrictions on defense cooperation with the United States as possible, like those imposed in Japan today. The greater the number of restrictive measures in Japan's defense cooperation with the United States, the higher the appreciation in China. What China would like to see is for Japan to maintain its exclusively defense framework, not to change its constitution including collectives effectefense rights, not to proceed with wartime or national emergency legislation, and not to loosen the actual restrictions under "the law concerning measures to ensure peace and security of Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan."

Basic Strategy against China.

Then what strategy should Japan take against China? The best approach is a strategy of building a very practical and mutually beneficial economic relationship, while avoiding political aspects as much as possible. China is a country that can maintain dose economic ties even with Taiwan. It cannot ignore Japan's economic and technological strengths, which far exceed those of Taiwan. In turn, Japan finds sufficient appeal in the enormous scope of China's ever-growing market. In other words, for Japan as well as for China, amutual dose economic relationship is essential.

From the military view point, China cbes not actually seem to consider Japan's defense power as a true threat, contrary to its political propaganche daim s, which at every opportunity refer to "Japan's tendency of militarization." It is feasible to assume that Chinah as already factored into its strategy all the shortcomings in Japan's defense functions: imperfection in defense related legislation; independent

defense policies; defects in equipment; restrictions on various operations defects from such policies; less and areness of the Japanese people and government in defense matters; and the lack of fundamental strength to sustain wars, such as a basically weak defense industry and defense logistics system. Therefore, onem ust not ignore the possibility that China may maneuver Japan into some conflicts over, for example, the Senkaku Islands and other territorial and EEZ conflicts if a situation can be generated in which the United States will not (or cannot) intervene. Japan must detersud possibilities by its elfandes tablish a system that can respond to crises effectively. It must stop being a nation without any sense or preparation for en ergencies as described above, and establish its own national security system to respond against China. Otherwise, such a timewill comesome clay.

Securing U.S. and Japan Alliance as an Axle.

For Japan, the best possible option in national security adaptable to the various future prospects is a secure Japan-U.S. alliance No other option is conceivable. In the environm entofth egeo-political situation of North east Asia, Japan is certainly free to consider other options such as nonalliance, bilateral alliancewith a country (even China) other than the United States, or a multilateral alliance inducing Russia, China and the United States. Some debates and propositions about such options have taken placein andout of Japan. If ower er, the seoptions are either implausible or lack future prospects. Certainly after the end of the Cold W ar, the aspect of a peace dividend w as emphasized, and some even questioned whether a Japan-U.S. alliancew ould beneeded any longer. The joint declaration of Japan and the United States in 1997 redefined the alliance and identified a dear direction tow ard an even stronger relationship.

For the United States, the significance of a Japan-U.S. alliance is, first of all, providing regional deterrent effect

through the presence of U.S. forces in Japan, mainly Navy, Air Force, and Marines. The second significance is developing acceptables upportmechanisms that can satisfy the U.S. standard in terms of every thing from supply and repair to medical services. From a different view point, the United States is well aware that its military with chawal from Japan would provide Japan with a good motive to fortify its military power. Moreover, the United States realizes that the alliance serves to deter any possible conflicts between a unified Korea, China, and Japan in the future.

Whether such U.S. aims are involved or not, it is preferable for the region for the United States and Japan to m aintain a solid alliance and to retain a mutually com plem entary relationship, while the alliance remains as a lind p in for regional security, including Japan's security. China and North Korea do not welcome such an alliance. Russia is no longer like the Soviet Union of the old days. North K orea coord not have sufficient power to confront the United States. Only China occasionally has shown a willingness to confront the United States in military power, and it is the only country that has the potential to cb so. Thus the only option for Japan is to maintain and solidify the Japan-U.S. alliance, which not only provides the stability necessary for favorable regional developm ent, but also is important for the safety and security of Japan. At the same time the alliance is anticipated to function as a deterrent against China.

The Bush ach inistration considers Japan as the most important U.S. ally in Asia. An Institute for National StrategicStucties (INSS)Special Report,¹ which is said to be the function ental statement of the ach inistration's Japan policy, expresses, with carefully selected phrasing to avoid the impression of pressuring Japan, the strong wish to secure and further solidify the Japan-U.S. alliance through Japan's efforts to solve the problem of the right of collective self-defense China will take every opportunity to disrupt the relationship between Japan and the United States. Japan must not be influenced by such a move, and must exert every effort to solidify the Japan-U.S. alliance, while perseveringly elim inating any elements that might alienate Japan and the United States.

C reation and M aintenance of D efense Power with out Functional D eficiencies.

What will happen if Japan develops effective military deterrents against China? Because of its national policy, at least, Japan will not become a military superpower. Its basic strategy is to rely on the deterrent effect of U.S. support based on the Japan-U.S. alliance H owever, some future argumentm ay develop as tow hether the rolesh aring in the Japan-U.S. alliance must be limited to Japan providing the shield and the United States providing the sw ord

The United States is currently studying a new defense strategy incorporating the missile defense initiative. Preceding this, a new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was announcedon October 1, 2001. The new QDR, strongly reflecting the shocks of the Septem ber 11 terrorist attacks on America, abandoned the conventional two major the eater war (2MTW) strategy and identified a policy of securing new U.S. bases, stations, and facilities for temporary uses, while reconfirming the importance of forward deployed forces. Inevitably it will become more difficult to operate U.S. arm ed forces abroad, and, in some cases, the situation of reduced military capability may continue sem iperm anently or temporarily.

Under such a situation, Japan needs to create defense forces that are fully functional qualitatively, if not quantitatively, to sustain the deterrent power against China that previously has been maintained through the Japan-U.S. alliance Such a move will inevitably bring dranges in rolesh aring in the Japan-U.S. alliance, but at

the same time will enable Japan to take on the role of a deterrent against Ch in a independently. Assuming the case of U.S. hesitation to exercise the articles of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangem ent, for example, in the case of intim idation attacks related to the Japan-Ch in a territorial dispute area over the Senkaku Islands or mid-range ballisticm issileattacks on nearby U.S. bases in Japan using conventional warheads, Japan must effectively and inclependently deter or defend against such in tim idation or actual attacks by China and the art China's intention. For this, it is necessary for Japan to build sufficient defense forces in every spectrum, including capabilities for ballistic m issile defense, sw ift am philoious operations against islands by marines, paratroop landings, and assault landings by heliborne troops. Furthern ore, possessing the capability to attack enemy strategic centers by anti-surface cruising m issiles will become the next issue. To develop such defense forces, Japan needs not only to have domestic discussions, but also to make adjustments with the United States concerning its share of military functions.

D eveloping Political and Military D ip lom acy against China, with Both H ard line and Moderate Stances.

Japan m ust take a stance that is both hard-line and m ocerate against China's political and military diplom acy, which is based on China's unique view of nations and values.

First, Japan needs to ask Ch ina to be "an open country" in military aspects as well as in others. Ch ina recently stressed that its military forces are purely defensive Ch ina published its "White Paper on National Defense," but Ch ina's transparency is still far below that of neigh boring countries. In Europe, there is rapid and significant promotion of confidence building measures embracing form er West and East countries, with developments to ensure transparency. Recognition of Ch ina as a country that complies with the world's standards is wide spread in econom ic and cultural aspects, as exem plified by China's W orldTraceOrganization (W TO)m embership and winning the bid for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, despite comestic hum an rights problem swhich have not been fully corrected Japan must take every opportunity to ask China to act as a more open country in the aspect of confidence building, and to try to improvem ilitary transparency.

Second, Japan m ust ask Ch ina to take a more positive stance tow archregional dialogue Ch ina used to be inactive in regional councils, but today there is a striking diange in Ch ina's posture Ch ina has begun to participate actively in regional councils, especially on political and econom ic issues. If owever, Ch ina's participation is extremely limited in security-related matters, probably because Ch ina finds it disadvantageous in many cases, or it has less aw areness of the need for transparency.

In terms of maritim eissues, regional-wide SLOCs are the property not only of Japan or China but are also common to the region, and to secure their safety is a common task shared by regional countries. For regional development, it is important that SLOC safety be ensured through the joint efforts of regional countries and not be left under the control of any particular country. We need to let China realize that the region as a whole must share such recognition.

In recent days, the focus of attention has been pirag at the converging points of international searoutes such as the Malacca Strait. It may be important for Japan to take the initiative to create an environment in which China can participate, starting from the easy-to-acchess issues of safety, environment, and hum an rights cooperation, and as a part of regional efforts to cheal with common issues like pirag, drug sales, the slave track, and environmental pollution, ultimately and gradually stepping up to national security issues.

Regarding such pending problems between Japan and China as them icline between them in the East China Sea, an issue related to E E Zs, Japan must abandon its obscure attitude and initiate a serious discussion to establish a tem porary border for the true Japan-China mid-line. Moreover, where both countries daim territorial rights, the two countries need to agree to tem porary joint control of these regions and to establish a council to control them while immediately establishing guidelines for Japan-China joint control over the regions.

Sim ultaneous to such negotiations, Japan must prevent any illegal activities performed by naval vessels and survey ships that dearly infringe upon Japan's jurisdiction in its territories and EEZ Japan must declare that it will take necessary and decisive actions against any illegal activities and adopt effective measures. As long as Japan leaves such territorial issues pending, China will uncoubted y proceed with one act after another to promote its effective control over the East China Sea, as it did in the South China Sea.

The Japanese government needs to implement these actions methodically, meticulously, and vigorously based on a grands trategy. For this, we must remember how U.S. diplomatics trength in international negotiation has been supported by "brains" consisting of and organized by international law researchers, think-tanks and relevant authorities and experts in various fields represented by the Department of State or the Department of Defense.

China's oceanic expansion is somehow reminiscent of U.S. actions. For Japan to win over international competition, it must aggregate the wiscom of not only the bureaucrats, but also of the private sector, and develop a strong spirit to launch a national strategy. Thus, it is strongly anticipated that Japan will pursue its national interests jointly by public and private sectors under the strong leadersh ip of Prim eM inister Junich iro Koizum i.

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 3

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CH APTER 4

A VIEW FROM MOSCOW: CH INA'SG ROWING MILITARY POWER

Anatoly V. Boly atko

China's military obstrine is an outgrow th of Beijing's strategic concept of national security, their perception of external threats, and their estimation of the likelihood of war. This military obstrine includes positions not only on the training of the arm edforces, but their composition and role. The leadership of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) sees national security as a process of eliminating internal and external threats, and as a way to achieve regional and global objectives by escalating what China's strategists call "the comprehensive power of a state." A well-developed economy, a high level of science and engineering achievement, internal political stability, and a strong defense are considered as main components of the comprehensive power of a state.

In China, military threats are seen in connection with potential drallenges in the economic and socio-political spheres. Judging from Chinese publications, Beijing still sees economic grow thas its main priority. Another significant domestic concern is the maintenance of the social-political order and "national unity." This induces opposing what Beijing sees as the tendencies of minorities, and Taiwan, to separate from the Chinese state. Basedon Beijing's assessment of the contemporary international situation at the regional and global levels, the maintenance of military security ranks third among the major national priorities of China. The PRC leadership, meaning the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Central Military Commission (CMC), and the Politburo Standing Committee, believes that the prospects for an outbreak of a world war are low. Therefore, the process of building the Chinesem ilitary can be carried out methodically under conditions that depend on long-term peace matched with the nation's economic development. Thus, the requirement for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is to increase strength acording tomilitary and dvil developments.¹

In the international sphere, Chinese leaders foresee a return to a multi-polar world because of several regional conflicts, albeit with different duration and varying intensity, and the increasing occurrence of dvilwars.

In China's view, these curity situation in the Asia-Pacific region is stable, although there are some negative chevelopments:

- ? The increased military presence of the U.S. in areas dose to Ch in a's borders;
- ? The scheduled deployment of the theater missile defense (TMD) system in East Asia;
- ? The development of a base of support in Japan for a relaxation of restrictions on military action in a zone surrouncing Japan;
- ? Increase in the scope of joint military exercises, especially between the United States and its allies; and,
- ? Instability on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.²

Taiw an is a special concern of the Chinese leadership. W eakened by a bitterly divided political leadership, Taiw an is further subject to the influence of external forces, easing the way for eventual reunification with them other land In China's opinion, certain factors are inim ical to their interests in Taiw an:

- ? Activities of those who harbor separatist aspirations among Taiwan's leaders;
- ? Military aid from the United States, which induces weapon sales, with the likelihood of future increases if the American Congress passes the Taiw an Security Enhancement Act;
- ? The possible indusion of Taiw an into the U.S.-led theater m issile defensesystem; and,
- ? The presence of U.S. troops in Japan, which enables the United States to intervene in a possible military confrontation in the Taiw an Strait.³

In resolving the problem of Taiw an, the Chinese government acheres to the principles of peaceful reunification and "one country, two systems." It has put forward some proposals on developing cross-strait relations, with the eventual goal of peaceful reunification. China considers the Taiw an question wholly an internal affair and insists that it will covery thing in its power to achieve peaceful reunification. If owever, if events result in as eparation of Taiw an from China under any slogan, China is willing to use force to protect its sovereignty and its territorial integrity.⁴

With this as its impetus, China has upgraded its military capability, retrofitting its ann edforces in an effort to transform them into a powerful, modern ann y. Ideally, the PLA should be able to protect China against external threats, maintain internal stability, and if necessary – guarantee Taiw an unification with the motherland.

In order to add ieve its goals, Ch in a seeks to boost its tactical capabilities, including battlefield m anagem ent, particularly during radical shifts in conditions, as well as

usage of modern technology. Thus, Chinah as paid special attention to improving the battle efficiency of its troops, shifting the focus to quality rather than quantity. This recent trend of military improvements came from a operational analysis of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. This is reflected in the solutions proposed by the CCP's Central Committee in September 1995 and in the directives of the PRC Perspective Development Program until 2010, which the National People's Congress (NPC) Stancing Committee approved in March 1996.⁵

At the endof 1998, China's CMC approved as checkle of defense modernization as well as a new military strategy and oborrine. In its new military strategy, the PLA is directed to train for waging battle in peripheral regions of China, sm all in scale and short in duration, but nonetheless intensive. The preparation for such a war differs radically from its previous strategy which focused on waging wars of attrition, which was the focus during its period of confrontation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).⁶

China's military strategy foresees five main types of local wars:

- ? Sm all scale wars with in the territorial boundaries of China;
- ? W ar to control acjacent water areas and islands;
- ? Suchen air attack on strategic resources with in Chinese territory;
- ? Defensive operations against deliberate invasions of restricted areas of China; and,
- ? Counteroffensive against an opponent's territory in retaliation for aggression and to protect national sovereignty.⁷

Common to all those listed above is the pursuit of limited political ends achievable with the help of a military ready for immediate deployment and capable of routing the opponent. The main prerequisite for achieving such an outcome is the effective use of military force. Thus, Beijing considers the readiness to wage local wars an indispensable tool for achieving limited political ends, and this should induce effective intimication and the ability to escalate to a full-scale war.⁸

The strategic concepts of reassessing the sources of military threats and targeting the political and military leadership to create a new military paradigm was approved in the obstrine of China. China's military reorganization would allow for a sufficiently constrained military during peacetime and the deployment of a large arm edforce during war. The arm ed forces of China should correspond to its economic capabilities, ensure socio-political unity, and not violate the integrity of the country. With in the framework of possiblemilitary conflicts, the nuclear forces of the PRC are invoked to deter aggression against China and the conventional forces are intended to manage local wars.⁹

The modern Chinese nuclear strategy is diaracterized by the following two positions. During peacetime, nuclear forces are intended to deter potential adversaries from unleashing nuclear war against China and to guarantee that China is free to exercise an independent foreign policy. The purpose of nuclear forces during wartime is to prevent China's enemies from turning a conventional war into a nuclear war.

Chinahas several hundredwarh eads, including several intercontinental ballistic missiles, some of which are deployed on tactical aircraft.

Apparently, Chinahas no intention of addiering nuclear parity with the United States and Russia. It has found a philosophy, adopted in the 1980s, of "restricted nuclear counter attack with the purposes of self-defense." This concept not only takes into consideration the limited financial resources of the country, but also recognizes that the United States and Russia plan to retrofit existing systems or deploy new defensive systems that will neutralize any achievable Chinese strategic nuclear buildup. The calculation dem onstrates that Chinese delivery vehicles are not cap able of overcoming prospective anti-ballistic missile systems and air defense systems; consequently, they will lose the ability to prevent the United States from interfering in China's political affairs. This is one of the main potential threats China faces at the global level.¹⁰

China's leaders have openly declared that they will not use nuclear weapons first. Furtherm ore, China's strategic nuclear forces operate on a three-component structure strategic missile forces, strategic aviation, and nuclear submarines. This compacts tructure of forces is necessary to deterwars against the China, to execute combat missions in response to various international scenarios, and to intimidate the smaller hegemonists in the Asia-Padific region.¹¹

It is necessary to identify the inconsistency between China's political declarations regarding its no first-use policy and its tech nological capabilities. Only about a obzen of China's strategic nuclear delivery systems are located in protected silo launchers. If ence, in terms of the theory of mutually assured destruction, China's existing nuclear forces have neither a first strike capability nor is China capable of unleashing a massive retaliatory strike to mipe out an aggressor. This reality is mentioned in the military obctrine of China.

However, it coes allow China to avoid participation in nuclear weapons reduction agreements, such as the strategic arms reduction treaties. In 2000, this author askedMr. Sha Zukang, Director-General of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, what China's rolewas in the U.S.-Russian arms reduction initiatives. He believes that China would participate in such treaties when Russia and the United States reduce their existing arsenal to one fifth of their current levels. It is difficult to imagine Moscow and Washington taking this step.

Chinese battle training and strategic nudear-m issile exercises are contingent on properly maintained rocket system s. The Chineserockets are technologically similar to the Soviet R-5 and R-7. These rockets were designed in the late 1950s - aperiodof cooperation between nuclear-missile specialists in the USSR and China. The extent of the Russian-Chinese exchange should not be overestim ated Far from the quoted level of \$20 billion, a realistic amount lies in the region of \$5-7 billion per year of which only \$1 billion consists of military equipment. An amount this small will have little significance in increasing military m ocernization. At the same time, the relationship between Russia and China should not be underestimated It takes time and effort to build apartnership in which the sharing of inform ation – especially related to weapons – is cone willingly. In addition to Russia, Chinahas received limited military aid from other countries and broad economic assistance from western powers - both types of aid are efficiently incorporated into the Chineseplan for national m odernization.

It is unlikely that the Chinese arsenal will perform well in educational and com bat-trainer tests, due to the sm all volume of production and limited early testing. China's technological lag behind the U.S.m issile program bols ters cbubts of any successful m issile firings.

On July 12, 2001, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul W olfow itz submitted a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee describing the unsuccess full test laundh of American Thor (4 of 5), Atlas (5 of 8), and Polaris (66 of 123) strategicmissiles.¹² Soviet missile testing during the 1960s yielded similar results. Apparently, China's missile experimentation has metwith the same outcome. Though government and industry forces want more extensive testing of China's arsenal to eliminate design flaws, the high cost of failure has frustrated further efforts. A missile system must be tested periodically to ensure immediate response in a combat situation. The lack of testing on a large scale poses two major problems for the reliability of China's arsenal: first, the currents took may have flaws, and second, the probability of a flawed launch increases the longer a missile sits idle and unmaintained

The Chineserely on lessons from past conflicts to shape their view of building general-purpose forces and deploying them into battle. Of particular importance in this respect has been the GulfW ar in which technological superiority was used to quickly defeat the opponent. Thus, China's strategy has evolved from the traditional "grand arm y" model in favor of concepts like "fast reaction" and "local warfare." These concepts m andate that joint state and military institutions be able to quickly and effectively mobilizein the face of combat situations and that the arm ed forces be prepared to immediately wage war in one or several theaters.

The new ideal of "fast reaction" has fostered considerable drange in battle training, unit organization and unit form ation as the modernization of the PLA advances. The creation and content of the PLA battle components tructure ("alert forces" and "fast-reacting forces" cap able of quick cleasions on emerging issues) has been recognized as indispensable.

The PLA military command is well-trained and has equippedbattalions and brigades to be used as impact units cap able of quick, retaliatory action. These units are trained to execute the following primary objectives:

- ? Breakth rough ,
- ? Shock m issions on the basecam ps of enemy military,
- ? Massive retaliations with the purpose of defeating opposition strongholds, and

? Tactics by which PLA troops flank the opponent.¹³

Units intended to execute these mission objectives are currently trained in each military district. The changing international situation, in connection with the end of the Cold W ar and economic concerns, has induced China to reduce the ranks of the PLA in the short term. The earm y will drop to 25 million members (from more than 4 million) and embark on a vigorous modernization effort. This effort will dose a number of bases and reduce the number of military divisions and regiments. However, the problem of up dating the arm y to modern levels has not been achtessed. The present condition of the PLA is draracterized by a lack of materials used by more developed countries and a great deal of obsolete equipment and weaponry.

The traditional military contrine of China since Mao Zecong held that people were indispensable to develop a modern army. Currently, though, this view has been tempered with obstrines of expediency and capabilityconcepts that surfaced after China's dvil wars and conflict with Japan. In addition to their own experience, the Chinese also "steadfastly keep track of strategics ituations in the world and combine the best tactics from foreign countries with national experience"¹⁴ In the end, the conditions " I as adopted. This doctrine recognizes the increasing importance of technology in a margare and envisions an arm y with a balance between weaponry and troops that effectively functions in fivedmensions: air, land sea, space, and tech nology. In addition, the plan calls for the up dating of already existing military-industrial operations.

Special attention is paid to the preparation of arm ed forces in peacetim eto allow for immediate response in case of conflict. A chaitionally, however, plans are made to efficiently transform the national economy, dvilair chefense, and national transportation chefense from a peaceful state to one of wartime operations. Legislation has been passed so that, if the states o cherees, all state bodies, political parties, firm s, institutes, and citizens are obligated to m oblize according to enacted guidelines¹⁵.

During the last 2 years, fundamental dranges have taken place in the field of defense education. Thestate has transform edth ecurriculum to target all ditizens by training in broader and more general areas. Defense education now consists of regular, intensive training combined with correspondence and day time dasses.¹⁶

It will be difficult for the Chinese to combine the traditional military practice of mass infantry and simple tactical operations with the usage of new, high-precision weaponry and aerospace technology. Unclubtedly, the transform ation will dem and severe modifications to the existing military infrastructure.

The most serious impediments to China's military development are its aging military bases and centers of production. In contrast to the way in which former ColdW ar period installations were funded, the current ach inistration recognizes the need for a solid national economy and the importance of coordinating economic and military building efforts. Chinese propaganda works to create a unified economic system in which production can serve both dvil and military uses – the former during times of peaceand the latter during times of conflict. Creating the system, how ever, will be problematic due to China's current level of technical expertise

Atpresent, military research and development is largely ineffective due, in part, to poor state financing. China's bureaucracy also has a hand in the slow pace of military R&D. The rigid duain of command often stiffes scientific ideas before they can reach decision makers. In addition to poor organization, negative public reactions hamper progress when news of military development leaks out to the public Small gains have been realized by studying Russian military equipment like submarines, destroyers, aircraft and air defense systems; the knowledge gained, how ever, is minimal. The modernization of the PLA often proceeds at the whim of officials; even then, it moves at a slow pacedue to the limited defense budget and obsolete equipment. The sectors of the military slated to advance most rapidly are nuclear operations and rapid deployment-type land troops. Import purchases are forgone to boost spending on military transport planes as well as air-defense troops. Chinese naval vessels with high performance ratings are entered into service.

In the short term, prospects for military development will rest on China's continued economic grow th – currently 8 percent per year. However, the current administration has recently assigned a low probability to future, external military threats; this places military spending near the end of the line for budget increases. At this point, it appears as if the bulk of governments pending will focus on retrofitting a research complex, creating new arms with Chines e produced elements, and laying the financial ground ork for a military technology base¹⁷

The process of developing market mechanisms in the country and obtaining the experience of commercial activity led to similar developments in the PLA. Special attention was paid to maintaining scientific and technological developm ent in areas pertaining to defense building and raising the standards of engineering to modern requirements. China has conducted structural reforms to create a new, high-perform ancescience of defensesystems, engineering, and industries. Am ong these was the creation of the Comm ission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense in March 1998. This commission operates as a leading department of the State Council and enacts policies, laws, rules, schedules, and standards in areas of m ilitary influence In July 1999, fivem ilitary organizations that specialize in nuclear weapons, spacecraft, aircraft, naval vessels, and weapons manufacturing were reorganized into ten corporations.¹⁸

With the help of the national defense science, engineering, and industry reforms, competition was introduced into the military production sector. The war industry's structure was improved, its ability to transition between peace and warstream lined, and plans were made for the creation of a new open system of military production.¹⁹

The current style of battle training focuses on m aking individual soldiers part of a cohesive unit. On the regiment and division scale, officer drilling through computer simulation has largely replaced the expensive, live ammunition training practiced earlier. The combined tactical training basesystem provides a versatile training ground by providing networked tactical, we eapon, and service simulation models. An interactive command and control simulation, new equipment operation simulation, and computer-aided training systems have been widely applied²⁰

Poor military financing, the inability to incorporate technologically advanced equipment with current troops and the evolving model of small-scale operations troops have forced PLA officials to create a number of "elite" brigades and battalions, specially trained for immediate mobilization. These divisions receive the larger part of allotted funct and are thus better equipped with arms and equipment, which enhances their training.

Them ajority of the PLA, PLA reserve units, the Chinese People's Arm ed Police Force, and them ilitia are provided with few resources for training exercises. For example, an ordinary PLAAF pilot typically trains in a Soviet prototype jet designed in the early 1950s. He only spends 80 hours per year in the air- not enough time to master the complex skills of piloting, let alone grasp the handling of high-ted weaponry used in combat planes.

The gap between current military coctrine about modern warandth eactual practices of the arm ediforces has resulted in a deficit of experience among Chinese soldiers.

Though political rhetoric promotes extensive training and increased usage of technology in combat operations, the bulk of them ilitary has nom odern equipment with which to train. The situation becam esopronounced in 1998 that the PRC CMC decided to train caches abroad and recruit foreign specialists to train various elements of the PLA. Though m any Chinesesolders trained in the Soviet Union during th e1950s, this is no longer the case. The decreased desire to learn Russian has contributed to the decrease in numbers, whiles do ols that offer English have become more popular. Although the Chinese still hold conferences with the Russian military, they are mostly restricted to the general headquarters and district level. The military leaders feel that the impact of foreigners will raise technological know ledge through out the PLA. The participants in this new initiative will be officers of high and middlerank, those who received a broad education, or those possessing specialized military know ledge. President Jiang Zem in h in selfs tated that "it is better to let the professionals at ait for weapons than for the weapons to wait for professionals."²¹

The practice of training troops for battle looks in posing, even on paper. The quantity of required exercises, m aneuvers, and officer drillings testifies to the drallenging studies of the PLA. With the advent of military reform, the num ber of exercises as increased but the subject content became broader and displayed a deeper understanding of geopolitics and military structure. After 1980 com bined arm s exercises became more common place. Strategies of encirclement, disembarkation from marine and air-vehides, and us age of weapons of mass destruction were discussed from both offensive and defensive positions. As early as 1984, 27 divisions, 269 regiments and over 200,000 servicent en utere trained in the Shenyang and Lanzhou districts alone. Involved in exercises were 3,600 artillery pieces, over 1,000 tanks and other ann ored vehicles, 13 ships, and 10,000 autom obiles. The num ber of aircraft m issions completed was 508. The military districts of Shenyang, Jinan, and Wuhan saw an increase of battalion scale exercises (1,726), regiment scale exercises (596), and division scale exercises (67). Strategic operations exercises were run with the participation of tens and even hundreds of thousands of servicemen.²²

Each of the seven military districts of the PLA carries out annual independent staff and field exercises in preparation for local ar. Joint operations in retaliation for border skinn ishes and other local incidents are regularly carried out. Increased hostilities along border regions fostered the desire that such exercises should create a military zone where independent operations could be carriedout during certain times. The commander in driefof a military district becomes the head of an integrated command Orders to all attached land, air, and, when necessary, naval troops are sent from a central comm and facility in a seaside zone²³ A lso contributing to peaceful borders is the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between the Russian Federation and the PRC. Although the treaty contains m any m ilitary-support sounding references like, "concerning guards of state unity and territorial integrity," the agreem ent is effectively as tatem ent of mutual support for policy concerns; it falls far short of a military alliance

Until the end of the 1980s, the majority of larges cale operations were conclucted in northern military districts based on the supposition that conflict would arise between China and the Soviet Union. In addition, the Guangzhou region also hos tedlarges cale exercises with Vietnam as the potential opponent. Special attention was paid to the selater exercises, though, for two reasons. First was the need to carry out the defense of coastal territories, especially those along the South China Sea, with as much efficiency as possible Second was the comprehensive nature- divisions from all branches of the PLA were used- of the training missions. Of special import was the commander of the coastal district, who also had control of naval operations. The skills of this leader could easily be transferred to battle in other countries. PRC Naval Commandwants to increase the battle capabilities of the Chinese fleet to a zone of operations of 400 m iles and enable independent operations of the fleet.²

In the 1990s, specialized exercises commenced with the use of high-tech arm ament and equipment. The development of electronic warfare, such as implanting viruses into enemy computer systems, is considered the primary goal of these simulations. The military district of Shey ang host editheses pecialized exercises, which included Chineses pecialists in electronic technology.²⁰

During the last few years, the military districts of Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou hosted training missions incorporating multiple branches of the arm ed forces.²⁰

Chinesem ilitary specialists have been able to acquaint them selves with the expertise of other countries. Com bining foreign learning with their know lecebe of historic conflict, they modify and shape military strategy and obstrine as it relates to tactical operations and troop preparation.

A similar trend was seen in Soviet forces during the 1970s and 1980s. During this time, Russian preparation for nuclear world war was completed, and induced the am assing of thousands of rockets and tens of thousands of nuclear warh each. The central research base of the country provided a huge variety of Russian and foreign designed arm aments. In the advent of another world war, a massive nuclear strike against the opponent could beguaranteed

The situation became more complicated when the United States and NATO- followed by the USSR and countries of the Warsaw Pact-began preparations for conventional warfare in addition to nuclear war. This preparation resulted from the change in perspective called the "antinuclear revolution in military affairs." It appeared, though, as if the minchet had changed with out a result in actual practice. New ideas became wides pread such as the

useofin issiles, artillery and air forces to guaranteesuccess; m ultipoint observation of opponents; and usage of a division- or even an arm y- to flank an adversary. In view of the great advances in military engineering, all of these things seem edpossible. In training simulations, the speed of an offensive was established at 50 or even 100 kilom eters per day. When questioned on how the necessary am m unition, fuels, lubricant oils, m eans of operation, and battlem aintenancew ould come to be the common answer was that in a short time these "necessaries" would be invented Samples of arm shad already been created, and there were promises of spreading them throughout the arm ed forces. On paper, the revolution had already encom passed all aspects of military art. The reality of the situation, how ever, was quite different. The Soviet arm y simply did not have the proper form ations and num ber of troops to carry out the tactical plans they had

The problem of possible transition to the use of nuclear weapons was solved by diagramming huncheds of potential nuclear strikes on cards. Each drew the appropriate impact zone and estimated the consequences of using nuclear weaponry. Induced in the plans were 2-3 days to allow the effects of a nuclear attack to dear. This period, how ever, was not induced in field training exercises. There is also a decided lack of skill, even in the elite units, relating to material support, logistics, and even the use of some forms of weaponry.

It is believed that the gap between PLA ideals like "high-tech local warfare" and "revolution in military affairs" and the actual practices of military units is even more pronounced than in the Soviet Arm y. Although the PLA is linked to the concept of "people's war" through weapons and equipment designed in the 1950-60s, its target of territorial defense creates a foundation of reliables ecurity for China. The 1960-70s were a difficult time for the PLA as the ach inistration did not allow military spending on up dating weapons and engineering. They waited while other countries went through 2.3 generations of arm aments. Even now, there is not enough support in the Chinese leadership to fund a full scale modernization of the PLA. I believe that the Chinese will continue applying existing we apons to their military theories for quite some time.

One area in which the PLA has attained a high degree of success is in the creation of a courageous officer and executive soldier dass. These services en are willing to wage war in the name of their country despite the arm y's aging equipment and untrained troops.

The author's above representation of Chinesem ilitary obstrine was only in brief. The question then arises as to whether China's military policy has recently dranged due to warm ingrelations with the United States. The answer is, of course, negative. The obstrine and practice of battle training are staples of the Chinesem ilitary structure and require trem enclus impetus before alteration.

The U.S. hardening policy towards China is expressed first in intentions, second in political steps, and finally in military action. It will be interesting to discover how the George W. Bush ach inistration's new foreign policy initiatives will be met by the PRC-both politically and militarily.

In China, as in other countries of the world, the latest steps of the United States in the international arena are perceived as America's attempt to assert itself as the last superpower and disrupt the present world order in the field of international security.

The developments of such a policy induce:

- ? A power *diktat* and the use of force without international approval;
- ? The departure from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the organization of a national ABM and theater missile defense (TMD) system which upset thest rategic balance and fractured the system

of agreen ents regarding the limitation and reduction of offensive forces and nuclear arm s; and,

? The expansion to the East.

The cevelopm ents in U.S. foreign policy have little direct impact on the Asia Pacific region in which Chinais situated There has been, how ever, abuildup of smaller incidents like the bom bing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade and the collision of the Chinese fighter with the American EP-3 off the island of # ain an. Furtherm ore, the Bush administration's support of Taiw an could substantially complicate the political and military situation in the region.

This is, of course, not a full list of the events instigated by the United States to overtly restrain the concerns of the PRC. If continued, these events may lead to complex operating measures in both political and military spheres between the two countries.

The PRC leadership strongly reacted to the events in Yugoslavia- to the extension of NATO and the creation of an anti-missile defense system. Its reactions are of a political and diplom aticnature statement, demonstration, consulting and coordination with likeminded countries. There are also, how ever, cases of military reaction as evidenced by the illegal airspace infringement of the EP-3.

The PRC has put forth as diecule of transform ation that lasts into them iddle of the 21st Century. This plan consists of 3 parts: first, econom ic grow thand an increased living standard for the Chinesepeople, second, the socio-political stability of the country; and third, the guaranteeof military security and the territorial integrity of the country.

The first part of China's strategy allows little room to cleais ively act in the international arena. Moreover, any Chinese plans of military expansion will severely clam age its foreign economic relations and slow its national economic growth.

The second part of the Chineseplan is connected to the active extraction of government forces from the economy. One of the functions of China's armed forces has traditionally been to assist in natural disaster relief projects and to rebuild dam aged houses. Natural disasters seem to plague the country and so distract the PLA from training objectives. Furthermore, with the significant reduction in the army (from 4 to 25 m illion) and the continuing call for disaster relief, China may hasten the removal of the PLA from the economy.

The thirdpart of the Chineseplan relies on its military potential and the modernization of the PLA. The pattern has been the gradual destruction of obsolete items (including tanks, artillery systems, aircraft, etc.) and the purchase and dissemination of new equipment through out the arm y. This process is not threatening to other countries and does not drange the balance of power on regional or strategic levels.

It should be noted that, when laying out its national goals, the Chinese leadership traditionally thinks in large categories, in large time periods, and exhibits significant patience China never entered an arm's race by massing its field troops or by buying expensive modern weapons system's. Since the 1950-60s, the PRC has based its strength on ground troops, although it has received and created samples of nuclear weapons, missiles, aircraft and marine vessels. Subsequently, China didnot conduct broad retrofits of its existing weaponry, though it was considerably outcated I thas only cone them inim um to ensurem ilitary security during the difficult times of the 1960-80s during which minor confrontations occurred with the Soviet Union and the United States.

Currently, the international situation is more favorable for Chineses ecurity. Using the concept of "people's war," the PLA reliably guards the country's borders. China's nuclear arms serve only as a deterrent to potential aggressors. China is not prepared for m ajor conflicts outside of its own territory, and there have been no rum ors of plans in this direction. Even the statements of Chinese leaders regarding the possibility of forcing Taiw and to rejoin the country should be dismissed as no more than a political show. Now, and in the near future, an assault on Taiw an is outside of China's capability.

This situation can be changed by large international political and military events such as:

- ? Obstacles on the path of reunification with Taiw an, international support of the Taiw anese government, or careless political and military maneuvers in the Taiw an strait;
- ? Allowing the PRC to build a nuclear arsenal unrestrained and,
- ? Dram aticch anges in the political or military situation in the Asia Pacific Region or in the world as a whole.

Developments of this naturemay force the leadership of the PRC to revise its military strategy and pursue an accelerated modernization of the arm ed forces. The rapid economic growth of China and its increasing military potential – combined with its active and firm military policy towards its opponents, including the United States – may result in an unexpectedly large threat, should China be forced to think outside of its borders.

Should these events occur, Chinawillhave to overcome considerable difficulties, induding:

- ? A weak technical and technological base;
- ? A vulnerable economy if a chastic increase in military consumption and research and development (R&D) dem and occurs; and,
- ? Decreasing econom ic relations with other nations.

The path to war is fraught with econom ic and sociopolitical difficulties for China, thus there is slight chance the country will pursue it. It has as an example the Soviet Union, which could not balance the arms race with its overstrained economy. At the same time, how ever, foreign powers should not expect China to take a passive stand in military operations. At aminimum, the PRC can engage in military action with in its borchers.

If the Chinese tendencies manifested over the last 15-20 years persist, the PLA will only have the potential to defend the PRC. It is difficult to imagine as cenario in which China would pose a real threat to the continental United States or even to American military bases in East Asia.

For this reason, the international situation over the next 15-20 years will be determ ined largely by U.S. policy. If America shows restraint, does not excessively increase its military, does not promote unilateral expansion plans in foreign regions, does not destroy the present system of strategics tability, does not engage in an arm s race (under the pretext of deployment of ABM systems, for example) and does not proliferate nuclear and conventional arm aments, then China will have no incentive to increase its own military capacity. Rivalry between China and the United States will then originate only from economic and political sources.

If the United States and its allies didate politically or militarily toother countries, it may place the United States and China on the road to a new Cold War. We are now witnessing the destruction of a series of international agreements regarding the reduction and limitation of nuclear arm aments. The United States has term inated its participation in the ABM Treaty of 1972 U.S. National Security Adviser Concoleezza Rice recently compared the present system of agreements to the geocentric concept of the universe; the future system of the world to the heliocentric system. Copernicus, though, had to form ulate h is concept of the cosm os and demonstrate its consistency with fact before he received the recognition of the world²⁷

Russia is often di argedwith giving China them odern air, anti-aircraft, and marine arm s that helpedincrease the military potential of the country. Making this statement, how ever, requires the following suppositions:

1. Russian arm s shipm ents to China were meant as defensive tools to protect the nation's borders.

2 China does not its elf possess the capacity to m anufacture its entire spectrum of military equipment. It also testifies to the reluctance of the Chinese leadership to enter an arm s raceand, in so doing, to become dependent on the military-industrial complex.

Form er President Dwight Eisenhow er spoke of the relationship between a country's leadership and its arm s producers in his farewell address. He warned of a military-industrial complex that dictates both defense and economic policies.

Neither the United States nor the USSR could avoid such a situation, how ever. The United States has not experienced the consequences, though, for two reasons: (1) high general econom icpotential, and (2)m ilitary-inclustrial corporations producing diversified commodities, selling both to them ilitary and to divilians. In the Soviet Union, though, a diktat of the producers of military equipment resulted in the economic weakness of the country's private sector, a redundancy of production, and that production's low quality.

It is plausible to view the national ABM system proposed by the Bush ach inistration as a concession to the military-inclustrial complex of America, which stands to profit substantially from the uncertaking. They prefer not to speak about the battle effectiveness of the system, but rather to point at the nonexistent threat of North K orean nuclear weapons. China, though, perceives the creation of the American national anti-missile shield very differently. Them ilitary policy of the United States will shape that of China. If momentum is given to them issiles hield, it will provoke the Chinese to institute a full-scale militaryinclustrial complex capable of producing thousands of rockets, aircraft, and tanks. Should this occur, it will heavily stress China's economic base, yet the transform ation is possible.

In the early 1980s, the author studied at the Military A cademy of General Staffofthe Soviet Armed Forces. Here helearned the three major strategic zones of the globe the West, the South, and the East. The Soviet Armed Forces had the resources and capabilities necessary for such operations. The PLA, on the other hand, does not have the capability to think of the aters outside of the Asia Pacific Region. I do not think that the United States and its allies should view the PLA as having such capabilities – a fact that should be taken into account before hardening foreign policy against China.

The transform ation of Chinesem ilitary coctrine and the combat training of their arm echorces diaracterize a country trying to reach a higher level of conventional military capabilities. It is obviously necessary for China to react against aggressors, but not always through military operations. The function entals of strategy and deception are with good reason the bases of "people's war" at the strategic level.

CHAPTER 4 - END NOTES

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PARTII: CH INA'S BALLISTIC MISSILES AND EASTASIAN REACTION TO U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVES

CHAPTER5

CH INESE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSE: CHALLENGESAND RESPONSES

Mark A. Stokes

INTROD UCTION

Since the days of Sunzi and beyond, nations have pursued defenses against offensive weapons. Naturally, sparkedby the advent of the first ballisticm issiles in World W ar II, interest in defending against ballisticm issiles over the pastseveral decades has increaseds ignificantly. Today, strategican doonventional ballisticm issiles posed allenges to the United States and to its national interests around the world Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery place significant portions of the U.S. population at risk. These systems, in the hands of governments that are hostile to U.S. national interests, diallenge these curity of allies and friends. No system exists to day that is capable of defending U.S. territory and only a limited capability exists top rotect allies and friends, as well as U.S. forces deployed overseas.

To address the growing proliferation of ballisticm issiles and WMD, President 6 eorge W. Bush has set out on a path to field ballistic missile defenses to protect the United States, its forces overseas, and allies and friends. At the same time, the United States seeks to reduce its nuclear arsenal to the "low est possible number of nuclear weapons." U.S. missile defense programs are designed to counter the existing and growing short, medium, and intermediate rangemissile threats to our allies and friends and deployed forces; as well as the long-range threat to American cities that is just over the horizon.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is concerned about U.S. plans to deploy a global missile defense and itecture From Beijing's perspective, even a modest missile defense system could have serious implications for the viability of its nuclear deterrent and for its expanding inventory of conventional short and medium range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs). Beijing's anxiety over maintaining its nuclear deterrent is not nem. Development of missile defense countermeasures dates back at least to the mid-1980s, when a series of responses to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) were contemplated. These responses induced plans for a significant expansion of China's nuclear intercontinental ballisticm issile force.

The author of this diapter examines the PRC's strategic and theater ballisticm issile development and the growing role of ballisticm issiles as an integral component of PRC coercive strategy. U.S. missile defense programs are outlined in order to provide the necessary context for subsequent discussion of the wide range of PRC technical responses that are underway. These countermeasures are intended to undercut the political and military utility of U.S. missile defense programs.

In addressing PRC technical responses to U.S. m issile defenses, three caveats are in order. First, this discussion does not necessarily imply that U.S. m issile defense programs are motivated by a perceived Chinese threat to the U.S. hom eland U.S. m issile defense programs are driven by roguenations equipped with limited numbers of relatively unsophisticated ballistic m issiles, as well the prospects of an accidental Russian or Chinese laundh. While m issile defenses are not necessarily driven by a perceived PRC threat, Beijing's track record of proliferating ballistic m issile related technology to rogue states – to indude counterm easures – is a legitim ate concern. Secondly, defense against ballisticm issiles, particularly thesh orter-range threats, requires an integrated approach consisting of survivable command, control, communications, and battlem anagement systems; passive defense such as hardening and rapid recovery measures; active ballisticm issile defenses that destroy missiles in the boost, mid-course, and terminal phases of flight; and attack operations intended to suppress the use of ballisticm issile forces at their source. This drap ter focuses only on the eactive component of missile defense.

Finally, China's opposition to m issile defenses often is viewed through the cognitive prism of Taiwan. Therefore, special attention is placed on the relationship between the development of missile defenses and their potential use in a Taiw an Strait conflict, since it is with in this context that Beijing perceives U.S. development of missile defense. The PRC's growing arsenal of strategic ballisticm issiles and increasingly accurate and leth al theater ballisticm issiles th reatens to disrupt the security situation in the Taiw an Strait and limit U.S. freedom of action should the PRC resort to the use of force to resolve differences with Taiwan. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China has an expanding inventory of conventional ballistic missiles, linked with other form's of coercive airpower, which could give Beijing a decisive edge in any future conflict with Taiw an. From a political and military perspective, missile defenses threaten to undermine the PRC's ballisticm issile "trum p card"

PRC BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

The PRC relies heavily upon its ballisticm issile forcesthe PLA Second Artillery Corps- for deterrence, coercion, and warfighting. With some foreign assistance, Beijing is expanding and modernizing its limited inventory of nuclear ballisticm issiles and is continuing to deploy increasingly accurate and lethal conventional ballisticm issiles opposite Taiw an. Its sm all intercontinental ballisticm issile (ICBM) force provides a modicum of assured retaliation should China suffer nuclear attack. The Second Artillery's conventional ballisticm issile force is becoming not only an important instrument of psychological intimication, but also a potentially devastating force of military utility. The nuclear and conventional missile buildup is taking place regardless of the scale of any future U.S. missile defense architecture or the provision of missile defenses to Taiwan. A 1998 U.S. Department of Defense report asserted that China's space and missile industry probably will have the capacity toproduce as many as 1,000 ballisticm issiles in the next decade¹

The PRC's strategic nuclear coctrine is based on the concept of lim ited deterrence- the ability to inflict unacceptable can age on an enemy in a retaliatory strike. China's nuclear forces generally are believed to follow a countervalue strategy that targets population centers. Chinah as sufficient nuclear weapons to hold approximately 15-20 m illion U.S. dtizens at risk, or about 5-10 percent of the total U.S. population.²

China's primary organization for ballistic missile research, development, and production is the China Aerospace Corporation's First Academy. The First A cademy, also known as the China A cademy of Launda Technology (CALT), consists of an overall design and systems integration department, 13 research institutes, and 7 factories which are responsible for engines, control tech nology, inertial system s, w arh each, m aterials, testing, and launchers. With more than 27,000 personnel, the First A cademy is the largest research and development (R&D) organization within the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC). In its work on solidsystems, the First A cademy is dependent upon the Fourth A cademy in H ohhot, Inner Mongolia, for its solid motors. CALT is also supported by institutes and factories subordinated to various bases deep inside China. One of these bases, the Sanjiang Space Group (066 Base) in Hubei province, has developed its own

com plete ballisticm issilesystem, the 300-kilom eter DF-11 and its 600 kilom eter variant, the DF-11A.

Today, the First A cademy's research and development resources are devoted to ensuring its nuclear ballistic m issileforceren ains av iable ceterrent in the face of m issile defenses. CALT and the 066 Base in H ubei province are leveraging foreign technology in order to achieve tren enclus advances in accuracy. At the same time, they are diversifying the payloads of their ballisticm issiles to increase their lethality. CALT and the PLA are also exam ining an iderange of countern easures to ensure their ballisticm issile force remains effective as missile defenses are introduced into the Asia-Pacific region. Key organizations responsible for technical countern easures induceCALT's 4 th PlanningDepartment (system setsion); the 14th Research Institute (marh ead/payload developm ent); and the 703rd Research Institute (m aterials). CALT and the 066 B as e are working on no less than six research and developm ent programs that will increase the range, size, mobility, accuracy, and survivability of the Second Artillery's inventory of ballisticm issiles. Many of these programs have been placed on an accelerated R&D schedulesinceMay 1999.³

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

The PRC's existing ICBM force consists of liquid-fueled DF-5 (CSS-4) and DF-4 (CSS-3) systems. Mobile, solid fueled ICBMs will augment these older systems over the next 5 years. The Second Artillery currently possesses approximately 20DF-5 ICBMs that are cap able of targeting any location in the United States. This figure is expected to grow to 21 over the next few years. CALT is working on an improved version of the DF-5 that could incorporate multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology. Deployment of at least twelve 6,000-kilometer range DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBMs began in the mid-1970s. Western sources indicate that these two stage, liquid fueled missiles are distributed an ong three brigades under the 54 Base in # enan province, 55 Base in western # unan province, and 56 Base in Qinghai province⁴

China's liquid fueled ICBM forcew ill be augmented by m obile, solid fueledsystem swith in the next5 years. At least one source alleges that China could deploy up to 100 new landor sea-laund edICBMs over the next 15 years. These new systems induce the DF-31, an extended range DF-31, and a sea-based version of the DF-31, the JL-2° The DF-31 is a solid-fueled, three stage nuclear m issile with an 8,000-kilom eter range, sufficient to strike targets in H aw aii, 6 uam, A laska, and som eportions of north western United States. Two successful DF-31 flight tests were conducted in 1999 and 2000. Slated for deployment before 2005, the DF-31 eventually will replace the DF-4 interm ediate range ballisticm issile (IRBMs). The DF-31 is estim ated to carry a single warh ead and ould incorporate penetration aids, including decoys and d aff. At least 10-20 DF-31 m issiles can be expected to enter the force over the next5 years, sufficient to outfit one brigadew ith a notional structure of 9-16 launchers assigned to three or four battalions.⁶

Two variants of the DF-31 also are under development. First is an extended range version of the DF-31 with a range of at least 12,000 kilom eters. This longer range m issile, know n as the DF-31A, likely will be tested with in the next several years and will be targeted primarily against the United States. Japanese observers note that the DF-31A is in some respects more advanced than some Russian systems, such as the Topol-M. As many as 10 DF-31A ICBMs could be fielded by 2010. Another variant of the DF-31-theJL-2-will be launched from submarines. The JL-2 m issile was successfully tested in early 2001. A m odified Type94 submarine that will be equipped with 16 tubes allegedly will carry the JL-2 Projected for deployment by 2005, the 8,000-kilometer range missile would be able to strike targets in Alaska, H aw aii, and the western part of the United States when operating in

Chinese coastal w aters.⁷ Indications exist that the timeline to field the DF-31, its longer rangev ariant, and the JL-2w as accelerated in May 1999.⁸

DF-21 MRBM System.

The PRC's principal MRBM is the solid fueled DF-21 (CSS-5). Research and development on the DF-21 began in 1967 and them issilewas first tested in 1985. Assembled at the 307 Factory in Nanjing, the initial introduction of the missile into an experimental regiment took place as early as 1991. With a 600-kilogram warh ead and an estimated CEP of 700 meters, the 2,100 kilometer range DF-21 is currently equipped for nuclear missions only. A longer range version of the DF-21, the 2,500 kilometer range DF-21 Mod 2, is reportedly under development. Both the DF-21 Mod 1 and Mod 2 likely have missile defense countermeasures, inducing encoder at mospheric decoys that were tested in 1995 and 1996.⁹

There are indications that a conventionally arm ed variant of the DF-21- the DF-21C- has been underway since at least 1995. This system may adopt a term inal guidancep adkage that uses on-board computers to correlate stored in ages with lanch arks and that theoretically could ad iere a circular error probability (CEP) of 50 m eters or better.¹⁰ Such a capability naturally would require a m aneuverable reentry vehicle. The reentry speed of the DF-21C is likely to be fast enough to preclude engagement by low er-tier missile defense systems, such as the PAC-3. Equipped with a conventional warh ead as large as 1,500 kilogram s, the DF-21C could force defenders on Taiw an to m ove tow ardm id-course or upper term in al phasem issile defenses, such as the Theater II igh Altitude Area Defense (TH AAD) system and sea based mid-course interceptors. As many as two conventional DF-21 brigades could be in operation before 2010.¹¹

Because of theits warh eads ize and the limited ability of lower tiermissile defense systems to engage longer-range M RBMs, incorporation of a term in al guidancesystem could have significant military implications. The high reentry speeds ignificantly reduces the footprint of the area that is defended by term in al interceptors, such the PAC-3 A high reentry speed, combined with a penetrator warh ead, also could be effective against hardened targets, such as intelligence facilities and strategic/operational command centers. The D F-21C could also range U.S. bases in the region. In addition, a term in ally guided system with a maneuvering payload could complicate the U.S. carrier operations in the Western Pacific¹²

SRBMs.

The deployment of the first conventional SRBM brigade opposite Taiw an in 1994 marked a significant departure from the traditional role and mission of the Second Artillery. Conventionally arm edSRBMs have become a key tool of PRC statecraft. The PRC's expanding SRBM inventory is intended to deter or coerce neigh bors such as Taiwan. Should Beijing resort to the use of force, conventionally arm ed ballistic missiles, operating jointly with the PLA Air Force and other arm edservices, could serve as critical enablers in gaining information dominance and air and naval superiority. Second Artillery conventional doctrines tresses surprise and disarm ing first strikes to gain the initiative in the opening phase of a conflict.¹³

The Second Artillery is said to be currently equipped with 350 conventional SRBMs distributed among three brigades opposite Taiw an. One source indicates that during annual meetings at Beichaih ein August 1999, China's senior leadership decided to accelerate the production and deployment of enough ballisticm issiles to outfit four SRBM brigades by 2002¹⁴ Western sources believe the PLA may deploy as many as 650 SRBMs opposite Taiw an over the next several years, while Taiw an's Ministry of National Defense statements indicate that as many as 800 SRBMs could be deployed by 2006.¹⁵ These m issiles would be distributed into as many as seven brigades in the 2005-2010 timeframe.¹⁶ Chinesew ritings indicate that after an initial salvo, launchers would move to new pre-surveyed launch sites with in that brigade's assigned area of operations.¹⁷ Should the PRC decide to use force, the PLA intends to carry outsynchronized launches from awide range of azimuths in order to stress activem issile defenses and associated battle management systems.¹⁸

To be politically and militarily effective, the PLA's conventionally arm ed ballisticm issiles must survive any attempt to intercept them issile in flight; and impact with in a set radius that will dam age the intended target. The PLA is seeking tom aximize the lethal radius with more effective warh eads and minimize its CEP with improved guidance systems. Such a developments trategy is intended to reduce the number of ballistic missiles required per target and perhaps minimize collateral dam age. Until CEPs readh 50-100 meters, it is difficult to hit a single point. Therefore, the PLA would require expending a considerable number of missiles per each target. As a general rule, two ballistic missiles would be required for a 50 percent probability of hit if they have a 50 meter CEP; three with a 100 meter CEP; and nine with a 300 meter CEP.

In a future contingency in the Asia-Pacific region, PLA writings indicate intent to use highly accurate SRBMs, MRBMs, and land attack cruise missiles against U.S. assets, to induce key bases in Japan and aircraft carriers operating in the Western Pacific Chineseresearchers have conducted extensive feasibility studies of the use of the eater ballistic missiles against aircraft carriers. Analysts have noted how such a capability would require four components: ocean surveillance; mid-course guidance; terminal guidance; and applicable control systems to maneuver the reentry vehicle to the target. Proponents advocate use of a global positioning system (PS) for mid-course inertial corrections and the use of a millimeter wave seeker for terminal guidance.¹⁹ Aware of the vulnerability of m illim eter w ave sækers to jam m ing, PLA enginærs are surveying electronic counter-counterm easure (ECCM) techniques to ensure effectiveness of term inally guided ballisticm issiles.²⁰ In acdition to aircraft carriers, Ch inese w ritings indicate other targets w ould induce regional airbases, naval facilities, and key C41 and logistical noces.²¹

DF-15 (CSS-6).

The DF-15 is a solid-fueled, 600 kilom eter SRBM. Manufactured by CALT, the DF-15's pay load reportedly has an attitude control mechanism that permits steering corrections from separation to impact.²² The detachable warh ead offers a much smaller target than a surface to-surfacem issilesystem (SCUD), and its potential maneuverability would complicate missile defense radar tracking, computations, and interception. Assuming a nom inal trajectory at a range of 500 kilom eters, the DF-15 would reach an altitude of about 120 kilom eters, achiere a reentry speedof about two kilom eters per second, and have a flight time of only 6 or 7 minutes.²³ Some reporting indicates the DF-15 currently has a 100-meter CEP.⁴ How ever, there are indications that the DF-15 has been flight tested to an accuracy of better than 50 meters.²³

To diversify its theater ballisticm issile inventory, the PRC is said to be developing a 1,000 to 1,200 kilom eter range version of the DF-15.²⁰ Strong incentives likely exist to develop an extended range version of the DF-15. An extended range DF-15 would significantly reduce the defended area or "footprint" of land and sea based low er tier m issile defense systems due to its reentry speed Deployment of a longer range DF-15 in South east Ch ina would eliminate the requirement to transport m issile assets nearer Taiwan, permit the targeting of Okinawa from sites along the East Ch ina Sea, and, if mated with a term in ally guided payload, potentially force carrier battle groups (CVBG s) operating east of Taiwan to move further away from the area of operations.

DF-11 (CSS-7).

The DF-11- better known by its export designator, the M-11 (CSS-7)- is a solid propellant, roadmobile SRBM with an estimated range of 300 km. Them ain advantage of the DF-11 over the DF-15 is its ability to carry a larger payload. Some sources credit the 300-kilometer version with an 800-kilogram warh eadanda 150-meter CEP.²⁷ The DF-11 is manufactured by the CASC's 066 Base, also known as the Sanjiang Space Corporation, based in Hubei province. The DF-11's 300-kilometer range presents diallenges for activem issile defenses due to its briefflight time of 3m inutes. Because its flight would remain with in the atm osphere, upper tier systems would be unable to engage the 300-kilometer DF-11.²⁸ Deployment of a 600 kilometer extended range version of the DF-11, the DF-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2), is reportedly underway as well.²⁰

U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE PROG RAMS

Beijing views U.S. plans for a limited missile defense capability as a threat to the viability of its growing inventory of increasingly accurate and lethal ballistic m issiles. While U.S. m issile defense program s are not necessarily driven by a perceived PRC threat, Beijing's ballisticm issile developm ent and export ofted nologies to roque states has increased regional interest in m issile defenses. The key driver for U.S. investments in missile defenses is apotential missileattack by roguenations, such as North Korea, Iraq, or Iran. A limited national defense is also needed to defend against an accidental or unauth orized Russian or Chinesem issile launda, which might involve only one or a few warh each. Ballistic missile defense requires lay ered, active defenses that can intercept ballistic m issiles in all phases of their flight: (1) the boost phase, (2) m id-coursephase, and (3) the term in alphase

Boost Phase.

Boost phase begins at laund and lasts up to 5 m inutes for a primitive liquid fuel ICBM or 3m inutes for solid fueled systems. Intercept during the boost phase engages the m issilew hen it is at its m os tvulnerables tage of flight. Boost phase intercept enables destruction of them issile before it is able to deploy countern easures and can reduce the num ber of targets that m id-course and term inal system s must engage. The key boost phase system under development is the Airborne Laser (ABL). Experimental space based systems are under development as well. Chinesesources note that the ABL system, slated for initial dem onstration as early as 2003 and initial fielding in 2008, could be deploy ed to the theater of operations in an atter of hours. The PRC believes that at least one operational conceptis for a pair of Boeing 747-400F ABL aircraft to orbit over friendly territory above the douds at 40,000 feet, 90 kilom eters off the enemy coast, scanning the horizon for the plume of m issiles rising above enemy territory. With a maximum laser range of several hundred kilom eters and m ission time of 12-18 hours, each aircraft carries enough fuel for 200 laser shots against missiles in the boost phase when the missile offers a bright, slow target under high aerodynam icstress.³⁰

The Space Based Laser (SBL) flight experiment is a demonstration effort to explore the feasibility of destroying ballistic targets with a high powered laser. According to Chinese sources, at least one architecture under consideration induces 30 satellites, a constellation of five rings with six satellites each at 40 degree indinations, and an altitude of 1,300 kilom eters. The 30 satellite constellation can counter more than a 100 SRBMs in a 2m inute period. Such a system provides a 24-hour intercept capability and would neutralize ballisticm issile strikes before implementation of countermeasures, to induce early release submunitions and decoys. The Chinese note that the SBL also is highly effective against

direct as cent anti-satellite system s. An experimental SBL could be tested early next decade.³¹ In addition, there are experiments underway that examine the feasibility of space based kinetic interceptors.³²

Mid-Course.

During the m ideourse phase of flight, the warh ead travels freely through spaceoutside the atmosphere. For an ICBM, this stage lasts about 20 m inutes, m aking the m id-course the longest phase of m issile flight. Engaging ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase offers several ad an tages for the defense. Mid-course intercept solutions offer greater time for higher level decision making to be integrated in the comm and and control system. Multiple shoot-look-shoot opportunities become possible. Mickourse defenses may be based farther an ay from the country launching the missile, possibly reducing system vulnerability. There are at least two systems under developm ent that will be able to engage missiles during the m id course phase of flight: (1) land based exoatm ospheric kill vehicles to counter longer range ICBMs; and (2) a sea-based mid-course system to counter medium - and short-range ballisticm issiles.

Land Based Mid-Course The Land Band Mid-Course system is the principal mid-course intercept system for defense of the United States. Its mission is to intercept incoming ballistic missile warh each outside the earth's atmosphere (exoatmospheric) and destroy them by force of the impact. During flight, the interceptor receives information from a battlemanagement, command, control, and communications (BMC 3) system to up date the location of the incoming ballistic missile, enabling the kill vehides on boards ensorsystem to identify and home in on the target. The land based interceptor would consist of a multi-stage solid propellant booster and an exoatmospheric kill vehide (EKV). Three options are being examined for the booster: the Minuteman III ICBM; a combination of other existing solid rocket system s; and an entirely new booster. Until booster developm ent is complete, EKV flight tests will be flow n on the Payload Launda V ehide (PLV), which is a booster consisting of a Minutem an II second and third stage³³

The EKV would use a highly cap able in frared seeker to acquire and track targets, and to discriminate between the intended target (i.e., the reentry vehicle) and other objects, such as tank fragments or decoys. This enables the interceptor to be launched against a duster of objects and subsequently identify and intercept the targeted reentry vehicle. These kerwill be able to discriminate penetration aick and warh each, though it would require assistance from ground based ractar systems or space based sensors to acchess more complex and soph is ticated targets. The EKV would receive one or more in-flight target up dates from other ground and space based sensors in order to enhance the probability of intercepting the target. Based on this data and its own sensors, the kill vehicle uses small on-board rockets to maneuver so as to collide with the target.³¹

In a previous concept, an initial architecture for defense of all 50 United States, known as "C apability 1" (C1), would have included deployment of 20 interceptors in the middle of A laska.³³ An additional 80 interceptors could be added (100 interceptors total) to form a "C apability 2" (C-2) architecture.³⁶ An even more advanced architecture (C-3) would have added and spread interceptors between two or more sites.³⁷ Today, however, this growth plan is under review. The ultimates copeor architecture of a U.S.missile defense system has yet to be determined and will be based on the existing or projected threat at the time a decision is made.

Sea-Based Mid-Course The Sea-Based Mid-Course missile defensesystem builds upon the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program and the cancelled Navy Area Defense program. Sea-Based Mid-Course will use a hit-to-kill interceptor- the SM-3Light Exo-Atm ospheric Projectile-

instead of the proximity fused SM-2 Block IVA that was developed for the Navy Area Defense system until that program was cancelled in December 2001. The Sea-Based MidCoursem issiled the fense program is unique in that A equis destroyers equipped with the SM-3 missile can patrol a large area to intercept ballisticm issiles with out the need to be collocated with the defended asset. The ships can be positioned for and of the defended area allowing for exoatm ospheric m id-course or even ascent phase engagements after them issile departs the atmosphere. In cbing so, a single Sea-Based Mid-Course platform can defend an area or footprint that is tens of thousands of square kilom eters. Like the TH AAD system and the GBI, the SM-3 interceptor is a hit-to-kill system that uses an infrared seeker and m iniature thrusters. Due to speed lim itations (4-5 km /sec), the SM-3 is intended to counter prim arily medium range ballisticm issiles. An initial NTW capability should be available by the 2005-2010 tim efram é³⁸

Low er Tier.

Low er tier m issile defense systems intercept ballistic m issiles in the term inal phase of flight, within the atm osphere at an altitude below 100 kilom eters, during the last 1 or 2m inutes offlight, depending upon the range of the m issile. The warh ead, along with any decoys or draff, reenters the atm osphere. A erodynam icchag then produces different behavior for light as opposed to heavy objects. D ecoys decelerate significantly and m ay burn up, but the warh ead coes neither. Thus at reentry the defense can discriminate the warh ead At least two low er tier systems are intended to counter short range threats during the term inal stage of flight: 1) TH AAD; and 2) the PAC-3 m issile³⁹

TH AAD. The TH AAD system will be able to engage longer range theater ballisticm issile threats (i.e., less than 3,500 kilom eters) during the upper term inal phases of

flight. As an essential component of a family of systems, THAAD can reduce the number of missiles that other term inal defense systems must engage. Using hit-to-kill technology to destroy its target, THAAD can operate autonom ously, but is required to be interoperable with other lower tier defenses and external sensors. An important feature of the TH AAD weapon system is its shoot-look-shoot capability. Kill assessment will determine if a warh ead is destroyed, and, if necessary, a second interceptorshould belaunched The TH AAD system uses a m obileX-bandground basedracarwith a detection range of up to 1,000 kilom eters. The interceptor uses a staring infraredseeker assembly, induding an indium - antimonide focal plane array; cryogenic cooler assem bly; signal processing electronics; and an electro-optical telescope TH AAD will operate in the upper tier to 150 km and in the interm ediate tier cbw n to around 40 km.⁴⁰ Ch inesesources estim ate the TH AAD probability of kill against a 3500-kilom eter ballisticm issile using a single interceptor at 85 percent, and 97.7 percent if two interceptors are us ed⁴¹

The ultim ateplan is to equip to o TH AAD battalions to support to o m ajor regional conflicts. Each TH AAD battalion includes four suborclinate fire units each with a Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (BMC 3I) element, one rachar, nine launchers and 144 missiles. Design parameters call for each TH AAD system to be transportable by land, rail or road, sea and air (by C-141 or larger aircraft).⁴² The May 1999 *DoD Report to Congress on TMD Architecture Options in the Asia-Pacific Region* notes that only one TH AAD fire unit would be needed to provide complete coverage of Taiw an.

PATRIOT A dranced Capability 3 (PAC-3). Them issile defense system slated for nearest term deployment is the PAC-3m issile Scheduled for introduction before the endof 2001, many in the Asia-Pacific region, including Taiwan, are expected to procure the PAC-3m issile over the next several years.⁴³ Taiwan currently is equipped with PAC-3 groundsystems (radar, trucks, comm and and control) and the Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM), which has some m issile defense capability.⁴⁴ Producement of the PAC-3 m issile will complete the PAC-36 row the Plan that began with the initial deployment of PAC-3 ground equipment in 1997. One prominent Taiw an journal, Defense Technology, posits that Taiw an eventually may procure enough PAC-3 m issiles and additional PAC-3 ground equipm ent to outfit between nine to 12 fire units.⁴⁵ The PAC-3 is a much more capable derivative of the GEM system in terms of both coverage and lethality. The PAC-3h as a new interceptor m issile with a different kill mechanism – rather than having an exploding warh ead, it is a hit-to-kill system. The PAC-3m issile is an evolutionary outgrow the of the Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT). The can is ter is the same size as a GEM canister, but contains four missiles and tubes instead of a single round Selected Patriot laund ing stations will be modified to accept PAC-3 can is ters. Each laund erm ay beloadedwith four 6 EM rounds or 16 PAC-3 m issile rounds if the launchers are modified to accomm ocate the PAC-3m issile⁴⁶

PLA affiliated sources assert the PATRIOT 6 EM (PAC-2+) will only be able to intercept 10-20 percent of incoming missiles. Taiw an sources daim that two 6 EM interceptors will have an 80 percent success rate against PLA short range ballisticmissiles.⁴⁷ With the PATRIOTs only deployed around Taipei, other critical targets around theis landare unprotected. There are indications, how ever, that the military intends to provide some coverage for Taidiung and K aoh siung.⁴⁸

Com m and Control, Com m unications and Intelligence.

Missile defense systems are reliant upon a steady stream of space and ground based command, control, communications, and intelligence systems. Current and future sensors include: (1) Defense Support Program satellites; (2) Space Based Infrared System - High; (3) Space Based Infrared System - Low; (4) Upgraded Early Warning Rachars; and (5) X-Band Rachars.

Defense Support Program Satellites. The U.S. existing missile defenses rely on Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and 1970s vintage racker systems for early warning purposes. The U.S. DSP satellites can detect a launch 50-60 seconds after launch and then relay warning inform ation about 90 seconds after launch. In clear weather, these satellites can detect am issile launch with in 10 seconds of launch. Cueing a ground based racker from space baseds ensor data can greatly reduce the airspace that must be search edito find the the eaterm issiles. Such data can cue ballisticm issile defense assets to search a specificarea, allow ing racker acquisition at them axim um range.⁴⁹

Space Based Infrared System - II igh (SBIRS-II igh). The SBIRS-High satellites will begin to augment the DSP satellites as early as 2002 The first SBIRS-H igh will be placed into a highly elliptical orbit for coverage of polar regions. Of the seven satellites being procured four will be placed into geosynd ronous orbit above the equator and the other twowill bein the highly elliptical orbits. SBIRS-High offers numerous advantages over the DSP system. It will have a revisit rate of once every few seconds thus enabling establishm ent of a track on them issile flight based on m ore num erous plots of them issiles location. The SBIRS system willh avealarger focal planearray, providing a laund point prediction of less than on e kilom eter. The system also will provide continuous coverage of the polar regions. SBIRS-High will have a "stare" capability that will allow then to continuously observe a designated sector of the earth. This technology can be particularly useful in countering fast burn boosters that lim it the time available to determ in e them issiles flight path.⁵⁰

Space Based Infrared System -Low (SBIRS-Low). An outgrow the of the SDI, SBIRS-Low will provide precise mick-coursem issile tracking and target discrimination. The

SBIRS-Low program is a low earth orbit satellite constellation that could observe the chaployment of reentry vehicles and penetration aids immediately following burnout of the booster. Projected for initial deployment during the latter part of the decade, 24 SBIRS-Low satellites, operating in a low earth orbit of about 1000 kilom eters, will be equipped with two independents ensors. First is an optical system that can track the booster and reentry vehicle through out all phases of flight. The second are infrared sensors that can detect heat signatures in various portions of the frequency spectrum – shortwave infrared that can detect targets in the boost phase; and medium and long wave infrared that are able to detect reentry vehicles in them id-coursephase of flight. Once a target is acquired, inform ation on the target will be form arched to a telescope that mould be able to track the m issile after boos ter burnout⁵¹

B ecause penetration aids deploy differently than reentry vehicles, it is easier to identify those objects that m ust be attacked if the deployment is observed SBIRS-Low will also be able to provide missile defense operators with sufficient tracking data to enable interceptors to be launched soon after booster burn-out and well before the early warning racher detects the incoming reentry vehicles. SBIRS-Low offers first generation processing cap abilities to interpret a target object map that was derived from another infrareds ensor rather than a rachar.⁵²

SBIRS-Low is considered to be a critical factor in any future decision to adapt the AEG IS-based mid-course interceptors for use against longer range ICBMs. AEG IS radar- the SPY-1D - h as limitations that prohibit it from being used in an autonom ous mode. For example, its range is limited to approximately 500 kilom eters, depending on the size of the target and the frequency at which it operates (S-B and 24 G H Z). The SPY-1D obes not provide as much resolution as the X-B and radar system. AEG IS requires some type of external queing to engage an ICBM in mid-course⁵³

Upgraded Early Warning Radars. The current U.S. early warning network relies on ultra-high frequency (UHF) ractars (430 MH zrange), as well as one L-B and ractar based in Shennya, Alaska. These systems were designed to provide warning of an incom ing attack, permitting sufficient time to laund our bom ber force and facilitate movement of key government officials. They were not designed to supply fire control quality data of sufficient precision to quide interceptors and discriminate individual objects within an incoming target array.54 However, the UnitedStates intends to up gradeexis ting rachers in order to providem or eprecise and timely data that can be used to anticipate a future intercept area. This will allow an interceptor to be laund ed and begin its flight - the earlier the fly out, the larger the defended area or footprint. These UpgracedEarly W arning Racears (UEW Rs) would be able to discrim inate between obzens or hundreds of objects that could bein a target dus ter and elim in a teobjects that do not fit the dracter is tics of a reentry vehicle

X-Band Radars. While UEW R system s will provide a greater degree of accuracy, they still will not be able to provide the detailed data needed to discriminate the right objects in a target array that must be destroyed in flight. The degree of predision requires a radar that operates in the X-B and (8-12 G H z). X-B and radar systems provide a detailed "picture" of the target array, inducing calculating the amount of nose wobble motion that would be diaracteristic of a reentry vehicle, measuring the diameter and length of objects with in the target array, as well as the spin rate, velocity, and position of objects.⁵⁶ B ecause X-B and radar system s will operate with in a fairly broad bandwidth, they are considered difficult to jam.⁵⁷

One concept is for one X-B and racher to be deployed to A laska. If owever, a single racher based at this location likely I ill not be able to provide racher coverage of all potential threats to the United States. A doitional racher systems I ould be needed X-B and racher systems should be able to detect an incoming target array at a range of about 4,000 kilom eters, although discrim ination will not be possible until the target array is at a distance of around 2000 kilom eters.

CH INESE RESPONSES

From Beijing's perspective, U.S. ballisticm issile defense program s threaten to undercut the political and military utility of the PRC's growing inventory of strategic and conventional ballisticm issiles. The PRC places a premium on ensuring its ballistic missile force would be able to penetrate any futurem issile defense and itecture. Defense industry analysts are examining a range of sophisticated m issile defense counterm easures in order to reduce the effectiveness of active missile defense system s. PRC collection of inform ation that would support development of effectivem issile defense counterm easures has a relatively high priority. With a limited for consisting of only a couple cbzen ICBMs, Chinese analysts believe that even a limited American missile defense system with 20 interceptors (i.e., the previous "C1" and itecture) could reduce or negate China's minimal nuclear deterrent. PRC military planners have been contemplating a worst-cases cenario in which the U.S. could laund a first-strike destroying most of the Chinese ICBMs on the ground because these missiles require several hours to fuel, and , and laund. In the aftern ath, a limited U.S. missile defense system could engage the rem nants of China's second strike missile foræ⁵⁸

Background

Beijing's interest in countering ballisticm issile defenses clates back to the 1960s. In response to U.S.m issile defense programs in the 1960s, Beijing began to exam inemeans to ensure the viability of its indipient m issile force, and at the same time, develop the basic technologies that would be needed to field an indigenous strategic m issile defense system . This effort, know n as the 640 Program , w as cancelled in the 1970s. $^{\rm 59}$

Interest in m issile defense counterm easures reem erged in the wake of President Ronald Reagan's March 1983 SD L. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs chafted an initial study to assess the implications of SD I in 1984. In late 1984 or early 1985, the central leadership tasked several m inistries and research institutes to develop a detailed exam ination of the SDI and its implications for China. During 1985, the defense industrial complex sponsored a series of conferences on SD I, and a consensus was developed that Soviet and U.S. development of ballistic missile defense systems had significant implications for China's nuclear deterrent. By 1986, Chinese experts generally agreed there were three potential responses: expansion of offensive forces; development of technical countermeasures, such as hardening and spinning of ballistic missiles, to penetrate m issile defense system s; and deployment of anti-satellite (ASAT) we expons to destroy space based system s.⁶⁰

The Commission of Science, Technology, and Incustry for National Defense (COSTIND) played a key role in form ulating Beijing's response to the "global technical revolution" prompted by the U.S.missile defense initiative. In September 1984, COSTIND delivered a proposal to the Central Military Commission (CMC) suggesting that relevant PLA branches develop defense science and technology gam eplans out to the year 2000. Working in conjunction with the State Council, COSTIND form ulated a defense technology strategy that focused on key technologies and presented it at a November 1985 meeting with the CMC leadership. Afterwards, in February 1986, COSTIND, with CMC support, commissioned a long term development program that included the form ation of 18 study groups to focus on designated critical technologies.⁶¹

However, some within the defense S&T community believed COSTIND's plan was not sufficient to meet the

technical challenges posed by U.S. missile defense programs. In March 1986, four of China's most prominent defense engineers presented a petition to the Central Committee calling for establish ment of a "High Technology Research and Development Plan Outline." The plan, referred to as the 86 3Program, was implemented in parallel to COSTIND's Long Range Plan to Year 2000 and was jointly managed by COSTIND and the State Science and Technology Commission. The 86 3program, still aguide and funcing source for numerous preliminary R&D projects, focuses on some of the same technologies induced in the SDI and Europe's answer to SDI, the Eureka program, including space systems, high powered lasers, microelectronics, and automated control systems.⁶²

Technical.

With studies and research conducted in the 1980s providing the foundation, Beijing has en barked upon a far-reaching and multi-faceted program to ensure the viability of its ballistic missile force. These programs inducte technical counterm easures, an expansion of its m issile force, as well as asymmetrical measures, such as anti-satellite operations. The PRC is investing significant resources into countering m issile defense through the development of technical penetration aids. Contemporary Chineseliteratureon technical counterm easures is focused on "two categories and eight major penetration tech nologies" (liangdalei, badatufang jish u): These induce countersurveillance (electronic counterne easures, stealth, decoys, and fast burn motors) and counterintercept (multiple warh each, maneuvering reentry vehicles, h ardening, and saturation).

Countersurveillance One technical strategy is focused on denying U.S. sensors the ability to properly detect and discriminate ballisticm issiles and their payloads. Chinese research and development into countersurveillance (fanzh endra) systems is centered on four areas: 1) electronic countern easures; 2) stealth; 3) decoys; and 4) fast burn motors.

1. Electronic Counterm easures. From China's perspective passive and active electronic counterm easures are a fundamental yet effective means of ensuring ballistic missiles are able to readitheir targets. Chinese literature dites use of passive electronic countermeasures, such as thaff, to confuse enemy rachar systems, such as the X-B and and UEW R systems. Chinese testing has demonstrated that ballisticm issiles can carry asignificant amount of the affect a large volume of space. Development is focused in part on production of metallics trips that are 1.5 centimeters in length that can target rachar systems that operate at 10 G H z (i.e., X-bandrachars).⁶³

Research also is underway on radio frequency and infrared countermeasures. CASC has conducted tests on active jammers that can broadcast a signal designed to interferewith a radar's ability to detect the target object or corrupt the signal in such a way as to cause the radar to receive a false echo.⁶⁴ National University of Defense Technology analysts have examined electronic countermeasure packages on board theater ballistic missiles as ameans to countermillimeter wave amplifiers used on the PAC-3 missile and infrared seekers on & BI, TH AAD, and Sea-Based Mid-Course interceptors.⁶⁵ The PRC also is investing significantly into ground and air based jammers that could effect radar systems supporting missile defenses deployed around its periphery.⁶⁶

2 Stealth. In addition to active and passive electronic counterm easures, PRC engineers area orking to reduce the ability of early a arning and tracking racher systems to detect ballisticm issiles in the mid-course and term inal phase of their flight. The intent is to decrease available reaction time and thus reduce the probability of kill and footprint of missile defense systems. One of the most effective and readily implemented counterm easures is to reduce the racher cross section (RCS) of the reentry vehicle. CASC designers already have taken simplesteps, such as shaping their reentry vehicles by bringing the nose to a sharp point and rounding the back edges. The DF-11 and the DF-15 have shaped warh each that separate from the remainder of the missile body. Chinese researchers also have experimented with complex reentry vehicle surfaces that useradar absorbent materials that can counter X-band racher systems used by TH AAD and the & BI. Engineers have taken noteof an advanced Russian steal the technology, a plasma (*denglizi*) coating that obes not affect flight dynamics and can significantly reduce the ability of racher systems to detect the reentry vehicle⁶⁷

PRC m issile engineers also are low ering the infrared signature of their reentry vehicles. Engineers have analyzed in detail the types of infrared focal plane arrays that are intended for use on the land and sea-based m id-coursesystems and TH AAD.⁶⁸ Experiments have been conducted using "cold screen" (*lengpeng*) technology that therm ally shrouch the reentry vehicle An alum inum alloy is used to encase them arh ead and liquid nitrogen is placed in between the alum inum shell and them arhead. In one experiment, engineers noted that systems, such as the L and and Sea-Based Mid-Course and TH AAD, norm ally could acquire a reentry vehiclew ith a fivem icron infrared signature at arange of 3,000 kilom eters. Equippedw ith the colds creen, detection range of the reentry vehiclew ould be reduced to threem eters.⁶⁹

3. Decoys. Chinese engineers note two basic decoy (you'er) measures: 1) saturation; and 2) deception. Saturation (bach e) measures induce the use of metallic balloons or other objects that simulate thereentry vehicle in the mid-course or terminal phase of flight. Engineers high light the relative ease of this technology as well as its low cost. In 1995 and 1996, the Chinese allegedly tested DF-21 encb-atm ospheric decoys.⁷⁰ Deception measures under evaluation induce electronic decoys or transponder jammers that transmit a rack return similar to that of the true reentry vehicle.⁷¹ 4. Fast-Burn Motors. Chinese engineers have demonstrated concern over potential deployment of U.S. airborne and space based lasers. Another method under consideration as an explicit countermeasure to boost phase interceptors is a fast burn booster (*suran zh utui*) for China's next generation of solid fueled strategic ballisticmissiles. Chinese engineers caution designers about potential quality control problems related to stage separation and accuracy, and suggest this technology should be divided into three stages based on the pace of foreign missile defense developments.⁷²

Boost Phase Maneuvering. One other counterm easure that Chinese observers have noted is a boost phase maneuver designed to fool U.S. D SP satellites. By dranging directions during the ascent phase of flight, the ballistic missile can complicate the defense's efforts to predict its flight trajectory. While no hard evidence exists that the Chinese have an active program to develop a boost phase maneuver, there is potential for cooperation between Russia and PRC missile engineers on technology used on the Russian Topol-M program (SS-27).⁷³

Counterintercept (fan lan zai).

The second major category of countern easures seeks to deny missile defense interceptors the ability to properly engage their targets. These induces (1) multiplemark each, (2) maneuvering reentry vehicles, and (3) hardening/ spinning of ballisticmissiles.

1. Multiple W arh each. China has had the capability to develop and deploy a multiple reentry vehicle system for many years, including a MIRV system. As of January 1996, CALT was in the mick tof developing multiple warh each payloach, each with its own guidance system and maneuvering capability.⁷⁴ Research and development on multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) was initiated as early as 1970. Technical difficulties, how ever, stalled the program. CALT renewed research and development in 1983, shortly after the SDI announcement in March 1983. The DF-5A, able to strike targets throughout the UnitedStates, was the designated recipient of the MIRVs, although there is no evidence to date that they have been deployed. The U.S. intelligence community assesses that China could develop amultiple RV system for the DF-5 ICBM in a few years. Chinese pursuit of amultiple RV capability for its *mobile* ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter significant technical hurdles and would be costly.⁷⁵

Critical to this effort is them iniaturization of ant each, a possible objective of tests at Lop Nur over the last few years.⁷⁶ A coording to Chinesem issile designers, real and decoy warh each can be mixed using multiple warh each technology. Real warh each can be coated with rachar absorbing materials in order to weaken rachar returns and recluce the ability of interceptors to discriminate real from decoy warh each.⁷⁷

2 Maneuvering Reentry Vehides. CALT also is developing maneuverable reentry vehicles in order to com plicate m issile defense tracking. Missile designers believe maneuvering is not only a means to complicate ballistic m issile defenses, but is essential for term inal quidance packages. While vehicles can maneuver at any time during flight, Chinese engineers seem ost utility in program m ing a reentry vehicle to m aneuver in its term inal phase, 20-30 seconds before striking its target. A reentry vehide traveling a notional range of 10,000 kilom eters has the ability tom aneuver with in a lateral range of 556-900 kilom eters. Another maneuvering option discussed is to send the warh ead up to a high er altitude after separation from them issile slow ly descending in a glide for avery long distance, and then finally dive tow and the target. Missile designers have den onstrated aspecial interest in the speed control maneuver used in the 1,800-kilom eter range Persh ing-II.⁷⁸ Ch inese engineers are addressing problem s associated with m aintaining accuracy after exoatm ospheric m aneuvering.⁷⁹ Through m odeling and simulation, CASC

has determ ined that maneuvering is a viable means to reduce land based low er tier missile defense systems' probability of kill.⁸⁰ China allegedly acquired PATRIOT technology to calibrate an auxiliary propulsion system on the DF-15 reentry vehicle to enable the payload to outmaneuver a PATRIOT system as it reenters the atm osphere.⁸¹ After computer simulations and modeling exercises, CALT is confident that its maneuverable the eater ballistic missile reentry vehicles can defeat opposing PATRIOT system s.⁸²

3. Hardening. Looking an ead to the potential cheployment of boost phase intercept systems, such as the airborne laser (ABL), CASC analysts are examining ballisticm issile spinning and hardening. Spinning their ballisticm issiles is intended to prevent concentration of a high powered laser on a single spot.⁸³Chineseengineers are developing a coating for ballistic missiles that could complicate use of high power lasers. Using their own indigenously developed high powered lasers, Chinese institutes have tested various coating materials to protect the outershell of ballisticm issiles, a process known as laser dacking (*jiguangrongfu*). Laser dacking, together with the spinning of the ater ballisticm issiles, m ay not m ake ballistic m issiles imm une to boost phasem issile defensesystem s but could increase required lasing time, thus reducing the num ber of laser shots available per ABL m ission.⁸⁴

OTH ER.

In addition to the tech niques described above, a range of other technical and operational counterm easures also are under consideration. These include: (1) trajectory techniques, (2) longer range development of non-nuclear electrom agnetic pulse warh each, (3) indigenous missile defense development, (4) anti-satellite (ASAT) development, and (5) multi-axis strikes.

1. Trajectory Techniques. The type of trajectory Second Artillery engineers select can affect the ability top enetrate m issile defense system s. Types of trajectories include: (1) fractional orbital bom barch ent system, (2) depressed trajectories, and (3) lofted trajectories. Ch ina conducted a feasibility study on a fractional orbital bom barch ent system (FOBS) in 1966. This system launch are an issile into very low orbit, approximately 160 kilom eters above earth. Before com pletion of the first orbit, a retro-rocket reduces the speedof thew arh ead, which hits the target with only a few m inutes w arning. Ch in see engineers explored the potential of launching a m issile to a precessignated point over Antarctica as am eans to penetrate thew eakest point in the U.S. w arning network.⁸⁵ Still view ing a FOBS as an alternative, Ch in see designers continue feasibility studies on fractional orbiting m issiles (*bufen guicho chochan*).⁸⁶

Chinese analysts view depressed trajectories (yadi guidao) as another option to counter space based and mid-coursem issiledefensesystem s. Chineseengineers note that ICBMs often reach altitudes of 2,000 kilom eters on a norm al trajectory. If owever, launching a missile at a depressed trajectory could allow them issile to achieve only a 100 kilom eter altitude, complicating the ability of some space based systems to engage the ballisticm issile Testing and modeling has been cone on the DF-3, which norm ally has a range of 2,780km and an altitude of 550km when flying a nom inal trajectory. With depressed trajectory, the DF-3 travels 1,550km at 100km altitude.⁸⁷

Lofted trajectories (tagao clancko) are anoth er option that Chinese missileers may consider. A longer range ballisticm issile obes not necessarily mean them issile will be used at its maximum effective range. A longer range system, fired on a lofted trajectory, can also serve as a technical countermeasure to missile defenses. Lofted trajectories can increase reentry speed, thereby complicating intercept solutions for terminal defense systems or reducing the footprint or defended area.⁸⁸

2 EMP w and each. PRC engineers also are conducting feasibility studies on electrom agnetic pulse w expons (EMP)

to overcom edefenses. EMPsystem s, such as a high powered m icrow ave (HPM) warh ead, could negate space or ground based sensors that support a missile defense ard itecture PLA writings indicate that fielding of an EMP warh ead is a relatively high priority. If PM devices in particular are viewed as a "natural enemy" of more technologically advanced militaries and an "electronic trum p card' (*dianzish ash ou*).⁸⁹ D ue to di allenges related to weaponizing a device with enough power, a first generation Chinese # PM warh ead likely would only be effective against radiating targets within the immediate area of im pact. Rachar system s and com m unications centers w ould be the prime candidates. As the technology progresses, how ever, I PM warh each could ad ieve wider effects.⁹⁰ The developers of the DF-11 SRBM- the O66 Base-have dem onstrated them ost interest in H PM w arh each.⁹¹

In addition to non-nuclear EMP weapons, Taiw an observers are concerned about the potential use of high altitude EMP (#EMP) bursts that use an actual nuclear device. Such a device, detonated at an altitude of 40 kilom eters, would avoid casualties on the ground, yetwould have significant effects on the island's electronic systems. The solution, according to Taiw an analysts, are missile defenses, such as the Sea-Based Mid-Course, that can engage the ballisticm issile in its ascent phase and before detonation.⁹²

3 Missile Defense Beijing has an indigenous missile defense development program intended to ensure that at least a portion of its inventory could survive a first strike. China's research on missile defenses dates back to the 1960s. Under the 640 Program, the space and missile industry's Second A cademy, traditionally responsible for SAM development, setout to field amissile defensesystem, consisting of a kinetic kill vehicle, high powered laser, space early warning, and target discrimination system components. While this program was abandoned in 1980, engineers associated with this effort are still active. Prelim in any research on m issile defenses was resum edin the 1980s, at least partly functed under the 86 3Program.⁹³

The CASC SecondA cademy and the Shanghai A cademy of Spaceflight Technology are playing a leading role in missile defense research. Western reporting and Chinese technical journals indicate that the Central Military Commission has approved funding for a 10-year developmental program for a missile defense system, to induce satellites for missile launch warning. The PLA A ir Force and CASC advocate a 15-year, three phase approach to missile defense. The first step is to field a "Patriot-like" system, such as the # Q-9, followed by research and development on an extended range interceptor modeled on the PAC-3 missile; and basic conceptual research on a TH AAD-likem id-course intercept system.⁹⁴

Chinese engineers are focused on development of infrared and radio-frequency seekers that could engage both medium and short-range ballisticm issiles. Engineers are developing short and medium wave infrared band (312 microns) focal plane arrays that would be able to engage reentry vehicles during themic-coursephase of their flight path.⁹⁵ In addition to infrared seekers that could be used to countermedium and short range ballisticmissiles, the PRC has stepped up research into millimeter wave (Ka-band) amplifiers similar to those used on the PAC-3missile. In fact, a special state laboratory on millimeter wave research was established in Nanjing to help achieve technological break through s.⁹⁶ One conceptual design for a low er tier missile defense interceptor adopts an integrated millimeter wave and infrared seeker assembly.⁹⁷

There also are indications that Chinese aerospace engineers are examining the feasibility of space basedearly warning. Technical writings indicate the space industry is working to master specific technologies associated with missile early warning satellites. The Second Artillery has conducted modeling and simulation of alternative early warning architectures.⁹⁸ China has a well-established tech nology base in infrared sensors, which, when placed on satellites, can detect a missile almost immediately after launch by detecting the infrared radiation from its engineor motor plume⁹⁹ In a potentially related program, the China A cademy of Space Technology is developing a satellite bus for an infrared teles cope, which, according to design outlines, will be placed in a geosy dironous orbit shortly after the turn of the century.¹⁰⁰

4. Counterspace Negating U.S. spacesystems is another approach to countering missile defenses. Chinese research and development on anti-satellite technologies has been underway since the 1960s. Technical literature suggests that a direct as cent A SA T program is underway involving an assessment of various design proposals for seekers and propulsion system s. As part of a missile defense counterm easure program, ASAT operations would be directed against satellites in low earth orbit, such as the SBIRS-Low system or against the SBIRS-H igh satellites in high ly elliptical orbits. Technical papers clem on strates on e of the greatest obstacles in developing an active counterspace capability are with development of a kill vehide and associated term inal guidance. Modeling has been carried out on infrared, radar, and im pulse radar term in al quidance system s.¹⁰¹ H arbin Institute of Technology and Beijing University of Astronautics and Aeronautics, for example, have carried out modeling and simulation of various space intercept control and term inal quidance system s. One concept introduces several sm all solidm otors for orbital control stabilization.¹⁰² There also have been unconfirm edreports that the China A cademy of Space Technology (CAST) is developing nanom eter-sized "parasitic satellites" that could function in an ASAT $m o c e^{103}$

Engineers have conclucted studies to counter satellite decoys as well.¹⁰⁴ The PRC has stepped up its efforts to distinguish decoys from real satellites. One study, carried out by the National University of Defense Technology, determ ined that this problem could be solved through use of at least three groundstations using infraredsensors and neural networks.¹⁰⁵ China's existing space tracking network can detect and track most satellites with sufficient accuracy for targeting purposes.¹⁰⁶

China's desire to field a direct as cent A SA T assetm ay be affiliated with a program intended to support the laundh of sm all satellite constellations. A sm all solid fueled laundh vehide, most likely a derivative of the DF-21, will be able to places mall pay loads in orbit at a time and place of Beijing's droosing. China intends to field these mobile, solid fueled laundh vehides by 2005. Reduced size and complexity allows for faster manufacturing time and production in significant numbers.¹⁰⁷ Chinese engineers are conducting conceptual studies on a space based satellite tracking system that would serve as a potentially important component of any A SAT system.¹⁰⁸

Beijing also is investing in the development of high powered lasers that, under certain conditions, could affect optical components of satellite systems, such SBIRS-Low. The 1998 Report to Congress on PRC Military Capabilities (pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98 National Defense Authorization Act) states "China already may possess the capability to clamage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on satellites that arevery vulnerable to clamage by lasers. If owever, given China's current interest in laser technology, it is reasonable to assume that Beijing II ould clavelop a III eapon that could destroy satellites in the future "¹⁰⁹

5. Multi-Axis Strikes. In addition to technical counterm easures, the PLA is examining operational methodologies intended to penetrate U.S., allied, or friendly missile defense systems. The Second Artillery and China's space and missile industry have conducted modeling and simulation to test China's ability to break through thewide range of projected U.S. missile defense deployments. Modeling has been carried out that involves various com binations of surface to-surface, air-to-surface, sea tosurface, air-to-air and naval air defensem issilesystem s.¹¹⁰

Am ong them ost im portant are syndiron ized, multi-axis strikes as a function ental principle of Second Artillery conventional obstrine (duodian, duofangxiang, tongshi *tuji*). Associated are deception and timing measures that could ensure penetration of at least a large portion of a salvo. These involve coordinated launches from different laund azim uths and use of infrared "disruption" to confuse DSP satellites and complicate enemy attack operations. Another methodology includes dosely spaced salvos that could take advantage of reload time. Laund es from different azim uths, com binedwith use of infrared radiation "disruption," could confuse enemy satellite early warning systems and complicate enemy attack operations. Another concept involves the use of two strike waves, the first "screening" the second exhausting missile defenses, before they have time to reload¹¹¹

Anti-Radiation Missile Developm ent. An asym metrical approach to countering missile defenses includes attacking critical nodes within the missile defense system, particularly racher system s. The PRC is acquiring and/or developing an anti-radiation m issile (ARM), such as the Russian Kh-31P, that is intended to negate early arning and fire control radar systems that are able to detect and/or track ballisticm issiles during various phases of flight.¹¹² There are persistent rum ors of PLA procurement or joint production arrangement on the Kh-31P, which Chinese engineers note as specifically developed to counter the PATRIOT'S MPQ-53 radar, and AEG IS SPY-1D phased array radar. China's defense industrial complex, specifically the Third A cademy with support from the H arbin Institute of Technology, is aggressively pursuing deployment of a long range anti-radiation missile¹¹³

Foreign Cooperation on Missile Defense Counterm easures.

There are indications of Russian Space Agency assistance in Chinese development of ballistic missile defense counterm easures, perhaps dating back to the m id-1990s or earlier. Cooperation between China and Russia in the field of space and m issiles was form alized into a series of agreen ents between CASC and the Russian space agencies when representatives from Chinese and Soviet space industries signed an initial agreem ent in Moscow in May 1990 on 10 cooperative projects.¹¹⁴ The relationship was solidified when CASC and the Russian Space Agency signed an official protocol for the sharing of spaceted nology in 1992 This agreement was raised again as a deliverable during President Yelts in's visit to Beijing, but only after the two countries signed ano-first-useplecte. A follow -on agreement was signed by Chinese and Russian space officials. The agreem ent included ten areas of cooperation, including satellite navigation, space surveillance, propulsion, satellite com m unications, joint design efforts, m aterials, intelligence sharing, scientific personnel exchanges, and spacesystems testing. Chinese sources indicate cooperation also induced countering U.S. m issile defense program s.¹¹⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The United States has expressed its intent to develop defenses capable of defending against limited missile attacks from a rogue state or from an accidental or unauthorized launch. U.S. missile defense engineers are developing layered defenses, capable of intercepting missiles of any range at every stage of flight: boost, mid-course, and terminal. Layered defenses would permit reductions in nuclear forces, thus contributing to strategic stability. These defenses will be introduced incrementally, deploying capabilities as the technology matures and then acbing new capabilities over time. Since research on m issile defenses began in the 1980s, B eijing has been concerned about the potential underm ining of their lim ited nuclear deterrence, and, m ore recently, their ability to deter and coerce neigh bors such as Taiw an. To ensure the viability of its nuclear deterrent and for its expanding inventory of conventional SRBMs and MRBMs, Beijing has im plemented numerous measures to counter U.S.m issile defense program s. These measures are targeted against sensors that support m issile defenses and against m issile defense program that could ensures om e modicum of assured retaliation. A number of condusions can be drawn from the range of measures underway to undermine U.S.m issile defense program s.

Ch in a's Counterm easure Ch allenge.

Chinese research and development of missile defense countern easures is extensive and appears relatively sophisticated II on ever, countern easures introduce an added element of complexity into an already complex system. Despite significant investment, PRC counterm easures on longer-range ballisticm issiles are unlikely to keep pacewith U.S. technology. With more than 30 years experience, the United States is the world's leader in countern easure technology. Such expertise naturally is integrated into countering penetration aids. Chinese engineers will face drallenges as they attempt to put into practice many of the concepts described above. Counterm easures can be time consuming, and can reduce available space and weight. As a result, penetration aids could low erperform ance (i.e. range and accuracy) or force a reduction in pay load (i.e. a trace off between a decoy or a MIRV).

Sim plecounterm easures, such as chaffandem ploym ent of a limited num ber of decoys, likely already have been incorporated into som em issiles, such as the DF-21 MRBM. Integration of m ore soph isticated counterm easures, how ever, such as balloon clecoys, fast burn m otors, and boostph as em aneuvering arelikely to bem any years aw ay. Russian technical assistance m ay hasten their tim eline Regardless, as new counterm easures com eon line over the next 10 years, the UnitedStates should beable to keep pace, particularly given the general requirement for CALT m issile designers to conduct flight tests. The layered defense approach is perhaps the most effective m eans to reduce the effectiveness of m issile defense counterm easures.

Nevertheless, the U.S. shouldhedge against unforeseen breakthroughs in PRC countermeasureted nology. China's technological progress, Russian assistance to PRC programs, and Beijing's propensity to provide technical assistance to rogue statemissile development all require carefulmonitoring. Testing of new penetration aids should be easily observed via national technical means.

It should be noted that an ong the entire range of U.S. m issile defense programs, PRC specialists seem most concerned about the deployment of SBIRS-Low satellites. Slated for initial deployment during the latter part of the decade (about the same time as the PRC's new generation of solid fueled extended range ICBMs are fielded), SBIRS-Low has the potential to undercut an entire category of Chinese countermeasures. Specialists note that the dual surveillance and tracking capability of SBIRS-Low (infraredandelectro-optical) would reduce the effectiveness of counter-surveillance measures, such as electronic countermeasures, racker steal th, and thermal shrouds. Therefore, greater emphasis must be placed on counter-intercept measures, and a combination of decoys and thermal shrouds.¹¹⁶

Planned Expansion of PRC Ballistic Missile Forces.

The discussion above focuses on technical and asymmetrical countermeasures that the PRC may acoust. To

augm ent soph is ticated penetration aids, lim ited expansion of China's ballisticm issile force is to be expected, depending on the scope of the U.S. m issile defense and itecture. The Second Artillery's arsenal of strategic and conventional ballisticm issiles already is expected to grow substantially through the introduction of m or e soph is ticated silo-based ICBMs, such as the DF-5A; mobile systems, such as the DF-31 and the longer range DF-31A; and the JL-2SLBM. Further expansion, beyond current plans, is to be anticipated I ow ever, the scopelikely would belim ited due to Beijing's desire to avoid presenting a threatening in age to its neigh bors and econom icpartners around the world¹¹⁷ If Beijing drooses to expand its nuclear ballisticm issile force, them ost likely routew ould be to increase production, beyond current plans, of the DF-31 and its longer range variant.

As discussed above, by 2005, Beijing is expected to have 24 DF-5 ICBMs; 10-20 DF-31 ICBMs that should replace the Second Artillery's approximately a cbzen DF-4 ICBMs; and perhaps the same number of JL-22, assuming the Type 94 submarine is produced according to schedule. At least one additional DF-31 brigade (10-20 missiles) could be fielded by 2010. Initial deployment of the DF-31A could be expected in the 2005-2010 timeframe, with as many as ten DF-31A ICBMs ostensibly being in operation by the endof the decade W ith as many as 100 new ICBMs entering the PLA's inventory over the next 10 years, the PRC is in effect more than doubling its arsenal of nuclear ballisticm issiles able to range targets through out the United States. This expansion appears to be taking place in dependent of U.S. plans to field limited missile defenses.

Upgracing all or a portion of the PRC's DF-5 force structurew ith MIRVs is anoth erpotential responseshould a CMC decision bem ade to do so. The specific num ber of MIRVs per DF-5 can not be determ ined at this tim e¹¹⁸ Prospects that a layered missile defense system could induce a boost-phase intercept capability could dam pen any incentive to deploy MIRV's. Boost-phase defenses would destroy the missiles early in flight, when they are most visible and before they can release their warh each.

M issile D efenses and B eijing's Six Specious Argum ents.

Since the early 1990s, Beijing's technical and obotrinal responses have been supported by a coordinated foreign policy and propaganda cam paign to influence international opinion and shape the debate with in the U.S. regarding m issile defenses. As its nuclear and conventional ballistic m issile inventory grows, Beijing's political leadership has form ulatedanum ber of argum ents againstm issile defenses that are based on half-truths and over-sim plifications. First, Beijing argues that m issile defenses will cause an arm's race. In fact, in the conventional military context, arm s races generally arecaused by one sides rapid buildup in offensive capabilities.¹¹⁹ One could argue that an accelerated ann s race has been underway in the Taiwan Strait since the early 1990s. Undercutting Beijing's overwhelm ing offensive advantageth rough viable defenses would enhance cross-Straits tability by raising the costs of using force Activem issile defenses, com bined with other approaches, would reduce the perceived utility of ballistic m issiles as Beijing's preferred tool of coercion.

Secondly, Beijing asserts that U.S. missile defense programs will violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. However, at this time, there is no intention to violate the ABM Treaty, which was a bilateral agreement between Moscow and Washington to help manage and stabilize the strategic bilateral relationship. Because the ABM Treaty is an artifact of the ColdW ar, the treaty needs to be adjusted or eliminated altogether. A dialogue has been initiated with Moscow to ensure that such a movew ould be madewith the consent of both parties.

Beijing also posits an isleading argument that missile defenses will encourage Taiwanese independence sentiment. There are more important factors besides defenses that fan the flam es of Taiw anese independence PRC policies that alienate Taiw an are most relevant. Besides, active missile defenses would not encourage independence sentiment any more than other weapon systems, such as F-16 fighters, PATRIOT & uidance EnhancedMissiles, or PF& -2frigates. One also could argue that Taiw an's indigenous capacity for defense is only a minor factor influencing publics entiment regarding greater autonomy since, according to some sources, Taiw an's obmestic polity is largely uninterested in defense issues.

PRC spokesm en argue that activem issile defenses can beused offensively. Much to the contrary, missile defenses are defensive- they threaten no one. If any thing, building effective defenses will reduce the value of ballisticm issiles, and thus remove incentives for their development and proliferation. One could argue that converting upper tier interceptors to surface to surface missiles could enable strikes against targets at long ranges. However, using interceptors in this way is not cost efficient due to pay load limitations. It is dreaper and more effective to develop a dedicated ballistic missile than to use a missile defense interceptor.

A corollary to this argument is that missile defenses can shield offensive assets, such as ballistic missiles or strike aircraft. This supposition blurs the distinction between offensive and defensive action—whether or not a system is offensive or defensive depends upon the user's intent, strategy, and doctrine. Beijing also argues that U.S. provision of missile defenses to Taiw an would transfer technologies useful to ballistic missile development. This assertion assumes that Taiw an does not have the indigenous capacity to develop the necessary technology; would be willing to violate Missile Technology Control Regimerelated assurances made to the U.S. government; and would take the trouble to reverse engineer propulsion, guidance, or other associated technologies. Chinese arguments that missile defenses could lead to a militarization of space have some merit. However, since deployment of the first reconnaissance and military communications satellites, spaceh as long been exploited for military purposes. There is a relationship between missile defense and ASAT interceptors. If supported by a robust search, acquisition, and tracking network, upper tier mick coursesystem s could be used to strike some satellites in low earth orbit. Chinese observers, such as Du Xiangwan from the China Academy of Engineering Physics, have noted that intercepting satellites is easier than engaging reentry vehicles.

Finally, the PRC has argued that provision of active m issile defenses to Taim an mould "violate" the Three Com m uniqués. The Three Com m uniqués are parallel statem ents of policy that have little standing in international law. Provision of missile defenses would not "violate" the 1982 Communiqué any more than other weapon systems. As Assistant Secretary of State John H oldridge pointed out in his August 1982 Congressional testim ony, the U.S. agreem ent to reduce arm s sales to Taiw an was contingent upon Beijing's peaceful approach to resolving the Taiw an issue, generally diaracterized by its m ilitary posture directed against Taiw an. As H oldridge noted in his testim ony, a rise in the military threat to Taiw an theoretically would be accompanied by a rise in U.S. security assistance, in accordance with U.S. dbm estic law under the Taiw an Relations Act.

Beijing argues that provision of activem issile defenses to Taiw an would revive the U.S.-Taiw an defense alliance, undermining the foundation of U.S.-PRC relations as spelledout in the 1979 Communiqué Such an argument is based on the faulty assumption that a Taiw an missile defense architecture would require some form of operational connectivity with U.S. space based early warning and command and control systems. While DSP early warning could enhance the effectiveness of missile defenses, systems such as TH AAD can operate autonom ously against SRBMs. Early warning rachar systems can supplant the need for satellite early warning.

MissileDefense in the Taiw an Strait.

As can be seen from these arguments, China's opposition to missile defenses is viewed largely through the cognitive prism of Taiwan. Ballistic missiles are a political and, increasingly, military trump cardintenced to stempolitical movement in Taiwan toward greater autonomy. At the same time, China's strategic nuclear force affects cost-benefit calculations of regional players, such as the United States and Japan, as they contemplate intervention. In theory, W ashington policy makers would be less likely to interveneif the risks of escalation were high. Beijing has a no-first-use policy, but regional actors can not be assured that Beijing would not use nuclear weapons to retaliate against foreign intervention, particularly if that intervention involved strikes against military targets on the mainland opposite Taiwan.

SRBMs, com bined with certain types of counterm easures, present Taiw an's missile defense planners with significant challenges. The potential for large raidsizes; the short flight time of SRBMs (approximately 7 minutes for the 600 kilometer DF-15); and wide range of attack azim uths would stress any missile defense architecture.

Despite these challenges, Taiw an's interest in ballistic m issile defenses can be expected to grow with the threat. A m odest m issile defense and itecture could reduce the effectiveness of limited PRC use of ballistic m issiles in a coercive air cam paign. In addition to land and sea-based low ertier systems, the deployment of conventional MRBMs and extended range SRBMs in significant numbers likely will drive Taiw an's interest in sea-based mid-coursem issile defense and TH AAD. If owever, to defend against large scale raids, exclusive reliance on active missile defenses will be insufficient to offset the overwhelming advantages Beijingholds with its expanding arsenal of ballisticmissiles. As a result, Taiwan can be expected to adopt asymmetrical approaches to augment active missile defenses. These induce passive defensemeasures to complicate targeting and enhancing its ability to sustain or reconstitute operations after a first strike Evenmore important, Taiwan force planners can be expected to invest in active defenses and interdiction operations that would target critical nodes with a conventional ballisticm issile organization.¹²⁰

The PRC is concerned about U.S. plans to deploy a global m issile defense and itecture. PRC observers understand that the United States, should it so droose, has the ability over the longer term to develop a robust, lay ered global m issile defense and itecture that could deallenge the viability of China's deterrent. To ensure the viability of its deterrent, Beijing is in them ickt of a long-term program to upgrade its strategic nuclear force in both gualitative and quantitative term s. MIRV ing and success in fielding missile defense countern easures would be factors in the ultimate size of the force Beijing has the ability to influence the nature and scope of future U.S. m issile defense development, as well as the transfer of those systems to allies and friends such as Taiw an. The scope of a future U.S. m issile defense and itecture has not been determ inedy et. Positive steps that Beijing could take to moderate developm ent, deploym ent, and transfer of U.S. m issile defenses induce a reduction in PLA m issile deployments opposite Taim and cooperation in limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their m eans of delivery.

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 5

1. Department of Defense, Selected Military Capabilities of the People's Republic of China (Report to Congress Pursuant to Section

1305 of the FY97 National Defense Authorization Act), W ashington, DC: U.S. 6 overnment Printing Office, 1997, p.4. The report states that most of these missiles are likely to beshort-ormedium-range systems.

2 Th is figure assumes 15-20 ICBMs (between 75 and 100 percent of the PRC's current ICBM force) are directed against U.S. urban areas and able to liquidate a million people per dity.

3 A sum m ary of CASC organization is induced in Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for U.S. National Security, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1999.

4. See Federation of American Scientists, WMD Around the World, www.fas.org; Bill & ertz, Betrayal, Washington DC: Regnery Press, p. 20; and U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the People's Republic of China (Cox Report), Vol. I, Chap. 4, 105 th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: U.S. & overnment Printing Office, 1999. Also see Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Undassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, Director of Central Intelligence, January 2002

5. Walter Pincus, "China May Add 100 Missiles Over 15 Years," Washington Post, May 26, 1999; and "China: Long Range ICBM Could Read: U.S. Mainland," Flight International, August 14, 2001.

6. See Federation of Am erican Scientists webpage, www.fas.org, Bill & ertz, "Chinese Missile To Threaten U.S. By 2000," Washington Times, May 23, 1997.

7. Department of Defense, Proliferation and Response, January 2001, China Section; "China: Long Range ICBM Could Reach U.S. Mainland," *FlightInternational*, August14, 2001; "Kongjunyuhaihang zhuangbei fazhan" (AirForceandNaval Modernization) in *Zhonggong junshi xiandaihua* (PRC Military Modernization), Taipei: Ziyou Publishing, June2000; andShintaro Ishihara, "An Urgent Threat," *The Shidd*, Vol. xviii, No. 2, Mard / April 2001. Therelationship between the DF-31A andtheDF-41 is unknow n. Thenum ber of Type94 submarines thatwill bebuilt is unknow n; one could surm is ethat two-fourhulls (i.e., 32-64 tubes with a likenum ber of JL-25) is a safees tim ate.

8. A series of meetings were held in the afterm ath of the accidental bom bing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. A total of 15 program s were designated for acceleration. A CASC committee was formed to plan for the accelerated timeline. See "Beiyue zhaxing: wuqiyanzhijiasu," (NATOBom bing: Accelerate W expons R&D), Zhongguo H angtian Bao, May 12, 1999, p.1. Attending the meetings were retired aerospace advisors, Xia & uohong (CAMEC Director), Zheng Quanbao (First Academ y Deputy Party Chairman), Yin Xingliang (Second Academ y Deputy Director), H uang Ruisong (ThirdA cadem y Deputy Director), Ye Peijian (Fifth Academ y ChiefEngineer), and H ua Linsen (066 Base Director).

9. The 700-m eter CEP is extracted from Janes Strategic W expons Systems, 1998. See Bill 6 ertz, "New Chinese Missiles Target All of East Asia," W ashington Times, July 10, 1997. Also see "Dongfeng-21 zhongcheng chaochan (DF-21 MRBM), Shijie junshi luntan (W orld Military Forum), January 2000, in Chinese and Bill 6 ertz, The China Threat, W ashington, DC: Regnery Press, 2000, pp. 231-235; and Bill 6 ertz, Betrayal, p. 234.

10. The conversion of the DF-21 from a strictly nuclear mission to a conventional role as reported as early as 1994 in the Chinese journal, 6 uoji # angkong (International Aviation). Further indications of a term in ally guided DF-21 are from discussions between Rich ard Fisher and an engineer from CALT's Beijing Research Institute of Telemetry (704 th Research Institute) at the 1996 Zhuhai Air Show. Extensive CASC technical writings on term inally guided the ater ballisticm issiles tend to substantiate the engineer's comments. Other sources indicate th at the conventional DF-21C program, referred to as the DF-21 Mod3 by some sources, is influenced in large part by the Pershing-2, entered th eapplied R&D (xingh aoyanzh i) phase in 1995, and that the primary payload will be a penetrator warh ead (zuandi dan tou) for use against sem i-hardened facilities such as command centers. See Will Young, "Shenm i dezhongguo chochan budui" (The Development of the Chinese SecondArtillery), Shijiejunshiluntan (WorldMilitary Forum), internet edition (www.wforum.com), January 2000, in Chinese. It is not dear how farengineers have gone in their prelim in any research in this type of ballistic m issile term in al quidance. For a discussion of term in ally guided ballisticm issiles, see 6 an Chuxiong and Liu Jixiang, D aodan yu yunzai huojian zongti sheji (General Design of Missiles and Launda Vehicles), Beijing: Defense Industry Press, January 1996, pp. 68-69. Also see W ang H onglei (Second Artillery Corps), "Optical Im age 6 uidance Technology," in Zhidao yu Yinxin, in Chinese Astronautics and Missilery Abstracts (hereafter referred to as CAMA), Vol. 2, No. 3, January 1995, pp. 34-37.

11. "K ongjun y u h aih ang zh uangbei fazh an" (A ir Force and Naval Modernization) in *Zh onggong junsh i xian c*laih ua (PRC Military Modernization), Taipei: Ziy ou Publish ing, June 2000. One sh ould note,

how ever, that the PAC-3 could engage an incoming MRBM if them issile was targeted directly against the fire unit itself.

12 Use of ballisticm issiles in support of a naval blockace and for use against carrier battle groups is a key theme of a recent internal publication on blockace operations. See II u Wenlong (ed), Lianhe fengsuo zuozh an yanjiu (Study on Joint Blockace Operations), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999. A PAC-3 interceptor could under certain conditions, engage a DF-21C given sufficient early warning and if themissilew as targeted directly against the PAC-3 fire unit

13 Am ong num erous references on conventional Second Artillery cbctrine, seew ang H ouy ing and Zh ang Xingye, Zh any ixue (C am paign Studies), Beijing: National D efense University Press, 2000, pp. 375-385.

14. A brigadeconsists of at least four battalions, probably with three to four companies each. Each brigade would be equipped with approximately 100 SRBMs. Each company likely is responsible for at least one laundher. If one assumes a notional structure of four battalions per brigadewith four companies/laundhers each, then a brigadewould beable to execute a raids ize of at least 16 SRBMs at one time. In a major campaign, seven Second Artillery brigades notionally could achieve a raids ize of at least 112 the eater missiles. Threes alvos would utilize 336 missiles. Remaining the eater missiles in the PLA arsenal would likely be kept in reserve for other contingencies and/or to support naval operations and amphibious landings. See Bill & ertz, "China Acbs To Missiles Near Taiwan," Washington Times, August 28, 2001, p. 1; and Will Young, "Shenmidezhongguo caocan bucui," (The Development of the Chinese Second Artillery), Shijie junshi luntan (World Military Forum), internet edition in Chinese (www.w.forum.com), January 2000.

15. See Tony W alker and Steph en Fidler, "China Builds Up Missile Th reat," *Financial Tim* es, February 10, 1999, pg 1; and "Taiw an Boosts D efenses W ith Live Fire Test of Patriot System," *AFP*, June 20, 2001.

16. L ianh ezh any i di erp aobing zuozh an (PLA SecondArtillery Joint C am paign Operations), unpublish ed m anuscript, 1996, p. 10. The choum ent is believed to be an internal PLA academ icp aper, but its authenticity has not been establish ed. H ow ever, a num ber of sources h ave corroborated m uds of the paper's content. PLA w ritings indicate th at them ission of the SecondArtillery's conventional ballisticm issile force is deterrence; the second m ission is to achieve the "Three Superiorities" – inform ation com in ance, air superiority, and m aritim e superiority. 17. See W ang Jixiang and Ch ang Lan, "6 uow ai jicong cancao caocan clim ian shengcun nengli yanjiu" (Stucy on Survivability of Foreign MobileBallisticMissiles), in XuDazhe, 6 uow ai clancao caoclan jishu yanjiu yu fazhan (Stucy and Derelopment of Foreign Ballistic Missile Technology), Beijing: Astronautics Press, October 1998, pp. 96-108. W ang and Chang are from CALT's systems integration clepartment.

18. Lianh ezh anyi di erpaoloing zuozh an, p. 17.

19. Xu Minfei, Zhu Zili, and Li Yong, "Feasibility of Technologies for Use of Ballistic Missiles to Counter Aircraft Carriers," & uofang Keji Cankao, 1997, 18(), pp.126-130, sum marized in CAMA. Also see Feng Jianbao, "Feasibility Study of Conventional Ballistic Missiles Attacking Aircraft Carriers," paper presented at the Annual China Astronautics Society UAV Specialists Conference, April 1998, sum marized in CAMA, Vol. 6. No. 1.

20. W ang 6 uobao, "Initial Discussion on Tactical Ballistic Missile Electronic W arfare," *H angtian dianzi duikang*, April 97, pp. 1-7, sum m arized in CAMA. China's interest in m illim eter w ave (MMW) technology is best exem plified by a Chines efirm 's illegal acquisition of a MMW traveling w avetube am plifier in 1996. A special MMW laboratory w as established in 1995.

21. See W ang Jixiang and Ch ang Lan, p. 107. Most vulnerable would be Kaden a AB and Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan.

22 D uncan L ennox, ed Jane's StrategicW eapon System s, Issue 24, May 97, Surrey, England Jane's Information 6 roup.

23 6 eorge Linckey, The Inform ation Requirements for Aerospace Defense Lim its Imposed by 6 eom etry and Technology, Bailrigg Memorandum 27, CDISS, Lancaster University, p. 18. Ifm oveddoser to its target, the DF-15 likely would belaunched on a lofted trajectory that would increase the flight time outside the atmosphere, thus increasing them issile's vulnerability to upper tier systems. On the other hand, a lofted trajectory could increase them issile's reentry speed, reducing the footprint, or defended area, of low er tier system s such as PATRIOT.

24. Zh ao Yunshan, Zh ongguo caocan jiqi zh anlue, jiefangjun cle h exin w uqi (Ch ina's M issiles and Strategy: The PLA's Central Weapon), H ong Kong: M irror Books, p. 232. Other sources credit the DF-15 w ith only as goodas a 150-m eter CEP. See "M issiles! Ch inal as Then Too!," W en w ei po, June 1, 1999, p. A5, in Foreign Broackast Inform ation Service (h ereafter FBIS)-CH I-00169, June 22, 1999. 25. Brian II su, 'M-Class Missiles' Bark Worse Than Bite Military," Taipei Times, Augist 16, 2000.

26. Zh ao Yunshan, Zhongguo chaochan jiqi zh anlue, jiefangjun che h exin w uqi (Ch ina's Missiles and Strategy: The PLA's Central Weapon), H ong Kong: Mirror Books, p. 232 Inform ed sources assert the Mirror (*Mingjing*) series of books have a mixed record of reliability. H ow ever, chevelopm ent of a longer rangeversion of the DF-15 is also alluched to in Bill & ertz, "Ch ina A cbs To Missiles Near Taiw an," W ash ington Times, August 28, 2001, p. 1. Zh ao states that the expanded range DF-15 incorporates a more advanced propellant. There is often confusing reporting on an unidentified 1000 kilom eter system – the M-18– that m ay in fact be the rum oredexten chedrange DF-15.

27. Zhao, p. 234.

28. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1999.

2). See Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiw an Strait (Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. Also see Bill Gertz, The China Threat, p. 232

30. If ui Zhong, "Meiguo Kongjun Shishi Jiguang Fanchao Jihua" (USAF Implements Laser Missile Defense Plan), Zhongguo II angtian (China Aerospace), February 1996, pp. 38-39; and Zhang Yaping, "Jiguang Wuqi de Zuozhan Xiaoneng yu Fazhan Qushi," (Capabilities and Trenchin Laser Weapon Development), Zhongguo II angtian, July 1997, pp. 37-40. Presence of longer range surface to air missiles could force the ABL to operate further out. As a high value asset, the ABL would require fighter escort for protection. If based on II aitan Island the S-300/PM U1 coverage extends out to central and northern Taiwan's west coast.

31. *Ibid*.

32 Seespecial briefing on m issile defense programs and testing by Lieutenant 6 eneral Ronald T. Kadish, July 13, 2001.

33 National Missile Defense A Candid Exam ination of Political Limits and Technological Challenges, Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1998, pp. 21-22

34. Federation of American Scientists website, & round based Interceptor, www.fas.org/spp/starwars. 35. A coording to the Federation of American Scientists, the basic "th reshold" th reat that drove the C1 and itecture is said to consist of an attack of fives inglew and each issiles with unsophis ticated decoys that could be discriminated, plus draff, obscurant particles, flares, jammers, and other countermeasures.

36. According to the Federation of American Scientists, a C2 architecture would have defended against any authorized, unauthorized, or accidental attack by sophisticated payloads at the basic threshold level, said to consist of an attack of fives inglew and ead missiles, each with either a few (about four) credible decoys that could not be discriminated (and would have to be intercepted), plus dhaff, obscurant particles, flares, jammers, and other countermeasures.

37. A coording to the Federation of American Scientists, the C3 architecture would have defended against any authorized, unauthorized, or accidental attack by sophisticated payloacs at the "objective" level. The "objective" level is said to consist of an attack of twenty singlewant each missiles, each with either a few (perhaps as many as five) credible decoys that could not be discriminated [andwould have to be intercepted], or a larger number of less sophisticated decoys that could be discriminated, plus dhaff, obscurant particles, flares, jammers, and other countermeasures.

38. Charles Swicker, "Ballistic Missile Defense From the Sea: A Commander's Perspective," *NW C Review*, May 1997.

39. A third low or tion cap ability, the cancelled Navy Area Defense system, was to be a near term capability for low er tier area defense of ports, airfields, and forces ashore. The centerpiece of the Navy A rea Defense System - the SM-2Block IVA area defense interceptor- is an evolution of the Navy's Standard Missile and is one of the Ballistic M issileD efense Organization's coreprogram s. The SM - 2B lock IV A is a high speed, solid fueled system with a dual mode (infrared and sem i-active radiofrequency) hom ing and a blast-fragm entation warh each specifically designed to enhance the ballisticm issile defense m ission. The com bination of precise quick noew it apow erful explosive proximity fused warh ead makes this interceptor highly effective augmentation to the PAC-3's kinetic energy hit-to-kill system s. Its footprint, or defended area, as larger than the PAC-3. Naval Area Defenses ystem s generally aremost effective if they are located near the assets they are supposed to protect. A t-seatesting was expected to begin in late 2003/early 2004. Taiw an has requested four AEG IS-equipped destroyers that could, in the future, provide some limited missile defense should Taiw an decide to pursue such a capability. If owever, Taiw an's current pursuit of AEC IS-equipped destroyers is chiven by the need to defend against airbreath ing th reats, such as cruisem issiles and strike aircraft.

40. J. R. Wilson, *TH AAD*: In *TheEyeOfTheStorm*, unpublished paper, 1996; and BMDO Fact Sheet, "Theater H igh Altitude Area Defense (TH AAD)," *h ttps://www.acq.os.clm il/bm cb/bm cblink/pcH7 th aacl*, May 1999; and TH AAD Program Office H om e Page, *h ttps:// Im m g.external.Im co.com / th aacl*.

41. See Li Feizhu, "Taikong chochan genzh ong xitong clui tufang cuosh i deyingy ong (Influen ceofSpacean dM issile Tracking System on Penetration Measures), unpublish ed Ch ina A cadem y of Engineering Physics paper, April 1999.

42 J.R. Wilson, THAAD: In The EyeOf The Storm, 1996.

43 Statement of Lieutenant 6 eneral Ronald T. Kadsh, USAF Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Research & Development, Thurschay, June 14, 2001, http://www.acq.os.dmil/ bmcb/bmcblink/html/kadish14 jun01.html.

44. The Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) is sometimes referred to as the "PAC-2+." The GEM incorporates improvements to the front end of the PAC-2m issile receiver to enhance its effectiveness and lethality against ballisticm issiles.

45. Zh ang Lide, "W oguo goujian feidan fangyu yu yuanju gongji feidan xitong depinggu," (Analysis of Taiw an's Missile Defense and Long Range Attack Missile Systems), in *Jianduan Keji*, (Defense Technology), March 2000, p. 66.

46. Federation of American Scientists homepage, PATRIOT, (www.fas.org).

47. Lu Teyun, "A Patriot Anti-MissileD effense Um brellais Form ing in the 6 reater Taipei Area," *Lien-ho Pao*, August 24, 1998, p. 1, in *FBIS-CH I-*98-246; and Yuen Lin, "Probing the Capability of Taiw an's Antiballistic Missiles," *Kuang Chiao Ching*, August 16, 1998, pp. 54-61, in *FBIS-CH I-*98-25 2 To counter a DF-15 traveling at 2km /sec, MADS operators have 25-40 seconds after radar acquisition to fire and intercept the incom ing missile. With cueing data, reaction/intercept tim ew ouldincrease to 50 seconds or more.

48. "Military May Join Theater MissileD effense Project," The China Post, November 19, 1998, p.1.

49. For a discussion on the potential impact of D SP support for PATRIOT operations, see Yuen L in, "Probing the Capability of Taiw an's Antiballistic Missiles," If ong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching, August 16, 1998, pp. 54-61, in FBIS-CH I-98-252

50. National Missile Defense A Candid Exam ination of Political Limits and Technological Challenges, Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., July 1998, pp. 21-22 Chinese interest in this "staring" capability was reflected in at least one study; see Qiu Yulun, "Staring Focal PlaneArray Im aging for MissileEarly Warning," Kongjian Jishu Qingbao Yanjiu (Space Technology Inform ation Studies), May 1995, pp. 150-160, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1997.

51. "Spectrum Astro/Northrop 6 rum m an Complete SBIRS Low Review," SpaceD aily (internet version), 7 May 2001. Very hot objects radiate high quantities of short way e in framed (SW IR: 1-3 m igrons); warm bodes radate significant quantities of medium wave infrared (MW IR: 38 m icrons); coldobjects prim arily radiate long w avein frared signal (LW IR: 8-14 m icrons); whilevery coldobjects emitvery long wave radiation (VW LIR: 14-30 m icrons). Different options for focal plane arrays induce mercury-cach ium -tellurice (# gC dTe) or silicon based sensors. H gC dTearrays, which will be used on SB IRS-Low satellites, can detect in frared signatures up to about 12m icrons (LW IR) but are very difficult to m anufacture and susceptible to radiation and EMP effects. If our ever, a key advantage of I gC dTe arrays is that they obnot require cooling to the extrem e low temperatures that other infrared m aterials cb. For a detailed Chinese evaluation of SBIRS-Low, see Li Feizhu, "Taikong chaochan genzhong xitong clui tu fang cuoshi de yingyong (Influence of Space and Missile Tracking System on Penetration Measures), unpublished China A cademy of Engineering Physics paper, April 1999.

52 National MissileD of ense, pp. 21-22

53 Ibid.

- 54. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
- 55. Ibid., p. 26.
- 56. Ibid., pp. 26-31.
- 57. *Ibid*.

58. See the Cox Report (Vol. I, Chapter 4). Also see Li Bin, "The Effects of NMD on Chinese Strategy," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1, 2001.

59. John Wilson Lew is and Xue Litai, "China's Strategic Seep on er: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

60. BonnieS. 6 Laser and Banning N. 6 arrett, "Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative, *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1986, pp. 28-44.

61. Ch in a Today: Defense Science and Tech nology, Beijing: National Defense Inclustry Press, 1993, pp. 149-150.

62 Ibid, pp. 152153 also see Rid and P. Suttheier, "China's High Tech nology: Program s, Problem s, and Prospects," in China's Economic Dilam m a, pp. 546-564. The senior engineers responsible for the 863. Program included W ang D ah eng, a preem in ent optics expert who playeda rolein China's spacetracking network; W ang Canch ang, one of the founding fathers of China's nuclear program; Yang Jiachi, as atellite attituce control expert; and Chen Fangy un, an electronics engineer and leader of program to develop Ch in a's space tracking network. To focus R&D investment for the longer term, Hong Kong media sources reported that the State Council authorized a new initiative, similar to the 863 Program, that ostensibly will emphasize six key areas: 1) aeros pace tech nology; 2) in form ation tech nology; 3) s trategic defenses; 4) deep strike technology; 5) optics and laser technology; and 6) advanced m aterials. The project, dubbed the 126 Program, allegedy as form ally proposed during the 26 January 2000 Annual COSTIND National Conference in Beijing. The effort, to be overseen by Wu Bangguo, W ang Zhongyu, Cao G angchuan, and Liu Jibin, is to functed over the next 1215 years. See Wen Jen, "Jiang Orders High Teda A erospace W eapons D evelopm ent- '12' Program Signed and Placed Under II u Jintao's Command," Tai Yang Pao, in FBIS-CH I-0040, March 21, 2000, p. A 19.

6 3 L ull ongquan and Yang Lian cbng, "Zh an lueh ezh ansh u can cao caocan de tufang" (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical Ballistic Missiles), publish edin an unknown journal in March 1999. Lu and Yang are from the Ch ina A cadam y of Engineering Physics (CAEP); also see Baill an cle, "Ganraochan cle zhongleih e zuozh an fangshi" (Types and Operational Styles Associated with Jamming Warh each), Xian chai bingqi (Mochern Weaponry), 1995, pp. 15 2-15 3.

64. 6 an Chuxiong and Liu Jixiang, *D aodan yu yunzai huojian zongti sh eji* (eneral Design of Missiles and Laundt Vehides), Beijing: Defense Industry Press, January 1996, p. 45.

65. W ang 6 uobao, "Initial Discussion on Tactical Ballistic Missile Electronic Warfare," # angtian dianzi duikang, CAMA, April 1997, pp. 1-7.

66. "Kongjun yu haihang wuqi zhuang bei fazhan," (Development of the Air Force and Naval Aviation Equipment) in Zhonggong junshi xian daihua (PRC Military Modernization), Taipei: Freedom Publishing, June 2000; also see Bai Hande, "Ganrao de zhonglei he zuozhan fangshi" (Types of Jamming and Operational Methods) Xiandai wuqi (Modern Weaponry), 1995, pp. 152-153.

67. Lull ongquan and Yang Lian cbng, "Zhan lueh ezhansh u chan chao chaochan che tufang" (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical Ballistic Missiles), publish eclin an unknown journal in March 1999. Lu and Yang are from the China A cachen y of Engineering Physics (CAEP).

68. For example, Cai Yi, "Status and Development of Two Color InfraredDetectors," *H ongw ai jish u*, (InfraredTechnology), 1997, 19(5), summarized in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6, details the indium-based (InSb) infrared detectors used on the TH AAD m issile; and the mercury-cach ium-telluride (#gCdTe) detectors that are part of the Ray theon EKV sensor system.

69. Lull ongquan and Yang Lian cbng, "Zhan lueh ezhansh u chan chao chaochan che tufang" (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical Ballistic Missiles), publish eclin an unknown journal in March 1999. Lu and Yang are from the China A cachen y of Engineering Physics (CAEP).

70. Bill 6 ertz, Betrayal, p. 254.

71. Lull ongquan and Yang Lian cong, "Zhan lueh ezhansh u can cao caocan de tufang" (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical Ballistic Missiles), publish eclin an unknown journal in March 1999. Lu and Yang are from the China A cadem y of Engineering Physics (CAEP).

72 W ang Jixiang, "Fast Burn Boost Strategic Ballistic Missile Technology," A crosp ace S&T Intelligence Studies Abstracts (2), 92 (4), pp. 68-78, in CAMA, Vol 3, No. 6, 1996. W ang is from the Beijing Institute of Space Systems Engineering (Beijing yuh ang xitong gongch engy anjiusuo); also seeQin 6 uangm ing, "Application of Slotted Tubular 6 rain in Fast Burn Solid Motors," Bingong xuebao (Orchance Journal), Vol. 18, No. 2, 1996, pp. 4 1-4 3, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6. Qin is from the Xian Institute of Mochern Chemistry.

73 See National Missile D efense, p. 16. The Topol-M is believed to drange directions during the last phase of its as cent.

74. 6 an Chuxiong and Liu Jixiang, *Daodan Yu Yunzai II uojian Zongti Sh eji* (eneral Design of Missiles and Laundt Vehides), Beijing: Defense Industry Press, January 1996, p. 42

75. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Undassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, Director of Central Intelligence, January 2002

76. Stokes.

77. 6 an and Liu, p. 46; 6 ui Yongfeng, "Penetration of Tactical Ballistic Missile's Decoy," *H ubei H angtian Keji* (Aerospace H ubei), February 1994, pp. 36-38, in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 1; and Li H ong, "Motion Characteristics of Atm ospheric Reentry Ballistic Missile W arh eachs and Their Applications To H eavy Decoy Design," *Jiangnan H angtian Keji* (Jiangnan Space Technology), 1997 (1), pp. 26-30, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 3

78. 6 an Chuxiong and Liu Jixiang, Daodan yu yunzai huojian zongti sh eji (eneral Design of Missiles and Laundt Vehides), Beijing: Defense Inclustry Press, January 1996. p. 4243; and Wu Ganxiang, "Guow ai fanjich ang wuqi," (Foreign Antirunway Weapons), in Xu Dazhe, Guow ai clancho chochan jishu yanjiu yu fazhan, Astronautics Publish ing House, 1998, pp. 65-76. The control maneuver may be necessary to slow obwin the reentry speed to allow acquisition of the target image in the ballisticmissiles seeker.

79.6 an andLiu, p. 4 3 Alsosee Cai Yuanli, "Research on Trajectory Recovery in Exo-Atm ospheric Flight," in *Daochan Yu II angtian Yunzai Jishu* (Missiles and Space Vehicles), March 1995, pp. 10-15, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No.5; and Zhao II any uan, "Sim ulation, Analysis of Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles," *Yuh ang Xuebao*, January 1, 1997, pp. 96-99, in *FBIS-CST*-97-012 Zhao is from the National University of Defense Technology.

80. Zh ang Mincle, "Sim ulation Research of Defenses Against Conventional Ballistic Missile Reentry Vehicles," *Xitong gongch eng yu clianzi jishu*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1997, pp. 45-49. The sim ulation was conclucted by CASCs Beijing Optoelectronic Engineering & eneral Design Department. For general background on saturation, see # arsh berger, pp. 169-170.

81. David Fulghum, "China Exploiting U.S. Patriot Secrets," Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 18, 1993, pp. 20-21. 82 Zh ang Dem in and H ou Shim ing, "Sim ulation Research of Offensive and Defensive Capability of Conventional Manuevering Reentry Missile," Xitong & ongch eng Yu Dianzi Jishu, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1997, pp. 45-49, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 5. Full translation in FBIS-CH I-97-272 Zh ang is from the Beijing Electrom echanical Engineering Design Department, also known as the CASC Fourth System's Design Department. According to one evaluation, PAC-2h as a probability of kill of 10-25 percent against an unidentified tactical ballisticm issile See Zh ao Yuping, "Probability of PAC-2Intercepting a Certain Tactical Ballistic Missile," paper presented at the November 1997 conference of National Missile Designers Specialist Network, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 3

83 Meng Daikui, "Sim ulation of Control and Guidan cof Spinning Missiles," Xitong Gongcheng yu Dianzi Jishu, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1994, sum marized in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1995; Wan Chunxiong and Yang Xiaolong, "Identification of Flight Disturbances on Spinning Missiles," Zhanshu Daodan Jishu (Tactical Missile Technology), March 1995, pp. 1-8, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 3 For a general assessment on methodologies to protect missile systems against high pomered lasers, see Ji Shifan, "Protection of Missiles Against Lasers," Daodan yu Hangtian Yunzai Jishu, Vol. 5, 1996, pp. 35-42, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 1. Ji's research concentrated on the effects of high pomered lasers on a variety of materials and opto-electronicsystems.

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113 Si Xicai, "Research on Long Range Antiractation Missile Passive Rachar Seeker Technology," in *Zh ansh u chochan jish u* (Tactical Missile Technology), Vol. 2, 1995, pp. 4 252, other studes on specific approaches to ARM technology induce Yang H uay uan, "Study on Superni idebandH igh Accuracy Microw aveDF System," in *D aojian yu zh icho xuebao*, February 1995, pp. 7-12 At least one SecondA cachen y entity that has conducted work on anti-radiation m issile seeker technology is the Beijing Institute of Rem ote Sensing Equipment (probably the CASC 25 th Research Institute).

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CH APTER 6

CH INESE REACTIONS TO NEW U.S. INITIATIVES ON MISSILE DEFENSE

EricA.MdV addn

INTROD UC TION

The author of this drapter describes and analyzes Chinese views of U.S. missile defense initiatives, based largely on interviews, meetings, lectures, and conversations with various Chinese officials, People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers, think tankers, academ ics, and other s trategics tudies and security specialists in C h ina.¹ The core research was concluring 3weeks on them ainlandin July and October 2001, plus other meetings held and materials obtained in the weeks before and after those visits. In general, it was not necessary to raise them issile issuew ith Chinese interlocutors; there was eagerness among these Chinese contacts to acchess the topic describe Chinese positions, and raisequestions. 6 is en the similarity of many of the responses, it was dear that the topic has received ample attention, that the same material had been readall over China, and that there was universal support among officials and academ ics for the central objections to U.S. m issile defense initiatives, albeit with interesting m odifications.

PRC VIEW S OF THE UNITED STATES IN MID-2001

Som e observers in the United States have conducted that 2001 is a bad year for U.S.-China relations, that W ashington's crive tow archmissile defense and more arms for Taiwan, coupled with many other bilateral strains, has left Beijing unready, even unwilling, to deal with W ashington. Chinese observers have a different view. Chinese diplom ats in W ashington asserted as early as the spring of 2001 that Beijing is, at the outset of the G eorgeW. Bush presidency, exercising restraint and being accomm odating-despite m any U.S. ach inistration statem ents, including those on m issile defense, that m ight be considered offensive to China.

The frequently expressed open as that the anticipated meeting between Presidents Jiang Zem in and Bush in Beijing, coincident with the Asia-PacificE conom ic Council (APEC) session in Shanghai in October 2001, would result in much enhanced understanding and a steadily improving bilateral relationship. This expectation was particularly evident among interlocutors in China in July and encom passed a publicly expressed willingness, even desire, to discuss m issile defense issues. This was in contrast to an earlier Chinese attitude of making righteous public pronouncements in opposition to missile defense program s but largely avoiding serious discussion, especially any form of discussion that would suggest Chinese behavior might be the subject of legitim ate concern or reproad. As a consequence of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trace Center and Pentagon, the Beijing meeting between Bush and Jiang did not occur, and missile defense was not prominent in their brieftalks in Shangh aion the periphery oftheAPEC forum.

Am icls t this alleged Chinese willingness to accomm ocate² and to aw aitpatiently the outcome of what is seen as a clayeloping U.S. policy for China (and, more broadly, for Asia), there were seem ing contradictions. These contradictions prominently induced the arrests and trials (and subsequent deportations) of ethnic Chineses diolars with American connections, the continuing harsh crack clowing non the Falun & ong movement, the sharp Chinese reaction to the reductions of military-to-military contacts initiated by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2001, and the handing of the April 2001 chuining of the U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft. These topics could not be acbressed fruitfully by the author in most open discussions in mid-2001; how ever, points were made by the Chinese, mostly in private discussions, that these should be understood as exceptional situations and kept in context (the Chinese context, of course). The Chinese side, they suggested, did not link these events to the Bush ach inistration policy tow and China or missile defense initiatives; and it was hoped that an American understanding of the factors involved would insure that discussions of missile defense issues would not be prejudiced by these unrelated events.

Theim plications were that these events reflected three primarily *cbm estic* factors:

1. An obsession with the Taiw an issue that overrides considerations of how it might affect relations with the United States. The state security organs had bggedy sunk their teeth into the issue of scholars "misusing" information about them ainland, especially in such matters as making com parisons with Taiw an society and the like. In a written response to questions submitted to Jiang by the New York Times, it was asserted that the scholars were "members of Taiw an espionage organizations" and had "engaged in spy activities on m any occasions on the m ainland of China."³ Discretion overroce valor for those Chinese officials who recognized the negative effects on China of such actions. Moreover, American reactions to the detentions and trials we reprint given high priority in evaluating the crusace; the audience for the actions was the body of ethnic Chinese scholars abroad who are indined to undertake such work-and the Chinese public As Senator Joseph Biden, Chairm an of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Com mittee, saidafterm eeting with Jiang and oth erofficials at Beidaih e in August 2001, "They [the Chinese] are sending a not-so-subtle m essage. You [Am ericans] have a problem with [Chinese actions tow ard] Pakistan, with Iran; we have a problem with [Am erican actions tow ard] Taiw an." Biden

said Jiang appeared preoccupied with the fate of the island Beijing regarches as a rebel province⁴

2 Paranoia about the Falun 6 ong on the part of Jiang. Jiang, personally, was still firm ly convinced that the regime was threatened by the Falun 6 ong "cult," and no onew ith influence though titp rucent or useful to try to convince him of the counterproductive that aracter of the actions; moreover, the cam paign to discredit them ovement and persuade the Chinese people of its evil nature was, indeed, succeeding—sowhy relent now?⁵

3 Insecurity of Jiang about h is future, especially as Chairm an of the CMC. Jiang, although m is led by the military as to the antecedent and proximate causes and draw stances of the collision between the PLA Navy F-8 and the U.S. Navy EP-3, did not think it prudent to take on the PLA leadership about the post-accident events or the their anger about them ilitary relationship m add in the store by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rum sfeld Jiang was reluctant to ignore their ranting against the United States because this might complicate his expected retention of the position as Chairm an of the Central Military Commission after his upcoming retirem ent from the positions of President of China and Communist Party General Secretary. Thus avoiding confrontation with the military leadersh ip is an ajor part of Jiang's effort to ensure that he retains an influential position and protects h is aspiration to gain "param ount leader" status com parable to that enjoy ed by D eng Xiaoping and M ao Zeobng. H e, consequently, H as not indined to confront them ilitary and in both instances let the PLA have its way.

In short, these events that seem ed to be avoidable incidents, alm ost gratuitously harming the relationship with the United States, were draracterized by the Chinese as Jiang and others playing primarily to comestic- not international- audiences. There is another important aspect to this som en hat oblique explanation of contradictory conduct offered by Chinesespecialists. These com plications in the relationship were not in any way a reaction to U.S. missile defense initiatives, neither those against long-range nuclear missiles nor short-range conventional missiles, according to these Chinesesources.

Ch in a ls the Target of Nuclear M issile D efense.

Chinese specialists suggest that, indeed, their government is taking a measured, reasonable approach to U.S. m issile defense initiatives. They do, nevertheless, argue, rath er righ teous ly (as usual), that U.S. statem ents about national m issile defenses not being intended for use against China's intercontinental ballisticm issile (ICBM) force are not credible. One interlocutor pointed out that Chinahas been a factor in U.S. concerns about defending its elfagainst or deterring missile attacks since the emiddle of the last century. Moreover, most Chinese experts do not take seriously the expressions of U.S. concerns about m issile threats from the "roquestates," arguing generally th at North K orean m issile forces are not now, and will not become significant, and that North Korea and other rogue nations have been and will continue to be deterred by the overwhelming U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities.

The geography of the proposed defenses ites (in A laska) seems to the Chinese to be aplaced entspecifically dosen to protect the United States against China's long-range missiles—which they term a minimal deterrent arsenal. Basedon the prevalent Chinese assertion that North K orea is not a real present or potential threat to the United States, the argument that the placed ent is to defend against a Pyongy ang threat is discounted, even scorned The *Chinese* believe firm ly and state publidy what several haw kish Americans have stated (some more publidy than others): Regardless of what is said, China is the target of U.S.m issile defenses. If the United States succeeds in developing asmall interceptor force, W ashington will inexorably move to a larger, more capable force, they assert. Less loudy spoken is that Beijing does not trust W ashington as a world player with such a force any more than W ash ington trusts Beijing with its small (but probably increasing) and obsoles cent (but modernizing) ICBM arsenal, allegedy useful only as a ceterrent.

Itall depends on W ash ington, as the Chineses exit In the eyes of the Chinese, much of the to-and froon them issile defense issue depends on the state of the bilateral relationship and the degree of mutual trust, a factor that could erode badly, rem ain stagnant, or improve significantly. They consider that the quality of the relationship depends alm ost wholly on W ashington's th inking and actions. From their perspective, an important factor is whether W ashington has, in clead, made, or is in the process of making, a function ental drange in its strategic outlook with respect to China. A prominent Chinese thinker in talks in W ash ington in early sum m er 2001 op in edth ath e though this governmenthadtaken aw ait-andsee attitude. For him and others, there is the hope that the U.S. acheres to a oneCh in a policy and that the bilateral relationship returns to a less bum py track, but there is no condusion y et. The apparent warm ing of Sino-U.S. relations after September 11 and the cordial, if truncated Bush-Jiang meeting in Shanghai, havemost Chinesew ondering if the enhanced relationship II ill persist or return to bickering over the same old disputes as time passes.

In m ick 2001 anoth er Ch in es es trategis t an dspecialis t in American studies described two schools of though tin China on U.S. strategy. One is the conviction that U.S. strategy is "aim ed at Ch ina." The other is that U.S. strategy is more globally directed (aim ed at much more than China). If e noted that, predating Bush adm inistration pronouncements, President William Clinton hadstated the U.S. shift to a focus on Asia. These and other such argum ents m ade by other interlocutors seem edito holdout the prospect that U.S. policy for China and Asia was not yet in concrete, and that it as still in the process of form ulation, implying an opportunity for those in Beijing and else in here to influence it. This, coupled with the events

in Septem ber and October, encourage Beijing's hopes that, despite U.S.-Russian deal-making, it has not been relegated to an altogether passive role on the missile defense issue.

A well-connected academ icrem arked that hearing U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Rum sfeld talk about issues relating to China or about which China was concerned was likelistening to two governments. Hem ace th is observation on the case that Powell arrived in Beijing in July 2001 to prepare for the meeting between the two presidents, then 3m on this in the future. The Chinese are convinced that they have taken the rational position and that it is the Bush administration, in its early pronouncements about favoring Japan and Taiw an and being firm er on China, that was producing uncertainty and instability in the bilateral relationship - and could return to th at once Beijing's support is seen as no longer needed in the war on terrorism. Furtherm ore, the Chinese do not believe that their conduct warrants such harsh treatment and insulting affronts by W ashington. They refuse, for example, to recognize that Beijing's firm position on the Taiw an problem including its refusal to renounce the use of force, plus other issues such as hum an rights, makes W ashington conduct that Beijing is the culprit.

CH INESE REACTION TO DEFENSES AGAINST ICBMS (NMD)

Although the Bush ach inistration has merged the concepts of national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) into the common term missile defense system (MDS)⁶, China's reactions can best be described and analy zedwhile preserving the distinction of defenses against ICBMs and defenses against short-range and medium -range ballisticmissiles (SRBMs and MRBMs). For them ostpart, China, while adknow ledging the blurring of the distinction, continues to object to the two in different ways and on different grounds, and there are also specific objections to the concept of MDS- the merging of the two concepts into some sort of lay erect defense of wide areas.

MeasuredChineseOpposition.

Beijing is not ranting about NMD. It is not using alarm ist expressions and is not engaging in name calling, as it so often obes on other issues – and as it didearlier on th is one. There is little, if any, the torical excess, as was the case in the fall of 2000 when the Defense White Paper described the Taiw an issue as "complicated and grim." Absent in m issile defense discussions are the term s hegen onism and power politics, and the accusations, like those from the White Paper, that "certain big powers are pursuing 'neo-interventionism ' [and] neo-gunboat diplom acy." In Jiang's written responses to the New York Times questions in August 2001, the points on m issile defense are only that (1) Ch in a cbes not favor the proposed U.S. m ove that it fears would jeep arcizes trategics tability, (2) it wishes to discuss solutions that would not harm the security of any side, and (3) China needs to maintain the effectiveness of its "self-defense" nudear force

NMD C an B e Ov erw h elm ed or D efeated

That was the tone struck by Chinese interlocutors. In June, a prominent Chinese think tanker went so far as to suggest (a bit sim plistically) that China could tolerate ten interceptor missiles because that wouldnot defeat China's 20 ICBMs and that China could, in any case, build additional ICBMs in the 10 or more years before such a system could be deployed- if it works. On the matter of NMD efficacy, many Chinese specialists think that it will not work and that it certainly will not work soon. Several referred to NMD as G reat Wall or Maginot Line thinking. A PLA general officer, who is considered a strategic thinker, commented on the analogy that missile defense is a train that has already left the station. If esaid that might be true but that the tracks are not yet complete, effective missile clefense, in h is view, sim ply m ay not be feasible, especially in the short term.

NMD WillCostaLotandNotWork.

Som eput a positive spin (for China) on this argument, suggesting that China will not follow the Soviet example of reaction to President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star W ars) but could easily maintain sufficient missiles to overcome the defenses while the UnitedStates expends enorm ous resources on its ineffective obsession. China, they say, will increase and improve its ICBM arsenal, but U.S. NMD will not be a central impetus for that undertaking because NMD is not expected to work very well. Some Chinese go so far as to argue that few er resources than planned need now to be expended on ICBM modernization because NMD, by whatever name, will not be effective, that minor offensive changes will continue to overcome edifficult defensive modifications.

The PLA general officer strategist, when pressed, tempered his argument a bit. He said that although effective missile defenses may be infeasible, if the technology is present, they would be built; no American president could refuse to cb so. However, he forecast that NMD couldnot be care eloped before the endofth is cleade, so Chinah as time to ensure its nuclear forces are effective. It is, of course, hard to cletermine if this theme of NMD ineffectiveness is mouthed in order to discourage its clevelopment or because the Chinese have, inclead, convinced them selves that itw ill notwork. The latter seems most likely.

No Nuclear Arm s Race

China, it was said, cbes not want to expendres ources on building up a much larger ICBM force, it wants both econom ic cbevelopment and a ceterrent. That combination seems feasible to the Chinese specialists. A PLA general officer suggested that China's response would be proportional and would not result in an arm s raceor even a priority item in the Chinese defense budget. China, hesaid, would do extra things, but just enough; it would not go overboard Others said China would not react strongly to NMD and would not build a large number of missiles. Nuclear weapons, one civilian specialist argued, are just for deterrence, not real weapons. China will not waste its resources on a useless system.

There has a bit of gloating am ong som eof the specialists that the United States would likely proceed headong and spendan enorm ous am ount of m oney on a system not likely tow ork and that, putting a finer point on earlier arguments, offensivem issiles and im aginative penetration techniques were far easier and dreaper to devise and produce than defensive m issiles and complex target discrimination tech nologies. If owe rear, none of the interlocutors, even in response to provocative questioning, took a position that the UnitedStates II ouldrueth eday it undertook NMD against the wise and wily Chinese, or anything resembling that position. Other threats and bluster were not offered The tone of the conversations resembled that taken by Sha Zukang, Director of the Arm's Control Department in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in March 2001 when he said that, even if NMD were developed by the United States, China would not necessarily take radical steps such as with chawing from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [im plying also ending its moratorium on nuclear weapon testing], as had been threatened previous ly $.^{8}$

NMD W ould Reduce Security.

Instead, the gentler suggestion was maceoften that the United States and China might both be less secure as a result of NMD. The general officers trategist and a divilian specialist in Beijing said China is concerned about the ram ifications for outer space, fearing a U.S. move to put missile defenses in space would invite others to employ weapons in space or to react unpredictably to one country's "weaponizing space" In the short term, there would be an increase in the capability of the United States to defend itself; but in the long term the United States will "repent." The general went on to argue that the United States spent many years building a nonproliferation regime and now seems to be throwing all that away and inviting proliferation. The crux of his argument was that the national security of one country cannot be based on increased insecurity of others, and that absolute security cannot be achieved D efenses, he suggested, sometimes invite proliferation rather than stop it. As clicithers, he pointed the finger at countries other than China, forecasting that, in reacting to U.S.m issile defense, China will cb just a few things; others will cbm uch more

Others elaborated on this them e. An arm s control specialist said some countries would react to NMD by developing an improved capability to penetrate defenses; others would turn to other methods of delivery or to alternatives such as biological a expons. If e then made a less fam iliar argum ent. Il esaid NMD would lead to a sense offalsesecurity. If it were to work, the United States would feel secure against North Korea, for example. Yet W ash ington w ould, in building m issile defenses, not only have further antagonized Pyongy ang but also would have failed to give the appropriate attention to resolving the underlying problems in relations with North Korea- and probably further exacerbated them. To bolster his argum ent, he said Pyongy ang has reacted favorably to overtures from Beijing and Moscow to curtail its missile program A tough m essage from W ashington about m issile defense would be counterproductive, he argued Alm ost in passing, he added that all this is about a country that does not, in the view of China, pose a credible nuclear missile th reat to the United States – a country that I ants and needs better relations with the United States.

A specialist in Beijing gave it a geopolitical twist. It esaid that if Bush's plan for missile defenses were completed, the worldwould be divided into two parts: that covered by MDS, and that left uncovered. That returns us to a bipolar world Thereal security problems in the world are based on lack of trust. MDS would exacerbate the underlying problem of lack of trust between various countries and work counter to the concept of confidence building measures (CBMs), he argued

North K orea No Th reat

As mentioned previously, the Chinese argue frequently and with conviction that North Korea is not now, and will not become a threat to the United States. As one divilian specialist put it, North Korea's territory is too sm all to develop a nuclear weapon system that would include launching facilities, force protection, etc. North Korea cannot develop the technology to get m issiles even to the western United States, he asserted In any event, North Korea could only laund, not survive, it would be a real suicide, he said on phatically. Several others pointed out that North K orea's failure to initiate military action over half-a-century makes the point that the leaders in Py ongy and are not irrational. Chinesepress this argument about the lack of credible threat from North Korea in significant measure to support their belief that U.S. defenses against ICBMs are ultimately intended to negate China's nudear deterrent.

Piling On.

Onegains thesensein talking to Chinesespecialists on them issile defense issue that a great deal of time has been spent contriving and cataloguing arguments against m issile defenses, apparently in the belief that the number of arguments madewill count in the debate. As an example, a think tanker in Beijing said that China is worried about the prospect of an arm s race but not between China and the United States. If effeated that, if the United States builds m issile defenses, other countries could build up their m issile forces in response and then later could turn those m issiles on China, or at least those m issiles would be a threat to China. Nevertheless, most of the arguments offered are along similar lines and often employ precisely the same words and phrases, such as the comparison of NMD with the G reat W all and the Maginot Linementioned previously. At a minimum, one must conclude that the specialists have all read the same material or heard the samespiel.

The Second Strike Issue.

Two quite different views were offered (quite dinically) by two interlocutors on the issue of Chinese interest in a second strike capability (after an initial U.S. nuclear strike on China). A Chinese strategist speaking (not for attribution)here in the United States said that China needs a second strike capability - in addition to the ability to overwhelm a U.S. defense against ICBMs.¹⁰ A Beijing civilian specialist suggested it was all moot. He argued privately (and gravely) that Chinese leaders would be unable to find a single m ajor Am erican dity where dose relatives of important Chinese leaders do not now live H e conducted on that basis that there is no realisticutility to China's ICBMs; they have only deterrent value, no real value as weapons. This was offered, not frivolously, but as a serious appraisal. I ealsonoted that the United States had, for very different reasons, elected not to use nuclear weapons in Korea in 1953, suggesting that neither country has the stom add to employ them.

TH E ABM TREATY ISSUE

Most of the interlocutors predicted, in one way or another, that Moscow would not, in the end, stand firm ly with Chinaon them atter of opposition to any mechling with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that might permit missile defenses desired by Washington but prohibited by the treaty. At least as early as June 2001, a prominent specialist said that he expected Russia to concecte its opposition to NMD and that China should be ready to go its own way. A divilian specialist in Beijing, noting that Russiam ust for econom ic reasons reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal, said in advance of the July 2001 Putin-Bush meeting in 6 enoa that Russia would comprom iseon the ABM Treaty issue Heexplained further that on ascale of 1-10 Russiaw as at 10 in its concern about NMD and 5 about TMD; Chinaw as at 5 on NMD and 10 on TMD. He translated that into an expectation that Moscow would comprom isew ith Washington and enter into some form of cooperation on NMD and warh ead num bers.

After Russian President V ladim in Putin stated publidy with Bush in G enoain late July 2001 that offensivem issiles and missile defense would be treated as a set. Chinese specialists uniform ly took the position that we were later to hear from Jiang in his New York Times interview: the matter could be worked Possibly their concern was less than most American analysts expected, they expected that Putin had another cardup his sleeve, or Beijing decided to put the best face on their disappointment. A retired senior PLA officer now with a strategic studies institute told a small international audience in H ongK ong invery late July 2001 that hehad expected Russia to make a deal with the United States on the matter, or at least thought it was possible Noteven the Bush-Putin Novem ber 2001 meeting on this issueseem edito discourage the Chinese

A well-connected senior think tanker put it this way: China's preference was to stand solid with Russia in opposition to drange to the ABM Treaty that would permit NMD, but Chinah adseen very early the prospect for drange in Russia's position. If esaid that there are in this matter "gray areas." China, he asserted, could still work with Russia and talk with the United States. Noting that China's form erprincipal arms control official, Sha Zukang, has said hewants to discuss missile defense with the United States, hesaid there could be talk on the "merits" of missile defense and on overall relations; may be there is room for maneuvering, he rum inated If e conduced with the hope that Jiang and Bush, in Beijing in October 2001, would discuss the issue and find som eway out. Although that meeting didnot takep lace, its till seems that Beijing wants to finesse the issue, make the best of it, or at least not to give the impression that China is panicky over the unfavorable development—whatever precise form it may take as Bush and Putin continue to talk with out a representative from Beijing present.

CH INA'S VIEW S ON THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (TMD)

TMD to Protect U.S. Forces and Bases Is Okay.

Am bassacbr Sha Zukang, who has now lefthis post as China's primary arms control official, has for half a decade voiced his assertion that TMD intended to shield U.S. forces and bases in Asiaw ereunderstandable to Beijing and would not draw a radical reaction from China. He has referred to this as "pure" TMD, implying apparently that it did not involve Japan or Taiw an or threaten Chinese strategic m issiles. He repeated that position in March 2001 in response to questioning about U.S. plans to deploy system s top rotect U.S. forces based in Asia. I esaid, "There is a gray areahere. Chinais not opposed to [theatermissiledefense]. ... to protect troops and military bases." Nothing has been heard from a successor on this issue, affirm ing or denying the position. This may be in part because of the uncertainty about where the United States TMD program is headed as m ajor dranges arem adein the overall U.S.m issiledefense program and W ashington's attention and resources are concentrated on the war on terrorism.

For the Republic of K orea (ROK).

Chinese officials and specialists are generally relaxed about TMD and South Korea because Seoul has, so far, drosen not to participate. There is satisfaction among the Chinese that part of the reason Seoul coes not want to obtain a TMD system is that Koreans cb not want to "poke China in the eye" South Koreans have expressed the view that TMD is not an effective defense against their biggest concern: North Korean artillery and other forces just north of Seoul, that the North Korean threat may in any case go away, and that then the ROK would be stuck with a very expensive system seem ingly suitable only to defend against Chinesem issiles. Chinese are not giving much attention yet to the rum blings among som eROK military leaders that it would be a mistake for them to get left behind in missile defense tech nology – tech nology that many think will be an integral part of any modern arm edforce in coming decades.

For Japan.

China's objections to TMD for Japan persist. Various concerns are expressed with various degrees of seriousness.¹¹ The earlier arguments that TMD would provideam ilitaristic Japan with the shield behind which it could, in a matter of months, develop and deploy nuclear m issiles is heard infrequently now. Nevertheless, there rem ain concerns that the tech nology shared with Japan as a result of Japanese participation with the United States on TMD research and development will aid a future Japanese ballisticm issile program. One specialist pointed out that JapaneseAegis-equippedships could be used in the Taiw an Strait, obviously thinking that he had made a telling point which would cause even Americans to recoil at the very though t ofsuch a thing. The Chineseh ave been attentive to the Japaneses ending of destroyers to the Indian Ocean in noncom bat support of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. At least in part because of this Chinese angst, A eqis-equipped ships, although already a part of the Japanese Maritim e SelfD efense Force were not dispatched by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

More generally, the Chinese argue that TMD is yet another American mistake in dealing with Japan. Beijing argues that Japan is the real future threat to regional stability and that the United States is aiding the potential resurgence of Japanes emilitarism by many of the things it is obing to aid the Japanes e Self Defense Forces (JSDF). The aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance that has been seen as controlling Japan or curbing Japanes emilitarism has led in the past to Chinese acceptance that the alliance was, on balance, favorable for China, but TMD is seen as part of a shift tow and the alliance making the JSDF more capable and more likely to threaten China, even to come to the support of Taiw an in some way in a conflict – especially one with U.S. involvement.

Some Chinese interlocutors # ill adknow ledge that the real root of their concern about TMD for Japan is that the Japanese, # hile# ringing their hands about North Korean Taep ocbng m issiles, are actually looking over their shoulders at Chinesem issiles. The essence of the concern, then, is that China# ants to be able to hold at risk # ith its ballisticm issiles Japan and, of course, U.S. bases in Japan andy et coes not # ant to m akeloudpublic pronouncements to that effect. TMD for Japan # ouldspoil that.

For Taiw an.

Beijing continues to express in the strongest term s its opposition to TMD for Taiw an. It has said it will react harshly to the transfer of missile defense from the United States to Taiw an. There has been no diminution of this opposition toproviding defenses for Taiw an, even as Beijing has seen edito take am orem easuredoutlook with respect to NMD. The chum beat has intensified on the assertion that TMD for Taiw an is bad enough in itself but that the introduction of real missile defense there will mean far greater and doser coordination between the earm ediforces of the United States and those of Taiw an. That is described as a greater concern by far than the acquisition of the various TMD system s.

There is also in China now an oreintense concern than expressed previously about the prospect of the transfer of Patriot A dranced Capability 3 (PAC-3) ground based air and issile defenses to Taiw an. This is them ost likely real TMD that Taiw an might obtain, although it is still a ruch entary capability against short-range ballistic missiles. Previously, Chineseconcerns over PAC-3h ad been muted in favor of deary ing the prospective transfer of ships equipped with the U.S. Navy A egis air and missile defense system, asystem that is expected eventually to have a TMD capability. The Chinese are still more wrough tup about A egis than PAC-3, but now both are of considerable concern.¹²

A well-inform ed Chinese think tanker has suggested that the deployment (already) by China of 300 or more short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in Fujian, with about 50 m orem issiles com ing each year, m ight bestopped or reversed were Taiw an to accept the one China principle. (few enton to say that Beijing could not now make such a m ove because it would recound to the benefit of current Taiw an President Chen Shui-bian and aid his political party, the hated D en ocratic Progressive Party $[D PP]^{13}$) Furthern ore, other Chinese interlocutors now at least accept the fact that these missiles threatening Taim an are incleed being deployed by their military. They now assert that all should understand that the purpose of these m issiles is only for deterrence of a Taiw an m ove tow ard autonomy, not for use as weapons. Previously, even senior PLA officers have often denied them issile deployments or refused to discuss the subject. They simply said that everything concerning Taiw an was purely an internal affair. It is not that these developments signal that a solution to the issue is at h and but at least, when conditions for rem oving missiles are raised and the fact of deploy ments by the hundreds is address ledged, the prospects for reasonable discussion and even negotiation are enhanced

MighttheDoorBeOpenaCrack?

Because of the intertwining of TMD and Taiwan, Beijing's concerns about TMD dearly exceed those about NMD. Noneth eless, Chinese official and unofficial spokesmen, as has been described, have at least acknow ledged that TMD for U.S. forces in Asia is reasonableand that their SRBMs threatening Taiwan exist and are part of the problem and an element in its possible solution.

CH INESE REACTIONS TO THE MERGING OF NMD AND TMD INTO MDS

ChineseConfusion: Real or Feigned?

There is among Chinese specialists confusion (or professed confusion) about the Bush administration's merging of NMD and TMD. Beyond the uncertainty, acknow ledged by Rum sfeld, about just what the new concept of a m issile defense system (MDS) implies,¹⁴ the Chineseask questions about Japan and Taiw an. Does MDS m eans that the Japanese TMD cooperation with the United States would have, as part of MDS, an NMD component against China's long-range m issiles? Others raised the issue of whether PAC-3 would then be a part of MDS, thinking that it was absolute anathem a to any logical person to suggest that Taiw an (which may get PAC-3) could be a part of MDS. Underlying many of the concerns expressed was the profound worry: Beyond the direct implications for China's ICBM force, would Taiw an be construed as part of MDS, meaning an even greater degree of coordination between U.S. and Taiw an arm edforces? It is difficult at this early stage in the "MDSm erger" to as certain the degree to which the Chinese confusion is real or whether the MDS matter is being used as a peg on which to hang m ore Chinese argum ents against m issile defenses and to offer up m ore concerns about Taiw an.

M D S C ould Negate A II C h in a's Ballis tic M issile Arsenals.

There is inherent in this incheate MDS concept the specter of a worldwide system, including sea-based and land-based interceptor missiles of various sorts and an airborne laser (to kill missiles in their boost-phase as cent), thatwouldputinjeopardy China's ICBM deterrent arsenal, its SRBMs, and even medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Powell's visit to Beijing in late July 2001 didnot assuage Chinese concerns on this issue H is arguments that the U.S. missile defense system would be limited and no threat to Chinese long-rangemissiles was, for the Chinese, chow neclout by noises from elsew here outside (but dose to) the ach inistration that send other signals and the silence with in the ach inistration, based on acknow ledged uncertainty, about how the concept will evolve.

The Taiw an Complication.

A young research er at as trategic institute in Sh angh ai sum m ed up the Chinese view of MDS: The Bush ach inistration's blurring of NMD and TMD is apparently a program to cover m ore countries with a missile defense blanket. This complicates the Chinese view of missile defense with respect to Taiw an and gives China m ore reason to object to any form of missile defense for Taiw an. This is not a positive development from the Chinese military view point. Coupledwith the announced U.S. focus on Asia, this will give Chinese hard liners a stronger argument. As with other arguments concerning Taiw an, the speaker considered that his point had been made tellingly when hesaid even Taiw an might be protected by MDS.

TH E CH INESE DESIRE OR WILLING NESS TO TALK ABOUT MISSILE DEFENSE ISSUES

For some American observers, it appears that Beijing and W ashington are so firm ly entrended in mutually irreconcilable positions that there might seem to be no hope for negotiation of a positive outcome or any other form of resolution. Yet Sha, then head of the arms control department of the Chinese MFA, in March 2001 agreed to talks on NMD that he hoped would "narrow ... differences," and he welcomed Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly to Beijing in May. In Kelly's departure statement after those talks, hesaidhe had explained the overall American strategy and that there was agreement to a continuing dialogue.

Beijing W ants Both E conom ic Progress and D eterrence

Although this statement by Kelly may have had an understandably optimistic tilt, there are other positive signs. As is well known, China is already testing a modern ICBM, the DF 31, to replace its obsolescent DF 5A force, but Beijing obes not and to expend the resources to build hundreds of m issiles (enough to overcome any NMD) envisioned) or to greatly improveits missiles to make them less vulnerable to intercept. As alluced to previously, a responsible Chinesespecialist on this issue has suggested that Beijing m ight be able to tolerate the 10 NMD interceptors recently mentioned by Rumsfeld, but that Ch in a could not tolerate 250 in tercep torm issiles. A coording to Chinese sources, when Kelly met Sha, Sha did not indicate a readiness to comprom ise so far; how ever, if China's core interest is respected "to some extent," China m ay be flexible, according to this well-inform edsecurity specialist. China, it was suggested, wants both economic development [unfettered by a need for a large nuclear buildup] and to m aintain a deterrent. This speculative tidbit about possible Chinesecom promise is certainly not a breakth rough, but it obes reflect, itseems, a desire by China to talk and offers W ash ington a bit of negotiating room.

The talks with Kelly were viewed in China as successful only in that they heldout the promise of further talks. The Chinesew ereapparently unhappy at the level of seniority an assistant secretary rather than the deputy secretary of statewhohadvisited other Asian countries (and Australia) on the tour that induced Kelly. It was noted that Bush administration very senior people talk to Russia and other countries, as did the Clinton administration; but that there had been, as of mid-July 2001, no such talks with China. An arm s control specialist pointed out bluntly that Bush has personally spoken tooth erpresidents on missile defense (br phone and in person, hevolunteered), but hehadnot, to that point, spoken to Jiang on that topic Yet Powell was in Beijing in late July, he reported that, although m issile defense was a major agenda item for his session with Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, there had been no in-depth discussion about m issile defense. The Chinese had only "listened and responded with a question or two."¹⁵

Chinese Suggestions about Missile Defense Talks with the United States.

In any event, the Chinesewere, in the weeks preceding the expected Bush-Jiang October meeting, indicating a reachiness to talk and making suggestions about how that might proceed They now have the prospect of a sum mit in 2002, and the prospect that Sino-U.S. relations may be much improvedover early 2001. The arm s control specialist in Beijing explained what Americans should understand before the United States talks to China on the missile defense issue H esaid that Americans need to understand more fully the Chinese political situation. Jiang has to contend with pressure from public opinion. He has to convince the Chinese people and the Chinese media¹⁶ that the United States is not to be feared

If e then suggested that, in developing an agenda for talks, it is important for China to know what form of missile defense the United States contemplates because missile defenses are seen in China as a form of U.S. hegemony. Next, talks should turn to the threat missiles pose to the UnitedStates and to Ch ina and Russia. Options other than m issile defenses that could reduce the threat should be discussed, as well as options with respect to the issue of the ABM Treaty.¹⁷ Then, options for m issile defensesystems to be deployed would be appropriately discussed H e added that, in the Chinese view, there is now no real threat that warrants a national m issile defense.

View edgenically, this carefully laidout proposal for an agencia illustrates that what China, in the view of this well-inform edspecialist in Beijing, wants to do is force the UnitedStates to describe the concept in at least some detail, talk about options other than missile defense to copewith the threat, and then argue that national missile defense is neither needed nor appropriate and that abandoning the ABM Treaty is unwise.

Anoth er interlocutor sugges ted that the United States and China should begin now to exchange views at other than the very senior level, that an early diverse dialogue would be beneficial. He said that it is important to find a way to discuss missile defense issues seriously at senior levels, expert levels, and in Track 2 (nongovernm ental d annels) or other sud unofficial venues. If is reasoning was that, if the United States deploys missile defenses, Chinaw ould have to increase the number and quality of its nudear forces. The United States should use all these diverse opportunities to persuade China that NMD is not intended against China. [This suggestion by a som en hat senior PLA reserve officer at a strategic institute is notew orthy primarily because hew as the only specialist who seem ed to take seriously the United States position that m issile defenses are not ultimately intended to be able to defeat Ch in a's ICBM force]

Does China W ant To Share in Missile D efense?

On the issue of the Americans possibly offering to share missile defense technology with China, there were two divergent views: An arms control specialist at a Beijing institute opined that China may, contrary to previous positions, be interested in having the United States share missile defense technology with China. China is concerned that the United States may react to a Chinese attack on Taiw anwith a first strike, and that the United States could then defeat a Chinese retaliatory strike with its missile defenses. If e rushed to add that he did not consider the scenario realistic, but that such theoretical scenarios were the stuff of arm s control strategic thinking.

The other view was offered by a divilian specialist and form er diplom at associated with the State Council. Chinese officials, hesaid, think that the United States is not indined to sharem issile defense tech nology with China but believe the United States is more likely to share that tech nology with Russia. Moreover, he asserted, the examples of disasterwith military technology transfers from the United States in 1989, after events at Tiananm en Square, serve as a lesson for Chinesewhom ight consider a program of U.S. transfer of important technology. A fterm ore than a decade, the Tiananm en sanctions are still in place China cannot risk cooperation with the United States, hest at edifatly and with out acrim ony.

China Wants To Bell eard

An arm s control specialist who is currently working on precisely the topic of how China should react to the Bush ach inistration missile defense issues made a hopeful observation. If esaid that, propitiously, there have been no final decisions yet by the United States on missile defense Heexpects [or may behopes and is, in effect, making a plea to Americans tow hom he talks] the United States to talk to China and not present China with a fait accomplion the issue It is not good, hesaid plaintively, for Americans to say that missile defenses will be deployed regardless of the views of others, "no matter what." A senior and well-connected figure at a prestigious think tank sum med up China's reaction to the Bush program saying that China wants to talk moreon missile defense issues and wants the United States to leave room in its policy form ulation for the legitim ate concerns of China. China, he reminded, has small but "legitim ate" nuclear forces. If MDS works and these forces are neutralized, what is China to do? he asked, apparently rhetorically, seem ing to know that there would be no answer forth coming.

Nurture the G ood or A ttack the B ad?

Professor Yang Jien ian at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies used the analogy of Western and Chinesem edicines in explaininghis view of how Beijing and Washington approach them issile defense issue and the eroot problem of the threat of missile attacks. He said Western medicine is likemissile defense in that it vigorous ly attacks aspecific aspect of the problem, concentrating potent, even changerous, medication or therapy on a certain component of the situation that seems to be producing the symptom s. By contrast, Chinese medicine more broadly attempts to nourish the positive aspects of a situation to create steadly improvements that over come or resolve the narrow problem and prevent its recurrence

Prognos is.

It was made quite dear that a central theme of any discussions the United States may have with China on missile defenses will be the Chinese conviction or assertion that such a protective shield, even if successful technologically and militarily, will ill serve the overarching security interests of the United States, its allies and friends, and China. If W ashington wishes to respond to that criticism, thereply would probably begin with an argument that the United States can find a way to have adequate missile defenses and, at the same time, improve or sustain its bilateral and multilateral relationships and demonstrate that it will not be hegemonic. That argument would alm ost certainly fall on deaf ears, because the Chinese have convinced them selves that missile defenses are "false security," counterproductive, and even obstades to resolving international security problem s; many Chinese strategists have also convinced them selves that the United States increasingly acts in an interventionist and hegemonic fash ion.

Noneth eless, it appears that, if desired by W ashington, there is a real prospect of having meaningful discussions with China on missile defenses because Beijing is sending the dearsignal that it is willing to talk- or at the very least that it wants to be heard It will be left to the patience and skill of the negotiators and to other unpredictable factors whether avenues for progress and understanding will open during the talks, if they are held or whether both sides will sim ply bog down in their deeply rutted tracks- or may be they should be termed "preset trajectories."

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 6

1. Although it is not appropriate to mention the individual interlocutors, spokesm en, and questioners, the organizations represented in the discussions included in Beijing, the Division of Arms Control and Security Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the Institute for Strategic Studies at the PLA National Defense University, the School of International Studies American Studies Center at Beijing University, and the the Institute of W orld D evelopm ent of the State Council of the PRC, Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); in I arbin, the I eilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences; in Sh angh ai, the Sh angh ai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), Shangh ai Institute for East Asian Studies, and the Shangh ai Center for Rim PacStrategic and International Studies; in I angzhou, Zhejiang Academy of Social Science, in 6 uangzhou, Center for Asia Padific Studies (CAPS) and Institute of Southeast Asia Studies of Zhongshan University, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Jinan University, and the Institute of International Studes of the Guangzhou A cademy of Social Sciences; in Xiam en, Institute of South east Asian Studies of Xiam en University. Additionally, the topic was discussed extensively at the three-day 2001 H ong Kong Convention of International Studies sponsored by the International Studies Association (ISA) and the University of H ong K ong 26-28 July.

2 There was more than the toric to the Chinese assertion that, despite affronts by the Bush administration, Chinaw ould turn the other dreek. For example, Chinese officials announced in early August 2001 that Chinaw ould buy 36 Boeing 737 jetliners that could be worth up to \$2 billion. Martin Fackler, "China Airlines to Buy Boeing Jets," *Associated Press* wire report, August 9, 2001. In contrast to this announcement, China has in the past made decisions not to buy American commercial aircraft to demonstrate its annoyance with W ashington's actions on various matters. China quickly offered its support of the U.S. response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks. This likely stemmed from both a desire to enhance bilateral relations, express outrage at the attacks, and gain U.S. support (or at least more uncerstanding and acceptance of China's problems with terrorism in Xinjiang-where it has long warned of the dangers of Islam ic function entalism).

3 "Jiang's Responses to Questions Submitted Prior to Interview," New York Times, August 10, 2001.

4 Jeren y Page, "China's Jiang Preoccupied with Taiw an-U.S. Senator," *Reuters* wire report, Beijing, August 9, 2001.

5. "Jiang's Responses to Questions Submitted Prior to Interview," New York Times, August 10, 2001. Jiang asserted in the written response to a New York Times question that the Falun & ong cidnot have the capacity to be aserious threat to China. In defending his harsh crack cow n, he focused on the harm that Falun & ong cobes to its followers and Chinese society. The tone and intensity of the response tends to confirm, despite the defensive words to the contrary, that Jiang is, indeed, irrationally fearful of the power of the Falun & ong organization. It also reflects h is apparent belief that h is anticult campaign is working, having the desired effect, so that the Chinese people are convinced the Falun & ong is an evil cult that cobes harm and should be elim in ated by government action.

6. The abbreviation MDS (m issile defense system, implying a merging by the Bush ach inistration of various elements of m issiles defenses so as to provide layered, wide protection) should not be confused with the abbreviation & MDS (ground based mid-course defenses egm ent), roughly synonymous with the earlier term NMD – knocking cown n ICBMs after boost phase and before reentry, roughly put. Some, seeing the letters & MDS have assumed in correctly that it meant global m issile defenses system.

7. Questions are asked about why China is concerned about U.S. NMD if it does not intend to launch thosem issiles against U.S. targets.

Chinesem ight ask thesam equestion about the UnitedStates and its ICBM arsenal. Most Americans would answer as the Chinesedo: We haveno intention of attacking any country with nuclear missiles, but we feel we must maintain a deterrent force.

8. John Pom fret, "Beijing Eases Stand on Missile Defense," W ashington Post, March 15, 2000, p. A 21.

9.6 iven the tone of these arguments and private comments offered after the terrorist attacks, it seems only a matter of time before the Chinese will, gently or harshly-depending on the state of bilateral relations at the time, suggest that missiles defenses would not have stopped the September 11 attacks.

10. W ith the advent of the mobile, solid fueled Dongfeng 31 ICBM, and especially the anticipated longer-range follow -on version, the problem of survivability of Chinese ICBMs (against a first strike) would seem to be appreciably lessened. Beijing may feel adequately confident that at least some of its ICBM arsenal would survive if they are not pinned to a fixed (and probably known) location. Use of mobile decoys could, of course, furth er complicate U.S. targeting.

11. For a detailed examination of China's objection to ballistic missile defense for Japan, see the recently published Michael D. Swaine, et al., Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense, RAND, Santa Monica, 2001, pp. 79-83

12 Neither Aegis-equippedships nor PAC-3m issiles have yet been approved by the United States for transfer to Taiw an.

13 The Dem ocratic Progressive Party of President Chen Shui-bian had traditionally been known as a pro-independence party, although Chen has not em braced that concept during his time in office.

14. Vernon Loeb, "Rum sfeld in Moscow for Talks," Washington Post, August 13, 2001, p. A9. Rum sfeld acknow ledged as reported in this artide, Russian complaints that they did not understand the kind of missilesystem envisioned by the Bush ach inistration and was quoted as saying, "It's not know able, what we'regoing to deploy, because we're in a testing mode"

15. U.S. State Department transcript of a pression ference held by Powell on July 29, 2001. The transcript was entitled "Sec. Powell Outlines Results of Visit to Asia-Pacific Region."

16. Hereduced his credibility a bit by explaining how independent the Chinesem edah ad become.

17. This arm s control specialist raised a point that no one else m entioned H e said that, rather than talk about abrogating or m odfying the ABM Treaty, unidentifiedE uropeans are suggesting that itwouldbepreferable to try to impose some broadversion of restrictions on m issiles, possibly something similar to MTC R. Hew enton to describe it rather vaguely as an "international court" on m issiles. The idea, it seemed, would be the establish ment of an international body to impose restrictions or prohibitions on the development and deployment of missiles. The concept, cruckly put, was that, rather than building missile defenses, missiles would be outlawed.

CHAPTER7

EASTASIAN REACTIONS TO U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE: TORN BETWEEN TACIT SUPPORT AND OVERTOPPOSITION

Taeh o K im

In light of the Septem ber 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States hom eland, it is increasingly certain that the G eorgeW. Bush ach inistration's initial policy priorities and future visions will go through a reappraisal, reacjustment, and reconfirmation. It is also true that war in A fgh anistan, together with the broader international antiterrorist efforts, has significantly altered the ach inistration's working definition of its friends and foes around the world-at least for the time being. There is also little coubt that antiterrorism will remain a priority agenda in future U.S. for eign policy.

It is equally likely, how ever, that given its recent origin and its varying degrees of significance to other governments, the antiterrorism agenda will be severely contested by other compelling U.S. priorities and buckgetary concerns that have been put on hold during the war in A fight anistan. The Bush presidency's initial policy priorities and future visions, albeit at a reduced scale and a slow er pace, will be back on the front burner sooner rather than later.

Ranging from future national security threats to the United States to the future possibility of arm ed conflict in international politics to U.S. relationships with such m ajor powers as Russia, China, and Japan, they – if fully im plemented-would have constituted a sharp departure

from those of the William Clinton presidency. In particular, the administration strongly intended to not only slash the size of its nuclear arsenal but also develop both defensive and offensive missile system s.

Thus, m issile defense (MD) stands tall as a premier defense issue in the Bush ach inistration's larger "m ilitary transform ation" with the basis of defense planning now being shifted to a future "capability-based" approach from the previous "th reat-based" one¹ One of the key questions for U.S. policym akers is how to mesh America's MD program with East Asian security – now in the larger context of international antiterrorist efforts.

In this drapter, I argue that in light of the political sensitivities, technological drallenges, and bucgetary constraints associatedwith U.S. MD, as well as the diverse defense requirements of major EastAsian states, there is no such thing as a uniform, "one size fits-all" approach in coupling American MD with EastAsian security, and that those states, as the MD issue inches toward the central place in their crow decls ecurity agenda, are highly likely to take a bifurcated and polarized position with some different nuances and shades – that is, between tacit support and overt opposition.

At present and for the foreseeable future, no single regional security issue seems more multifaceted and potentially divisive than MD. It touch as upon a variety of issue areas ranging from regional stability, power balance among major states, and arm scontrol to U.S. alliance ties. As such, a great many factors intervene in each state's calculus before any actual MD deployment with in the region, while an equally great number of consequences are possible as well. To better understand the complex calculations the regional states must factor in, it is necessary to identify and prioritize some major variables that affect the debate and the likely courses of action by individual regional states. At a minimum, four major considerations standout:

- ? Their prim any sources of current and likely future th reat and the relative weight of MD in their security calculus;
- ? The evolution of dom estic politics and their relationships with the United States, including an assessment of the latter's future role in and commitment to regional security;
- ? Tech nological feasibility and budgetary considerations as the MD plan takes an oreconcrete shape in they ears ah each and,
- ? Possible reactions (either positive or negative) by neigh boring states, especially m ajor powers, to their decision to develop and deploy MD.

Am ong the four, the first factor falls with in the realm of reasonable prediction, as it concerns geography, fam iliar th reats, and the availability of defense measures. Both lateral and vertical proliferation of missile and oth er WMD tech nologies over the past decades have alm ost invariably increased the need to deter this type of security threat. The com esticulariable is far more com plex and more uncertain than the first factor and involves m any unknowns and unknow ables down the road. The relationship with the UnitedStates, which would norm ally betreated as separate from commentic considerations, is often an issue of critical importance in the vortex of politics in Japan, Taiwan, and South K orea, as all three depend to a varying extent on the United States for their security. Regarding the third variable, a thick doud of technical uncertainties overshadow the MD architecture, especially national m issile defense (NMD), while Japan, Taiw an, and South K orea, the so-called economic powerhouses, now look pale in the face of grim econom icprospects. The regional reactions, of which China's appears them ost important, are likely to bem ixed, complicated, and nesteds that they may defy a

sim pleprediction, even if recent developments and existing trends are extrapolated

As befits a premier defense issue in the Bush administration's "military transform ation," MDs have attracted enorm ous attention with in a short period of time on both sides of the Padific Ocean. While there has not been a shortage of conference proceedings, edited volum es, and policy papers, they tend to high light certain aspects of th eater m issile defense (TMD) and/or NMD only.² Th is much more briefessay is no exception. In particular, as other observers have pointed out, the debate has already incurred diplom atic costs prem aturely: Even if program feasibility has yet to be proven by repeated test results, m any observers have assumed them ost effective system.³ would further argue that America's current adhoc on-and-off approach to explain its MD program overseas is not sufficient and has yet to be replaced by a more frequent and institutionalized one that aim s at addressing each state's defense requirements, its political as well as technical issues, and finally, future regional stability and prosperity.

With the above considerations in mind, this drapter throws some light on each of the four North east Asian powers' perceptions, reactions, and likely future actions tow ard m issile defense. It is intended to be a think piece high lighting select aspects of the MD debate in Japan, Taiw an, South Korea, and North Korea only, as China's position and its likely actions are addressed in greater detail by EricM d/ adon and Mark Stokes in this volum eand by others.⁴ As the author is tech nologically uninitiated, this d apter will forgo any arcane talk about the worldofs dence except to invoke the relevant authorities, but will address in som e depth South Korea's perspectives, which have often attracteds can tattention. It concludes with an assessment of the potential regional consequences of the MD program and a set of policy proposals that might enhance the prospects for coupling m issile defenses and regional security.

Japan: Lim itedResearch andDevelopm ent (R&D) Commitment and Alliance Consideration.

As an island nation, Japan is particularly concerned with am issileth reat. The North K orean missiles, especially their currently deployed *Nocborgs*, figure prominently in Japan's security planning. While the possibility is very low, China's potential threat to use its medium -range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in various contingencies also cannot be ruledout. For instance, in the context of an inter-K orean or a cross-Strait conflict, Japan would remain worried about a potential or actual missile threat by North K orea and/or China and the collateral cost of being a host to U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as well as a dose ally of the United States.

As compelling as the perceived missile threat is the consideration of alliance maintenance. Even if Japan's clearing to commit to a limited joint R&D program on TMD w as precipitated by the August 1998 flight-test of the North Korean Tagoocobng-1, the American request for Japan's participation in MD harkens back to the StrategicD effense Initiative (SDI) program in 1983. As long as Japan regards its alliance relationship with the United States as vital to its national interest, its lim itedparticipation in MD should be taken as an easure to strength en the U.S. Japan alliancein the post-Cold W ar era. Thus, alliance considerations, together with a potential missile threat, constitute a prim any rationale influencing Japan's decision to join the R&D program, which is also in line with Japan's overall strategictilt towardthe UnitedStates in the post-ColdWar era.

At present, Japan participates in a joint R&D program on four technical areas of the Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) missile program, but has not committed itself to development or deployment of TMD.⁵ It currently operates six battalions of 2 enhanced Patriot A dv anced C apability-2 (PAC-2 Plus) fire units, which, under the 1975 agreement with the United States, are part of Japan's air-defense role for U.S.military installations. As of the endof 2001, Japan is likely to acquire PAC-3 as part of its force in proven ent plan and/or an upgraded PAC-3C onfiguration-3system to fully function as part of a layered TMD architecture. In addition to the current four *Kongo*-dass AEG IS-equipped destroyers, the Japan Maritim e Self-D effense Force (JM SD F) plans to acquire two additional ships in the new Mid-term D effense Program (2001-2005), with the decision likely in 2003. For reasons related to Japan's requirements and system draracteristics, other TMD components, such as the eater high altitude area defense (TH AAD) and naval air defense (NAD), are not likely to be seriously considered

Beforem oving beyond the current R&D stage, how ever, Japanese policym akers need to pay attention to a host of m ajor cbm esticand external factors. First, as the Japanese economy suffers from nearly 0 percent grow th for a cleade, coupledwith growing nonperforming and unclerperforming loans and a record high unem ployment rate of 5 percent through out 2001, the JSD F is chomed to engage in an uphill battle against the national level social programs and economic restoration efforts, as well as with in its three services.

Second, Japan's MD debate is subject to well-known bureaucratic in-fighting and legal constraints. It is the com plex and divisive nature of MD that brings to bear upon the cebate the continued competition among the ideological cam ps (leftvs.right), interest groups (anti-Ch in a groups vs. arm s control supporters) and government agencies (Ministry of Finance vs. Japan Defense Agency). The weakening of the traditional left and the new "Koizum i factor" – as Japan's wider security role in the wake of the war in Afghanistan dem onstrates – could make astronger case form issile defense, although a fragile political coalition and the ensuing frequent drange of government coulds teer the debate back into a more familiar bureaucratic tug-of-w ar am ong them inistries concerned with the issue As Stephen A. Cam bone has pointed out in a perceptive study, the MD program is set to stir dom estic debate in Japan as it touches upon such sensitive issues as the peaceful useofspace, the right of collective defense, and the export of defense related tech nologies.⁷

Third, Chinese reactions will have an important role to play. Japanese policy makers will remain concerned with the negative impact of its MD decision on Sino-Japanese relations, even if China's relations with both the United States and Japan arelikely to bestrained for the fores eeable future regardless. As to them ost sensitive issues involving Japan in the eyes of Beijing – that is, Japan's potential role in a Taiw an contingency, Japan has no practical option other than taking an am biguous stance. For this reason, Japan will be very cautious and remain m indful of the so-called "international security situation," in which the China factor occupies a central place. Aside from political developments in cross-Strait and inter-Korean relations that m any Am erican officials and analysts often believe to bein portant variables, the positions by Taiw an and South Korea on TMD acquisition could significantly affect the Japanese decision as well.

Fourth, even if the PAC-3 low -tier and AEG IS-based NTW upper-tiersystems were eventually to be acquired by Japan, it would leave no role for the Japan G round SelFD efense Force (JG SD F). Not only closs the arm y still remain them ost clominant service in Japan- as well as in Korea- but inter-service rivalry among the services, with each trying to secure its respective crowinger els (e.g., tanks, ships, and aircraft), closs not bock well for TMD functing. Uncler such circum stances a real opportunity cost exists between major platforms and TMD.

Fifth, and dosely related to the fourth factor, interoperability and comm and and control problem s will arise sooner rather than later. As the JSDF is not structured to operate under a combined forces comm and with the United States, unlike the U.S.-Republic of K orea (ROK) case, it needs to address such complex questions as the level of interoperability, surveillance and cueing, adjustments of forces tructure, and operational control. Taken together, these issues confront Japan with diversed allenges, which itmust facebeforem oving beyond the current R&D phase If Japan ever takes that course of action, itwould transpire in the context of domestic politics and an external environment draracterized by a dramatic departure from the past patterns. In order to prepare for such an eventuality, as one Japanese observer noted, a political decision based on the criticality of the U.S. alliance as well as public education intended to provide a better understanding of this arcane issue will be a good beginning.⁸

Taiw an: In Search of a Political Shield

A m issile threat from m ainlandCh ina, together w ith a lim ited naval blockade, constitutes a prim ary source of concern to Taiw an, especially at the opening stages of a largescale cross-Strait conflict. Besides its longer-range m issile inventory, Ch ina is reported to have deployed a m inim um of 150-200 short-range ballisticm issiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiw an and doubtless has a capability to significantly increase its existing m issile arsenal.⁹ Short w arning time further complicates any m issile defense scheme by Taiw an.

Even if Taiw an possesses a limited missile defense capability consisting of three PAC-2M odified A ir D efense System (MADS) fire units with 200 missiles as well as of Tien Kung (Sky Bow) surface to air missiles (SAMs), it by nom eans possesses sufficient measures to counter the large and apparently growing Chinese missile threat. For this reason, Taiw an has considered other options, such as development of longer-range missiles that can reach the targets inside them ainland and has implemented various passive defensemeasures. None of them are likely to be very effective against the Chinesemissiles, how ever.

As m any observers in W ashington, Beijing, and Taipei have pointed out, Taiw an's search for a m issile defense capability centering on the United States is prim arily aim ed at securing political, rather than military, deterrence As the need to counter the mainland's threat and to maintain relations with the United States is a well-establish edfact of lifeam ongpoliticians and the general public in Taiwan, it is natural for Taiwan to consider joining U.S. MD to an extent and in ways that maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait.

The changer lies, according to Thom as J. Christensen, in the falsesense of safety MD m ight create for W ashington as well as for Taipei. In his words, "The acquisition of m issile defenses thus may perversely make the island appear safer than it actually is in the eyes of the American public and leadership, to the detriment of Taiwan's security."¹⁰ Furthermore, as a Stim son Center report has persuasively argued,¹¹ any TMD components transferred to Taiwan that are interoperable and linked with U.S. forces would not only invite a strong reaction from China, inducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and in U.S.-China relations, but could actually sendanother wrong signal to the Taiwan people, as noted before

For its part, Taiw an m ace an official call for common defense against the growing Chinesem issile threat to itself as well as to the United States and Japan. In a recent interview, Taiw an President Chen Shui-bian argued that "A PRC [m issile] threat against Taiw an is something that the United States, Japan and Taiw an must jointly deal with through the division of responsibility and cooperation."¹² In asimilar vein, Taiw an's Ministry of National Defensem ace dear that if invited it would "seriously" consider joining U.S. MD.

While Taiw an's reactions to U.S. MD will very much depend upon the level of missile and other threats from mainland China, the Chinese leadership, for its part, remains worried about any possible connection between U.S. TMD and the Taiw an question. China's reactions to TMD transfers to Taiw an will be ostserious. As MD would com promise its ability to coerce Taiw an not tom ove beyond the limits set by Beijing, the PRC is very opposed to Taiw an TMD. In particular, as a recent study by the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) has pointed out, a TMD linkedwith Taiw an especially the AEG IS-equipped destroyers – would severely impair China's ability to deter the United States or the United States and Japan in amajor Taiw an contingency and would constitute a quasi-alliance between Taiw an and the United States.¹³ It may thus further reinforce a dirdeof containment against China.

In ligh tofboth Taiw an's need for a political shield in the face of a dearm issile th reat and of Ch in a's strong reactions against doser ties between Taiw an and the United States, any viable future for Taiw an would fall between the opposite positions. This also points to the fact that any resolution in cross-Strait relations will and should be of a political, and hop efully peaceful, nature. However, continueds talemate in the cross-Strait talks, coupled with the highly limited scope of the MD debate in Taiwan,¹⁴ would continue to make the issue a corm ant yet highly consequential one in the three-way relationship among Beijing, Taipei, and Washington.

South K orea: Selfreliant Now , L inkedwith the United States L ater?

Countering m issile threats in South Korea's overall defense requirements should be seen in a different context from those of Japan and Taiwan. For one thing, the kaleicbs copic dianges in post-ColdW arglobal and regional security notwith standing, the crux of the Korean security problem has remained remarkably undianged to date: a land based military threat from North Korea. Even with out a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) capability, North Korea's conventional military capability in general and the size, deployment, and equipment of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) in particular pose a significant threat to the defense of South Korea. Not only is the NKPA numerically superior and highly medianized, but 65 percent of its offensive elements are currently concentrated with in 60 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Since Seoul, the South Korean capital and hom eof12million people, is locatedless than 30miles south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the South Korean forces would have littles trategic dep than dwarning time While it is true that the South Korean forces, backed by the United States forces and by their own inclustrial infrastructure, db retain a substantial technological edge, the NKPA's quantitative and geographical advantages couldwell lead to unacceptable damage upon the South, especially upon Seoul.¹⁵

Throughout the 1990s, moreover, North Korea's accumulation of an NBC capability posed an additional threat to South Korean security. North Korea's consistent efforts to develop various types of missile systems were manifest in at least three flight tests: the May 1993 test of the *Nocbng* missile (an improved version of *ScudC*) with the range of over 500 miles; the June 1994 test of two 60-mile antiship missiles; and the well-publicized three stage *Taepochng-1* Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) in August 1998.¹⁶ North Korea is believed to possess 300-500 *Scud* Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) of various types and about 100 *Nocbng*M RBMs.

If owever, most worrisome, especially at the opening phases of war, is the threat of barrage tactics by North Korea's 11,500-strong artillery. In particular, the 240-mm Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) and 170-mm self-propelled guns, with a range of 65 kilom eters and 45 kilom eters, respectively, can literally shower Seoul with thousands of rounds with in a few hours – a fact pointedly made in an apocalyptic statement in March 1994 by North Korean negotiator Park Young Soo who threatened his counterpart that, in case of a war, Seoul would become a "sea of fire." As an additional reminder of this artillery threat, the NKPA's two artillery corps are currently deployed below the Pyongy ang-W onsan line. Thus, it can be concluded that North Korea's missile capability constitutes a significant, but not the primary, threat to South K orean security.

The relative weight given to missile threats in South Korea's overall defense requirements was a major factor in the ROK government's March 1999 announcement that it would not participate in a U.S. TMD system on the ground that "South Korea's geographical characteristics and its limited strategic depth as well as our technical capability and economic conditions would not allow us to join it at this stage "¹⁷

ROK policym akers arew ell aw are, how ever, that missile defense is an issue that could critically affect the health of its alliance relationship with the United States. Besides its alliance ties, South K orearem ains central to an overall U.S. MD plan and its regional components: the North K orean missile as a prim ary rationale, the M utual D effense Treaty (MDT) manchated deployment of U.S. we apons in and around South K orea, and the presence of U.S. Forces K orea (USFK).

It is ould be an exaggeration to say, how ever, that in South K orea there has been an extensive debate on the MD issue at either the public or government level.¹⁸ The government's position has largely been confined to that of the Ministry of National Defense (MND), is hile any in-depth discussions on the pros and consofin issile defenses in South K orea haves of far been held only by a handful of policy institutes, universities, and nongovernent organizations (NG Os).¹⁹ From those limited debates, a fei en erging perspectives can be discerned that could affect South K orea's likely course of action.

First, how could peace and unification, the prim ary national objective of South K orea, be reconciled with missile defenses? W ould the peace process on the peninsula be inversely correlated with U.S. missile defense, as Michael & reen and Toby D alton, among others, have posited?²⁰ Or would missile defense constitute a part of South K orea's preparation for its futures ecurity environment regardless? Second is the possibility for a drange of government in the December 2002 presidential election. Unlike the incumbent government, which puts a heavy emphasis on reconditation with North Korea, Lee Hoei Chang, the current chairm an of the opposition & rand National Party, who was defeated in the 1997 presidential election by a narrow margin, is known to have a much tougher policy stance tow and North Korea in general and tow and the latter's missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability in particular.²¹

Itshould also be noted parenthetically that much of the confusion in the ROK's North Korea policy stems from the tension between a progressive government and conservative society in South Korea, while the opposite-that is, a conservative government and progressive society – has long been the case in post-wark orean politics.

Third, while the ROK government decided not to join U.S. TMD, it does not necessarily mean that it will be deprived of any missile defense capability in the future, a point frequently raised by the inquisitive media and the critical NG Os.

While it is rare for senior ROK officials to makepublic statements on MD, one of the most explicit statements was made by the defenseminister in early 2001, which deserves a long quotation.

The U.S. NMD plan, which is still at a conceptual stage, needs to cope with technical problems, buckget appropriation, consultations with allies including NATO, and Russian and Chinese responses and will therefore take some time to be finalized. The [ROK] government, when the Bush administration's NMD plan becomes more concrete, will cautiously clarify our position after taking a comprehensive view of our capability and other security considerations. Regarding TMD, the government is not considering to participate in it at this stage in light of our geographical characteristics, economic capability, and the urgency of [our] responses to North K orea's long-range artillery and short-range threats [Scuck?]. Over the longer term, given the current North Korean m issile threat and future battle environment, we are reviewing to construct a m issile defense system suitable to our own [security] environment.²²

Furtherm ore, the South Korean military is now in the middle of making five major weapons produrement decisions: the F-X, the AH-X, the E-X, the SAM-X, and KDX-III.²³ Among the five big-ticket items, totaling over \$10 billion (\$1=1,200 w on), the SAM-X, the KDX-III, and the E-X (AirborneW arning and Control System) programs are relevant to an MD architecture, even if the eventual form of any ROK missile defense system is a matter of conjecture at this time² For the SAM-X program the PAC-3 Configuration-3 is a serious contender, while the KDX-III induces two destroyers with the AEG IS system. As for the remaining three platforms, its earn and European defense bicders.

While the governments till insists – only when asked by the inquisitive K orean and foreign media- on an MD system that fits into South K orea's needs, it begs the question of how the ROK would ever acquire and operate the surveillance, cueing, and B attle M anagement/C ommand, C ontrol, and C ommunications (B M/C 3) cap ability, which immediately puts a big question mark on its technical feasibility and functing availability. At present, USFK operates only one battalion of Patriotmissiles with six firing batteries, which can barely defendits key installationsagain a pointed reminder of the ROK government's future need for a larger missile defense system.

Finally, like m any other states in the region, South Koreaw ill also factor in the impact of its MD decision on its larger neighbors, especially on China. This is quite understandable, as peace and security on the peninsula is as much an international issue as an inter-Korean one and them ajority of the South Korean public perceives, rightly or w rongly, that Chinaw ill play a growing and benign role in peninsular affairs in the future.²⁰ To make a long story short, how ever, the Ch ina factor, while important, will not cominate the decision, as a combination of factors including South K orea's defense needs, its elite perceptions, and the emerging strategic configuration in the region all point to the prolongation of the existing "strategic prioritization" with the United States in the decades to come

North K orea: A Matter of Regim e Surv iv al.

Being singled out as a prim any rationale for U.S. MD, North Korea adam antly opposes the plan. North Korea's visceral reaction to MD, how ever, should be seen in the context of its function ental goal: regim es urvival. Its nuclear and missile capability is a multipurpose enabler that helps to keep the Kim Jong II regim e affoat.²⁶ Militarily, for one thing, it deters the United States or the ROK-U.S. com bined forces from attacking the North in case of a contingency as its *Scuck*, *Noclongs*, and possibly *Taep oclongs* could threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United States, respectively. Diplom atically, for another, its missile capability helps North Korea to maintain its own leverage and prestige in the international arena. For still another, its missile capability is a major hard currency earner in its overall declining outside trace.

For these reasons, while taking a "diplom atic united front" against U.S. MD with Moscow and Beijing, Pyongyang has offered the most acerbic phrases in its official *Rocbing Shinm un*, which says that the UnitedStates has intended to "run over the Republic [DPRK] by MD," "push to death those who ob not surrender," and "aim at the wholew orldas its strategic coordinates."²⁷ It further argues that the "so-called theory of the North Korean missile threat is an unash amed casuistry," and that the United States is now threatening North Korea by military means and would launch a preemptive strike at it at the right moment.²⁸

Am ong a long list of negative im pacts of MD unto itself, MD w aters down and m ay eventually neutralize the utility of North Korea's nuclear and m issile program as a bargaining drip (if it was ever intended to be so) in its negotiation with the United States. It is also possible and even likely, how ever, that the North K orean leadership has already understood the fact that despite its repeated hos tile rhetoric, TMD/NMD is not an issue to be bargained away at any price. North K orea's perspectives and positions on MD are similar to those of China in that it sees U.S. MD as having a political motive based on military and technological proviess and that MD is aimed at "rogue states," "states of concern," "missile proliferators" – in other words, the dislikes of the United States.

While the Bush ach inistration has confirmed the resumption of negotiations with Pyongyang, the latter understands full well that unless its WMD capabilities, missileproliferation and conventional forces are addressed, therewill belittleh ope for improved relations between itself and Washington. Notwith standing Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's call for a resumption of U.S.-North K orean talks "anywhere, at any time,"²⁰ the new U.S. ach inistration's dem and for an "improved implementation" of the 1994 Geneva Agreement, "verifiable constraints" on missile programs as well as the conventional force issue-which are significantly different from those of the Perry Process- are seen by North K orea as tantam ount to giving up its trump cards.

North Korea's possible reactions to U.S. MD deployment and particularly South Korea's future involvement in it are by nomeans certain. A limited range of options North Korea might take, such as expansion, improvement, and sophistication of the existing missile arsenal, development of new types of missiles or countermeasures, and increased missile sales, would be prohibitively costly and/or diplomatically unwise. In their stead, North Korea's short-term solution is a diplomatic darion call with China and Russia, while waiting for a drange of atmospherics in a recalcitrant W ashington. As long as Seoul and Tokyo remain vulnerable to its missile and NBC capability, North Koream ay take a coercive option combined with separate negotiations with the United States and South Korea.

It was, how ever, in this constricted external environment of North K oreath at the September 11 attacks intervened For one thing, North Koreahadneverhelda priority in the Bush administration's long foreign policy agenda- at least before Septem ber 11. For another, now is not the time for North Korea to draw world attention by m aking its time proven provocations or indicents, which are noneth eless necessary for a continued flow of international assistance onto itself.³⁰ For still another, as Russia's ostensidy moderate response to U.S. with draw all from the ABM Treaty might indicate, North Korea's strong opposition to MD may end up with a chorus of onearguably the worst situation in the eyes of Py ongy ang. In short, North Korea's limited military and diplomatic options as to MD would likely result in celaying tactics in separatetalks with the United States and with South Korea over the longer term .

Conclusions and Implications for East Asian Security.

In the dosing pages of this drapter, it is appropriate to sum up the findings and arguments with respect to the questions raised at the outset. First, in light of the varying consequences of U.S. MD on regional security and of equally diverse reactions to it by individual states, it is critical to achtess the specific defense requirements of U.S. regional allies and friends and their concerns with regard to the MD issue. This is all them ore necessary because- even if U.S. regional allies and friends generally support the MD program – there will be nuances in policies, shades in commitment, and delays in implementation in their reactions.

Second, as the high ly circum scribed nature of the MD debate in the three countries – at both public and governmental level – strongly indicates, more regular and

m ore system atic efforts on the U.S. part are necessary to explain its MD plan to regional states. Focus ecidis cussions on the different levels of m issile th reat to individual states and consideration of their comestic politics – the two most important factors chiving their individual responses to MD – would be a good starting point. An institutionalized clis cussion of the MD issue in regular U.S. clefense talks with its allies would be anoth er approach enhancing mutual unclerstancling on the subject.

This also underginds the third recommendation, which is that the sooner the United States copes with the major defense and strategic concerns of regional states on MD, the easier it will be to tackle the specific technical and even buckgetary issues later. With out a sem blan ceofth ough t, for instance on the future possibility of possessing either individualized MD assets or those of an integrated North east Asian MD system, the regional states would continuetheir own soul-searching with significant was teef political and buckgetary resources likely chun the road For another, the Ch in a factor, and more specifically America's understanding with China on the MD issue, should be conveyed to regional states so as to allay their concerns about China's potential reactions to the MD issue and to their respective bilateral ties. This would be particularly pertinent as China enters the critical period of the generational drange in leadersh ip and of projecting benign in ages to the outside orld

Fourth, while there is little coubt in America's needand determ ination for a MD plan, a more sensible and more balanced approach is necessary to copew ith other types of international and regional sources of threat. As the Septem ber 11 attacks have vividly show n, a fuller spectrum of threats to national security is now the order of the day for most nations in the world They induce, but are not limited to, biological and drem ical attacks, border/hom eland in filtration, computer virus es, and international terrorism.³¹ In brief, a viable MD program should

com plem ent, not supplant, other com pelling defense requirem ents of a nation.

Finally, it is trite, but true, to note that MD ultimately intends to enhance both U.S. security and regional stability. Neither goal should be pursued at the expense of the other. Nor should the MD issue be taken as a litmus test for "making or breaking" U.S. bilateral relationships with its allies and friends in the region. Barring any unforeseen developments or regional shocks, it is certainly possible for U.S. regional allies and friends to adjust their respective defense requirements for the sake of regional stability and prosperity. Whether or not the MD issue will open up a new possibility for this goal will hinge on a renew edeffort and mutual understanding on both sides of the Asia-Pacific

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER7

1. "Military transform ation" is the key word of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report released by the Pentagon on September 30, 2001. For the operational goals of the military transform ation, seep. 30 of the QDR Report. See also Kim Burger, "QDR Report Blurs Edges on Specific Strategy," Jane's Defence Weekly, October 10, 2001, p. 10; Andrew Koda, "QDR Aims to Transform US Forces," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 22, 2001, p. 6.

2 For a fuller discussion of U.S. MD and East Asian security, see MidtaelD.Swaine, RadtelM.Swanger, and TakashiKawakami, Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001; Evan S. Medeiros, ed., Ballistic Missile Defense and North east Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo, Monterey: The Stanley Foundation and the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2001; Midt ael J. 6 reen and Toby F. Dalton, Asian Reactions to U.S. Missile Defense, NBR Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 3, November 2000; Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region, Working & roup Report No. 34, W ash ington, DC: All enry L. Stim son Center, June 2000. See also the conference papers presented at the "Partnership for Peace: Building Long-term Security Cooperation in North east Asia," http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/workshops/shandhai-01/paper s.h tm I, and "East Asian Regional Security Futures: Theater Missile Defense Implications," http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/TMD-Conference/index.html.

3 See, for exam ple, Medeiros, p. i.

4. For China's official positions on MD, see as eries of statements by Am bass acbr Sh a Zukang at the PRC Foreign Ministry's web page, www.fm prcgov.cn. See also Yan Xuetong, "TMD Rocking Regional Stability," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer 1999, pp. 67-86; Xie Wenqing, "US TMD and Taiwan," International Strategic Studies, Serial No. 57, July 2000, pp. 25-31; Xia Liping, "Prospects for Cooperative Security in East Asia: From Chinese Perspectives," apaper presented at the "Partnership for Peace Building Long-term Security Cooperation in North east Asia," http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/workshops/shanghai-01/paper s.html; Li Bin, "The Effects of NMD on Chinese Strategy," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 2001, pp. 49-52

5. The four areas of cooperative research based on the August 1999 Memorandum of Understanding between Japan and the United States are the lightweight nose cone, the infrared sensor, advanced kinetic warhead, and seconds tage propulsion. See Defense of Japan 1999, p. 84.

6. Midtael Sw aine and his colleagues have offered by farthemost detailed examination of the Japanese bureaucratic actors on the MD issue. See Sw aine, *et al.*, *Japan and Ballis tic MissileD effense*, esp. drap. 3

7. For furth er details, see Steph en A. Cam bone, "The United States and Theatre Missile Defence in North - east Asia," *Surv iv a*l, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autum n 1997, pp. 68-69.

8. This comment is attributed to Satoshi Morimoto in *Plutonium*, No. 33, Spring 2001, in Japanese.

9. The most recent figure is 350 m issiles. See Bill 6 ertz, "China Increases Missile Threat," *W ash ington Times*, August 28, 2001.

10. Thom as J. Christensen, "Theater MissileD effense and Taiw an's Security," *Orbis*, Vol. 44, No. 1, Winter 2000, p. 89.

11. Taiw an's reactions to MD are best analyzed in The H enry L. Stim son Center, *Th eater Missile D efenses in the Asia-Pacific Region*, esp.pp.41-60.

12 Quoted in Brian II su, "Military Says US National Missile Defense an Option," *Taipei Times*, July 18, 2001.

13 M echiros, p. 19.

14. A series of interviews with defense officials and security analysts conducted in Taiw an indicate there is no serious public debate

on the MD issue, which is still regarched as an arcane issue of technological and military nature. Interviews, Taipei, December 2001.

15. For a succinct yet focused overview of the military situation on the peninsula, see "2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula," Septem ber 12, 2000, available at www.claffenselink. mil/news/Sep 2000/korea0/122000.html.

16. See Chosun IIbo, June 16, 199 3; New York Times, June 1, 1994.

17. See Sisa Journal, April 8, 1999, pp. 64-65. For an objective assessment on the relative weight of MD in South Korea's overall defense needs see The Henry L. Stim son Center, Theater Missile Defenses, esp. pp. 33-39.

18. In Japan and Taiw an as well, any in-depth discussions over MD are confined to a sm all group of security experts inside and outside of their respective governments and generally constend to the wider public or throughout the government. Interviews, Taipei, December 2001. See also Sw aine, *et al.*

19. One of the most vocal NG Os is the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea. See its webpage at www.peacekorea.org, which is available in both Korean and English.

20. 6 reen and Dalton, pp. 21-25.

21. W ook-Shik Chung, "W hy Should W e Oppose MD?" a paper presented at the KIDA Policy Forum on "The MD Plan and [Our] Security Interest," KIDA, Secul, July 13, 2001, p. 17.

22 Unofficial translation by the author. Defense Minister Cho Seong-Taes statements on the ROK's position on NMD and TMD at the 218th provisional session of the ROK National Assembly, February 20, 2001. In a similar vein, an ROK foreign ministry official argues that South Korea should maximize the "benefit of am biguity" until MD feasibility is proven, but nonetheless support U.S. efforts in the end See Shin, Kak-Soo, "The Implications for South Korea of the United States Missile Defense," New Asia, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 2001, pp. 178-207.

23. They are Fighter-Experimental, Attack Helicopter-Experimental, Early Warning Aircraft-Experimental, Surface to Air Missile-Experimental, and Korean Destroyer-Experimental-III, respectively. See Shim Jae Hoon, "South Korean Projects May Face Further Delays," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 19, 2001, p. 20; Darren Lake, "South Korea Announces Record High Buchget," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 4, 2001; John Larkin, "Dogfight over Seoul," Far Eastern Econom icReviaw, July 5, 2001, pp. 16-18, 20.

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23. For details on the South Korean publicperception of China and its role on the peninsula, see Taeho Kim, "South Korea and a Rising China: Perceptions, Policies, and Prospects," in Ian Jam es Storey and Herbert Yee, eds., The Dragon Awakes: Perceptions and Prospects of the China Threat, Loncon: Curzon, forth coming in 2002

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27. Rocbing Sh inm un, North K orea, A ugust 15, 2001, av ailable at h ttp://www.hani.co.kr/20010816.

28. *Ibid.*, and North K orea's official announcements via Chosun Central News (*Chosun jungang tongsh in*) and Py ongy ang B roackasting (*Pyongy ang bangsong*), at *h ttp://www.hani.co.kr/20010805*.

21. See "Transcript: Pow ell Discusses Korean Peninsula, Missile Defense," W ash ington File, No. 2890, July 27, 2001, available at w w w. usinfo.state.gov.

30. L. 6 orchon Flake has noted the current North K orean dilem m a between its need to lie low when the cost for its provocative action is high and its equally compelling need to draw world attention for thesake of international assistance and aid. See his "North Korea's Options After Sept. 11," *PadVet* No. 47, November 23, 2001.

31. A perceptives tudy is available on the issue of balancing MD with other defense requirements. See Midsael E. O'll an Ion, "Beyond Missile Defense," *Brookings Polig Brief*, No. 86, August 2001.

PARTIII: IM PROVEMENTS IN PLA CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES: FORCE PROJECTION AND AIR FORCE LOG ISTICS

CH APTER 8

ROUG H BUT READY FORCE PROJECTION: AN ASSESSMENT OF RECENT PLA TRAINING

Susan M. Puska

Introduction.

Over the last 3 years,¹ the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has significantly advanced its near-periphery power projection cap ability through concerted experimentation and adaptation of modern warfighting cap abilities during threat-based training and exercises among targeted army, navy, air, and missile forces.² This experience base now reaches into all seven of its Military Regions (MRs),³ and induces a growing number of younger, innovativem ilitary thinkers and fighters who areversed in modern operational art.

Against a potential threat that dosely resembles the advanced capabilities of the U.S. military, the PLA has shown a determination, particularly since Kosovo, to enhance its confidence and competencies with the means and resources that are presently available. To maximize what it has now, the PLA has more concertedly used training as the warfighting laboratory in which to develop creative ways to compensate for its own relative weaknesses, while it aggressively and innovatively seeks ways to exploit the vulnerabilities of an advanced, information-dependent opponent.

During 2000-01 training, in particular, the PLA's warfighting training aim edatm axim izing its offensive and defensive operations with in the PLA's area of operation, including its maritim eperiphery, through a combination of threat-based military training and dvillan augmentation.

The author of this drapter examines the sector elopments in terms of mobility; joint operations; logistics; missile operations; coastal/maritime operations; communications, electronic warfare (EW), and Computer Network Attack (CNA); and special operations. The materials used for this examination are primarily Chinese national and regional military new spapers, although some recent journal articles and books have also been consulted

Background

The last 3y ears have been aparticularly dynam icperiod in the modernization of the PLA. The results of experimentation and innovation during this time have been summedup in the seventh generation of military training and examination programs, which will be implemented during 2002⁴ These programs will concentrate on seven areas – ground, naval, and air forces; Second Artillery; scientific research and test units; reserve units; and the People's Arm edPolice⁵

During the last 3 years, the scope of military exercises has steadily increased to include out-of-sector MR forces performing increasingly complex tasks in parallel and increasingly joint operations. Maritime (inclividual and unit) training has been stressed curing this time and culm inated in major near periphery exercises during the sum mers of 2000 and 2001 near Dongshan Island in southern China opposite Taiw an.

Then in the fall, the PLA sought to show case its accomplishments in applying science and technology to training up to that point by conclucting concurrent chills and exercises on October 1316, 2000.⁶ Foremost among those was a "grandmilitary show" said to be the first since 1964, which was held near Beijing at the foot of the Yanshan Mountain.⁷ Jiang Zemin, as the Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman, inspected the Beijing exercise on October 13. This exercise was said to demonstrate primarily defensive measures to counter stealth technology, aerial surveillance and reconnaissance, precision guided weapons, and EW. It also employed various concealment and deception measures, such as "infrared decoys," to interfere with enemy operations and conceal combat operations.⁸

Concurrently, selected ground units trained in Inner Mongolia, whilenaval units conclucted training in the Bohai Sea, and Second Artillery strategicm issile forces exercised in Jilin Province in north east China.⁹ Elsewhere in China on October 13, a Chengclu MR unit conclucted a sabotage raid against vital enem y targets, while a naval helicopter-borne Marine unit attacked an enem y rear command center. PLA digitized artillery, and ored corps, and mechanized infantry demonstrations were held, while the "first successful" multi-direction airborne operation (inducing personnel and gear, rockets, and vehicles) was conclucted against an enem y on the march.¹⁰

Through out 2000-01, the Nanjing and G uangzh ou Military Regions (MRs) ledth e PLA for their innovations in training and operations. Since both MRs play key roles in potential forceprojection against Taiw an, as well as into the South China Sea, their training appears to have hadgreater emphasis and perhaps, resources.

A 2000 assessment of the 6 uangzhou MR's training reflects the progress its units made in training during 2000-01. Thereport noted that MR training in 1999 focused on company and battalion level training. During 2000, it progressed to training in Joint Operations, during which Army, Navy, and Air Force units fought under high-tech conditions.¹¹

This assessment also observed that achievements in training during 1999 depended on innovations in equipment. In 2000, how ever, over one-half of all innovations related to methods of operations, military

theory, and methods of training, accomplishments that dependupon the ability of personnel to apply concepts and new ideas. While training in the G uangzhou MR solved "common" problems in 1999, during 2000 the MR units could solve more complicated and important problems. Further, most of the 1999 training achievements came from combat units; while in 2000, the majority of training achievements were in joint logistics and arm ament.¹²

Regarding joint operations, the graduated mobilization response (GMR) assessment described pre-2000 Service relations in military exercises as "friendly support" or "guest perform ances" through negotiations. By 2000, the training among the G uangzhou MR's three Services was assessed as more joint and extended from individual level training up to operational, tactical, and technical training, and, finally, to unit training.¹³

Although the 6 uangzhou MR and the Nanjing MR training have been most extensive, improvements in training with in the other five MRs, as well as the Strategic Rocket Forces, have also been significant, particularly out-of-sector support and support to cross-sea operations, which have been stressed throughout all seven military regions.

Building on the 2000 priority on "th rees trikes and th ree defense, "¹⁴ PLA training and operational priorities during 2001 concentratedon rapidm obility operations, ¹⁵ including com bat use of helicopters;¹⁶ en ergency logistics support;¹⁷ special operations;¹⁸ sealancing and cross-sea operations;¹⁹ m aritim e denial (anti-subm arine and blockacks);²⁰ air com bat and support;²¹ m obilem issile operations; and EW and counterm easures.²² C over and concealment, psychological training to counter battle and operational stress, and enhancing confidence in PLA equipment, operational strategy and coctrine, we ere also stressed B as ed on Chief of the G eneral Staff G eneral Fu Quanyou's direction, the training objective during 2001 w as no longer to simply "fight" a local regional war under hightech nological conditions, but "fight to w in" against a qualitatively superior force that w as based on U.S.m ilitary capabilities.²³

In the General StaffDepartment (GSD) training plan for 2001 PLA units were specifically asked to deep en advances in science and technology (S&T) training.² Priority was placed on the following guidelines and tasks:

- ? Innovate in light of actual conditions;
- ? A di ieve rapid advancen ent in fighting capacity;
- ? Further upgrade the quality of officers and men;
- ? Apply research results to training;
- ? Deepen research on military theory;
- ? Closely study adversary operational concepts, equipment, and weaponry and develop countermeasures;²⁰
- ? A coelerate innovation in training;
- ? Carry out realistic, arlike training;
- ? Expand the use of computers, simulators, and online training; and,
- ? Exert greater effort in Joint Operations training.

While the GSD 2001 training plan continued to stress the "three strikes, three defenses," night training and physical fitness were also emphasized Operationally, the 2001 plan specifically calledon units tom akegreater efforts to solve problem s in the following areas: defense penetration and counter-penetration; destruction and counter-destruction; sea and air control; and electronic warfare²⁶

Fu, in an address to an enlarged party committee m eeting of the GSD, stressed that 2001 military work must be based on the basic requirement to "win in battle."² He said the PLA must strength en studies of the international situation, high-tech local war, and the application of rule of law tomilitary management during 2001. He called on the PLA to organize and coordinate all efforts between units, schools, academ ies, research centers and test units. He urged that the process of transform ing research accomplishments intopolicies, training, ar-readiness, and com bat strength be accelerated H e also stressed the importance of science and technology to enhance combat capability through out the entire Arm edForces. If ecalled on the PLA to enhance comm and and control, Joint Operations, and combat effectiveness, and stressed the im portance of training a large num ber of "new-type" high-quality military personnel.²⁸ The March 2001 National People's Congress added as ense of urgengito the needtom odernizethePLA to conduct "military struggle" as soon as possible²

Rapid, Long D is tance M obility : Land, A ir, and Sea.

Military training conducted during 2000-01 en phasized the need for rapidm obility across long distances by air, sea, and land Airm ovement, for example, continually stressed long-range air raids and various air com bat m issions. In m id-March 2001, a Nanjing air regim ent was high ligh ted for flying 3,000 km across five provinces to conduct a surgical raid on enemy ractar, guided missiles, and AAA positions, using live an m unition. The unit was credited with successfully penetrating enemy electronic interference, ractar tracking, and guided missile attacks.³⁰ In early M ard , one Second Artillery equipment inspection regiment (Zhuang Jian Tuan) dem onstrated its enhanced rapiddelivery capabilities during an exercise in which units simultaneously delivered equipment to several launda positions over long distances via high way and railway networks.³¹

A Beijing MR m otorized infantry brigade held rapid reactions m aneuvers that covered 1,000 km with in Inner Mongolia during late 2000. These maneuvers also stressed information countermeasures, coordinated operations, field defense, and comprehensive logistics support.³²

Reserve units have also steppedup mobility training. On April 20, 2001, for example, a reserve regiment on H ain an Island held a rapid mobilization and assembly exercise following the release of the EP-3 crew. It was reported to be the first ever reserve exercise held between four provinces and one autonomous region in south China. All pre-appointed officers, specialized technical soldiers, demobilized soldiers, squad leaders, and assistants answered the call up with in 1 hour from notification. Among themwere 168 reservists working in H aikou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai.³³

Logistics mobility, which will be essential to support of any forceprojection, was also tested in the G uangzhou MR, for example, mobilecommand, control, and logistics support modules were developed. The G uangzhou MR reportedly invested two million yuan during 2000-01 to reform its command and control and logistics support in the field At least one unidentified G uangzhou MR G roup Arm y and division were equipped with mobilecommandsystems that can be disassembled and moved with in 1 hour. The same unit's logistics and arm ament technical support facilities also were made mobile for field operations. Modular barracks were developed, which can accommodate ten bunks presumably for command and operations personnel.³¹

Joint Operations: A W ork in Progress.

Joint operations continued to develop slow ly. The PLA consequently has not yet realized the full potential of joint operations. Nonetheless, substantial progress has been made, particularly at the operational level of each Military Region.

At least three problems inhibit the PLA's transform ation to joint operations so far. First, the PLA views "joint" in unique and flexible terms which allow for independent interpretation that undermines synergy of effort. Second, there is resistance, perhaps even confusion, about what "joint operations" means and why they should be conducted Finally, the commandand control of the PLA under a Military Region system and an Arm y-dominated & eneral Staff perpetuates combined arms operations, at best augmented by parallel air, navy, and missile forces operations, rather than facilitating joint integration. But PLA leaders and defense intellectuals recognize these problems, and appear committed to achieving sufficiently joint operations to suit the PLA's operational needs.

To address these diallenges and enhance understanding ofjoint operations with in the PLA, military scholars and com m anders publishedseveral articles and books on joint operations during 2000 and 2001. Yang Zhigi, director of the 6 SD, Military Affairs Department, in late 2000,³⁵ for example, urged the PLA to accelerate changing from a combined arms command system to a joint operations com m and system, which is an essential link to realizing joint operations. If e argued that a joint command system could not be establish ed at the last m inute during a crisis, but must be put in place during peacetime Although Yang observed that the PLA has made substantial progress to ad ieve greater joint coordination between Services during operational level training, henoted all the Services tend to fight in different ways once an exercise begins. Yang attributed this deficiency to a fundamental lack of an "authoritative" joint command³

In a National D efense Publication entitled, "New Theory of Joint Operations,"³⁷ the authors argue that despite similarities in its nature to com binedarm s, joint operations represents a great, even radical, drange for the PLA.³⁸ Through joint operations, they wrote, the Arm edForces will unify com bat cap abilities through coordination to defeat the enemy.³⁹ In December 2000, asymposium entitled "W ar Patterns and W ar Theory in the Early 21st Century" was held in Beijing.⁴⁰ The meeting was sponsored by the Beijing Military Region and the Strategic Studies Department, A cademy of Military Sciences (AMS). It was attended by representatives from the seven military regions, the National Defense University (NDU), and the Air Force Command A cademy. The Beijing MR Chief of Staff, Yu Chenghai, presided over themeeting, which was reported to be the first joint activity held between the PLA's high est-level strategic studies department and a theater command The purpose of the meeting was to promote transform ation of military strategic research into com bat strength throughout the Arm ed Forces. Development trenck in joint operations were among the top ics discussed

On December 29, 2000, the Nanjing Military Region published an article that also stressed the importance of forming a joint operations commandsystem.⁴¹ The article identifieds everal problems that centered on command and control. Specifically, it criticized "factionalism" (parochialism) between Services. The article argued for the need to establish truly separate units under Joint Operations 6 roups (JO6), in order to eliminate command and control interference by the units' parent Services. The article stressed that Services should only provide com bat support and coordination to units assigned to a JO6.⁴² Other writings discussed the need to significantly reduce the layers of command- dranging from a "tree type" commands tructure to a "flat" one⁴³

Training with in all Services of the PLA has stressed joint operations. Air Force training, for example, increasingly emphasized joint support to both ground and navy forces. In March 2001, a Guangzhou Military Region Air Force aviation regiment was high lighted for its joint operations. This unit is equipped with a "new-type fighting aircraft" (probably SU-27) to concluct blue water com bat patrols, com bates cortmissions, and military exercises. The regiment had recently shifted from technical to tactical training on the new equipment. It reportedly had a drieved an all-weather offensive and defensive flying capability. Its capabilities included low-altitude and ultra low-altitude flying, the ability to attack ground targets at great speed, live bom b operations, deep sea interception, and over-the-horizon air com bat during electronic countermeasures (ECM).⁴⁴

During 2000-01, PLA training focused on Taiw an-like scenarios with in all seven military regions. Priority was given to sea-crossings, island seizures, and special operations behindenem y lines. The threat-based scenarios employed forces that were modeled on the advanced technology of the U.S. military, including arm ed helicopters; cruisemissiles; sophisticated reconnaissance, EW capabilities; stealth technology; and extensive maritim eassets.

The intent of this training seems to have been multifold-first, it gave PLA units experience against a Taiw an and U.S.-type opponent, which provided a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of potential opponents. Second, more realistic training focused on likely scenarios helps to build confidence in PLA equipment, as well as defensive and offensive operations. Finally, more realistic training exposes PLA weaknesses that can be solved or avoided before actual combat.

Logistics: Flexibility and Forw ard Support.

Progress in the Joint Logistics System benefited from thestress on warpreparation, which revealed the need for more field logistics support and mobility. During 2000-01, consolidation of common garrison functions, such as military hospitals, which have been opened up to divilians as well as other Services, and consolidation of key commodity items, such as bulk petroleum, continued Emergency stockage of generic, dual-use items were also developed. In some cases, emergency supplies were integrated into divilian warehouses to provide emergency and training replenishment to military forces through contracted or other support arrangements.

During 2000-01 emphasis was placedon components of operational level logistics, such as field feeding, field medical support, forwardmaintenance, and on-site repair and re-supply. Rapid reaction and emergency support units were tested to provide multiple types of support to combat forces in near-combat field conditions. Through out the Air Force, Navy, Army, and Second Artillery units, logistics support emphasized enhancements of core support capabilities. In addition, with in the Nanjing and Guangzhou MRs, dvillan augmentation tomilitary logistics was stressed This support induced the coordinated use of the dvillan air, land, and sea infrastructure; acquisition of maritime vessels; access to dvillan telecommunications; and acquisition of materiel and supplies.

Whilem uch of the logistics support is managed by the General Logistics Department (GLD), the new General Armament Department (GAD), created in 1998,⁴⁵ played the central role in ammunition replenishment and maintenanceofweapons and armor. Like Second Artillery, GAD macea concentrated effort to enhance the quality and expertise of its personnel through greater cooperation with divilian and military institutions. In November 2000, General Cao Gangchuan, director of GAD, noted that reforms in armament, national defense science and technology, and industry now are reaching an unprecedented level in China. He encouraged further reform and innovation, diting a Party and CMC directive to raise the rate of success in scientifictes ting.⁴⁶

In October 2000, © AD hostedan all-Arm y sym posium at the Arm ored Force Engineering A cadem y, commanded by Major © eneral W ang H ongguang, in Changxindian, Beijing, with the stated purpose of enhancing comprehensive arm am entsupport.⁴⁷ During October 2000, © AD initiated a 1-m onth rotational course, open to the entire PLA commandcadre, to take advantage of peacetime to improve arm ament management and raise the level of comprehensive arm ament support for wartime. The main focus of this training was on the science of arm ament and wartime arm ament support.⁴⁸

In 2000, 6 uangzhou MR set up a "theater comm and center for ann am ent support," which was the first in the PLA.⁴⁹ The center provides mobile comm and posts for field ann am ent support to the MR, ann y, and divisional levels. A colitionally, the MR has developed a comm and autom ation system for the 6 uangzhou W ar Zone. This system links inform ation vertically and horizon tally between ann am ent and support units and high er headquarters. It greatly enhances comm and and control over amm unition assets, and facilitates decisionm aking and operational management.⁵⁰

During February 2001, the & AD convened asymposium in Beijing to discuss its military training tasks for theyear. These inducted (1) assess training achievements and transform these into training capabilities; (2) strength en guidanceand theoretical studies, and regulate these dentific development of military training; (3) renew training content, methods and quality; (4) train high-quality personnel to achieve leap frogging development in and ment; and (5) strength en infrastructure construction and maintain the sustained development of military training.⁵¹

In the sum mer of 2000, the Jinan MR conclucted an emergency logistics support chill based on a flood relief scenario.⁵² Materiel, POL, transportation, and medical support modules were quickly mobilized. The support modules were based on warehouses, hospitals, and other specialized units, and encompassed orchance, material, POL, transportation, medical, and maintenance support. During peacetime, these units are sent on firefighting, flood relief, and other major projects and operations. The dv ision developed new approaches to conceal supply at fixed points, m aneuver under concealm ent of sm okes creens, and coordinate logistics support with naval and air units.⁵³

Nanjing MR form ed an "Emergency Mobile Logistics Support Model" that met the CMC's standards to perform combat missions without personnel and equipment replenishment and pre-battle training (i.e., no notice).⁵⁴ One brigade spent over three million yuan improving its company-level combat-readiness provisions, standard storage rooms, field medical kits, combat-readiness coffers, and wartime light sets. The brigade developed new equipment, including floating stretchers, field kitchen containers, and rapid reaction tankers, and participated in numerous exercises with the Navy, Army, and Air Force units over the past 3 years.⁵⁵

6 uangzhou MR developed multitube POL tankers for field refueling that significantly raised field support efficiency. Water tankers could support up to 20 kitch en units at one time Field repair vehicles could perform various em ergency repairs. In addition, support equipment for sea operations was also developed by 6 MR's Logistics Department and an unidentified 6 MR dvision.⁵⁶

Although there has been some em phasis on field medical support, m ost m edical support im provem ents, including joint logistics, have focus eclon reform s, as well as garrison and near-garrison support. In this regard, the G uangzhou MRm edical training objectives, which varied according to a unit's level, may be representative⁵⁷ The brigade or regiment focuses on rapid deployment of a first-aid post. The battalion or company focuses on rescue of personnel injured on the firing line Medical units above the division hospital level focus on treatment of critical cases and research in traum atology. In recent years the G uangzhou MR has built or renovated 80 percent of its division hospitals and brigade or regiment medical team s.⁵⁸ Em ergeng support units have been issued "advanced" field m obile m edical equipm ent, such as field surgery vehicles and decontamination trucks. The GMR reported that the m edical w ar-readiness of "key units" with in "key com bat divisions and brigades" now meets war readiness standards.⁵⁹

By early October 2000, two-thirds of all PLA hospitals completed construction of "Project Number 1," which laid a foundation for an "inform ationized" medical servicesystem that can be used by both them ilitary and divilian medical services.⁶⁰

The PLA's first airbornem edical teams conducted battle drills during the summer of 2000.⁶¹ Three planes aircroppedmedical personnel and medical supplies onto a captured airfield. The medics boarded air-croppedvehides and set up a first aid station. Twenty medics of the First Airborne Medical Team parachute unit, made up of personnel from the PLA 457th H ospital, landed by plane. The Second Medical Unit, consisting of 50 personnel, arrived by plane and set up a comprehensivem ultipurpose medical post. During the exercise, transport aircraft evacuated critical personnel.⁶²

The Nanjing Military Region's Fujian Military District alsow orkedh arctoim proveits wartim eintegratedlogistics support capabilities during 2000. The military district medical support forces conducted an exercise during the summer that inducted an evacuation of casual ties brough t in on an unidentified vessel "from distant seas."

A notable feature of the PLA's extended logistical system during 2000-01 was the integration of dvilian fixed fadilities, infrastructure, personnel, and resources into contingency operations and training. This support is established through a combination of pre-arranged contracts, legal confiscation of support and dvilians, as well as integration through local reserve and militia units. The coordination and integration of dvilians and com estic resources provides a "total war" logistical multiplier to PLA support, especially along China's coastal region and in the south west, where this type of support has so far been most emphasized. The types of dvilian resources, inducing possible fiscal augmentation, are extensive and continue to develop. In addition to supplies, material, and personnel, they also include airports, ports, rail networks, expressways, and bridges that have been adapted to military specifications and support military missions. For example, the construction of some high speed roads and bridges was coordinated with themilitary to include extra exits and upgraded surfaces to bear the weight of military vehicles, better with stand air attack, and facilitate quick rebuild in case of an air attack. In certain areas, such as the G uangzhou MR, the military works dosely with divilian authorities to capitalize on divilian assets and ensure these can easily be integrated into military operations when needed

With a priority on cross-sea operations and island seizures during 2000-01 training, the use of dvillian marine vessels was also tested. In some cases, maritime exercises were conclucted with a mix of dvillian vessels that have been integrated into war planning. Civillian vessels and personnel even participated in antisubmarine exercises – showing that the use of dvillian assets by the PLA is not limited by either imagination or legal restrictions.

In July 2000, the Navy held a 17-day, 4,000 nautical miles wartimeshipping chill across the Bohai, Yellow, East China, and South China Seas, using the National Defense Mobilization Ship, *Shichang.*⁶³ The exercise was the first successful chill of "wartime emergency mobilization and chafting of divilian personnel vessels." The exercise was jointly organized by the State National Defense Mobilization Committee and the PLA Navy. Dozens of military and divilians participated from the State Planning Commission, Finance Ministry, Communications Ministry, Chinese A cadem y of Engineering, Ceneral Staff Department, and Ceneral Logistics Department. The exercise tested and enhanced the efficiency of chafting divilian vessels into service in an emergency.⁶⁴ Reserves and militia also have increasingly fadilitated local support to military exercises and operations. For example, in Zhejiang Province amilitias eaborne refueling unitwas setup on April 18, 2001, at the Zhejiang Petroleum LimitedCompany in Yuhuan. The unitwas maceup of 100 militiamenwhosemission is to set up permanent refueling points at ports along the eastern coast line and high ways, as well as small mobile refueling teams on land, to provide POL support during peacetime and war.⁶⁵

M issile Operations: Concealm ent, M obility, and Quality.

Missile Operations, which have been a pocket of excellence in the PLA for several years,⁶⁶ continued to improve in terms of the quality of personnel, rapidmobility, concealment and deception, and logistics support. During 2000-2001, Second Artillery pushed enhancements, particularly to address key problems in rapidmobility and information countermeasures under high-tech conditions.⁶⁷

To improve the quality and quantity of its science and technology personnel, for example, Second Artillery has actively recruited about 2,000 university students in recent years.⁶⁸ Like other elements of the PLA, it has sought not only to deepen the quality of its personnel, but also to encourage innovative high-tech solutions to its training and operations through closer cooperation with divilian institutions, as well as the recruitment of divilian-educated specialists. On March 9, 2001, for example, the Second Artillery Engineering Academ y signed a cooperative agreement on research and teaching with Northwest Inclustrial University.⁶⁹

Coastal/Maritim e Operations: Key Focus.

With a concerted effort to enhance coastal operations, all Services emphasized sea-crossing and island seizure training. A Nanjing MR & roup Arm y heldsea training on the southern Fujian Coast during mid-July 2000 that is representative.⁷⁰ Training included infantry and tanks seizing beaches, scouts conclucting reconnaiss ancefrom the sea, artillery employed on ships, amphibious arm ored troops seizing beaches and carrying out fire attacks at sea; and engineers dearing obstades. The GA has been engaged in sea training since the beginning of the summer 2000. Mock ups of an amphibious landing field have also been set up in garrison so that infantry regiments could continues ea training year round⁷¹

The Sheny ang MR developed an phibious training in early 2000. On January 22, 2000, the division experimented with live fire practice from a freighter, and tested several ways to secure equipment onto vessels (presumably divilian).⁷² Between January and July, the division trained in loading equipment onto vessels, firing arm ored car guns over water, striking at aerial targets using ship-borne anti-aircraft artillery, and striking beach targets with ship-borne artillery.⁷³

In June 2000, a Naval Landing Ship Unit that is attached to PLA unit 3809 1 at H aikou, H ainan Island, conclucted training in night landing operations with troops, arm ored cars, and am phibious tanks against an enemy objective ⁷⁴ Because the unit's equipment was outdated, it tried to develop innovative ways to enhance its capabilities and compensate for its defidencies. This induced training during the heavy fog season (March through June) in fishing areas and narrow drannels. Air defense training was also steppedup to "take advantage" of heavy air traffic in the area. During the first half of 2000, the unit conducted 4 2 singleship chills and eight formation landing chills, half of which we reconducted at night, in heavy fog, and in other environments resembling realistic warfare conditions.⁷⁵

A submarine flotilla that underestimated the capability of the enemy and failed a training test 2 years before steppedupits study of enemy capabilities and consequently was able to penetrate an enemy port to enforce a blockade during a summer 2000 chill.⁷⁶ The unith as focus edits study on submarine attack of aircraft carrier and destroyer formations, and submarine coordination with the aviation corps and surface vessels to penetrate an enemy blockade and lay mines in a port. The unit established a file on each enemy vessel and adjusted its training to counter enemy anti-submarine capabilities.⁷⁷

In August 2000, the Beijing MR reportedon an Air Force unit that had participated in sea operations.⁷⁸ The unit, which had only trained over land before, trained for 2 months overwater beginning in April 2000. During these training, special attention was paid to low-altitude acrobatics, formation and navigation.⁷⁹

Com m unications: Connectivity, EW, and CNA. 80

The PLA recognizes that it must enhance its command and control, EW, and counterelectronic marfare capability, as well as its computer network attack and counterattack capabilities, if it hopes to fight to win a regional war under high-tech conditions. Consequently, the PLA has taken increased efforts to boost all of these capabilities. As an example, 6 roup Army Deputy Commander ZhangH etian of the Nanjing MR held network warfare chills⁸¹ on July 11, 2000 in which Blue Force (enemy) reconnaissance and attacks on Red Force targets were simulated The 6 roup Army achieved an initial network capability at the time of the exercise, but Zhang noted that some PLA commanders hadnoty et grasped the clemants of "achieving victory."

The Lanzhou MR held an Electronic W arfare D effense W ork M eeting on July 34, 2000, at a G roup Arm y that had been a pilot for electronic defense operations during the previous two y ears.⁸²D uring them eeting, the MR reviewed the accomplishments in "three anti's, one resist" (anti-reconnaissance, anti-jamming, anti-network attack, and resist destruction). The ability of commanders and staffs to organize and direct information/electronicwarfare w as reportedly significantly enhanced⁸³ Beijing MR (BMR) held a m ajor electronic w arfare exercise in early August 2000 in conjunction with a com binedarm s operation.⁸⁴ This was the first time all the new and m ain battle EW equipment of the ground forces were brought together and comprehensive assessments were made of the combat capability of the equipment systems and units.⁸⁵ BMR has also developed on line Operational Forces (OPFOR) training for electronic warfare to enhance training.⁸⁶

In the "Southwest 2000" Exercise, two form ations separated by 500 km fought against each other in a "virtual reality laboratory" in Chengdu MR's first online test of its command and staff. This developed from online "diedks" heldduring late 1999. Chengdu MR applied its experiences, which were an each of other PLA units, to cooperation with NDU to develop a "Campaign Command Training Model System" that form ally went into operation during the Southwest 2000 Exercise⁸⁷

NDU experts diaracterized this as the first true "W ar Laboratory" for PLA cam paign training. The m ain diaracteristics of the exercise were:

1. Units in fives outh western provinces and regions were linked by obzens of local networks and several hundred term inals.

2 Real-time, force on-force simulation that provided information on the campaign situation, disposition of orders, and Red Force and Blue Force postures.

3 The exercises unfolded synchronously in real-time at numerous campaign units and induced sound, image, text, and data online, thanks to an emergency doubling of the transmission capability. (4) The exercise lecto a significant drange in network and itecture, re-routing of transmission routes, renovation of equipment, and break throughs in addieving secure information transmission under dynamic long-range network draracteristics.⁸⁸ The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) of the BMR heldan online training exercise in conjunction with a meeting on headquarters science and tech nology training in mickJune 2000.⁸⁹ This exercise simulated an attack on Beijing by multiplesorties of enemy aircraft flying at low altitude. The system greatly reduced training planning and preparation time and can be used to access inform ation about enemy aircraft and meteorological inform ation, as well as chaw up plans for integrated simulated training and joint training with army units.⁹⁰

Special Operations: Strike Deep Beh incl ines.

Special operations forces have concentrated on enhancing basic skills to concluct operations deep behind enemy lines. The "Cheetahs," am odel unit commanded by Colonel Liu Youch un, is one example of the accomplishments in recent Special Operations training.⁹¹ The 56 294 unit is a Chengdu MR Special Reconnaissance Dadui that has made notable progress to develop special operations soldiers. Cheetah soldiers can perform multiskills inducing operating light to heavy weapons, basicknow ledge offoreign arm ies'weapons, and the ability to operate transport that ranges from ground, to tank, to helicopter, and to assault boats.

Shenyang Military Region lauded personnel improvements in one special operations unit that is commanded by Li Jizhao, and political commissar, II an Baosheng. The unit expects to train 100 officers in both command and technical tasks, and develop 100 personnel III ho are experts in airborne operations, island landing and sabotage operations, psychological III arfare, enhanced instructor skills (IIII the "four abilities"), and all-round special operations skills.⁹

OneSpecial Operations Unit that had previously failed a spot examination in Lanzhou MR was high lighted in the MR new spaper for passing an inspection without prior notification. No advance information was provided on the

subjects to be tested, which was a change from previous years. The unith adpreviously failed some tasks and only achieved good results in about half of the 23 test subjects. The unith ad consistently perform edwith excellent results in yearly training.⁹³ The inspection reinforced the need for units to develop a no notice capability.

Overall Improvements.

PLA training has become increasingly more sophisticated and complex, incorporating evolving joint operations and national defense mobilization. Training within a core of elite and experimental units is diaracterized by use of more professional and capable Opposing Forces (OPFOR)⁹⁴ near-com bat conditions; all-weather and night operations; sea and island force projection; and long distance deployments into unfamiliar terrain.⁹⁵ A coep tance of "failure" (i.e., defeat of the Red Forceby the BlueForce), as well as more open discussion of deficiencies has also lead to a more realistic appraisal of strengths and weaknesses, with the potential for more realistic measures to correct shortcom ings. In addition, training is conducted more frequently through out they ear, rath er than simply relying on enclofy ear training. G reater use of simulation and "online" training are becoming more wide spread and sophisticated, providing an augmentation to field training in every thing from commandand control, to asymmetrical arfare tomobile operations, to nuclear and biological arfare training."

Conclusion.

The PLA lacks a sufficient bucget to support faster and m ore extensive m ilitary hardware and technology acquisition, and is handicapped by China's deep-seated preference for independent domestic capabilities that can be obtained through reverse engineering, domestic innovation, or acquisition of technical information. Moreover, China needs to sustain an export-led economic strategy that could be undermined if the region or the West were alarmed by China's military modernization efforts before China is ready.⁹⁷ The PLA has been able to make a virtue out of necessity by focusing on software m odernization. Am ong these are steps: (1) im proving the quality of personnel through educational and recruiting reform s and initiatives; (2) instituting organizational d anges that will enhance efficiency, reduce was teful practices, including corruption, and illultim ately enhance com bat force capabilities, such as a chaptation of joint operations and joint logistics; (3) selectively adapting relevant foreign military management practices and modern (specifically information age) asymmetric strategies; (4) stream lining organizations; and (5) intensively studying and assessing potential threats, with particular emphasis on the United States, and more recently on Taiw an's military capability.

Relying on key units that serve as both the vanguards and testing grounds for new equipment, structures, techniques, and strategies for offensive and defensive operations in a high-tech environment, the PLA has testeda myriadofequipment, maceoperational improvements, and innovations to enhance its combat effectiveness in a high-tech environment. The PLA is poised to capitalize on the lessons learned to enhance its regular, reserve, and militia units. At the very least, the PLA now has developed a sound basis for continuing enhancement of the PLA's force projection capability, and has established a jump offpoint for modernization of the entire PLA as resources increase, modern technology is absorbed, and innovation and adaptation further develop.⁹⁸

While hardware and technology acquisition will continue, the PLA's recent concentration on modern thinking, innovation, and experience of leaders and fighters provides a more potent base for accelerated modernization. The PLA today possesses a rough but ready force projection capability, one that will continue to steadily improve over time, which adds greater risks and costs for potential opponents in Ch in a's near periphery. Them odernizing PLA increasingly provides the Ch in each each provide the Ch in each provide the Ch in each provide the coercives trength – one that can back up the threat of the use of force and/or selective employment of force to promote Ch in a's national sovereignty and security interests along its land, air, and maritime borders.

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 8

1. Jiefang Jun Bao (tereafter JJB), August 10, 2001.

2 "Modernization" of the PLA must be viewed in relative terms. This drapter obes not argue that the PLA has become an "advanced" military in the past 3 years, since most PLA equipment and weaponry still remains up to 20 years behind advanced militaries. This drapter, however, starts from the firm belief that hardware based comparisons to advanced militaries are insufficient to fully assess the growing coercive power of China's military in both real and psychological terms within the Asia-Pacific region.

3 Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan, Guangzhou, Lanzhou, Nanjing, and Chengdu Military Regions.

4. JJB, August 10, 2001.

5. *Ib*id.

6. JJB, October 14, 2000.

7. Lanzhou Military Region Junchi Bao (hereafter RMJD), October 17, 2000; Nanjing Military Region Renm in Qianm in (hereafter RMQX), October 17, 2000; Rocket Force News, October 17, 2000; Guangzhou Military Region Zhanshi Bao (hereafter ZSB), October 16, 2000.

8. Ibid.

9. JJB, October 14, 2000.

10. *Ibid*.

11. Guangzhou MRZSB, October 13, 2000.

12 *Ib*id.

13 *Ibid*.

14. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance; air raid and counterair raid; and jam m ing and antijam m ing.

15. See, for exam ples, JJB, D ecem ber 2000; *Sh* enyang *M* ilitary *Region Qianjin Bao* (h ereafter QJB), April 4, 2001; JJB, May 7, 2001; Beijing *M* ilitary *Region Zh* anyou *Bao* (h ereafter ZYB), Novem ber 4, 2000; ZYB, Novem ber 7, 2000.

16. See, for exam ples, JJB, May 6, 2001; ZSB, March 6, 2001; JJB, May 16, 2001; RMJD, April 26, 2001; ZSB, March 6, 2001.

17. See, for examples, ChinaNational DefenseNers, May 21, 2001.

18. See, for exam ples, QJB, April9, 2001; JJB May 4, 2001; ZSB, March 6, 2001; JJB, D ecem ber4, 2000; QJB, April9, 2001; JJB, May 29, 2001; ZSB, March 6, 2001.

19. See RM QX, March 2, 2001; RM QX, April 5, 2001; RMQX, November 2, 2000; ZSB, November 3, 2000; ZSB, March 6, 2001; Air Force News, April 19, 2001; China National Defense News, May 21, 2001; ZSB, March 6, 2001. In addition, six of the PLA's 29 proposals submitteed at the National People's Congress in March 2001 addressed maritime issues, which testifies to an increasing interest. This was said to be the largest number of PLA proposals ever submitteed (UJB, March 11, 2001). For coordination of sea-land unit coordinated training, see People's Navy, 10 April 2001.

20. See, for exam ples, *People's Navy*, April 7, 2001. For People's Liberation Arm y Navy (PLAN) sub-dt as ing training in coordination with PLA arm y, see *People's Navy*, April 12, 2001.

21. For People's Liberation Arm y Air Force (PLAAF) Opposing Forces (OPFOR) support, see People's Navy, April 5, 2001; for long range operations (up to 3,000 kilom eters), see Air Force New s, April 19, 2001.

22 See, for examples, ZSB, April 19, 2001; JJB, May 20, 2001; China National Defense News, May 24, 2001; RMJD, March 15, 2001.

23 See, for exam p les, JJB, May 27, 2001; ZSB, March 3, 2001; JJB, May 29, 2001.

24. JJB, February 2, 2001.

25. In Chinese open source writings, "opponents" are most frequently diaracterized in term sofcap abilities, which most frequently implies U.S. military capability. Recently, how ever, materials have been increasingly published that specifically identify Taiw an military capabilities as a threat and name the United States as an opponent, or even "enemy."

- 26. Ibid.
- 27. JJB, January 12, 2001.
- 28. Ibid.
- 2). See ZSB , March 3, 2001.
- 30. Air Force New s, April 19, 2001.
- 31. RocketForceNars, March 8, 2001.
- 32 JJB, Decem ber 28, 2000.
- 33 JJB, April 28, 2001.
- 34.6 uangzh ou M R ZSB, March 1, 2001.
- 35. JJB, October 31, 2000.
- 36. Ibid.

37. Zh ou Xi aoning, Peng Xiw en, and An Weiping, Lianh e Zuozh an Xinlun, National Defense University Press, Beijing, 2000.

- 38. JJB, October 10, 2000.
- 3). Ibid.
- 40. ZYB, Decem ber 28, 2000.
- 41. RMQX, Decem ber 29, 2000.
- 42 Ibid.
- 4 3 JJB, January 9, 2001.
- 44. Air Force New s, March 15, 2001.
- 45. Directory of PRC Military Personalities, October 2000, p. iv.
- 46. JJB, November 14, 2000.
- 47. Ibid.

- 48. China Defense Inclustries, November 9, 2000.
- 49. ZSB, October 20, 2000.
- 50. *Ibid*.
- 51. China Defense News, March 1, 2001.
- 5 2 JJB , August 9 , 2000.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54. RMQX, March 8, 2001.
- 55. Ibid.
- 56. ZSB, March 1, 2001.
- 57. ZSB, July 26, 2000.
- 58. Ibid.
- 59. Ibid.
- 60. JJB, October 25, 2000.
- 61. Air Force New s, August 17, 2000.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 Ch in a National Defense New s, August 11, 2000.
- 64. Ibid.
- 65. Ch in a National Defense News, April 26, 2001.

66. For more detailed and authoritative discussion of missile modernization, see Mark Stokes, *China's Strategic Modernization: Im plications for the United States*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999; and "China's Military Space and Conventional Theater MissileD evelopment: Im plications for Security in the Taiw an Strait," in *People's Liberation Arm y After Next*, Susan M. Puska, ed, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000.

67. RocketForces News, March 1, 2001.

68. JJB, May 10, 2001.

- 69. RocketForces News, March 15, 2001.
- 70. JJB, August 8, 2000.
- 71. *Ib*id.
- 72 QJB, July 10, 2000.
- 73. Ibid.
- 4. People's Navy, July 8, 2000.
- 75. Ibid.
- 76. People's Navy, July 15, 2000.
- 77. Ibid.
- 78. JJB, August 8, 2000.
- 79. Ibid.
- 80. Com puter Network Attack.
- 81. JJB , August 8-9 , 2000.
- 82 RMJD, July 11 and 15, 2000.
- 83. Ibid.
- 84. JJB, August 11, 2000.
- 85. Ibid.
- 86. Ibid.
- 87. Ibid.
- 88. Ibid.
- 89. Air Force New s, July 8, 2000.
- 90. Ibid.
- 91. JJB, May 4, 2001.
- 9 2 Shenyang MR Qianjin Bao, April 4, 2001.

93 JJB, December 31, 2000.

94. See, for examples, ZYB, April 2, 2001; JJB, December 1, 2000; People's Navy, April 7, 2001; CONMILIT, October 2000; Renmin Qianxian, September 9, 2000; JJB, October 10, 2000; PLA Pictorial, January 2001; Air ForceNews, March 29, 2001; and People's Navy, April 5, 2001.

95. See, for examples, Air Force News, April 5, 2001.

96. See, for exam ples, ZYB, April 24, 2001; RM JD, April 21, 2001; Rocket Force New s, April 26, 2001.

97. Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's & rand Strategy, Past, Present, and Future, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2001, pp. 141-147.

98. Finance Minister Xiang Huiadieng announced in March 2001 that the PLA budget would beincreased by 141.004 billion yuan, 17.7 pecent. Xiang attributed this defense budget increase to (1) salary increases; (2) adaptation to chastic dianges taking place in the world military situation; and (3) the need for the PLA to prepare for defense and combat. (See JJB, March 6, 2001). This increase is a consistent trend-in 1998 the official defense budget was increased by 9.3.47 billion yuan, in 1999 itwas increased by 107.67 billion yuan, and in 2000 itwas increased by 1.21.29 billion yuan.

CH APTER 9

LOG ISTICS SUPPORT FOR PLA AIR FORCE CAMPAIG NS

Kenneth W.Allen¹

Under today's wartim e conditions, aviation troops must be prepared to deploy quickly across borders to awar zone and be prepared to fight immediately. Currently, some of China's war zones do not have many first-line airfieds, so the existing airfieds must support several types of aircraft. The PLAAF must also hide its aircraft by dispersing them to field airstrips and high way landing strips. Therefore, PLAAF logistics troops must have the ecapability to support multiple types of aircraft at different types of airfields.²

Logistics Support for MobileOperations, 1997

INTROD UC TION

The purpose of this drapter is to exam ine what the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is obing to reform its logistics systems in order to fight and winhigh technology wars under modern conditions, employing all five of its branches. Many of these reforms have come about as a direct result of contingency planning for a possible war with the United States over Taiwan, but the reforms are applicable to the PLAAF as a whole.

In the 1990s, the PLAAF began the process of transform ingits effrom a force cap able of employing single branches (aviation, surface to-air missiles [SAMs], antiaircraft artillery [AAA], rachar, and airborne troops) and single types of aircraft in positional defensive campaigns to one cap able of using multiple branches and several types of aircraft in air force combined arms, mobile offensive operations cam paigns, with the goal of shifting to operations in joints ervice cam paigns.³ In order to reach this goal, the PLAAF has had to implement some significant dranges in its logistics system, which traditionally has not been structured for supporting mobile, offensive operations. While many of the changes are still underway, some are still only aspirational.

The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section I, I III provide the setting for changes in the PLAAF's logistics operations by discussing PLAAF operational theory. In Section II, III define PLAAF logistics and provide a brief discussion of the PLAAF logistics structure. In Section III, I III exam ine PLAAF logistics theory and III hat types of training the PLAAF has conclucted to implement this theory. In Section IV, III ill provides om econdusions about dianges in the PLAAF's logistics system in relation to possible cam paign operations against the United States.

SECTION I: PLA AIR FORCE OPERATIONS THEORY

PLAAF Positional Defense.

The PLAAF basically has two modes of operationspositional and mobile⁴ Traditionally, the PLAAF's primary mission has been positional air defense for China's airfields, national political and econom ic centers, heavy troop concentrations, important military facilities, and transportation systems.⁵ As a result, most fighter airfields and virtually all of the PLAAF's SAMs and AAA are concentrated around China's large dities. During the its first 3 decades, the types of weapon systems the PLAAF had and the location of the airfields made it difficult for the PLAAF to conduct any other type of operations.

According to Paul God in, the PLAAF's reliance on positional defense became even more apparent during the late 1970s, when the core of the PLA's new strategy of "People's War Under Modern Conditions" was forward defense⁶ 6 od in states,

This strategy meant that Chinaw ould be defended at selected critical points as dose to its borders as possible to prevent Soviet forces from driving deep into China. Positional defense was not the preferred option for China's military strategists, whow ould have preferred amore flexiblem oblied effense But, the superior arms and equipment of Soviet forces conducting joint warfare granted them such mobility, speed, and destructive power that the PLA's operations could not realistically be based on a war of maneuver.

The PLAAF's Search for a Strategy.

Serious di anges in the way the PLA though t about its future took place between the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam and Deng Xiaoping's 1985 "strategic decision" that directed the arm ediforces to di ange from preparation for an "early, major, and nuclear war" to preparing for "local limited wars around China's borders, including its maritime territories and daims." Whereas the PLA Navy (PLAN) had conceptualized a di ange in its strategy from coastal defense to offshore defense, the PLAAF entered the secondh alfof the decade still in search of a strategy.⁷

The PLAAF's search was chiven, in part, by a clasire to seek inclependentm issions and to try to break away from its near total submission to the ground forces. This dependence was exemplified in the early 1980s when the PLA began reorganizing its ground forces into group armies, and the PLAAF was tasked to provide defense for group army positions. Specific guidance from the & eneral Staff D epartment (SD) was given that "each branch and unit of the PLAAF must establish the philosophy that they support the needs of the ground forces and that the victory is a ground force victory."⁸

W ang H ai Initiates Sh ift Tow ard Sim ultaneous Offensive and Defensive Operations.

Under W ang H ai, who became the commander in 1985, the PLAAF began articulating its views on mobile, offensive operations. First, in a break from the PLAAF's focus on positional defensive campaigns, W ang laidout a program in 1987 that form ally set forth the *thought* (*sixiang*) of "building an air force with simultaneous offensive and defensive capabilities" (*jianli gongfang jianbei xing kongjun*).⁹ W ang emphasized that the combined arm s combat environment of the 1980s required a force that "could move quickly over long distances, could fight in an electronic environment, could have the capability to attack an enemy, and could keep the PLAAF from sustaining complete chamage from an enemy air attack."

In the late 1980s, the PLA began experimenting with the concept of rapid-reaction units. In 1990, the PLAAF published an authoritative book entitled *Air Force Operations Research* that stated, "The rapid-reaction *strategy* (kuaisu fanying *zh* anlue) is based on the premise that China will only be engaged in local wars for the foreseeable future, and the PLA must strike to end the war quickly and meet the political objectives."¹⁰


Given China's military limitations compared with those of the Soviets and Americans, the study advocated the concept of deploying air defense forces according to the principleof "frontlight, rear heavy" along with the principle of "deploying in three rings."¹¹ The fixed base logistics system that existed at that time met the PLAAF's requirements for positional defense.

Using the "front light, rear heavy" concept, the PLAAF stated it should organize its SAM and AAA troops into a com bined high-, medium - and low -altitude and a far-, medium -, and short-distance air defense net. The air force would also set up many intercept lines and organize its aviation troops into a lay ereclintercept, especially along the enemy's main routes. In deciding how to deploy its forces, the PLAAF divided the battle area into three lines, using the front line of enemy airfields as the baseline. The first linew ould extend to a radius of 500 kilom eters (300 m iles) from the baseline, with in which the notional enemy will mainly use its fighters and fighter-bom bers. These condline would extend to 1,000 kilom eters (600 m iles), where the enemy will primarily use its fighter-bom bers and bom bers. The third line extends bey ond 1,000 kilom eters, where the enemy would mainly use its long-ranges trategic bom bers.

Inform ation from The Republic of China 199 394 National Defense Report described the situation as follow s_{1}^{12}

The deployment of the Air Force is aimed primarily at defending against Russia and secondarily at defending against the Republic of China and Vietnam. Their deployment adopts the principle that 'a minimum number of troops are deployed on the front line while the main forces are mobile' Currently (1994), with in 250 nautical miles (450 kilometers) from Taiw an, Mainland China has 13 airbases capable of accommodating more than 1000 aircraft. However, there are only about 100 fighters stationed therenow. In the second line, which is 250-500 nautical miles (450-900 kilometers) from Taiw an, there are more than 20 airbases with over 1500 [PLAAF and Naval Aviation] combataircraft of various types.

The Republic of Ch ina 1998 National Defense Report states,¹³ "A tpresent, 1, 300 aircraft arestationed at airbases with in 500 nautical miles of Taiw an, of which 600 have a radius of operation over Taiw an proper." The 2000 National Defense Report states, "Already deployed with in 600 nautical miles (1000 kilom eters) of the Taiw an proper are about 1000 [PLAAF and Naval Aviation] planes of various types which could undertake operational missions at any mom ent."¹⁴ In December 2000, Taiw an's ministry of defense stated, "There were 14 military and dvil airfields with in 250 nautical miles of Taiw an. They currently have 121 fighters, but could accommodate 1,279 fighters, not inducing Su-27s, on short notice..."¹⁵ Looking at a m ap, the area out to 1,000 kilom eters described in Taiw an's reports starts at the Shandbng Peninsula, arcs halfw ay through H ubei and H unan Provinces, then goes down to the Leizhou Peninsula, covering alm ostall of the Nanjing MR and about half of the G uangzhou Military Region (MR). According to the Federation of American Scientists Map 1, there are 50 airfields with in 800 kilom eters of Taiw an, inducting 36 m ilitary airbases – not all of which are perm anently occupied¹⁶



Source Federation of American Scientists.

Map 1. Chinese Airfields with in 800 Kilom eters of Taiw an.

According to Taiw an military officials, since the mid-1990s, the PLAAF has been deploying small units from designated rapid reaction units from throughout the PLAAF into some of the bases directly opposite Taiw an for 6-m onth familiarization deployments.¹⁷ The deployments have given the PLAAF's logistics system the opportunity to practice supporting those forces.

In using the "light front, heavy rear" concept, the air force believed it would have to cheal with two important problems. The first problem was that the PLAAF's aircraft in the 1980s did not have the capability to fly to the borcher from their home bases, loiter for any length of time, conduct an intercept, and return home again. This problem was exemplified during the 1979 borcher war with Vietnam. In addition, the PLAAF believed that, during any suchen attack on China, it must be able to scram ble all of its first line aircraft to meet the attack and prevent the incoming aircraft from striking any airfields.

The second, and contradictory, problem III as that the most likely anticipated adversaries at that time – the United States and Soviet Union – had aircraft capable of conducting deep strikes into the heart of China. Therefore, the PLAAF believed it shoulds tation most of its air defense III eapon systems in the second and third lines so they could intercept any longer-range aircraft as they converged on key targets. Furthermore, the attacking aircraft III ould most likely not have the proper escorts at those distances, and the PLAAF's early III arning rachars might be able to give enough advance notice of an attack for the air defense systems to be ready.

Several simultaneous forces are pulling on the PLAAF today. Although current PLAAF writings cb not mention the "front light, rear heavy" concept, the air forces till faces the same concerns about air defense and aircraft survivability at facilities near the coast. They are being told to prepare for offensive operations, possibly against U.S. forces, but they are also analyzing the types of operations and weapons, inducing long-range cruise missiles used during the GulfW ar and Kosovo conflict that success fully targeted air defense networks and airfields.¹⁸

Teaching the Theories.

Beginning in the 1990s, the PLAAF began training its midlerel officers in some of the senere theories. According to an article in *China's Air Forcem* agazine¹⁹

ThePLAAF Comm and College im plem ented an in-depth tead ing reform in 1993 to drange the PLAAF's operating methodology from employing single branches and single types of aircraft to using multiple brandles and several types of aircraft in an air force com bined arm s cam paign, with the goal of shifting to operations in a joint service cam paign. Prior to then, the training of middle ranking com m anders w as aim ed m ainly at directing com bat involving a single brand and single types of aircraft in warfare under general conditions. Commanders who graduated from such training were good at the tactical operations of their own types of aircraft and their own branch, but they did not know much about other types of aircraft or other brandles and services. The PLAAF's joint operations consisted of aircraft flying com bat air patrols and attack airplanes flying far apart from each other and not having much to cow ith each other.

As part of the reforms to produce "transcentury commanders," the CommandCollegealso began focusing on theories such as joint combat operations, mobile warfare, information warfare, and electronic warfare²⁰ The new combat theory embodied "four dranges" as follows:

1. Change from studying air com bat under general conditions to studying air com bat under high-tech conditions.

2 Change from stressing air defense to stressing air offense.

3 Change from air com batsupported by joint operations with the arm y to air com batsupported by joint operations of arm y, navy, and air force

4. Change from warfare involving a single brand and single type of aircraft to com bined arm swarfare involving them ultiple brand es and types of aircraft.

The PLAAF under Liu Sh uny ao.

Whereas Wang Hai initiated the concept of simultaneous offensive and defensive operations in 1987, it did not receive much publicity until late 1996, when Chinese leaders, inducing Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairm an Jiang Zem in and PLAAF commander Liu Shunyao, began to emphasize the PLAAF's need to fight offensive battles.²¹ During 1997, Liu stated, "The PLAAF must improve its capabilities in actual com bat by high lighting campaign and tactical training."²² He further emphasized that campaign training involves air deterrence, air interdiction, air strikes, and participation in joint exercises.

In the February-March 2000 issue of *Ch ina's Air Force* m agazine, four authors provided a candid assessment of the PLAAF's shortcomings and requirements for it to be able to conduct simultaneous offensive and defensive operations.²³ The articles tated, "The PLAAF must drange the direction of its strategic thinking from an emphasis on territorial air defense, primarily because the concept of modern high-tech war has dranged. If the PLAAF does not drange its thinking, then its development will be constrained and fall behind with the rest of the world's weak countries."

The article also stressed that the ability to attack is the PLAAF's weak link. This weakness was a cirect result of the PLAAF's past operational though t, which was reflected in the air force's flight training program. The authors stated that if the PLAAF wants to develop a simultaneous offensive and defensive capability, then reform ing the training system is urgent. Some of the reforms include upgracing the professional military education (PME) system, overhauling the pilot recruitment and training requirements, and focusing on realistic flight training.

PLAAF Mobile Operations.

As the PLAAF acquires better # eapon systems and contemplates using its rapid-reaction units in simultaneous offensive and defensive operations, it has begun to focus more on mobile operations. In 1997, the General Logistics Department (GLD) published a series of books on logistics support of local # ars under modern high-tech conditions. One of those books, Logistics Support for MobileOperations, provides valuable information on PLAAF logistics.

The PLAAF Dictionary defines mobile operations as "Aviation troops seizing the right moment to move to the objective by air, land, or water. Normally, this entails deploying mobile fencui to concealed locations to conduct their attack."² Although this is the official definition, the PLAAF's use of mobile operations is not limited to fencui-size forces, not is it limited to the aviation forces. Today, all five of its branch es and support units train in mobile operations. According to Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, the PLAAF has five types of mobile operations – long-range, air interdiction, support for other services and branch es, airborne supply, and am bush – as described below.²

1. Long-range operations. According to the PLAAF's view of mobile operations, bom bers and fighter-bom ber aircraft are the primary means for conducting mobile long-range air attack operations. Norm ally, these are planned attacks on land or maritime targets by aircraft carrying specific weapons and supported by all types of escort aircraft. Therefore, in order for the PLAAF to acopt this method, it must take into consideration the current condition of its bom ber units. When planning the bom ber forces future attacks, the PLAAF must select the right

forw ard bases. Therefore, it must strength en the ability of the airfields in peacetime to support bomber operations during wartime. The PLAAF must plan on having its bomber airfields attacked after the PLAAF's bombers conduct their attack, so the PLAAF must carefully select its targets and cleade upon pre-and post-attack procedures. Based on the PLAAF's bomber and escort aircraft range capabilities, it must cleaterm ine the appropriate distance for long-range attacks, so that the attacking task force will have enough time over the target to accomplish its mission and the electronic support aircraft will have enough time to support them.

2 Air interdiction operations. The PLAAF uses its fighters as the primary method for air interdiction operations. This method is used for air superiority, air defense over key points, and air cover missions. Operations during the GulfW arshow edth at an attacking force cannot completely destroy all of the opposing forces aircraft on the ground, so the best way to keep your aircraft from being destroyed on the ground is to conduct air interdiction operations against the attacking force In future ars, the PLAAF will adopt the following methods for air interdiction: concentrate force by stressing quality and combat power to carry out en ergengr (ji), difficult (nan), changerous (xian), and significant (*zh ong*) m issions as the ecope of the knife; attack the aircraft that are supporting the attacking aircraft, such as airborne early warning and jam wing aircraft; attack the enemy at all levels along the entire route as farout as possible; and pay attention to attacking low and super low level air targets.

3. Aviation Support for Other Services and Branches. The PLAAF's aviation troops will also provide support for the ground and naval forces, including airborne cover missions, airbornefirepower support, aerial reconnaissance and electronic countermeasures to degrade the enemy's overall combat capabilities. This includes the enemy's campaign rear air defense system, second echelon units (or campaign reserve forces), logistics support system, com m unications system , h elicopters, and m assing forces. It also m eans the PLAAF's attacking forcem ust avoid ground or m aritim e corricors and guarantee friendly ground and naval forces' freecom of m ovem ent.

4. Airborne drop operations. The PLAAF is responsible for air transport of supplies, which can be either airchopped by paradiute or brought into an airfield Since transport planes do not have any air defense capability, it is important to consider their routes and vulnerability to air attack.

5. Patrol and an bush operations. The PLAAF uses its aviation, AAA, and SAM troops as the prim ary methods for these operations. These operations require a high degree of independence, use little firepower, are highly flexible, and usually receive good results. In order to execute these types of operations, the PLAAF will deploy small aviation elements or AAA and SAM units to areas where the attacking aircraftwill pass. AAA and SAMswill be effective against low and super low flying targets, inducting arm ed helicop ters.

SECTION II: WHAT IS PLAAIR FORCE LOG ISTICS?

This section begins the discussion of PLAAF logistics reforms by first laying out what PLAAF logistics encompasses. Basically, the logistics system is responsible for providing all the PLAAF's general purpose supplies, construction, health services, food, shelter, dothing, fuel, and transportation, as well as managing its bucget and expenditures. The *PLAAF Dictionary* defines air force logistics as the overall term for the logistics structure that supports com bat, training, and air force building.²⁰ PLAAF logistics consists of command, plus finance, health, arm ament, fuel, materials, transportation, capital construction, and airfield management support services. Logistics is organized into four operational levels– H eachuarters Air Force, military region air forces (MRAF), air corps, and units. The ach inistrative structure consists of a Logistics Department at Heachpuarters Air Force and each of the MRAF and air corps heachpuarters. In addition, each ground unit (non-aviation) division, brigade, and regiment has a Logistics Departments or Logistics Division.

The most important logistics organization for operational aviation units at the division and regimentlevel is the fields tation (*drangzhan*), which is an independent logistics support unit under dual leadership of the air division and the MRAF headquarters. In the PLAAF, the fields tation director serves the same function as a U.S. A ir Force (USAF) basecom m ander. Prior to February 1970, the field station was called a base, and had the status of a division.²⁷ Today, it has the status of a regiment. The field station is responsible for organizing and supplying material and equipment, and also for providing continuous combined service support for operations and training. Each airfield housing aircraft assigned to the division has its own field station. Each airfield generally has 1-2 aircraft regiments, which determ ines the field station's size. For example, a fields tation at an airfield supporting two fighter regiments has about 930 personnel, including 170 officers and 760 enlisted troops.²⁸ A coording to Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, the field station will be augmented by additional logistics personnel when necessary.

The PLAAF's supply depot system is organized into a three tier structure-first level depots are located in various military regions but are subordinate to H eachpuarters Air Force, secondlevel depots are located in each military region and are subordinate to the MRAF H eachpuarters; and third level depots are located at and subordinate to operational units.² For example, each airfield has a third level depot, and the secondlevel depots can support the third level depots when required In achition, first level depots can either supply the secondlevel depots or senditem s directly to the unit if necessary.

The PLAAF Dictionary states that the air forces strategican dram paign rear area depots can be divided into

com posite depots, where all types of materials are stored, and specialized depots for air material, arm ament, fuel, vehicles, and quartermaster articles, etc.³⁰

In the past, the PLAAF's Logistics Department has also been responsible for som e weapon system s maintenance ThePLAAF has alw ays made a dear distinction between its aviation (aircraft) and air defense forces (AAA, SAM, and ractar troops). This can be seen throughout the entire PLAAF's administrative, operational, logistics, m aintenance and training structure W h creas the PLAAF has alw ayshada separate first level department that was responsible for aviation m aintenance,³¹ the Logistics Departmenthas been responsible for air defense equipment m aintenance 32 In 1998, the Logistics Department transferred its second level Air Materiel³³ Department (hangcaibu) and Arm ament Department (junxiebu) to the PLAAF's Equipment Department. Today, the Logistics Department is responsible for all general purposes upplies, and the Equipm ent Department is responsible for all special purpose supplies and all weapon systems and equipm entmaintenance³

Finally, there are PLAAF academ ies, schools, and training regiments and groups to train logistics and nonaviation maintenance personnel. In addition, the PLAAF has several suborclinate research institutes for aviation medicine, fuels, dothing, aviation munitions, four stations (oxygen generation, compressed air, battery charging, and power supply) equipment, and capital construction.³⁵

Operational and Logistics Comm and Posts.

The PLAAF has identified several types of operational commandposts (*thi uisuo*), some of which are established only during exercises and wartime campaigns.³⁶ The PLAAF's logistics system also has a separate set of commandposts, which may or may not coincide with the operational commandposts. According to a report in the South China Morning Post, the PLAAF built 100 comm and posts, operational offices, and aviation control centers between 1994 and 1999.³⁷

Operational Comm and Posts. Each of the following PLAAF headquarters have operational comm and posts:³⁸ Headquarters Air Force, MRAF headquarters; air corps; aviation divisions and regiments; and AAA and SAM divisions, brigades, and regiments. Thesenior stafffor each type generally consists of the following representatives: a comm ander, drief duty officer, drief of staff, and logistics support staffofficer. Depending on the organization level, other staffofficers induce representatives from the various second level administrative offices under the four major departments (headquarters, political, logistics, and equipment), including operations, intelligence, communications, confidential (security for classified material), navigation, SAM, AAA, flight management, weather, rackar, political, logistics, and maintenance

B as ed on their m ission, com m and posts can be categorized as m ain (*jiben*), alternate (*yubei*), advance (*qianjin*), auxiliary (*fuzhu*), or rear area (*houfang*) com m and posts. Main com m and posts are perm anent com m and posts that are norm ally established at each echelon's headquarters. During cam paigns, the com m ander is the senior officer in the com m and post. Alternate com m and posts are established before the start of a cam paignat H eadquarters Air Force, each M RAF, and each air corps w ith the responsibility of com m and not m and post but are not used unless the m ain com m and post is no longer functional. Alternate com m and posts can also be set up for special purposes or to com m and low er level units.

A duance comm and posts are established in the operational area to assist the main comm and post in a general comm and role or to comm and air force units that are assisting ground and naval forces. For example, during the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, the Guangzhou MRAF # eachuarters established an advance comm and post at an unidentified location, which worked together with the 7th Air Corps # eachuarters at Nanning as the unified authority for the PLAAF's participation.³⁹ An auxiliary comm and post is created to assist a m ain or advance comm and post in com bat areas where comm and is difficult. In addition, depending on the type of activity, comm and posts can either befixedorm obile, and depending on their physical location, they can be on the surface, underground, ship borne, or airborne.

War Zone Joint Logistics Comm and Posts. A coording to Logistics Support for MobileOperations, the war zone joint logistics structure is the joint logistics comm and center for all of the various services and branches, and is the high est logistics com m and structure for the cam paign.⁴⁰ Norm ally, the war zone logistics organization forms the base, which then incorporates people from the participating navy, air force, and second artillery cam paign juntuan logistics organizations, and local comm and structures that are supporting the cam paign, as well as the appropriate people from the headquarters, political, and equipment departments. When necessary, the GLD and the Headquarters Navy and Air Force Logistics Departments send representatives to participate. Under normal circum stances, the war zone deputy commander who is in di argeofrear area logistics work becom es the joint logistics center com m ander, and the w ar zone logistics departm ent director and each of the war zone service and brands logistics directors are assigned as deputy com m anders.

Depending on them ission, the joint logistics comm and structure can organize four other types of comm and posts: rear area basic comm and post, rear area reserve comm and post, advance comm and post, and a direction comm and post. Norm ally, a rear area basic comm and post is located in the rear area where it is safe to conduct complete, unhindered comm and of joint logistics for mobile operations. A rear area reserve com m and post is establish edearly to take over from the basic com m and post if necessary. Norm ally, the reserve com m and post is staffed by the w ar zone deputy logistics com m ander, other required staff officers, and logistics support *fenclui*. The reserve com m and post is located to the flank or to the rear of the basic com m and post. They m aintain a dose relationship. In the event that the basic com m and post is dam agedor is unable to com m and the logistics units and *fenclui*, the reserve com m and post im m ediately takes dharge.

A rear area advance com m and post is established to strength en the logistics com m and for the prim ary direction or for the important operations. When the war zone deploys an advance com m and post, the war zone logistics organization m ust deploy a logistics com m and team to be part of the advance com m and post, or it m ust establish a rear area advance com m and post in front of the basic com m and post to assist the basic com m and post in carry ing out its com m and

A rear area direction com m and post is established to strength en logistics com m and for independent cam paign directions. When the war zone creates a direction com m and post, the war zone logistics organization should simultaneously create a direction com m and post com posed of a logistics deputy com m ander (unspecified from what logistics level hecom es from) and key staffofficers to assist the basic com m and post and to com m and the logistics for that particular direction. Other personnel for the advance logistics com m and post can com e from logistics brandh departments along the direction, including naval bases, from the high est cam paign juntuan joint logistics organization, and from the war zone logistics organization.

The GLD stresses that in order to provide the best command, the command posts must remain survivable, must have good communications, and must have good cam ouflage. According to the requirements and capabilities, logistics mobile command posts can be placed in fast, mobile vehicles, aircraft (including helicopters), ships, and trains. In order to support command for technical (maintenance) support units and elements, each level of mar zone logistics organization should also make every effort to create technical (maintenance) branch command posts.

PLAAF Logistics Com m and Posts. According to the GLD book, for future wars, the war zone air force logistics structure must create a "th ree-tiered com m and system" comprisedofaw arzoneair forcelogistics com m and post, air corps and base logistics com m and posts, and fields tation basic com m and posts or flight logistics support com m and offices. Thew arzoneair forcelogistics com m and post will be the com m and coordination center. The GLD book did not indicate whether this was part of the joint logistics com m and center. The air corps or base logistics com m and post or air force forw ard com m and post is responsible for m anaging logistics along the direction of the war, and the field station or flight logistics com m and tasks.

The PLAAF stresses that the key tom aking this system work during a war is communications along the chain of command, since logistics is the link between a campaign and the units involved in battles. The brigade and regiment level is the basis for the *budui* logistics. Therefore, when lines of communication are disrupted, logistics along this chain are also disrupted.

SECTION III: PLAAF LOG ISTICS THEORY AND TRAINING

PLAAF Logistics Support Theory.

If av ing looked at the PLAAF's logistics structure, this section will focus primarily on logistics support theory and applied training form obleoperations, which can be utilized in both offensive and defensive cam paigns. The PLAAF has traditionally conducted its com bat operations as a series of air cam paigns with in the PLA's overall cam paign. The term The air force fiew 8,500 sorties, using 3,131 groups of aircraft curing the cam paign. Transport aircraft perform ed a very crucial logistics support function, flying 228 sorties, carrying 1,465 troops and 151 tons of materiel. The num ber of sorties also inducted a large num ber of helicopter sorties, inducing those used to transport over 600 wounded solders from frontline hospitals to Nanning.⁴⁵

Several reasons contributed to the lack of Chinese air com bat operations, including the fact that most airfields were not near the Vietnam eseborder, the existing aircraft (primarily F-5s, F-6s, and II-28s) hadshort legs and limited loiter time, and the PLAAF did not train for sustained sorties, especially from airfields other than their home bases.⁴⁶ Equally important was Beijing's concern that any PLAAF air involvement would escalate the conflict, which was planned to last only 45 days.⁴⁷ Beijing met its goal of "using its aircraft to deter the Vietnam ese from escalating the conflict," even though 20,000 to 30,000 PLA ground troops were killed during the 45-day cam paign.⁴⁸

The PLAAF's logistics forces were thorough ly involved from the time preparations began in the G uangxi Autonom ous Region and Yunnan Province opposite the Vietnam ese border about 45 days prior to the first day of operations. The PLAAF's overall preparations included establishing a command structure; preparing airfields to receive aircraft, AAA, SAMs, and over 20,000 PLAAF troops; and delivering propagancha designed to get the troops and local populace ready for the war.

The G uangzh ou M RAF com m ander (and future PLAAF C om m ander), W ang H ai, w as placed in diarge of PLAAF troops in the G uangxi operations area.⁴⁹ The K unm ing M RAF com m and post director, H ou Sh ujun, w as placed in diarge of PLAAF troops in the Yunnan operations area.⁵⁰ Each operations area w as further divided into several operational directions, and a com bined com m and post w as establish edat ones trategically located airfield with in each operational direction to com m and and coordinate all m atters am ong different brand es and aircraft types with in that district. The G uangzhou MRAF headquarters also established a forw and comm and post at an unidentified location, which worked dosely with the 7th Air Corps at Nanning as the unified authority for the PLAAF's participation in the conflict.

Before and during the conflict, the PLAAF's logistics organizations had two primary missions- to support housing for those troops already stationed in 6 uangxi and to prepare housing, food, water, and electricity for the incoming troops. These organizations issued about 10,000 mobile beds, over 32,000 meters of water pipe, and 200 kilom eters of electric cable; built 4 3,000 squaremeters of bam boosheds; and repaired over 23,000 squaremeters of oldhousing. In addition, the air force used we hides and its boat troops to transport mobile housing with the troops to Tiany ang. During the conflict, the Nanning Wuxu field station dispatched over 16,500 vehicles to provide support for portions of one aviation regiment and one independent air group.

The logistics organizations also had to acquire and supply enough fuel for the incom ing aircraft. Based on initial estimates of the amount of fuel required, the PLAAF's fuel supply was totally inadequate, and several depots were almost empty. Therefore, during the preparation period, fuel depots at all of the region's airfields were filled This induced the depot at Tiany ang, which relied on water transport for its fuel supply. Some of the airfields did not have rail spurs, so vehicles had to bring in all the fuel. In addition, all of the combat readiness tanks available through out the MR and some from outside the MR were quickly transferred to the frontline airfields. These expanded the amount of aviation fuel by over 50 percent. By the time the conflict began, the amount of fuel supplied to all the 6 wangxi airfields was 4.3 times the norm al amount.

Supplying fuel during peacetime in Chinaw as difficult enough, but it proveder en more difficult during wartime Because some airfields, such as Ningming, are dose to the border, their fuels torage was partially underground, and therail lines supplying the bases were overscheduled As a result, the PLAAF was concerned that the Vietnamese might destroy or disrupt fuel supplies. Because of this concern, the PLAAF took about 45 days to build over 50 kilometers of semipermanent fuel pipes leading to three different airfields.

Because the air force did not fly any actual com bat m issions during the conflict, only about one-fourth of the fueles tim ated for com batw as used, and the difficulties with fuel consumption were fewer than expected H owever, several organizational and facilities problems were high lighted For example, the fuel depot capacity at the PLAAF's airfields was toosmall, and there was now ay to supports everal types of aircraft or the sustained com bat use of fuel for several batches of aircraft. In addition, the refueling equipment was deemed backwards and incompatible- a problem the PLAAF states it grappled with through most of the 1990s but has now solved for the most part.

What Logistics Changes Have Taken Place?

As notedearlier, by the early 1990s, the PLAAF hadnot progressed sufficiently toward combined arms training, let alone joint service training. Because of this, the PLAAF's logistics system was still not organized to support mobile operations for long periods of time By the late 1990s, however, that situation had begun to change.

The testing ground for the PLAAF's operational and logistics concepts has been the advanced training center at Dingxin, 6 ansu Province, in the Lanzhou MRAF. In 1958, the PLAAF built a large center for testing its air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and SAMs in the 6 obi Desert near Dingxin.⁵¹ During the mid 1990s, the PLAAF began expanding this base to include a large tactics training center, where multiple PLAAF units could practice the tactics developed at the Tactics Training Center at Cangzhou, II ebei Province, and tested in individual units throughout the force. The PLAAF also established a sm aller-scale "joint tactical training base" in the Nanjing MRAF in 1995.⁵² A 1995 *Liberation Arm y Daily* article alluded to the Dingxin training center while describing a large scale exercise as follow s:⁵³

The exercise involved three categories and six types of combat aircraft, inducing fighters, attack planes, large transport planes, arm edhelicopters, and transport helicopters. Units have made efforts to turn airfield and support stations from those that provided logistic support for only one category of combat planes in the past into those that provides upport for all categories and all types of combat planes. Since different categories and different types of combat planes are to participate in future air battles in one air fleet, units have worked out different types of support plans, renovated and transform edexisting combat planes' service equipment and fadilities, and imported advanced foreign logistic support equipment and fadilities with the result that airfield and supports tations can now provide logistics support for different categories and different types of combat planes.

Them ost important logistics dranges have taken place at the field stations, which have tried to implement three basic dranges in order to support mobile operations. First, the field stations have had to adapt their organizational structure to support the regiment (\$) housed at their airfield when they deploy to other airfields. Second, the field stations have had to organize them selves to support multiple types of aircraft that deploy to their airfield For example, in March 2001, several aircraft from a Guangzhou MRAF bomber dvision conducted a long-range mobility exercise, involving "round the clock flying for several thousands of kilometers, and stops at several unfamiliar airfields."⁵⁴ Third, the field stations have had to prepare to support operations from dispersal airfields and high way landing strips.

To assist the local fields tations, the PLAAF is also trying to create central fields tations that act as regional support centers. The goal of establishing central fields tations is to drange the current system of providing support for only one type of aircraft or one branch to a system that can support multiple types of aircraft and branches, such as AAA, SAM, and racker units in the area of an airfield. This center will have additional fuel, ammunition, and supplies for the aircraft.

In order to support aircraft deploying in or out of a perm anent airfield, the PLAAF began establishing in the mid 1990s a rapid-reaction logistics structure organized of various *fenclui* as follow s:⁵⁵

- ? Em ergency m obile flight support fencluiw ill deploy to field airstrips, highway landing strips, or to other airfields when needed
- ? Emergency mobile transportation fenclui, equipped with large fuel trucks, tow trucks, and container trucks, will deploy to an area quickly to supply personnel and material.
- ? Emergency field fuel pipe *fenclui* will be responsible for providing fuel to airfields not serviced by rail.
- ? Em ergençam obile fieldm edical and rescue fendui.
- ? Em ergency m obile repair *fenclui* w ill be responsible for repairing special equipment.
- ? Em ergency m obileairfield repair fendui, consisting of 150 personnel, will augment the central fields tation repair runw ays and cb other required engineering tasks.
- ? The fenclui can either deploy to another basewith the aviation unit they support, or they can deploy to a base that requires additional support for incoming aircraft. In addition, they can be used to help prepare

and support aircraft dispersing to auxiliary airfields, fields trips, or high way landing strips.

A coording to a 1995 *Liberation Arm y Daily* article, the PLA moved from the theory phase to testing phase for "group contingency logistics support" to meet the requirements of local wars under high-tech conditions.⁵⁶ The articles tated, "The PLAAF hadalready formedvarious mobile support battalions to be transported by air, along with creating fields tation contingency support *fenclui*. At that time, over 90 percent of the personnel had reportedly been placed in service and over 80 percent of the major required logistic equipment was already available."

An April 2001 article in *Air ForceNaus* describeds everal exercises that the Nanjing MRAF had conducted since 1996.⁵⁷ Each exercise involved deploying emergency support teams of 100-300 personnel to unoccupied airfields to set up support operations for aircraft to perform com bat sorties. During one exercise, four aircraft landed and took offagain after 15 m inutes of refueling and provisioning of amm unition.

By the end of 2000, the PLAAF felt comfortable enough to begin expanding the concept to larger units. For example, at the end of 2000 the Jinan MRAF conducted "the first organic deployment of an entire aviation division." A coording to a PLA Pictorial article,⁵⁸

A Jinan MRAF aviation division received orders for combat maneuvers and immediately went into a state of combat readiness. Four hours later, several transports carrying an advance edielon of officers, men, and all kinds of support equipment and supplies left for the war zone. The next day, obzens of combat aircraft took off and flew across three provinces to the designated area, where support activities werequickly accomplished and an advance command postwas established. Shortly after landing, the combat aircraft engaged in exercise training up to 400 kilometers away. Ten days later, the division returned home.

The Role of Transport A ircraft

Although the use of civil aircraft is not new to the PLAAF, there are differing opinions about the PLA's ability toused vilaircraft, as well as military aircraft, to transport supplies and personnel during wartime. Unlike the U.S. military, the PLA transports almost all of its troops, equipment, and supplies by road or rail. The PLAAF's transports are used primarily for VIP support and to support the PLAAF's 15th Airborne Arm y. In June 1989, the PLA used dv il aircraft to transport troops to Beijing prior to the Tiananm en assault. In December 1992, the PLAAF used three Tu-154 transports to ferry over 10,000 troops in andout of Xinjiang and Tibet during the annual troop rotation.⁵⁹ The aircraft flew 83sorties and also carried 15 3 3 tons of supplies. In 1995, the PLAAF for the first time ordered that large transport aircraft carry support personnel and equipment to accompany large deployments of aircraft in energengin obile com bat support exercises.⁶⁰ In addition, military officials in New Delhireported that the PLA used divil aircraft to ferry troops to Tibet during a recent exercise⁶¹ According to a 1999 Department of Defense report, the PLAAF's current complement of large transport aircraft is limited to about a obzen II-76/C and ob and about fifty Y-8/Cubs, the remainder of the transport force consists of sm aller aircraft like the An-24/Coke, An-26/Curl, and Y-5/Colt.⁶² Beijing can be expected to purch as e a few additional Russian II-76s or similarly-sized foreign aircraft. The ongoing expansion of China's civil aircraft fleet ill also allow the PLAAF to use the country's civil airlines to supplement its transport capability during crises.

In Septem ber 2000, Taiw an's *Tung Sen* news quoted high level Taiw an military sources as saying that the PLA plans to use divilair craft, which are cap able of transporting 20,000 troops to Taiw an within 24 hours, to carry out a first-wave assault.⁶³ Regardless of what the PLA cbes during peacetime, there are limits to using dvil aircraft to ferry troops into a hostile environment.

Since the early 1990s, the PLAAF's 15th Airborne Arm y's exercises have become more sophisticated in scope For example, analysis of a 75-cay offensive exercise held in April-May 2001 showed that "the PLA now has the capability to airchop an organic regiment plus an accompanying logistics support unit, together with necessary equipment and supplies, in one airborne operation, and to sustain the operation with reinforcements in succeeding airchops less than six hours later."⁶⁴

In July 1999, the *Liberation Arm* y *Daily* provided inform ation about a large-scale airborne operation in the Dabie Mountains in central China.⁶⁵ The article en phasized that the exercise induced air dropping pieces of light artillery, boxes of am munition, com bat vehicles, com m unications equipm ent, and individual air defense m issiles. According to the article, this was the first time heavy equipment and assault vehicles were para-chopped by the PLA airborne force m arking a historic leap of the force from sole para-landing operations to com bined arm s operations. The reporters stated, "This emergency logistics support unit, otherwise called an 'airborne warehouse' carrying tens oftons of arsupplies, can be air-chopped at any location according to operational needs. It can be employed in a concentrated form in one direction, or separated into sm all segments and dropped over scattered locations to provide supplies to the battlefield in m any directions."

Fuel Support.

One of the m ost important challenges for the field station is m aintaining sufficient m aterials, especially fuel, on h and before the start of a cam paign, and then m aintaining enough supplies to sustain the cam paign. The PLA states that the cost for fuel per flying hour for the PLAAF's "com paratively advanced" aircraft can reach 10,000 renm inbi (USD 1,250).⁶⁶ Assum ing this refers to an F-8, the cost for a regiment of 2 aircraft with each pilot averaging 100 hours per year, and 1.5 pilots per aircraft, means the regiment's aircraft would fly 3500 hours at a cost of approximately 35 million renm inbi (USD 4.52 million) per year. A coording to the PLAAF,⁶⁷

Fuel is 80 percent of the PLAAF's material. Based on PLAAF statistics, asmalls calelocal war requires 90,000 to 140,000 tons of aviation fuel. Given this large quantity of usage, it would be difficult for the PLAAF's water and ground transportation system to supply this amount completely today. The best way to solve this problem is to build apipeline network, which would be easy to open, could transfer large quantities of fuel, is easy to hide, and its ability to exist is high.

6 iven the PLAAF's historical problem s with refueling equipment, in 1999, the PLAAF reportedly developed and tested a new airfield petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) supply system in the Jinan MR.⁶⁸ The system is an emergency mobile refueling device capable of supporting transregional air operations, and can be quickly deployed to forward airfields. It is mainly for use on sod airstrips, reserve airfields, and on highway runways opened for wartime operation. It can also be used on fixed airfields in case of damage to POL installations or power outages. During the exercise, the system was brought in and with drawn after refueling two warplanes in 15 m inutes. It can simultaneously refuel two aircraft of any model by gravity or pressure

The importance of the PLAAF's emphasis on its fuel supply and refueling techniques was demonstrated during an exercise in Nanjing in April 2000. According to a *Liberation Arm y Daily* article,

Minister of Defense Chill actian observed a PLAAF logistics exercise that focused on building a field oil depot capable of providing support to several hunched planes. The exercise also covereds everal other logistics tasks, including deaning up after an enemy air attack on an airport, restoring the airport's support capability, providing mobile combat support by ground units, im plementing cam outflage and protection for aircraft, battle positions, and oil depots.⁶⁹

6 iven the PLAAF's dual concerns of supplying its forces with sufficientmaterial in a timely manner and protecting its supplies from being destroyed, its tates,⁷⁰

Because the PLAAF's transportation capability is weak and requirements for supplying lots of material during wartimeis high, the most material should be stored at the primary war direction rather than secondary war directions. Fuel and ammunition used during battles are primary targets for the enemy, so it is not easy to store lots of material together. Therefore, the PLAAF should use campaign rear area bases as the primary with stores in several places. Airfields in the focal point direction can store some common usematerial, but the most important material should be stored and controlled by the war zone PLAAF logistics organization or by PLAAF H eachquarters logistics for emergency purposes. When necessary, they can be air transported to the combat area units.

Logistics Support for Com bat Sorties.

The PLAAF has establish exprocedures for what it calls the "four flying phases," so that all aviation and support units train and fight from the same sheet of music⁷¹ This is especially important for the logistics system when aircraft deploy to a new airfield, or the receiving airfield's field station coes not necessarily have the proper facilities or experience to support the new type of aircraft or equipment. Therefore, the fields tation is required to follow established procedures. According to the *PLAAF Dictionary*, the four flying phases are as follow s:⁷²

1. A drancepreparation phase, which usually takes place the day before a flight.

2 Direct preparation phase, which occurs the case of the flight.

3 Flightim plementation phase.

4. Flight appraisal phase

Whereas the commancer determines them issions, the political commissar's responsibility throughout the four phases is to ensure that the pilot is trustworthy enough to fly under the particular dircum stances. Other people are responsible for ensuring the pilot has the proper technical qualifications to perform a particular mission, heis healthy, and the flight plan conform swith the reality of the pilot's situation. In addition, others prepare the aircraft for the mission.

Sortie Generation and Sustainability.

The key to any conflict for the PLAAF is sustained com bat, and the PLAAF has not yet demonstrated the capability to conduct sustained, high intensity operations. The PLAAF does not have any real world experience in planning and executing the kind of high intensity air cam paign that has proven so successful in U.S. and allied operations over the past decade Although one should not analyze the PLAAF through mirror im aging, inform ation about U.S. and Allied air force activities during the G ulf W ar and the Kosovo Conflict provide am easure of com bat sortiegeneration and sustainability.

During the early stages of the conflict in Kosovo, allied air forces deployed approximately 400 aircraft to the area.⁷³ By the end of the conflict, the number of U.S. and NATO combat aircraft participating in strike delivery rose from 214 to 590 aircraft.

During the 78 days of Operation Allied Force, U.S. and NATO aircraft flew a total of 37,465 com bat sorties – an averages ortiegeneration rateof 486 m issions per day.⁷⁴ Of the total, 14,006 w erestrike and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) m issions (10,808 of which were dedicated strike sorties). According to Pentagon information, 23,000 bom bs and m issiles were used In the early days of the campaign, how ever, the sortie rate over Yugos lavia was m orelike 150 m issions per day. Them axim um intensity of operations w as reach edon day 57, when 1,000 sorties were flow n, 800 of which were com bat m issions. These figures compare to 109,876 com bat sorties over the 43 day 6 ulf W ar, or an average of 2555 m issions per day. Of the total flow n in the 6 ulf, about half were strike m issions, averaging around 1,600 sorties per day. These num bers db not include noncom bat transport support sorties. These figures dem onstrate the capability needed to ram p up and m aintain high intensity operations, or dies trate operations through a unified daily air tasking or der (ATO), and the need to sustain intense air operations when faced with a determ ined adversary.⁷⁵

Weath er affected nearly half the sorties during the Gulf War (in a desert environment), and the air offensive against Yugos lavia ground to a halt for days on end while targets remained obscured by doud⁷⁶ During the 78-day operation, there was at least 50 percent doud dover for over 70 percent of the time. The need to minimize divilian casual ties demanded visual identification and the use of precision weapons. With out a reasonably dear optical path, how ever, laser-guided bom by could not be employed

NATO and U.S. forces were also hampered by the political decision to restrict the operating height of NATO attack aircraft to a baseline of 15,000 feet for m uch of the w ar.⁷⁷ W hile this kept NATO pilots beyond the range of m ost Yugoslav handheld surface to air m issile (SAM) systems and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) over Kosovo, it placed what many saw as highly artificial limits on the freedom of air campaign planners and strike crews to employ the full range of battlefield air interdiction techniques for which they hadlong been trained It also, on occasion, drallenged the alliances ability to identify targets correctly, contributing to a number of targeting errors. The worst of these was an attack on a Kosov ar Albanian refugee colum n, when high-flying USAF pilots apparently mistook tractors and oth er civilian v ehides for Serbian ann or. These examples indicate that restrictive rules of engagement will

mostlikely guide any future air cam paign by the U.S. and possibly the PLAAF as well.

It is dear that the PLAAF has never conducted the high intensity sortie generation capability the allied forces show ed in the 1990s. Based on an analysis of Chinese literature and interviews in China, it is evident that PLAAF pilots do not fly as many hours as their Western counterparts. According to interviews with PLAAF and foreign air forceofficials, the PLAAF's flyinghours have not dranged appreciably over the past 15 years, but they have dranged their training techniques. Since the end of the 1970s, bom ber pilots have consistently flow n an average of 80 hours per year; fighter pilots 100 to 110 hours; and A-5 ground attack pilots up to 150 hours.⁷⁸ This com pares to about 215 hours per year for USAF bom ber, fighter, and attack crews. USAF pilots also conduct num erous hours training on advanced sim ulators.⁷⁹

The PLAAF's official magazine, *Zhongguo Kongjun* [*China's Air Force*], has provided information on the number of sorties certain divisions have flow n, which gives a glim pse of how the PLAAF as a whole operates. The 1994-4 issue discusses flight activity by the 39th Air Division in the Sheny ang MR for a 5-year period⁸⁰ From 1989-1994, the division flew 12,15 3 sorties in 1,715 *changci*, equating to 7 sorties per *changci*.⁸¹

A 1995 article in *Ch ina's Air Force* provided information about a fuels branch assigned to a PLAAF field station located on the Leizh ou Peninsula. Based on the information contained in the article, the fields tation is part of the 2nd A ir D ivision in the G uangzh ou M Randsupports am ix of F-6 and F-7 fighters. The gist of the article was that the Leizh ou Peninsulah as severe thunder storms 11 m on this out of the year, and the fuels branch conducted its activities safely under difficult weather conditions. The article touted the fuel branch's safety record by stating that it supported 54,506 sorties over the 8-year period of 1987 through 1994, equating to 6,813 sorties per year.⁸² Based on the author's calculations of these types of articles over a 15-year period, an average sortie lasts from 45-60 m inutes. It is not clear from the article whether the field station supports one or two regiments. Assuming the field station supports one regiment with a standard table of organization and equipment (TO&E) of at least 24 aircraft and 1.5 pilots per aircraft (36 pilots), this equates to 190 sorties per pilot per year, or 36 sorties perweek. If the fields tation supports two regiments of 48 aircraft and 72 pilots, this equates to 85 sorties per year or 1.6 sorties per week. If there are more aircraft and pilots per regiment, then the sortie rate is lower.

According to Air Commocbre Ramesh Phacke of the Indian Air Force⁸³

Nearly 50 per cent of the PLAAF consists of ageing and difficult-tom aintain F-6s, while therem aining aircraft belong to the reasonably modern category. Maintaining operational reachess must be a difficult undertaking. It would besafe to assume that at the rate of approximately 1.5 pilots per aircraft, the PLAAF would have to provide a minimum of 120-150 flight hours annually to 4500-5000 of its active duty pilots. Allowing for those employed in staff and headquarters appointments, it would mean that at least 4000 pilots would need regular flying training. A rough calculation wouldshow that to provide 150 hours of flying to 4000 pilots at 60-70 percent rate of serviceability, the PLAAF fleet would have to fly some 285 to 335 hours per serviceable aircraft per year, or 21-28 hours per month, which would be a huge task by any standards.

In the past, the PLAAF tried to overcome the individual aircraft sortie generation gap by having high numbers of aircraft available, such as when the PLAAF deployed over 700 aircraft near the Vietnam border in 1979. Another reason for low sortie generation rate is that most engines (F-6, F-7, and F-8) can only be used from 100 to 300 hours before they are overhauled, the aircraft availability rate would probably be reduced considerably during periods of sustained used uring a conflict. Although the engines for the

Su-27s and Su-30s arem uch better, the PLAAF still faces the airframe service ability. The PLAAF has facilities to overhaul all of its F-6s, F-7s, and B-6s, and their engines, but its F-8s m ust still return to the Shenyang Aircraft Factory to be over hauled aprocess that can take from 6-12 m on this per aircraft.⁸⁴ Until the Sheny and A ircraft Factory has the full cap ability to overhaul the Su-27s and Su-30s, the PLAAF must send these aircraft back to Kom som olsk to be overhauled It is not dear what the overhaul service period for a Su-27 is; how ever, assuming the original Su-27 s th at arrived at the 3rdA ir D iv is ion in June 199 2h ave been flow n am inim um of 150 hours per year (1.5 pilots at 100 hours each), then those airframes have at least 1, 350 total hours each. The PLAAF must decide whether to fly those aircraft moreor less as time progresses. Flying less means a reduced readiness capability, but flying more means more time on the airframes that cuts cown the time before they m ust be overhauled

The two latest examples of PLAAF sortiegeneration and massing aircraft come from the 1996 exercise opposite Taiw an and the sorties flow n in response to President Lee Teng-hui's "state-to-state" comments in July 1999.

The PLAAF was actively involved during the PLA's largescale exercises opposite Taiw an during March 1996. A coording to available open sourcem aterial, "The exercise included 12,000 PLAAF and 3,000 Naval Aviation servicen en. Moreth an 280 aircraft deploy ed to the exercise area and conducted total 680 sorties, inducing 82 transport sorties. Over 800 com bat aircraft were within a com bat readiness of 550 miles or we reon the alert." Another report stated the PLA deployed for er than 100 additional aircraft to the 13Fujian airfields from other bases, raising the total to only 22 aircraft. Basedon a briefing by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, the PLA conducted a total of 1,755 sorties during the exercise⁸⁵ Further press reportings tated that the PLAAF deploy edaircraft from its second and third line airfields to first line airfields, I here they conducted their exercise activity. It took about 3.5 hours for the

PLAAF fighters to prepare for takeoff, compared to the 10 hours they had needed previously. In addition, the PLAAF dem onstrated rapid aircraft sortie regeneration of 40 m inutes, which was considerably quicker than the past.⁸⁶ W hat was not indicated in the reporting is the number of sorties each pilot flew per day and whether they flew every day.

During July and August 1999, only the elve PLAAF aircrafthe ereairborneatany time, not all offichide ereover the Strait, and the PLAAF flee only about 30 total sorties per day.⁸⁷ The air environment over the Taile and Strait also provides limitations on the number of sorties that can be flow n. Most of the airspace immediately north and south of Taile and flying to/from Taipei and K aoh siung, is dedicated to dvil air routes, and over 1,000 dvil air flights fly through Taile an's airspace daily.⁸⁸ Although the PLAAF did not fly that many sorties in the Strait, Beijing definitely sent a dear message that the PLAAF could fly in the Strait if it wanted to and psychologically altered the view of the PLAAF in Taile an.

The PLAAF has classified its flying regiments into several categories as an indicator of their combat effectiveness. The high est is Category-A (*jia lei*). In 1997, Liu stated that 90.5 percent of the combat regimens were Category-A and the number of pilots capable of "all-weather" combath adreadt ed76.2percent, the high est ever.⁸⁹ In 1999, Liu stated that 98 percent of the regiments were Category-A.⁹⁰

C am ouflage, C oncealm ent, D eception, and D ispersal.

Through out the PLAAF's writings, there are references to concerns about secrecy and early detection of its plans for offensive operations, given today's intelligences at ellite and airborne surveillance collection cap abilities. PLA writers havestated, "Major military operations cannot escape from such an intelligence net,"⁹¹ so conducting frequent m ovem entanda certain am ount of dispersal is an effective concealment method^{9,2} "Forces should integrate the use of feints, cam ouffage, screening, and dispersion to conceal our command, control, communications, and intelligence systems and to deceive and jam enemy information reconnaissance"^{8,3}

The PLAAF's logistics forces have the primary responsibility for implementing most of the cam outflage, concealment and deception (CC&D) measures. While some CC&D and dispersal activities will take place during the cam paign preparation phase, others will occur during the execution phase. As a result of the need to conduct undetected offensive operations, at least during the early stages of a campaign, yet provide for survivability in a counterattack, the PLAAF's logistics forces have invested considerable time and m oney into passive CC & D m easures, such as building aircraft cave shelters, sm all hangars, single aircraft shelters, false targets, and "concealing the real and making the false obvious."⁴ The PLAAF has identified additional measures that must also be taken to ensure survivability, such as building hardened entrances to caves, underground com m and posts, aircraft h angars, and personnel shelters, as well as fuel, ammunition, m ateriel, and equipm ents torage facilities.⁹⁵ Other passive CC&D m easures have also been tried For example, in an October 2000 exercise, a Nanjing MRAF airfield conducted a complete blackout as their aircraft returned from an air strike⁹⁶

The PLAAF has paid particular attention to trying to enhance these CC&D m easures through the use of dispersing its meapon systems and equipment. The PLAAF states that the key to gaining air superiority is keeping airfields available for operations. According to Logistics Support for Mobile Operations,⁹⁷

The PLAAF must have a network of three types of runwayspermanent, field, and high way. During the first ten days of the Gulf War, 40 percent of the Iraqi Air Force's aircraft were

destroy ed Them ajority of the aircrafts unvived, but they were notable to take offfrom their airfields for combat, so it was the same as not having them at all. Therefore, the best way to deal with this type of situation is to hidey our aircraft and air defense equipment by dispersing them to field airstrips and high way landing strips from which they can continue to conduct their combat operations. The dispersal is especially important because airfield protection is weak. Currently, somewar zones do not have many first-line airfields, so logistics supportshould bestrength enedlat first-line airfields to support multiple types of aircraft prior to or returning from astrike, or aircraft stopping to refuel en route to their home bases. When mobile operations units are massing and there arenot enough airfields, then the warzonelogistics must open up field airstrips and high way landing strips and support them with emergency logistics support fendui.

Over the past decade, the PLAAF has tried to increase the number of airfields, as well as to open up many of its airfields for dvil aircraft. A 1996 Xinh uareports tated, "The PLAAF had opened 71 military airports and offered 53 reserve airports to dvilian airplanes since 1990."⁹⁸ According to a 1999 South China Morning Postartide, "The PLAAF built 37 airports between 1995 and 1999. In addition, more than 100 large weaponry and equipment warehouses and war-readiness facilities had been enlarged and renov ated "⁹⁹ Unfortunately, the article did not provide a list of the airfields or state whether they were strictly for military use or joint dvil-military use

In the late 1980s, the PLAAF began practicing dispersing its aircraft from perm anent bases to alternate runw ays, including high way and sod landing strips. For exam ple, in Septem ber 1989, three F-8 interceptors from the 1stAirDivision at Ansh an andone II-14 transport used the Sh enyang-Dalian high way as a dispersal runw ay for the first time ever.¹⁰⁰ The F-8s landed singly and took off quickly in a three-ship form ation. The 1996-4 issue of *Ch ina's Air Forceshow* edseveral photos of a logistics fuel team setting up fuel pipes to support a single F-8-2 from the 1st Air Division landing on the Sheny ang-Dalian high way during mobile operations "for the first time" in May 1996.¹⁰¹

ThePLAAF has establishedsetprocedures for providing logistics support for dispersing aircraft. According to Logistics Support for MobileOperations, logistics forces will follow a four-step process to prepare for aircraft to arrive at a fields trip or high way landing strip.¹⁰² The first step is the arrival of the advance team, that will coordinate with the local divilians and militia for securing the area and make an initial dreck of the run ay, aprons, and facilities. The seconds tep induces the arrival of the first ed elon, which is responsible for setting up the logistics command post, dosing the high way to civilian traffic inspecting and clearing the runw ay and parking apron, assisting m aintenance personnel prepare for flight operations, setting up fuel and am m unition storage, and organizing housing and health facilities. The next step induces opening the air strips and arrival of additional logistics forces. The final step is arrival of the aircraft and more logistics support troops.

Although this typeofdispersal training was rarely noted in the open media until the late 1990s, an exercise in April 2000 provides a good example of recent training.¹⁰³

At 0615, an unidentified PLAAF airfield in the Jinan MR initiatedan en ergency dispersal exercise following as in ulated cruisemissile counterattack on the airfield Given thes cenario, the cruisemissile counterattack appears to have occurred while the PLAAF's aircraft were returning from an attack. One group of support troops and over 50 special vehicles, including fuel trucks, power supply trucks, and oxygen trucks, dispersed to a designated high way lancing strip to support the regiment's takeoff and lancings. At the same time, a second group of emergency support personnel begin repairing bom bedrunways, extinguishing aircraft fires, giving first aid to injured pilots, and repairing oil pipelines.

Besides using emergency runways for pre-and postattack dispersal airfields, the PLAAF has also gradually tried to build up the capability to provide logistics and m aintenance support at auxiliary airfields for m ore than one type of aircraft over a sustained period of time. The PLAAF has gradually m oved from supporting a few aircraft of a single type at an airfield for increasingly longer periods of time, to supporting multiple types. In cbing this, they have had to tack lean um ber of long-stancing problems that underm ine support efficiency, including backward plane refueling technology and backward bom b loading technology.¹⁰⁴

Support for Nonaviation Units.

Although most of the PLAAF's reporting focuses on its aviation brands, nonaviation units have also conducted CC&D and dispersal operations. A September 1999 Liberation Arm y Daily article described a North Sea Fleet Naval Aviation ractar brigade exercise, that most likely represents the type of activity the PLAAF's rachar units would implement during a campaign.¹⁰⁵ The articles tated, "On receiving orders to set out, the brigade took only 40 m inutes to dism antle its nonm obile rachers tation and begin a motorized advance of several hundred kilom eters. On reaching the combat area, the ractars were quickly set up to provide air situation reports to the command post. In addition, decoy ractars and positions we resetup at the same time to confuse reconnaiss an ceptanes." In November 2000, a Beijing M RAF SAM division equipped with three types of SAMs used "m ixed deployment, concealing the real and displaying the false, and mobile and bush operations "during a live fire exercise 106

Unansw eredQuestions.

There are m any questions this drapter w as not able to answer due to the lack of open source information. For example, as someone who has observed China's defense industry for decades stated,¹⁰⁷ Logistics revolves basically aroundsystem sandhum bers. What kindofrelationships does the PLAAF havewith its suppliers? What doweknow about their supply drain managementskills? What doweknow about packaging-are consumables such as ammunition and petroleum, lubricants and oils (POL) packaged so they can be used right away "out of the box," or do they require assembly and/or processing before they can be used? What dowe know about operating standards and rates, induding sortie rates, ammunition and fuel consumption rates, maintenance rates (manhours of maintenance per hour of flight time), and other crucial logistics metrics?

These are just a few of the basic questions that need to be answered to really understand what the PLAAF's logistics capabilities are

Although little open source inform ation is available about the PLAAF's actual supply system, some generalizations can be adeby looking at the way the U.S. military's logistics system manages similar responsibilities. The following information is taken from AFSC Pub1, The Joint Staff Officer's & uide, 1997.¹⁰⁸ "The hundreds of thousands of items in the U.S. Federal supply system are categorized into one of 10 broad dasses shown below. Deployment planning focuses on very broad categories, but it coes subdivide the 10 dasses into a total of just over 40 subdasses. For example, ammunition is subdivided into ammo-air and ammo-ground subsistence is divided into subclasses for in-flight rations, refrigerated rations, non-refrigerated rations, combat rations, and water."

- ? Class 1: Subsistence
- ? Class 2: Clothing, individual equipment, tools, administrative supplies
- ? Class 3: Petroleum, oils, lubricants
- ? Class 4: Construction m ateriel
- ? Class 5: Am m unition

- ? Class 6: Personal dem and item s
- ? Class 7: Major enditems; racks, pylons, tracked vehicles, etc.
- ? Class 8: Medical materials
- ? Class 9: Repair parts
- ? Class 10: Material for nonmilitary programs

The Officer's 6 uidefurther states, "Strategicm oven ent ofpeople, equipment, and supplies is only part of a complex logistics problem, whereby units must move, supplies must be requisitioned and delivered on time, combat for celoading must be obne according to the type of officiating expected, and there are always competing demands for transport resources and support facilities." Based on the author's experience with the PLAAF and aviation ministry in the late 1980s and follow up discussions with aviation business representatives since then, the PLAAF has moved doser to a fully automated logistics system, but there are still problems with standardizing parts to put into the system.

SECTION IV : CONCLUSIONS

The bottom line is what the PLAAF's logistics forces have obne to better prepare the PLAAF to fight against the UnitedStates if required to obso. It is clear that the logistics forces have made adjustments in their organizational structure and operational methods to support the PLAAF's shift tow archigointmobile, offensive operations, but they are not there yet.

Over the past 5 clecacles, the PLAAF has only been involved in three m ajor external cam paigns- the Korean W ar, the 1958 Taiw an Strait Crisis, and the 1979 Vietnam border conflict.¹⁰⁹ During those cam paigns, the PLAAF cleployeds everal hunched aircraft to a handful of airfields near the border, but their perpilot sortieratew as m inim al. Moreim portantly, noneofth osecam paigns involvedenem y attacks against targets inside China's borders, so the PLAAF's aircraft, airfields, and troops were safe. The PLAAF has studied the GulfW ar and Kosovo conflict and knows that the next war will most likely be completely different. Their aviation and air defense assets, not only near the front but also in rear areas, will not be safe from attack by Americans. stealth aircraft and long-range cruise missiles. This is why the PLAAF is concentrating on CC&D and dispersalmeasures, and why Chinah as placed ahigh er emphasis on national military and dvil air defense capabilities the past couple of years.

The current description for PLAAF fighter, bom ber, and ground attack offensive air cam paign operations can be sum m arized as "transregional rapid m obility integrated long-distances trikes at night in all weather conditions from multiple levels and different directions under unknown conditions. These attacks can be conducted against landor m aritime targets, and the navigation routes can be over landor over water." Media reports discussing the PLAAF's exercises have mentioned all of the above, but from the PLAAF's perspective, one of the strongest aspects of its training program is that during exercises both an tagon is to are told when a war begins, but they are not told the other sides number of sorties, location, or altitude. Therefore, they must decide how to achieve victory in a completely unknown environment. An exercise conducted by a Jinan MRAF fighter regiment indicates the PLAAF's trend in training for energency mobile transregional operations. According to a November 2000 report in Air Force New s,¹¹⁰

A regiment of fighters consisting of over 20 aircraft departed its home base in the Jinan MR (which induces Shanchong and # enan Provinces) on a rainy night "uncher concealment" in late October. The aircraft flew to an airfield south of the Yangzi river (probably in the Nanjing MR), to concluct air patrols and rencher air support to the war zone. This emergency combat mobility chill signified a new breakthrough in its cap ability for large-fleet, long-range, all-weather operations at all hours and in all air spaces. The regimentholds monthly simulated drills of emergency takeoff and mobility, and drange of alert conditions. It has switched to unfamiliar field targets for target practice, and dranges ground markers frequently to enhance aviators' cap abilities for independent navigation and target identification. It flies frequent low - and ultra-low altitude flights, some over sea areas under unknown conditions. It also subjects aviators to maximum caily flying time training. Training for complicated weather conditions is conducted in minimal weather conditions. On the recent maneuver, the regiment also practiced electronic countermeasures, penetrating enemy defenses from different directions, coordinated attacks from high and low altitudes, and simulated attack over water.

Through out this drapter, there have been references to the PLAAF's requirement during the 1990s to transform itselffrom a force cap able of employing single brandles and single types of aircraft in positional defensive campaigns to using multiple brandles and several types of aircraft in air force combined arms, mobile offensive operations campaigns, with the goal of shifting to operations in joint service campaigns. With in this goal, the PLAAF's logistics forces have had to drange their operational structure and methods of operation from supporting single types of aircraft at their home or deployed bases for short and long periods of time.

Basedon them aterial available to write this report, it appears that the PLAAF's logistics system has made progress toward reaching its goal of supporting mobile forces. Organizationally, it has established emergency mobile *fenclui* to support deploying aircraft into and out of airfields. These *fenclui* are also responsible for helping set up mobile operations at field airs trips and high way landing strips. Although the articles reviewed discuss the need to preposition adequatematerial in the campaign areas before a war breaks out, they did not discuss whether this has actually happened From a training perspective, it appears that the PLAAF's logistics forces are applying their theory to operational exercises. The exercises involve repairing cam age to airfields after notional enemy attacks, including runw ay repairs, taking careofw oundedpersonnel, putting out fires, and preparing to recover aircraft that are en route hom e and have been dam aged during their m ission. At the sam etime, the logistics forces have deployed some fendui to begin preparing the field airs trips or high way landings trips for recovering aircraft or for generating follow -on com bat sorties.

One of them ost important issues that is not dear from the articles reviewed is how proficient the PLAAF would be during a real conflict, especially if some of the key first line airfields were destroyed as the PLA anticipates will happen in a conflict with the United States. Would the PLAAF, in fact, be able to conduct com bats or ties out offield airstrips and high way landing strips, or would they merely besom au here to disperse the aircraft until they could fly to another operational airfield? Would the PLAAF option ove its aircraft further to the rear as its airfields began sustaining clam age? Will the PLAAF actually be able to provide logistics support to multiple types of aircraft at a singlebase? Many airfields have as ingle regiment with two types of aircraft (generally F-6s and F-7s), or have two regiments with different types of aircraft, such as one regimentwith F-7s and onewith F-8s. The fields tations are organized appropriately to support m ore than one type of aircraft. Buthow proficient will the logistics forces at first lineairfields beifthey have to support several regiments of different types of aircraft? Although bom bers have conducted exercises where they stopped at multiple airfields, the media reports did not specify the types of airfields they transited or the types of support they received

Two probablew eak links for the logistics forces during a campaign will be communications and transportation. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations states that "when lines of communication are disrupted, logistics along this d ain are also disrupted Therefore, the PLAAF needs to establish an independent comm and comm unications network, consisting of radio, landline, and computers."¹¹¹ It is not dear from the media reports or the PLA books whether this taking place

Although the PLAAF has ordered that transport aircraft should be used to move logistics forces during campaigns, road and rail will still be them ost likely means. A logistics transportation exercise conducted during summer 2001 in the G uangzhou MRAF emphasized that the PLAAF is not yet prepared to operate under poor weather conditions or non-scripted exercises. During his critique, the G uangzhou MRAF transportation director emphasized "the key is that training still consists of form with out substance, including training for show to pass the test. Some units were throw n into disorder with just the slightest change in the predeterm ined disposition."¹¹²

If the PLAAF does have to engage the United States in battle som etim e in the near future, the keys will be pilot proficiency, sortiegeneration and sustainability, adequate logistics support across the board, reliable com m unications and intelligence and equipment maintenance capabilities. The PLAAF has made much progress in all of these areas over the past decade, beginning with establishing the theory, then providing the training to implement the theory. It is clear, at least from reading PLAAF writings, that much of what they want to cb is still aspirational, but they are definitely putting the pieces of the administrative and operational structure in place to accomplish their goals som etime in the future The PLAAF is also in the process of acquiring the types of weapon systems that will allow them to operate from airfields that are farther from the borders and to deploy SAMs with ranges that can reach out bey ond China's borders. The logistics forces are also definitely d anging accordingly to support these new systems.

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 9

1. The author would like to thank M ajor Bill Belk (USAFR) for his assistance in gathering the FBIS material for this drapter, and to K en Ashley, JeffG oldman, and Jerem y Morrow for their comments on early drafts. The author would especially like to thank Rick K amer for his assistance in identifying certain PLAAF units by their aircraft tail number, using his website www.China-defense.com / aviation/numbering-system.

2 W en & uangchun, ecl, *Jickong Zuozh an H ouqin B aozh ang*, [*L ogistics Support for Mobile Operations*], PLA & eneral Logistics Departm ent H eachquarters D epartm ent, PLA Press, January 1997, p. 184-185.

3 This description is a composite of information taken from H ong H eping and Tian Xia, H each to the New Century," Zhongguo Kongjun [China's Air Force] 1996-5; and W en G uang du un, ed, Jichng Zuozh an H ouqin B aozh ang. This is one of six books under the title G aojish u Tiaojian Xia Jubu Zh anzh eng H ouqin B aozh ang [Logistics Support for Local W ars under H igh-Tech Conditions] that the G eneral Logistics D epartment commissioned the National Defense University and all logistics organizations to compile in 1995.

4. The PLA adds guerilla operations as the thirdmode for its ground forces.

5. Teng L ianfu and Jiang Fush eng, ecs., *Kongjun Zuozh an Yanjiu* [*A ir ForceOperations Research*], Beijing: National Defense University Publish ers, May 1990, p. 187.

6. Paul H.B. Godt in, "Change and Continuity in Chines e Military Doctrine: 1949-1999," a paper presented at The Center for Naval Analyses Corporation's 1999 conference on PLA W arfighting. H arlan W.Jencks provided a detailed critique of this strategy in "People's W ar Uncer Modern Conclitions: W ish ful Thinking, National Suicide, or Effective Deterrent," *The China Quarterly*, No. 98, June 1984, p. 305-319.

7. The *PLAAF Dictionary* defines air strategy as "The overall plan and guiding plan for air force building and com bat. It is part of a country's military strategy and consists of three interrelated parts: air force strategic objectives, air force strength, and air force strategic employment." Zhu Rongdiang, ed, *Kongjun D a Cidian [Air Force Dictionary*], Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, September 1996, p. 6. 8. Chengcu Military Region Cam paign Training Office, Jituanjun Yezh an Zhendi Fangyu Zhanyi Kongjun de Yunyong [Air Force Utilization During the Cam paign to Defend & roup Arm y Field Positions], February 1982, p 1. This ground force dbm ination is not surprising, since every PLAAF commander and deputy commander until the late 1980s had their roots in the ground forces. It was not until 1973 that the PLAAF had its first aviator as a deputy commander, and 1985 until the first aviator became the commander. Even so, the Arm y still selects the PLAAF senior officers, and there are no air force general officers in any of the four PLA general departments (ceneral Staff, Political, Logistics, and Equipment Departments).

9. H ua Renjie, Cao Yifeng, and Chen H uixiu, eds., "Kongjun Xueshu Sixiang Shi," [Air Force Art and Thought H istory] Jiefangjun Publishers, Beijing, 1991, p. 204-331.

10. Teng L ian fu an dJiang Fush eng, ecs., Kongjun Zuozh an Yanjiu, p. 261.

11. Ibid., p. 186.

12 TheRepublicofCh in a 199 394 National DefenseReport, Taipei: Li Ming Cultural EnterpriseCo., Ltd, 1994, p. 65-66.

13 Republic of China: 1998 National Defense Report (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd, 1998, pp. 30-31.

14, Republic of China: 2000 National Defense Report, Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd, 1998).

15 Briefing from Ministry of National Defense, December 2000.

16. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dhina/facility/airfield.htm. There are 6 m ilitary airfields within 400 kilom eters, 11 m ore between 400-600 kilom eters, and 19 m ore between 600-800 kilom eters.

17. Interviews in Taiwan, December 2000.

18. In late 1999, the PLA began a program of training called the "three defenses and three attacks," including attacks against stealth planes, cruise m issiles and arm ed helicopters, and defense against precision strikes, electronic jam m ing, and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance

19. If ong II eping and Tian Xia, "II each to the New Century," China's Air Force, 1996, No. 5, p. 4-7.

20. Ibid.

21. The tim ing of Liu's comments on an offensive capability came as he took over the commancer's position in December 1996 and as Taiw an began final preparations to receive the first squaction of 150 F-16s and Mirages in April 1997.

22 Sun Maoqing, "Make Efforts To Build Modernized People's Air Force Interview With Air Force Commander Lieutenant & eneral Liu Shunyao," Beijing *Liaow ang*, April 14, 1997, No 15, pp. 20-21.

23 Yu Xiao, Tai Yang, Fu Song, and Wang Jianyun, "We Must Win the Next Battle: Two Fighter Division Commanders' Views of Simultaneous Offensive and Defensive Capabilities," *China's Air Force*, 2000, No. 2, pp. 4-8.

21. A ir ForceD ictionary, p. 30. The PLAAF's units (buclui) induces of visions, brigades, and regiments. The regiment is the low estlevel for logistics management. Below the unitlevel are elements (fenclui), which induce battalions, platoons, companies, and squads. Aviation troop equivalents of battalions and platoons are groups (clacui) and squadrons (chongclui), respectively. Fenclui consist of the troops that actually carry out the logistics work.

23. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, Chapter 1.

26. A ir ForceD ictionary, p. 274.

27. Yao Jun, ed, Zhongguo II angkong Shi [A II istory of China's Aviation], Zhengzhou: Dajia Publishers, September 1998.

28. K enneth W. Allen, *People's RepublicofCh ina's L iberation Arm y A ir Force*, W ash ington, DC: Defense IntelligenceAgency, 1991, Section 7, p. 5.

2). Ibid.

30. A ir Force D ictionary, p. 165. Com posite depots are zongh e ku, and specialty depots are zh uany eku.

31. In May 1976, the Aeronautical Engineering Department (hangkong gongchengbu/konggong), which had been cowingraded to a secondlevel department in 1969, was re-established as the fourth first level department and dranged its name to the Equipment-Technical Department (kongjun zhuangbei jish ubu) in November 1992 Following the April 1998 creation of the General Equipment Department, the PLAAF dranged the name of the Equipment-Technical Department to the Equipm ent Departm ent (kongjun zh uangbeibu/kongzh uang). A coording to interviews with PLA officials, the H eachquarters Departm ent transferred its second level Equipm ent Departm ent and Scientific Research Departm ent (key an bu) to the Equipm ent Departm ent, so that its responsibilities m atched those of the G eneral Equipm ent Departm ent. Air Force Dictionary, p. 146; Shijie Junshi Nianjian 1999 [World Military Yearbook], published by PLA Press, Beijing, p. 103

32 Air ForceDictionary, p. 276.

33. The difference between material (*w uzi*) and air materiel (*h angcai*) is that the former consists of items such as lum ber and concrete for the entire PLAAF, and the latter consists of item s only for the aviation branch's aircraft and aviation troops. The four other branches (AAA, SAM, rachar, and airborne) and specialized support elements (communications troops, etc.) cb not use air materiel.

34. Interview with PLA officials. The same situation now exists at them ilitary region headquarters, where the Joint Logistics Department is responsible for general purpose supplies and the Equipment Department is responsible for special purpose supplies and all maintenance

35. A # istory of China's Aviation.

36. Air ForceD ictionary, p. 70-71.

37. Oliver Chou, "Air Force Building Projects Take Offin Past 5 Years," South China Morning Post, April 17, 1999.

38. The term comm and post is sometimes confusing, since the PLAAF has also created several air corps level comm and organizations called comm and posts. Beginning in 1993, the PLAAF duanged the names of six of its seven existing comm and posts to bases (*jicli*) – Dalian, Tangshan, Xian, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Kunming. Apparently the Lhasa Comm and Post do not convert to a base

39. Titleunknown, 6 eneral Logistics Department cocument, June 1979, p. 35.

40. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, Chapter 3.

41. Air Force Operations Research, p 157.

4.2 Ibid, p. 15.2 W ang H ouqing, Zh ang Xingy e (ed.), Zh any i Xue [The Study of C an paigns], B eijing: National D efense University Press, May 2000, p. 316.

4.3 Ibid. The Chinese is Kongjun zhanyi, you kongjun zhanyi juntuan dan du huo zai qita junbingzhong peihexia shishi dezhanyi.

44. Li Man Kin, *Sino-Vietnam* ese *W* ar, H ong Kong: Kingsw ay International Publications, Ltd, 1981, pp. 3335. The PLAAF deployed F-5, F-6, and F-7 fighters, plus II-28 bom bers, to the border. At that time, the Vietnam ese Air Forcew as equippedwith MiG-21s, plus U.S. F-5As and A-37s left over from the war. The Vietnam ese also had SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 SAMs plus the form idadle ZSU-57-2self propelled AAA.

45. D angcai Zh ongguo Kongjun [Ch ina Today: Air Force], B eijing: Ch ina Social Sciences Press, 1989., p. 6 38. Since the nearest point from Nanning was 110 km and the farth est was 280 km, each helicopter trip took 2 to 4 hours. D uring most sorties, the helicopters could not turn off their engines or refuel at the pickup points. It was not until 1986 that the PLAAF turned alm ost all of its helicopters over to Arm y Aviation.

46. Ch ina Today: A ir Force, p. 638.

47. Inform ation on the PLAAF's activities during the 1979 conflict come from a General Logistics Department document, [Title Unknown], June 1979, pp. 35-37.

48. King C. Chen, China's War With Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1987, p. 114.

49. W ang H ai's autobiography publish ed in January 2001 cbes not even mention the 1979 conflict W ang H ai, W ang H ai Sh ang jiang: W ode Zh ancbu Sh engya [i eneral W ang H ai: My Com bat Career], B eijing, Zh ongyang W enxian Chubansh e [Central Literature Publish ers], February 2000.

50. On August 1, 1960, the Kunm ing MRAF CP (Kunm ing junqu kongjun zh ih uisuo/Kunzhi) was form ed and was responsible for controlling PLAAF units in Yunnan Province The Chengdu MRAF was not established until 1985, at which time the Kunm ing MRAF CP becam e subordinate to it. The Kunm ing MRAF Com m and Post was renam ed the Kunm ing Base (Kunm ing jici/Kunji) som etime after 1993.

51. Ch ina Tochay: A ir Force, p. 311.

5.2 Yuan Zhong and II ong II eping, "Air Force Completes Joint Tactical Training Base, First of Its Kind, To Provide Simulated BattlefieldEnvironm ent for Combat Exercises Between Various Arms of Service," *Jiefangjun Bao* [*Liberation Arm y Daily*], April 13, 1995.

53 Zhao Xianfeng and Zhang Jinyu, "Lanzhou MR Air Force Improves Logistics Support for High-Ted Air Battles," *Liberation Arm y Daily*, December 6, 1995.

54. This same boom ber regiment, which is most likely the 48th Air Division at Leiy ang, II unan Province (identified by Rick Kamer), has conducteds everal "first time" exercises over the past 2years. In October 1999, the division's airborne refueling B-6s were part of the fly over of Tiananm en for the PRC's 50th anniversary. In October 2000, one of the division's regiments conclucted "a4-hour integrated long-rangemobile exercise under unknown conditions, covering a distance of more than 2,000 km across four provinces. The raidw as ledby division comm ander Yu Jijun." In December 2000 or early January 2001, the same division conducted a 10-hour m doility exercise In March 2001, the same division conducted its "first exercise involving bom bers and tankers flying together in a combined task force (hundheng biandui). The task force implemented new campaignmethods (zhanfa), induding conducting a transregional flight with stopovers at several unfamiliar airfields and livebom bing." In May 2001, the division in plen ented another "first" by conducting a division-scale reconnaissance and bom bing exercise. An undeterm ined num ber of aircraft from the division conducted yet anoth er "first" by flying an obility exercise during the second half of the night. All of these articles stressed that the exercises were conclucted during poor weather conditions. Wang Dinghua and Niu Yingfu, "Guangzhou Region Air Forces 'Bomber' Regiment Conclucts Maneuver Exercise," Liberation Army Daily (Internet), December 5, 2000; Yang Mingde, W ang Dinghua, and Tang Baiyun, "PRC 6 uangzhou Bom ber Regiment Conclucts Long-Distance Bombing Flight Drill," Zhongquo Xinw en Shein Chinese, January 5, 2001; Wang Dinghua, "A Certain Air Division Forges Large Aircraft Assault Capability," Liberation Arm y Daily (Internet Version), August 22, 2001; Wang Dinghua and Fan H aisong, L iberation Arm y Daily (Internet), September 8, 2001.

55. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, p. 191-193. Zhao Xian feng and Zhang Jinyu, "Lanzhou MRAir Force Improves Logistics Support for High-Tech Air Battles," Liberation Arm y Daily, December 6, 1995. Several Liberation Arm y Daily articles have stated, "The PLAAF has set up a rapid mobile emergency support regiment with centralized command organization, to practice 11 special wartime support tasks such as rush-repairing bom bedrunways, extinguishing aircraft fires, giving first aid to injured pilots, an drep airing bom bedoil pipelines."

56. Yang Yang, "Training for Logistic Support Units Viewed," Liberation Arm y Daily, December 29, 1995.

57. Kongjun Bao [Air ForœNærs], April 3, 2001.

58. PLA Pictorial, January 2001.

59. Ch ina's Air Force, 1993, No. 1, p. 49.

60. Zhao Xianfeng and Zhang Jinyu, "Lanzhou MR Air Force Improves Logistics Support for H igh-Tech Air Battles," *Liberation Army Daily*, December 6, 1995.

61. Interview with Ministry of Defense officials in New Delhi, May 1999.

6 2 "The Security Situation in the Taiw an Strait," Report submitted by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the U.S. Senate as directed by the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 17, 1999.

6 3 "China reportedly to transport troops by civil aircraft to attack Taiw an," British Broaceasting Corporation, Ming Pao (Internet), Septem ber 26, 2000.

64. Tan Jun and Li Yuncbu, "Chief Military Officers of a Certain Unit of Hubei-based Airborne Forces Carries out first Military Drill," *Wuhan Hubei Radio* (Internet), April 24, 2001. The airborne forces also parachopped pieces of light artillery, boxes of ammunition, combat vehicles, and logistics supplies.

65. "Large Scale PLA A irborne Opex In Central China," *Liberation* Arm y Daily, July 21, 1999.

66. Lu W en, *Lianhe Zh anyi Zh an Juell ouqin Zh iyuan* [Strategic Logistics Support in Joint Operations], Beijing, National Defense University Press, April 2000, p.153. The paper dd not identify which aircraft were being described as comparatively advanced (*biji ao xianjin*), but most likely it is the F-8 and/or Su-27.

67. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, p. 196.

68. A ir Force New s, Decem ber 11, 1999.

69. Lian Juntao and Zhang Jinyu, "Chill actian Watches Air Force Logistic Exercise Aim ed at Promoting Scientific and Technological Training and Large Scale Stage Opera 'Matsu' in Nanjing," *Liberation Arm y Daily*, April 14, 2000.

70. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, pp. 197-199.

71. Ibid., p. 214.

72 Air ForceDictionary, pp. 195-196, 231-235.

73 Sergey Sokut and IIy a Kedrov, "W ar in Europe: Yugos lavia: 78 Days Under Missile and Bom bing Attacks: NATO's Limited W ar W as Uncom promising," Moscow Nezavisim oyel oyennoyeObozreniye, FBIS, No. 25, July 28, 1999, p. 2

74. Nick Cook, "W ar of Extremes," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 1, July 7, 1999.

75. Sokut and Kedrov.

76. Mark Henrish, "Waging Warnrith Weather," International Defense Review, Vol. 32, No. 12, December 1, 1999.

77. Nick Cook, 'W ar of Extrem es."

78. Kenneth W. Allen, & lenn Krum el, and Jonath an D. Pollack, *Ch ina's Air ForceEnters the 21st C entury*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1995, p. 130. E xam ples offly ing hours are as follows: *Ch ina's Air Force*, No. 2, 1993, p. 43, identifies a PLAAF regiment commancer who entered the military in December 1970 and had flown 1600 hours, equating to an average of 123 hours per year. *Ch ina's Air Force*, No. 6, 2000, p. 31, identified four young pilots in the Nanjing MR who averaged 150 hours per year in the new F-7-3 (identified as the 29 th air division by Rick Kamer). Two pilots were squadron commancers and two were deputy group commancers. *Ch ina's Air Force*, No. 5, 1993, p. 53, identified a second grade deputy group commancer pilot in the Ch engcu MR who joined the PLAAF in 1982 and had flow n 900 hours, for an average of 80 hours per year.

79. Robert S. Duchey, "Fifteen in a Row," Air Force Magazine, No. 23, April 1999. Unfortunately, figures are not readly available for other Asian air forces.

80. *China's Air Force*, No. 4, 1994, pp. 30-31. Rick Kam eridentified the unit based on a photo of one of the unit's aircraft.

81. Air Force Dictionary, pp. 276-277. The PLAAF uses the term drangci torate the logistics support for flying—excellent, good, and bad According to an interview with a PLA official, the term is also used to describe the num ber of flying days or missions per year, based on two "flying days" per 21-hour period—one day time and one night time. The 1992 issue of *China's Air Force*, p.48, provides another example of the use of *china's Air Force*, p.48, provides another example of the use of *chinagi*, the August 1st Aerobatics. Team, which is the PLAAF's "Thunderbird" equivalent, conducted 180 *chiangci* (dem onstrations) from 1962 1992 for 58 countries and 149 delegations. This equates to six dem onstrations per year.

82 MoQiang, Liang Weitong, and Zhang Lian fu, "Leizhou Banchao Shangche Youliao Bing" [Leizhou Peninsula fuel troops], *China's Air Force*, 1995-5, p. 32 The unit identification was made based on inform ation from Rick Kamer from photos in *China's Air Force*, 1993-3, p. 21. The 2nd Air Division began receiving the PLAAF's second regiment of Su-27s in 1996. The 3rd Air Division at Wuhu received the first regiment in 1992

83. Ram esh V. Phacke, "People's Liberation Arm y Air Force (PLAAF): Shifting Air Power Balance and Challenges to India," paper written for the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, September 2001.

84. A B-6 bom bern us thave its airfram eoverhauledafter 800 flying hours. PLAAF Aeronautical Engineering Department, *H angkong W eixiu [Aviation M aintenance*], No. 10, 1988.

85. "Chinese Exercise Strait 961: March 8-25, 1996," briefing presented by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence at a conference on the PRC's military modernization sponsored by the Alexis de Tocqueville Institute, March 11, 1997.

86. Lo Ping, "It Costs China 3 Billion Yuan to Make a Show of Its Military Strength," *Cheng Ming*, Hong Kong, April 15, 1996. Steven Mufson, "China Masses Troops On Coast Near Taiw an," *The W ash ington Post*, February 14, 1996.

87. State Department Briefing with James Rubin, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, August 3, 1999.

88. Victor Lai, "PRC Jets Twice Cross Taiw an Strait Center Line," Central News Agency, August 10, 1999. According to this report, about 310 international flights and 730 cbm esticflights fly over the Taiw an Strait every cby. 89. Sun Maoqing, "PLA Commancer on Modernizing Air Force," Beijing *Liaow ang*, *FBIS-CH I*, April 14, 1997. The PLAAF's definition of flying in "weath er conditions" is divided into "th reew eath er conditions" (i.e., day and night visual flight rules [VFR], and day instrument flight rules [IFR]), and "all-weath er" or "four weath er conditions" which adds night IFR flights. Although this particular reference does not mean being able to fly in poor weath er conditions, some reference to flying in weath er conditions does mean exactly that. The exact meaning is usually dear.

90. Ch ina's Air Force, 1999-6, p. 15.

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