Outrage and anguish over the September 11 terrorist attacks have found expression in the call for a "war against terrorism." As an analogy this phrase amply conveys the West's determination to stem terrorism. Taken literally as a guide to policy, however, the war analogy is badly flawed. It misunderstands the nature of the problem and misconstrues the instrument - war - that it proposes to use. Likewise, the idea that we are involved in a "clash of civilizations" is wrong and imprudent. Such notions are bound to do more harm than good.

Among the mistakes to avoid are an over-reliance on military power, a resort to sanctions that target whole communities, and the adoption of measures that overturn vital democratic rights. Such responses will add more to the terrorist pool than they subtract. They will subvert domestic and international support for an anti-terrorist campaign. And they will erode the value of what we seek to protect: democratic society.

Effective action against terrorism begins with understanding the problem. Terrorism is not an entity -- like a nation-state -- that we can simply target. It is an activity -- and one that is more akin to crime, than war. It has no capital, no headquarters, no unifying program or ideology. States may employ or host it, but it does not depend on state support. It is a political pathology continuously generated by conditions of communal violence and despair.

Like cults, terrorist organizations feed on such conditions, seeking to mobilize the anger and frustration of a larger community. To foil such organizations we must, first and foremost, isolate them politically from the constituency they hope to recruit. Otherwise the problem of terrorism will grow and overwhelm our capacity to counter it.

The Limits of War

The new terrorism, as practiced by al-Qaeda, is transnational and decentralized. This type of formation cannot be easily "decapitated" by one blow to a center. Instead, what is needed is a protracted campaign of detection, disruption, and interdiction. This campaign should mostly involve intelligence gathering and law enforcement. Like its target, it must be rooted locally but coordinated globally.

Within this program, military action has its place. But it must be discriminating in a way that most wars are not. Large-scale bombing, for instance, cuts too broad a swath of destruction. This can feed the well of anti-Western sentiment that in turn shields and sustains terrorism. Knowing this, terrorists care little about the destruction they bring down on people around them. Thus, terrorists cannot be deterred by punishment campaigns. Instead, we must seek to isolate them politically, block their actions, and disable their organizations. On balance, patient intelligence gathering efforts, law enforcement, and measures of homeland protection are more important tools than large military strikes.

Protection and Prevention

Homeland protection efforts should focus selectively on points of critical vulnerability -- such as airlines and nuclear power plants. In this area, America has more to learn from Europe and Israel than teach. The lapses in US airline security, for instance, are a scandal -- even to this day.

Nations should also aim to better screen access to arms and to hazardous materials, machinery, and training. A comprehensive international criminal database and terrorist "watch list" would greatly facilitate this effort. It could also enhance passport control. What exists along these lines today is piecemeal and under-funded. For instance, the US custom bureau has only limited real-time access to Interpol's database because the latter cannot afford to extend its services.

Tighter controls on technologies of mass destruction are especially important. Inspection and enforcement protocols to the chemical and biological weapon conventions should be strengthened. Cooperative threat reduction programs, like the one that helps the former Soviet republics manage their nuclear materials, should be extended to cover other regions and other types of weapons. Less exotic, but equally important: international flows of money, small arms, and military expertise must be made more transparent, nationally and internationally.

The tragic events of 11 September also underscore the urgent need for national police and intelligence agencies to dispense with bureaucratic feudalism and "turf wars". Effective action against the new terrorism requires unprecedented cooperation among agencies within nations and, especially, across borders. We do not need new police agencies or new police powers so much as we need existing agencies to use their powers more efficiently.

Building Cooperation

Should the campaign against terrorism be perceived as the privileged instrument of a few states, it will not elicit the cooperation essential for its success. Thus, the campaign must be placed in a multilateral, legal framework as soon as possible.

Internationalization of the campaign might begin with the UN Security Council establishing a special tribunal on the crimes of September 11. The Security Council could also convene an international summit to map international strategy on terrorism. A jumble of competing national strategies will not do.

Some first steps are elementary: All nations should endorse the International Criminal Court and extend the Court's purview to cover terrorism. Interpol and the UN Terrorism Prevention Branch should be reinforced substantially to help lead international cooperation in law enforcement. Military action against terrorism -- apart from acts of immediate self-defense -- should proceed under UN auspices, as during the Gulf War.

Failed States, Failed Policies

Finally, we must recognize that the acute terrorist challenge we face today derives largely from a single source: the 22-year Afghan civil war, which has flooded the world with thousands of terrorist cadre. From this knowledge flows two policy guidelines. First, the international community must redouble its efforts to defuse such conflicts and stabilize war-ravaged societies. This task is harder and more expensive than once imagined, but clearly the price of neglect is even greater. At any rate, building peace is cheaper and less risky than waging war.

Second, nations must avoid feeding the fires of toxic regional conflicts through arms transfers or military assistance. Outside powers must finally abandon the reckless notion that such conflicts or their participants can be reliably harnessed to support national objectives. Past American, Pakistani, and Saudi support for the Afghan mujahedin teaches a simple but bitter lesson: the dogs of war, once stirred, are likely to run out of control. We ignore this lesson at our peril.

Citation: Carl Conetta, Cooperative Action Against Terrorism, Project on Defense Alternatives Commentary. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, October 2001.
http://www.comw.org/pda/0112antiterror.html

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