Re-Envisioning Defense An Agenda for US Policy Debate and
Transition Project on Defense Alternatives 5 December 2008 The The Recent
defense policy evinces a disturbing paradox: it has been delivering less and
less security at ever increasing cost.
With national defense expenditures approaching $700 billion per year,
the On a world
scale, what parallels the present paradox in How deep a problem? It is
tempting to attribute the paradox of “less security at increasing cost”
entirely to the Bush administration and a coterie of neo-conservative
thinkers. But there is good reason to
believe that the problem runs deeper. ■ By the late-1990s, defense budgets were already
rising after a nine-year respite, but with little relationship to actual
threats. The 9/11 attacks found the
United States largely unaware and unprepared, despite a defense expenditure of
$3.9 trillion during the preceding decade.
■ On the strategic level: polls show that ■ Key precursors and enablers of current policy
ideas – such as offensive counter-proliferation, the "rogue state
doctrine", and regime change – were
already evident in the And, of
course, a prominent element of continuity in post-Cold War policymaking has
been the inability of national leadership to reach consensus on a So how
deep does the problem run? We can gain a
fuller perspective on our present situation by thinking back twenty years. In 1989, the end of the Cold War presented a
historic opportunity to increase global cooperation, advance the
demilitarization of international affairs, and claim a permanent peace
dividend. Twenty years later, this
promise remains largely unfulfilled. Of
course, grasping the promise proved from the start to be more difficult than
many had imagined. Certainly, the
failure was not a product of bad policy choices alone. But they played an important part. The quandary in which we find ourselves today
is path dependent. At every juncture
since 1989, our response to circumstances shaped what was to come and helped
define what would seem “feasible” and “practical” at the next turn. It is the depth and the breadth of our
current policy problems that should compel us to question not just the past six
years of decision, but much of the past 20. Three core concerns Reviewing
current policy, we have identified 25 specific concerns that relate to the
paradox of “decreasing security at increasing cost.” These might form an agenda
for policy discussion and change. From
these we have distilled three overarching topics or concerns that, taken
together, capture the fundamental problems in current policy. Alternative perspectives that address these
three core concerns can provide guidance for understanding and addressing the
rest. Core concern 1. Security policy vision: How do we
understand and hope to attain security?
This
entails our assessment of the security environment and its dynamics as well as
our security interests, goals, concerns, and strategy. Presently, the “war on terrorism” provides
the principal organizing theme for An
alternative approach might emphasize broad multilateral cooperation in
mitigating and redressing the sources of stress and instability in the
international system. Such an approach
would not turn principally on waging and winning wars or pursuing strategic
advantage in a contest of nation-states.
Instead, it would turn on building broad cooperation and winning the
confidence of people in troubled regions.
Water,
food, energy, and health security, global warming, economic development, and
the management of globalization – all represent concerns that can be addressed
only on a global basis. Cooperation in
these areas could serve as a foundation for cooperation on more divisive issues. This much is certain: How the community of
nations responds to the challenge of post-Cold War regional instability – and
how they relate to each other in responding – will determine the character of
the international system for decades to come. A central
issue for the ■ Will we redouble efforts to cooperate across strategic divides – with Russia,
China, and the Muslim world – or will we limit our chief efforts to friends and
allies? ■ Will we work through global institutions and regimes – or around them? ■ Will we seek to lead by virtue of the strength
of our ideas and diplomacy – or by throwing our weight around? ■ In our diplomatic practice, What will be the
relative importance of “bargaining” versus
“coercive pressure” (threats and sanctions). Core concern 2.
The role of force and the armed forces in US foreign and security policy Since the
end of the Cold War the role of the “Force”
can serve a variety of functions and ends,
including coercion, offensive goals, preemption, simple defense, deterrence,
and dissuasion. Similarly, the armed
forces can play a variety of roles.
Besides serving in combat, they can undertake stability and constabulary
missions, provide security and humanitarian assistance, undertake
nation-building efforts, and serve to collect intelligence or conduct
diplomacy. What is an appropriate
balance among these functions and activities?
What does recent experience suggest about our current dependence on
force and the armed forces? Should it be
rolled-back (in favor of other instruments) or simply refigured? Any
adequate alternative to current and recent defense policy must provide new
guidance regarding the use of force and the role of the military. Core concern 3.
The “fit” between Military
“transformation” and “revolution” have been DOD watchwords since the
mid-1990s. But they have not yet
inspired a defense posture that is demonstrably well-adapted to post-Cold War
circumstances. A poorly-adapted defense
posture is likely to be inefficient, relatively ineffective, and even
counter-productive. And this helps
produce a “sustainability” problem. Ideally, defense planning would function like an
adaptive process that adjusts military capabilities to fit changes in the
strategic environment. Of course, no
large-scale planning process works this way – that is, without friction. In the case of defense policy, a variety of
interests – bureaucratic, political,
parochial, and economic ones – impede adaptation. Institutional inertia and entrenched ideas
also retard adaptation – that is: the past always drags on the present. Adjusting
the nation's defense posture to more closely fit the security environment would
simultaneously render that posture more "sustainable". And this might turn the defense policy
paradox "on its head" – yielding greater security at lower cost. However, this path entails changes in force
development and modernization programs across the services. These
three overarching concerns – security vision, role of force, and the “fit” and
sustainability of An agenda for policy debate and change The 25
specific concerns that we have identified can be divided into eight categories: ■ Policy on strategic warfare ■ Counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and
homeland security ■ Policy on major military operations,
conventional and irregular ■ Peacetime military engagement ■ The US stance on international law and arms
control ■ Civil-military relations: The growing
influence of the Pentagon ■ Defense budget, acquisition, and management
issues ■ Country-specific controversies Policy on Strategic Warfare 1. Nuclear weapons, missile defense, and the “new
deterrence” This
involves the re-targeting of nuclear weapons, the renovation of US nuclear capabilities (including the
weapons production complex), and the pursuit of a credible shield against
ballistic missile attack. In fact, there
is nothing “new” in this. It has been a
long-standing dream of nuclear warfighters to “win” the arms race and render
one’s own nuclear weapons usable by (1) blunting adversaries’ nuclear threats
and (2) developing and maintaining one’s own options for credible, tailored
nuclear attack. But there is no
certainty in nuclear defense and any leakage is unacceptable. What is
certain is that the pursuit of a nuclear “sword and shield” system-of-systems
will inspire a broad range of counter-measures, breathe new life into the arms
race, and kill the momentum toward nuclear disarmament. 2. Prompt global strike: The advent of conventional
strategic warfare This
involves long-range, high-speed offensive capabilities – conventional and
nuclear – that would allow intercontinental strikes on high-value targets with
little or no warning. This is a
“hair-trigger” capability that would enable a much expanded practice of
forceful pre-emption, “prevention,” and coercion. New bombers, long-range missiles (ballistic
and cruise), hyper-velocity air vehicles, cyber-warfare capabilities, and
weapons based in space all might figure in prompt global strike. As in the case of the “new deterrence”, these
efforts will elicit counter-measures, prompt those who feel threatened to
greater secrecy and higher alert levels, and blur the boundary between nuclear
and conventional strikes. Some
adversaries may seek shelter under the umbrella of other nuclear powers. Thus, the net effect of these initiatives may
be increased polarization and militarization. 3. Seizing the “new high ground”: the weaponization
of space Prompt
global strike and missile defense initiatives may involve the use of outer
space as a staging area for weapons.
Space warfare also involves offensive and defensive capabilities to deny
the use of space to adversaries while protecting US space assets. But the Counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and
homeland security 4. Offensive counter-proliferation (OCP): Arms
control by means of bombardment?
OCP
involves the use of military means (including bombardment) to interdict,
disrupt, or disable the development, transfer, or fielding of nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons, their precursors, their means of delivery, or
other advanced weapons by adversaries or potential adversaries. One important issue is the balance in 5. Counter-terrorism and homeland protection: In
search of an effective strategy At issue
is the scope and focus of the efforts as well as the balance among the various
means for blunting terrorist threats:
cooperative intelligence and law enforcement, military strikes and
large-scale operations, and investments in direct homeland protection and incident
response capabilities. US
counter-terrorism efforts currently are poorly focused and emphasize military
means, which often undermine cooperation and feed anti-Americanism. Presently, homeland protection efforts suffer
from serious lapses and are poorly integrated.
These efforts may be
underfunded, but they also exhibit irrational priorities, heavily influenced by
pork-barreling. As a result, there has
been insufficient progress in reducing even the most prominent vulnerabilities,
such as those affecting aviation and nuclear security. Also at issue is the trade-off between civil
liberties and counter-terrorism efforts.
This pertains both to intelligence collection and the treatment of
suspects. Major regional military operations, conventional and
irregular 6. Planning and preparations for major wars reflect
unnecessarily ambitious goals DOD is
presently preparing for several types of large-scale conventional wars. These preparations lay claim to much of the 7. “Shock and awe” strategy and attacks on
civilian-military targets DOD war
planning emphasizes early and (sometimes) large-scale “precision” attack on
political and infrastructure targets, often in cities. Forceful “coercive bargaining” also often
involves holding such targets at risk.
These practices blur the civilian-military divide, seriously complicate
post-conflict reconstruction, erode international and popular support, and feed
vengeful anti-Americanism. Also at issue
is the importance of their contribution to battlefield success, which is less
than current military doctrine assumes. 8. Counter-insurgency, peace and stability
operations, nation-building Recent
security policy guidance suggests that the Peacetime military engagement 9. Global military presence & base posture Even prior
to current wars, the 10. Military cooperation, assistance, and arms
transfers programs Since
9/11, US efforts in these areas have grown significantly and have diversified,
involving new beneficiaries. Total
transfers of security-related funds, goods, and services now significantly
exceed $20 billion per year (including Economic Support Funds for strategic
allies). In addition, US Combatant
Commanders invest substantially in cooperative planning and exercises. The putative needs of the “war on terrorism”
have become a determining factor in pursuing cooperation. Restrictions based on human rights and weapon
proliferation concerns have been substantially relaxed. And the Pentagon is seeking greater
authority to dispense funds, training, and weapons as it sees fit. But this “war time” framework induces
short-sightedness. Many of our new
beneficiaries are of uncertain reliability.
This problem has consistently plagued even longer-term relationships
based on perceived military necessity; The 11. Adherence to international law and legal
institutions At issue
are decisions to use force, the protections afforded civilians and civilian
assets during military operations, the treatment of detainees (both military
and civilian), and the 12. The role of negotiated arms control in US
security policy With the
advent of Civil-military relations: The growing influence of
the Pentagon 13. DOD domestic “perception management” efforts Especially
since the 1999 Kosovo war, DOD has come to view public information as a
“battlespace” and has become more aggressive
in attempting to manage the media, control the flow of information, and
shape the coverage of American operations.
The most recent example of these “strategic influence” campaigns to come
to light is the use of 75 supposedly independent analysts as “message
surrogates” in the news media. Other
efforts include the planting of supposedly independent news stories in the
media, the screening of journalist access to information based on their
perceived bias, and the surreptitious shaping of public discussion on Internet
blogs. Most serious is the stealthy
conveyance of dubious or weak “intelligence” through third-parties. These propaganda campaigns are antithetical
to well-informed public debate and, thus, represent a direct assault on our
democratic process. 14. The Pentagon’s drive for expanded “authorities”
and greater freedom of action DOD is
currently seeking greater freedom of action or “authorities” in a variety of
areas, including budget, finance, acquisition, and personnel. It also seeks greater freedom in providing
security and other types of assistance to potential partner nations in the war
on terror (including the provision of advanced weapons), and more freedom in nation-building activities,
including work with foreign police forces and interior ministries. This means loosening some of the constraints
on foreign assistance and arms transfers imposed by Congress, and allowing DOD to extend its writ into
areas traditionally in the State Department portfolio. Curiously, DOD points to Defense budget and acquisition issues 15. DOD’s broken financial and inventory accounting
system The
Pentagon’s financial and asset accounting systems are in complete disarray,
making useful audits impossible. “DOD
does not know what it owns, where its inventory is located, and how its annual
budget is being spent,” according to Kwai Chan, a former lead analysts with the
Government Accountability Office. DOD
routinely cannot account for the final disposition of a trillion dollars or
more of its funds and assets. This opens
the door wide to waste, fraud, larceny, and misdirection of resources. As a result, the budget totals upon which
Congress bases and tracks its decisions are unreliable. And military units, personnel, and veterans
often do not receive and cannot find the goods and services supposedly at their
disposal. Indicative of the problem,
200,000 weapons and $9 billion in funds have been reported ‘lost” in 16.
Pork-barrel spending: the Pentagon budget as “gravy train” The
temptation to see and use military spending as a form of welfare for
congressional districts requires constant vigilance by independent observers
and actors. Congressional add-ons or
“earmarks” to presidential budget requests now often exceed $10 billion. But this is only the visible tip of the
problem. Ongoing support for troubled or
excessive programs within the yearly
presidential budget request also may reflect parochial interest. This tendency was most evident when
Congresspersons from both parties worked hard to preserve redundant military
bases in their states and districts, often against the Pentagon’s assessment of
requirements. Pork-barreling and
horse-trading within Congress tends not only to boost the overall size of the
budget (to the detriment of other priorities) but also to impede adaptation of
our military to new circumstances. 17. DOD’s broken weapon procurement system More so
than any other nation, the 18. Military transformation: To what end? And how much of what is enough? The idea
of a “revolution” in military capabilities has been a driver of 19. Setting the defense budget – forever more than
$600 billion? By the end
of FY-2009 it is likely that the There are
worthwhile policy choices that could lead the budget substantially lower,
however – as noted throughout this document.
These include more realistic war planning, refraining from the pursuit
of destabilizing weapon capabilities, and restraint regarding military
occupations and long-term counter-insurgency campaigns. At any
rate, proposals to anchor defense spending to a percentage of GDP are without
merit and would not be tolerated in any other area of federal spending. In an absolute sense, the nation could
probably afford devoting 4 percent of GDP to defense, although other needs
would go wanting. But the budget should
correspond to requirements, not abstract benchmarks. Moreover, given today’s highly-competitive
global economy, greater care should be exercised regarding how we invest every
percent of GDP. Country-specific controversies 20. The 21. Resolving the In both
cases, the goal of “regime change” has impeded resolution of the nuclear
issue. So have punitive measures and the
general designation of the two states as “rogues”, which tends to foreclose
normal diplomacy. Most deleterious is saber-rattling,
which undermines both diplomacy and the prospects for democratization and
stable transition. Progress in the 22. What
should be foremost in our policy toward 23. Israel-Palestine and The
present confrontations help drive instability throughout the region. Currently, US security goals are focused on
isolating and weakening Hamas and Hezbollah.
But these two are probably the most popular and powerful organizations
in the region. And neither faces any
real prospect of neutralization. Can and
should they be engaged? How and to what
extent? 24. Relations with 25. Increased military activity in sub-Saharan Africa
and Over the
past decade, With offices in Washington DC and Cambridge MA, the Project on Defense Alternatives develops and promotes defense policy innovation that reconciles the goals of effective defense against aggression, improved international cooperation and stability, and lower levels of military spending and armed force worldwide. Subscribe to the monthly PDA Updates Bulletin. |