Rotocraft for War - Part 2
Helicopters in
America's post-9/11 wars
Carl
Conetta
Project on Defense Alternatives
September 2008
This article is a
chapter in Lutz Unterseher, Military
Intervention and Common Sense: Focus on Land
Forces (Berlin-Greifswald: Ryckschau,
2008.)
New missions, old dilemma
Recent military experience in Afghanistan and
Iraq has prompted a significant change in
American ideas about the combat use of
helicopters, implying a greater emphasis in the
future on small-unit combat support roles. These
have significantly supplanted ideas of deep
attack and large-scale helicopter assaults.
These changes have not really surmounted the
dilemmas associated with rotary-wing aircraft,
however. Indeed, recent experience starkly
illustrates these dilemmas. And nothing is more
telling than the high attrition rate for
helicopters in operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom.
Since 2001, the US military has kept an average
of approximately 550 helicopters of all types in
the "Central Command" area, which encompasses
both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. (As of
August 2008, there are more than 600 involved in
these conflicts.) All told, in seven years, the
United States has lost about 25 percent of the
average number of deployed helicopters, that is:
136 helicopters lost – at least one-third of
these to enemy action.[1] Moreover, the
Army estimates that 3 percent of its entire
fleet of 3,150 helicopters will be "washed out"
due to recent military operations and require
replacement. This, despite spending an average
of $500 million per year to "reset" those craft
returning from service in Afghanistan and Iraq.
To restate the dilemma that frames our analysis:
Helicopters are
prized for their unique combination of
mobility, flexibility, and agility as well as
their putative capacity to work closely with
ground forces and provide them with persisting
support. But these promises and capabilities
are offset by issues of cost and
vulnerability.
Once deployed, helicopters prove
acutely sensitive to environmental conditions,
are relatively fragile, and can be engaged
throughout their performance envelope by
multiple, relatively-inexpensive weapon
systems. These vulnerabilities can be
mitigated, partially – but only in ways that
substantially increase costs while narrowing
the scope of the crafts' usability.
More than ever before, fielding military
helicopters is a high-cost proposition. In 2008,
the value of an Apache AH-64D ranged between $34
million and $48 million, depending on the level
of upgrades. To keep them flying requires a
complement of 30 support personnel each. And,
due to maintenance scheduling, it takes a fleet
of 30 Apaches to keep eight available in the
field.
Any nation hoping to frequently deploy and use
combat helicopters in operationally significant
numbers must have very deep pockets and a
certain insensitivity to cost and
cost-effectiveness – as though it has money to
burn. Even then, higher command and political
authorities may, at the last moment, prove
unwilling to risk these costly assets in the
types of missions for which they were supposedly
procured. Thus, the crash of two US Army
helicopters at the outset of the 1999 Kosova war
contributed to keeping Apaches out of that
conflict entirely (although 24 had deployed to
fight).
Nations with fewer helicopters to spare than
does the United States will be even more
cautious about putting them in harm's way. Thus,
peace operations in Chad and Darfur have had a
difficult time attracting sufficient numbers of
even transport types. The problem is not that
the world has too few military helicopters on
hand, however. All told, UN operations employ
about 150 helicopters worldwide – out of total
member military holdings that exceed 12,000.
Pivotal experiences in the Afghanistan and
Iraq wars
The most important factor influencing post-9/11
US helicopter operations was the general shift
in US security concerns from conventional
warfare to counter-insurgency efforts.
Counter-insurgency scenarios typically involve
too few forces attempting to secure too much
space. In this context, helicopters promise a
capacity to rapidly concentrate troops and
firepower across large expanses of territory
despite poor ground transportation nets. This is
something of a return to origins for military
helicopters, calling to mind their early use in
the Vietnam and Algerian conflicts.
Also important in shaping recent US practice
were a host of negative experiences in Somalia,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. The net result of these
has been to undermine command enthusiasm for
large-scale "deep operations" by armed
helicopters and to raise a caution flag on "air
assault" operations as well. (The latter involve
using helicopters to insert infantry units deep
in enemy territory with attack helicopters
providing support).
Operation Anaconda and the challenge of air
assault
Depositing lightly armed troops deep in enemy
territory is a high risk gambit. Success depends
on luck, good intelligence, and close
coordination among different arms. The
vulnerability of the troops leaves little room
for mishaps, while the vulnerability of the
helicopters and their sensitivity to
environmental conditions raises the likelihood
that mishaps will occur. Operating in mountains
or other challenging environments adds to the
risks and uncertainties. Operation Anaconda
illustrates how easily things can come apart.
In March 2002, three months after the fall of
the Taliban regime, US forces led an effort to
kill or capture Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters
still holed up in the Shahi-Kot Valley.
The plan was to have pro-government militia
(stiffened by US air power and special
operations units) engage the anti-government
forces, while other US forces stemmed their
retreat – a hammer and anvil operation.
Helicopters were to deliver US troops – the
"anvil" -- into blocking or observation
positions and provide them with fire support.
However, upon being inserted, the first wave of
about 200 US personnel unexpectedly found their
landing areas to be swarming with Taliban
fighters. Due to environmental conditions,
difficult terrain, and the density of enemy
fire, Apache gunships were unable to provide
sufficient fire support.
All of the seven Apaches involved sustained
significant damage – and five were compelled to
return to base (although three of these returned
to the fight within 24 hours). Deployment of a
second wave of US "anvil" troops was postponed
and half of the first wave was evacuated that
night. Given heavy support by fixed-wing
aircraft, deployment re-commenced the next day.
Under a revised plan, fixed-wing bombardment
continued for nearly a week before US and
pro-government forces secured the valley.
Central Command claimed that between 500 and 770
anti-government forces had been killed, although
only dozens of bodies were found.
In a related incident, an attempt to land a US
SEAL reconnaissance team near a peak (Takur
Ghar) overlooking the Shahi-Kot valley also ran
into unexpected heavy fire. One of the two
Chinook transport helicopters carrying the team
was hit by an RPG and both were forced to fly
off – but not before a team member fell out and
into the hands of the Taliban. The damaged
Chinook made a controlled crash-landing seven
kilometers away and its crew was rescued. A
subsequent attempt to land a rescue team for the
SEAL who had fallen from the chopper near Takur
Ghar also came under heavy fire, but
successfully inserted the team before flying
off, damaged. Finally, an effort to reinforce
this team similarly met heavy fire. Another
Chinook was hit by an RPG and crashed, killing
four on board.
The challenge of helicopter operations under
fire in difficult mountain terrain was
illustrated again more than three years later
(28 June 2005) when a MH-47 Chinook sent to
rescue another trapped SEAL team was hit by an
RPG. Badly damaged, it was nonetheless able to
land on a high ledge. Unfortunately, the ledge
gave way and the helicopter toppled down the
mountainside. All 16 service people on board
were killed. Due to high altitudes, the
Apaches that had been escorting the Chinook
could not keep pace, so it had to fly into the
hot zone without fire support. (Russian
heliborne troops faced a similar tragedy in
Chechnya on 27 April 2007 when the rotor of
their Mi-8 helicopter struck a mountain side
while trying to land special operations troops.
It tilted over, slid down the mountain side, and
burst into flames, killing all 20 on board.)
The troubles encountered in Operation Anaconda
also call to mind the October 1993 "Black Hawk
Down" incident in Mogadishu, Somalia. There, an
air assault raid into a militia-controlled area
of the city was stalled when RPGs brought down
two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. A blizzard of
small-arms fire and RPGs held support
helicopters and relief convoys at bay for 14
hours. Nineteen Americans were killed and 73
wounded.
Karbala, Iraq – deep attack undone
On 23 March 2003, three days after the onset of
the Iraq war, 31 Apache helicopters of the 11th
Attack Helicopter Regiment (some organic, some
attached) set out to deplete the armor and air
defenses of the Iraqi Medina Division near
Karbala. As was doctrine, they flew low in packs
toward their objective. However, en route they
became ensnared in "flak traps" – storms of
small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and
man-portable missiles, originating from roof
tops. This ad hoc air defense effort, which was
reminiscent of Somali tactics ten years
earlier, had probably been triggered by
Iraqi pickets equipped with either cell phones
or low-power radios. The fire brought down one
of the Apaches and damaged all the others
sufficiently to compel their return to base. The
experience dampened command interest in
attempting helicopter deep attack thereafter.
Following the Karbala incident, attack aviation
focused mostly on reconnaissance efforts, flank
security operations, and the provision of fire
support (Close Combat Attacks or CCAs) for
advancing ground units – especially in built-up
areas. According to one observer, this "signaled
the rebirth of aviation in a close fires role
and represented a paradigm shift from a
decade-long infatuation with deep attacks."[2]
One partial exception – a denouement, actually –
was a 28 March helicopter attack on the 14th
Mechanized Brigade of the Medina Division
conducted by the aviation units of the 101st
Airborne. This was a more deliberate effort than
the 23 March attack by the 11th AHR, with the
units carefully reconnoitering and clearing
zones as they proceeded, and pulling back when
they faced heavy ground fire (so that artillery
and fixed-wing aircraft might suppress it). As a
result, no helicopters were lost to enemy action
(although two succumbed to accidents). On the
downside, the attack claimed only a handful of
Iraqi armored vehicles, artillery, and air
defense systems. Caution has its price as well
as its benefit.
Recent counter-insurgency operations – a
helicopter renaissance?
Despite the experience of Operation Anaconda and
the failed Karbala mission, helicopters have
come to play a central role in recent
counter-insurgency efforts. Today, they are key
providers of transport, with armed types acting
as escorts. Gunships also serve to provide
security to ground convoys. And they serve in
reconnaissance, surveillance, and "close combat
attack" roles, providing ground units with "over
the shoulder" firepower. Sometimes they act
independently in smaller-scale
"counter-insurgent strike" efforts. In urban
cordon and search operations, they have acted to
block and interdict insurgents attempting
escape. During the 2008 operations in Sadr City,
at least a half-dozen Apaches were kept in the
air at all times, employing hundreds of Hellfire
missiles over a few weeks.
The fact that helicopters are serving broadly
does not mean they are the optimal choice for
all the tasks they have been assigned, however.
They are an asset that America held in abundance
before the onset of the current wars. Despite
America's unique investment in them, they have
not escaped the dilemma associated with their
vulnerability. This can be appreciated by
analyzing the types of threats they have faced
in recent wars and the ways these threats have
been managed.
Environmental challenges and maintenance
overload
As noted earlier, helicopters seem to offer a
ready-made solution to the force-to-space
problems that often plague counter-insurgency
efforts. It is just as important to note,
however, that insurgencies are most likely to
flourish in physical environments that
helicopters will find challenging.
As we have seen above, jagged terrain and
cityscapes make landings difficult and they
offer insurgents occluded firing positions.
Telephone and electrical wires in and around
cities have claimed at least four helicopters.
Thin, cold mountain air saps lift and power,
degrading performance and shortening helicopter
"on station" time. High ambient temperatures
also stresses engines and limits lift. Snow
storms in Afghanistan, sandstorms in Iraq, and
wind and rain storms in both limit visibility
and make controlled maneuver difficult.
Environmental conditions too frequently require
that helicopter use be curtailed, which can
disrupt joint operations. Such problems effected
the conduct of Operation Anaconda, delayed
planned helicopter attacks at the start of Iraqi
Freedom, and limited helicopter use to daylight
hours for 10 crucial days during the first phase
of the war.
Sand and dust pose persistent problems. Most of
the helicopter accidents in Iraq and Afghanistan
are due to "brownout conditions" in which the
downwash of rotors kicks up an envelope of
blinding dust. To compensate, pilots execute "no
hover" landings, touching down while their
aircraft are still moving forward – a practice
that stresses the rotor gears and airframe. Sand
and dust continuously coat, clog, and erode
mechanical and electronic gear (notably
including infrared missile warning systems).
Despite regular maintenance in the field, one
helicopter was found to harbor 230 pounds of
sand when it rotated home, according to the
commander of the Army Aviation Center.[3]
Helicopters fly between 30- and 50-hours per
month, on average, in Afghanistan and Iraq,
which is considered a high operational tempo.
The Army has been able to sustain a 77 percent
readiness rate for its deployed helicopters by
substantially boosting its field maintenance
efforts, routinely rotating helicopters into and
out of the theater – only 17 percent of the
total inventory is deployed at any one time --
and mounting an ambitious $4 billion helicopter
"reset" program at home. Today, maintenance
crews make up 85 percent of the Army aviation
force. By contrast, British forces, unable to
match American resources, have seen their
helicopter readiness levels in theater drop to
50 percent.
The insurgent threat
Modern attack helicopters and the doctrine for
their use developed with reference to Soviet
armored forces in Europe. There, the expected
main threat to helicopters was radar guided
missile and anti-aircraft cannon (notably the
ZSU-23-4, an armored self-propelled system with
four 23-mm guns). Helicopter attack scenarios
envisaged fixed-wing aircraft neutralizing these
weapons. Helicopters were supposed to approach
their objective flying nap-of-the-earth (to
lessen their exposure) and then pop-up on
arrival to deliver anti-tank missiles at
standoff ranges. Presumably, most of their
flying would occur over threatened, but not
enemy-controlled territory. Clearly, such
scenarios have little relevance to America's
post-9/11 wars.
The insurgent threat to helicopters in Iraq and
Afghanistan includes small arms fire,
anti-aircraft machine guns (notably the 12.7 mm
DshK), rocket-propelled grenades (notably the
RPG-7), and portable surface-to-air missiles
(principally the SA-7, but also the SA-14 and
SA-16). While small-arms fire is often
spontaneous, the use of RPGs, portable missiles,
and heavy machine guns is not. Insurgents often
fight in "air defense" teams that combine
weapons, spotters, and communications personnel.
Favored sites in Iraq are roof tops,
court-yards, alleys, and groves. Small open-bed
trucks carrying weapons covered with a tarp
offer a means to rapidly concentrate weapons –
especially heavy machine guns – and then
disperse. Favored targets include
helicopters flying predictable transit routes or
conducting routine reconnaissance. Any coalition
effort that concentrates helicopters over a
period of days, or any area that regularly
attracts helicopter surveillance, also offer
insurgents an opportunity to concentrate their
air defense efforts.
The contest between insurgent tactics and
helicopter counter-moves is evident in the 20
January 2007 downing of a UH-60 Black Hawk
helicopter in which 12 died. In this case, the
second helicopter in a team of two took fire,
tried to land, and was hit again by an RPG
round. The lead aircraft immediately returned
fire and then landed in an effort to assist the
downed crew. Soon, another set of Black Hawks
joined the fray as did two attack helicopters.
These destroyed a truck mounting a heavy machine
gun as well as three houses near some trees
where a second anti-aircraft gun was hidden.
Shortly afterward, a rapid reaction team of
seven armored jeeps (HMMWVs or "Humvees")
arrived. One was hit by an improvised explosive
device, however, which killed another soldier.
After securing the area, they additionally found
missile launchers and a mortar tube.
There are technological counter-measures
available that are usually effective for dealing
with those anti-aircraft missiles currently in
insurgent hands -- as long as helicopters fly
high enough to allow for reaction time
(minimally, above 2,000 meters). However,
as noted below, the best counter-measure systems
have not always been installed – nor will be.
And there are no counter-measures yet available
for the small arms, machine gun, and RPG
threats.
RPGs are very effective up to 200 meters, but
also have scored hits as far out as 700. Small
arms are out-ranged beginning at 1000 meters.
Heavy machine guns in skilled hands can be quite
effective up to 1,500 meters. So, taken
together, these weapons can make flying below
2,000 meters quite perilous. Unfortunately,
given the nature of these conflicts, there are
no or few truly secure zones.
In providing fire support or striking insurgent
targets, pilots would prefer to engage from
standoff ranges – at least three kilometers
using missiles. Cannons require closer shots,
however: 1,500 meters or less. Indeed, in order
to distinguish individual combatants,
helicopters often must fly closer. And, of
course, insurgents will choose to engage at
close ranges. Thus, most engagements occur at
distances of less than 1,000 meters, which puts
helicopters within range of an array of weapons.
Technological Countermeasures
Ideally, helicopters in harms way – which
includes all types in Iraq and Afghanistan –
would have infrared heat suppressors as well as
rugged, advanced missile warning systems, flare
dispensers, and active jammers. At the
start of the Iraq war, however, only special
operations types met this standard. Most
conventional scout and attack helicopters had
older warning and jamming systems and no flare
dispensers. Some lacked infrared suppressors.
Transport types were worse off. As the war
progressed (and helicopters fell from the sky),
warning and jamming systems received upgrades,
and these began to spread from attack models to
transport types. Yet, as of August 2008,
coverage was still not complete. And existing
upgrade programs have not kept pace with the
threat. Losses to enemy fire in Iraq during 2006
and 2007 – before many Sunni and Shia militia
stood down – were greater than those during the
preceding two-year period.
Losses not withstanding, there is no likelihood
that even the attack helicopter fleet will be
upgraded to the standard of special operations
craft. Upgrades to the latter cost about $19
million per airframe in 2004, while upgrades to
conventional helicopters were in the range of $3
million each. Cancellation of the Comanche
program has made possible a more thorough
upgrade program for the conventional fleet. But
the savings cannot close the gap because they
are also supposed to help the Army generally
modernize its helicopter fleet.
Equipping the Apache AH-64D with "best
protection" would probably drive the per unit to
cost into the $45 million to $55 million range.
The RAH-66 Comanche faced cancellation in 2004
when its unit cost rose to nearly $59 million.
Helping to motivate that decision was the
realization that, despite the Comanche's many
advanced features and high cost, it was not well
protected against the insurgent threat.
Additional upgrades would have had to be made.
Tactical countermeasures
No foreseeable technology will cure the
vulnerability of these fragile machines as they
operate over and within complex terrain, ridden
with adversaries. Indeed, the principal means of
alleviating helicopter attrition in Iraq and
Afghanistan have been tactical and operational,
not technological. But these have imposed their
own limits and costs.
Helicopters have taken to flying in small teams
– usually two -- rather then alone or in large
groups. Team members keep 500 meters between
them, so that one might cover the other and both
might divide the labor of identifying and
engaging targets. More generally, the
importance of working together with other arms
has been emphasized. Thus, for instance,
fixed-wing aircraft might escort helicopters in
especially dangerous areas.
Crashes are most common at night, but day time
is when insurgents have their greatest success
in downing helicopters. Night-time dangers can
be mitigated by flying above terrain obstacles
and landing only on landing strips in secure
bases, however. Unlike early in the war, by 2007
plenty of these bases existed. So night flying
increased. Still, most close combat support
operations require daytime flight. And
reconnaissance and transport tasks cannot be
restricted to night.
When conducting operations, nap-of-the-earth
flying is no longer attempted. Shooting "on the
run" or while diving has largely replaced
stationary fire techniques or "hovering fires"
(except sometimes at night). This, of course,
complicates the task of acquiring and accurately
engaging targets.
Helicopters have also taken to flying faster and
higher when transiting "hot spots".
Predictable transit corridors – such as those
that might follow surface lines of communication
– are avoided. And numerous "no fly zones" have
been designated. Complementing these are
shifting "danger zones" over which pilots must
exercise greater caution.
Seeking alternatives
The measures outlined above probably have helped
prevent a debilitating rise in the numbers of
helicopters claimed by insurgent action. But
they succeed by narrowing the utility of
helicopters – that is, by revoking the promise
of a "go anywhere, do anything" flying machine.
(Similarly, the wider adoption of advanced
countermeasures systems help drive the cost of
helicopters toward prohibitive heights).
These factors, and the inherent vulnerability of
helicopters, make a search for alternatives
worthwhile. One approach is to avoid using
helicopters for tasks that other arms --
artillery or fixed-wing aircraft, for instance –
might accomplish just as well and more safely
(as the US Marine Corps' Cobra Survivability
Plan concluded early in the war).[4] In
many situations, the armed reconnaissance role
is better fulfilled by more heavily armored
ground forces, with helicopters relegated to
standoff surveillance and fire support. Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) might substitute for
helicopters in performing many surveillance and
reconnaissance tasks, and they increasing are.
Especially in cities and other complex
environments, UAVs are substituting for scout
helicopters (such as the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior).
A tilt-rotor alternative to helicopters?
One alternative not worthy of consideration is
increased reliance on tilt-rotor aircraft, such
as the US Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey. The
Osprey's one sure advantage is its capacity to
fly 40% to 60% percent faster than helicopters
when it operates in "airplane" mode. Thus, it is
presumed less vulnerable when in flight. But its
cost – $75 million per unit (2009) – is much
higher and its transport efficiency is much less
than that of comparable helicopters. Helicopters
equal in power and empty weight to the V-22 can
carry much more payload to any distance. The
CH-53E Super Stallion, for instance, costs
approximately $40 million, but it can carry
twice as much payload to 400 nautical miles. And
the difference between helicopters and tilt
rotors in terms of transport efficiency
increases with altitude, which is relevant to
operations in mountainous terrain.
The MV-22 figures centrally in the Marine Corps'
plans for "rapid maneuver from the sea," thus
they are loathe to surrender it. Actually,
comparable helicopters could do the job faster
whenever several round trips are required. This
is due to their "transport efficiency"
advantage. But the MV-22 speed advantage holds
true if only one or two waves are planned. What
happens on arrival is another matter, however.
In "hover mode," the MV-22 is considerably less
stable than helicopters and must descend slowly
and carefully, which increases its exposure
precisely when insurgents might be closest.
Maneuverability in hover mode also is
compromised. These limits reflect efforts to
address persistent aerodynamic problems ("vortex
ring state"), which also make the craft likely
to kick-up especially disruptive dust clouds
when landing.
In 2007-2008, 12 MV-22s deployed to Iraq, but
these were not used in high-threat missions or
areas. During 2,500 sorties, pilots reported
being fired on twice. Given substantial
manufacturer support, the Osprey's in Iraq where
able to achieve a 68 percent average readiness
rating – which is still below that achieved by
older helicopters in theater. The aircraft
also has faced persistent engine problems. These
compelled at least one emergency landing in
Iraq, while a series of engine fires have
plagued the craft back home. (All told, 30
personnel have been killed in crashes during
Osprey test flights between 1991 and 2000.)
Despite its troubles, the Osprey has gained
popularity as a VIP taxi in Iraq – a favorite of
top brass and visiting dignitaries and
celebrities. Notably, on 22 July 2008, a flight
of four transported Senator Barack Obama from
Al-Anbar province to an airport in Amman,
Jordan. Without question, images of the four
odd-looking craft landing together were
impressive. But even as showman, the Osprey is
unlikely to supplant the helicopter – at least,
not until some footage of it deftly maneuvering
in battle supplants the ubiquitous videos of its
spectacular test crashes.
Notes
- "General
says US Army has lost 130 helicopters in Iraq
and Afghanistan," International Herald
Tribune (Associated Press), 23
Mar 2007.
- R. M.
Cassidy, "Renaissance of the attack helicopter
in the close fight," Military Review (Jul-Aug
2003)
- P.
Hess, "Army Needs $1.2b for Chopper
Replacement," United Press International,
2 Jan 2006.
- R.
Wall and D. A. Fulghum, "Coming Under Fire," Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 12 May
2003.
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