Slovenia: Facts and Statistics

1. Introduction

1.1. A Brief History of Modern Slovenia
On the geopolitical map of Europe Slovenia is a new and rather small country which, after winning political independence in 1991, has been slowly making its way towards a wider recognition by Europe and the world through numerous and increasingly extensive economic, scientific, cultural, sport, tourist as well as political contacts.¹

In fact, Slovenia existed long before the turmoil of 1991. It was for over seventy-three years a part of Yugoslavia, and before then it belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Yugoslavia existed first as a kingdom, generally referred to as Royal Yugoslavia and second as a socialist republic (called Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)), indelibly linked to the person of charismatic leader Josip Broz Tito. Both states had their good points and there were periods when Yugoslav optimism and ambitions appeared limitless.²

The second Yugoslavia that emerged out of World War II was a genuine attempt to reconcile the interests of all the country's peoples. The system of government was complex, but designed to be fair to all nations and national minorities in the state. The killings of World War II were not forgotten, but the Yugoslavs managed to get along with each other. The partisan and all-Yugoslav liberation movement of World War II and the international power of the second Yugoslavia had given a chance to Slovenia to establish its identity as a republic and also as a kind of intra-state in its current borders.

1.2. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia
There were great differences between Yugoslavia's regions, differences in the concepts on development strategies, on allocation of scarce resources, on political freedoms, on civilian control of the military, on accession to Western European and world economic, financial and security structures. These differences were not enough to break historical bonds, built up for more than seventy years. Many countries with regimes far more despicable than Yugoslavia's ever was, nevertheless remain together.³ Above all, the SFRY was among the first of socialist countries to develop co-operation with the European Community.

The disintegration of the SFRY was opposed by the international community, by the Yugoslav Peoples' Army which could exist only in the common state and by the last Prime Minister, Ante Markovic. There was some political will to reshape the SFRY into a modern post-cold-war state, which was presented in the meetings of the presidents of its six constituent republics at the end of the 1980s and in 1990. The efforts failed because Serbia, its media and a leader Slobodan Milosevic were already from 1987 on a war footing.

The central conflict which destabilised the SFRY was between, on the one hand, the desire to create or consolidate (in the case of Serbia) a state in which one national (Serbian) group was dominant, and on the other, the perceived vulnerability of minority (in number of inhabitants, not in economic power) populations in such a projected state. The inequality of nations, forced by Serbia, was a step back according to the achieved standard of political rights and freedoms in SFRY.

By the beginning of 1989 the SFRY was already in an advanced state of decay, but Western Europe and the United States appeared unwilling to recognise that Yugoslavia was disintegrating and that the prime minister and the presidents of its six republics were not capable of regulating this process in a peaceful manner. As communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, the SFRY lost the unique geopolitical position it had occupied for forty years as an anti-Stalinist, non-aligned state of Central Europe. After the collapse of communism, Western European and American decision-makers identified Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland as the three former socialist states which could be integrated most rapidly into Western market structures. The collapsing Soviet Union also absorbed considerable attention because of its size and possession of nuclear weaponry. The Balkans were regarded as uninteresting from a political and economic point of view.⁴ At that time Yugoslavia ceased to belong to Europe, it stayed in the Balkans, which was transforming itself more and more to the European "Third World".⁵

1.3. A Slovenian Way to Independence
In December 1990 Slovenians voted overwhelmingly to declare independence from Yugoslavia. During the next six months no working arrangement with the rest of the federation was reached, so Slovenia accelerated its departure from the federal Yugoslav state. The Slovenian Assembly confirmed the result of the December 1990 plebiscite in June 1991, when (precisely, on 26 June 1991) the Founding Charter of Independence was approved. During the evening ceremony on the same day, held to mark the approval of the Charter, some military units of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army already began marching into Slovenia and on 27 June, military operations and armed conflict developed throughout the whole of Slovenia. The intervention of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army within national borders put an end to the previous joint life and fictitious brotherhood and unity. The decision of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army to deploy classic military intervention instruments to bring the insubordinate inhabitants and politicians of Slovenia under central meant intervention against the very people whose security the Yugoslav Peoples' Army was supposed to provide for.

When the Yugoslav Armed Forces General Staff made the decision to intervene in Slovenia, it did so in the very belief that the United States was prepared to tolerate the rapid and efficient intervention with the aim of holding Yugoslavia together, no matter how pro-Serbian it would be. The visit of US Secretary of State James Baker to Belgrade and appeals of US Ambassador in Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann, to Slovenia in June 1991, were understood as a green light for military intervention. No matter how well intended these visits and appeals were, the outcome of Yugoslavia's crisis moved from the negotiating table to the battlefield. As the tanks rolled, Slovenian citizens and political leaders had to move from declarations and ceremonies to more operational acts. They decided to mobilise any means, also arms, of the territorial military units, called Territorial Defense,⁶ and of the police, to defy a militarily superior federal force. Both decisions (of the Yugoslav authorities to intervene and that of Slovenian citizens and leaders to resist) put an end to a peaceful method of resolving the Yugoslav crisis. Moreover, these decisions were a prelude to the war which lasted from June 1991 till November 1995 and which was so bloody that Yugoslav people, who had cherished their fictitious kinship for 73 years, had no desire to live together any more.

1.4. The International Community: Keeping an Eye on the Balkan Wars
The Slovenian envoys who during spring 1991 lobbied world politicians and states to support the decision to secede from Yugoslavia, and during summer 1991 to support and help in the armed conflict, and after that to recognise the state of Slovenia, were mostly ordered back to the negotiating table in Yugoslavia. It was not at all easy to break long lasting perceptions of Yugoslavia as the most favoured socialist state, especially with the superpowers (USA and Soviet Union/Russia) which perceived themselves as the founding fathers of the post-Yalta Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia were turning their eyes and hopes to: the European Community (EC), asking it to intervene in the conflict, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the United Nations Organisation (UNO), the United States of America and to NATO. After years of brutal and one-sided fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the sequence of important international institutions was just the opposite (with NATO as the most preferred institution).

The European Community finally decided to engage, first in the Slovenian phase of the Balkan Wars. The EC had set itself up as mediator and three prominent politicians, the Troika, mediated cease-fires and organised other negotiations. The EC also sent its unarmed observers to watch over the cease-fires and over the implementation of the Brioni Declaration, signed in July 1991, which resulted in Slovenia's putting a three- month freeze on the process of self-determination. EC member states decided to recognise Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992.

Today we are dealing with five new states that have emerged on the territory of former Yugoslavia. These are: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of the former Yugoslav republics Serbia and Montenegro) and Macedonia (because of disputes with Greece named officially as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia -- FYROM). All but the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are Internationally recognised states.

2. National Security as Cultural Issue: From Continuity to Transformation

Slovenia is a transition state in which the remedies of the past are still presented and influential. In the field of national security there is a great need for continuity and at the same time, for transformation. Both can be explained by taking the past events into account. The remedies of the past are found:

• in the political culture of Slovenia;
• in the overwhelming concepts of guerrilla warfare and territorial defense in the military doctrine and in the outlook of the military organisation;
• in the public attitudes towards military and security alliances and elsewhere.

2.1. Political Culture: A Lack of a Sense of Statehood
The main characteristic of Slovenian political culture is a lack of a sense of statehood. Slovenia has never played an important role in the internal policies of the states it belonged to, except in the former second Yugoslavia, where it established almost all key statehood mechanisms; including an independent police, a kind of competitive armed force in the form of the Territorial Defense, to a certain degree an independent executive, a representative and a legislative power.

The newly established state needed a large amount of adapted, renovated or newly prepared legal documents. There is a need to legalise itself in a statehood manner. The rights and duties of all individual subjects, comprising the security system and other sub-systems of the state, should be explained in laws and legislative norms, starting with the Constitution and ending with military regulations and rules. There is a kind of dilatory⁷ process in this respect taking place not only in Slovenia, but also in other post-socialist Central and Eastern European states.

2.2 The Territorial and Guerrilla Defense Doctrine: The Impact on the Standing Slovenian Army
In October 1991, when the last Yugoslav army soldier left Slovenia, the Slovenian army assumed full military control over the republic's territory, the Slovenian police took control over responsibility for border passes and the Slovenian political system gained full sovereignty over the country. The armed forces of Slovenia retained the previous name "Territorial Defense" for three years. It contained elements of a standing army and dispersed reserve units.

The name Territorial Defense was not only a symbolic concept of the former Yugoslav armed forces, it was territorial according to its doctrine.

Looking through the imperatives,⁸ supposed to be fulfilled by the modern military organisations, territorial units are more apt to fulfil the social imperative. However, Slovenian public opinion, measured from 1982 till 1990, showed expectations⁹ which did not accept the social imperative. In this period, the principal characteristic of Slovenian public opinion regarding military functions was the rise of expectations concerning the functional imperative. The functional imperative was understood to consist of resistance towards outside threats, military training and some civilian tasks, traditionally performed by the military, such as assistance in natural disasters and other catastrophes. Slovenian public opinion was also striving to reduce the social role of the military in domestic matters and to deny it the right to educate young males in the population in a patriotic spirit. Slovenians were also against all possible forms of military engagement in defending the constitutionally decided political system. It seems that Slovenian expectations towards its own military (according to the bad experiences with the Yugoslav military) were to keep it as "la grande muette" in internal affairs, which is not always possible when establishing one's own military.

The discrepancies between functional expectations of public opinion and the social role of the Territorial Defense units led to a very slow process of modernisation and transformation of the Territorial Defense into a standing army. The Territorial Defense was renamed to the Slovenian Army (Slovenska vojska) in 1994.

2.3. Attitudes Towards the Military and Political Alliances
In Slovenia and in former Yugoslavia after 1945, especially after the break with the Soviet Union in 1948, a specific political orientation towards the military and political alliances was formed. It was the so-called concept of defensive self-reliance, which was a result of a somewhat intermediate, geographical and political, position between two blocs, the capitalist West and the socialist East. Both blocs and their military-political alliances, NATO and Warsaw Pact, were presented to the public as negative factors of international politics. As a result of the counter-bloc policy, Yugoslavia found itself among the "founding fathers" of the Non-Alignment Movement, hosting one of its founding conferences in Belgrade at the beginning of the 1960s; it was among the most active countries in the process of establishing the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in the 1970s. All these processes formed and maintained Yugoslavia's political character as non-aligned country with no exterior security or defense guarantees, The value of independence in defense policy kept a very high position among the values of all Yugoslav regions, republics and nations. It was preserved in Slovenia during the armed conflict in 1991 and also for some time after.

Being a relatively small nation the Slovenians are eager to preserve their political and cultural identity and individuality, These concerns are displayed in public opinion when confronted with stronger international actors and they form an ambivalent situation together with another Slovenian novelty. In comparison with other European small nations, the Slovenian political élite feels the psychological need to be recognised symbolically as belonging to "Europe" and to the West.¹⁰

Slovenia was, in the period of attaining independence, before international recognition (December 1990-January 1992), forced into preserving the concept of defensive self-reliance. The concept has lost its non-aligned character, but it has raised a sense of responsibility for Slovenia's sovereignty by the Slovenian Territorial Defense units.

After Slovenia's international recognition in January 1992, the possibilities forguaranteeing its security changed considerably. Slovenia became a member of the United Nations and in March 1992 it was accepted into the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Changes also occurred in the international security environment. NATO and the USA both symbolically and actually began moving closer and closer to Central Europe and the Balkans. On one hand, on the basis of the London Declaration of 1990, regular diplomatic relations were established between NATO and countries which were former members of the rival pact. On the other hand, NATO had an increasing military presence in the nearby war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The revival of a US presence in the Balkans came together with the Croatian¹¹ phase of the Balkan wars. The USA decided to find the solution for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina through Croatia.

3. The Present Security Situation in Slovenia

The contemporary national security situation is determined generally by factors deriving from the internal development of Slovenia as a nation-state and from the international security environment (sub-regional, regional and/or global).¹²

3.1. The Socio-Political Framework
Regarding the internal development in the years of independence, Slovenia has accomplished some of the essential changes important for a successful transition from an authoritarian one-party into a democratic multi-party system, from a state economy to a market economy and from a nation within the state to a nation-state. The changes took place in the formation of the new constitutional and legal system, in the process of privatisation and denationalization, in the forming of new, democratic civil-military relations, in the establishment of new responsibilities and relations and ties in the international arena. However, Slovenia started the transition process in better economic shape than other transition countries; it had the advantage of already having a market-based economy, although with restrictions on property rights and on the use of capital. The growth of industrial output accelerated to an impressive 6.4 percent in 1994, after the massive trade re-orientation towards the West. By 1995, the geographic structure of Slovenian trade had become dominated by the OECD countries, which account for roughly 80 percent of foreign trade.

Despite all these positive changes some problems have arisen which generate significant difficulties in the establishment of a modern Slovenian state and primarily for its new national security system. The problems are the results of: the incomplete establishment of an overall legal order in Slovenia, differences in the accountability of legal organs to parliament and the public and the misunderstandings in civil-military relations produced because of a lack of expertise as well as knowledge in the military and civilian environment.

3.2. The Economic Framework
Among the three basic structural elements of the economy: industry, agriculture and services, Slovenia is inclined more and more to the service industry as the most promising element of its recent growth.

Manufacturing has until 1990 contributed the largest share to Slovenian GDP. Today, services already have became dominant with a 60 percent share in GDP in 1996.¹³ The Slovenian economy was already as part of Yugoslavia highly export-oriented; it accounted for nearly one third of all Yugoslav convertible exports.¹⁴

Slovenia's economic recovery also required d a new national currency to replace the unstable Yugoslav dinar. This was done first, by introducing the new Slovenian currency -- the tolar in October 1991 and second, by obtaining its full convertibility four years later.

Slovenia had advantages in tourism, transportation and banking before 1991 and they turned out to be disadvantages during the Balkan wars. For example, military disputes have had a devastating effect on Slovenian tourism (the strategic branch of the Slovenian economy) with two disastrous seasons in 1991 and 1992. The situation recovered in 1994 and stagnated again in 1995. When comparing the number of foreign and domestic visits in Slovenia from 1988 till 1995 it is obvious that the absolute level in 1995 is still less than half of that in the preindependence years.¹⁵

The other industry most adversely affected was transportation, as a consequence of the interruption of the transshipment function between Western Europe and the Middle East, Greece, Turkey, the former Communist countries of South-Central Europe and the former republics of Yugoslavia. The loss of this traffic has been estimated to be worth as much as US$ 300 million per year.

The reform of the banking system is being completed. The five largest banks conduct a combined 35 percent of banking transactions with the remainder shared by the other 25 commercial banks operating in the country, several of them Austrian or German owned.

The real determinant of the long-term future of the Slovene economy is foreign trade of goods and services. Some Slovenian economic analysts estimate that the recent trends in the structure of trade will continue: the share of processed products will grow and trade patterns will be more dispersed. In addition, the current most important Slovenian foreign trade partners (Germany, Italy, France, Austria, United Kingdom, the Netherlands) will remain the same in the near future.

3.3. Slovenian National Security Policy
The official defense doctrine and national security strategy, understood as a consistent set of attitudes, plans, ideas, standards of readiness in the fields of state security, peace and defense, do not as yet exist. There are some ideas in political programs of parliamentary parties, declared by government, the president of the Republic or by parliament, through which it is possible to foresee the guidelines of a future official Slovenian national security concept, but they cannot be found in one document or programme.

3.3.1. The Options for Slovenian National Security Policy
Since its independence, Slovenia has been confronted with a number of options concerning the military aspect of its national security. Following options should be mentioned:

• the need for Slovenia to form its own armed forces and to rely upon collective systems of security;
• to gain the status of armed or non-armed neutrality;
• to sign defense agreements with other states;
• to enter the process of European integration and to achieve the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and/or the Western European Union (WEU);
• a combination of two or more of the above mentioned options.

The Slovenian political élites which came into power after parliamentary elections in 1990, 1992 and 1996 had to overcome serious difficulties before reaching a clear and unambiguous agreement on key questions relating to the country's fundamental national interests. Public opinion was sometimes more consistent and visionary than politicians. Nevertheless, the Slovenian political establishment genuinely agrees that the international aspects of the country's defense policy should be based on defensive self- reliance coupled with the clear aim of attaining NATO membership ar as soon as possible.

In April 1997, the leaders of all parliamentary parties and the two representatives of ethnic communities agreed to sign a common statement in support of Slovenia joining NATO.

The main reasons for this preferred course of action are the result of several factors:

1. the relative inefficiency of existing international security mechanisms which have failed to resolve the crisis quickly, following the dissolution of the former Yugoslav Federation, especially in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
2. the undisputed military inferiority of the small Slovenian state;
3. the strategic impetus which has influenced Slovenia's desire to enter the process of European integration and, by extension, to become a member of European security institutions;
4. the strategic reflection that the new geostrategic and military-political milieu in Europe in the 1990s is also motivating Slovenia to find its security "shelter" in the framework of broader European security organisations, particularly NAT0;¹⁶
5. the attractiveness and prestige of Western civilisation, guaranteed by participation in the EU/WEU and NATO.

3.3.2. Slovenian Security Legislation S Lee on the Decision to Join the m EU and NATO
Slovenia as a new state adopted a new Constitution in December 1991 and numerous new laws. The Slovenian legislative package on security issues consists of: Articles 92, 102, 123 and 124 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, The Resolution on the Principles of National Security in the Republic of Slovenia, The Law on defense, The Law on Military Service, The Doctrine of Military Defense, The Guidelines of the Foreign Policy Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia. Other very important documents which are in parliamentary debate or not even prepared yet, are: The Doctrine of Civil Defense, The Guidelines for Defense Policy and Defense System, The National Security Strategy, The Military Strategy, The Concept of Transformation and Development of the Slovenian Army.

The Slovenian Constitution established the basic principles of Slovenian security, further elaborated in the Resolution on the Principles of National Security in the Republic of Slovenia, adopted by the Slovenian Parliament in December 1993. The Constitution stipulates general defense obligations for all male citizens and the right of conscientious objection on religious, philosophical and humanistic grounds to contribute to the country's defense and security other than by military service. It provides for parliamentary control over the execution of defense. The president of the Republic is the titular commander-in-chief, while the prime minister has no specific power in defense matters. The defense minister is the key defense politician in peace time.¹⁷ When the Constitution was being adopted, Slovenian pacifists insisted on the inclusion of the idea, that Slovenia's defense must stem from peace policy and the culture of non-violence. The operationalisation of this idea was seen in the concept of a demilitarised Slovenia which in 1990 was one of the two most prominent defense concepts for the future defense policy of Slovenia. The second concept related to the idea of Slovenia's own Army, which in fact succeeded and survived the armed conflict in 1991.

The Resolution on the Principles of the National Security in the Republic of Slovenia is a political document which determines the basic elements of the security system in Slovenia and the guidelines for its international security. The national security policy should be based on defensive self-reliance and on co-operation within the mechanisms of collective security in Europe, according to the principles of the UN Charter and according to the CSCE Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter. The Resolution defines the functions and structures of a Slovenian security system and the tasks and the organisation of the Slovenian defense Forces.

The Law on defense from 1991 (adapted in 1994) enabled the organisation of the defense forces and, in some respects, substituted the doctrine of military defense. The Doctrine of Military Defense was adopted in 1995, after the first revision of the Law on Defense in 1994. The Doctrine of Military Defense was the first military document which respected the political decision to strengthen the state security by joining NATO and the EU, to co-operate in the process of ensuring collective security and to accept the security standards of international alliances.

The Guidelines of the Foreign Policy Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia is a political document prepared by the Slovenian Government in June 1995. Concerning future Slovenian foreign policy goals it is far more concrete than all other documents. The goals mentioned in The Guidelines are: good relations with all neighbouring states, full membership in the EU, WEU and NATO, active role in the UNO and OSCE, membership in CEFTA and free trade with EFTA, Co-operation in tile Central European Initiative and the normalisation of relations with all recognised states of former Yugoslavia.

In April 1996, the Slovenian Parliament passed a resolution stating that "the Republic of Slovenia wishes to ensure its fundamental security interest within the system of collective defense enabled by membership in NATO". This resolution in fact indicates the achievement of a political consensus between all parliamentary parties on the foundations of Slovenian national security policy. The new Slovenian Parliament, formed after the elections in November 1996, decided to put forward the question of accession to NATO and it accepted a new Common Statement of the Parliamentary Parties on Support for Slovenia's Inclusion in NATO. It was signed in April 1997 and amounted to a serious attempt of presenting the idea to the Slovenian public and also to international organisations.

3.3.3. The Position of Slovenian Political Parties on NATO and EU Membership
The general impression, made according to all official statements of Slovenian parties and state institutions, is that the Slovenian political scene as a whole is genuinely in favour of Slovenia joining the Western integration processes, especially NATO (see Table 1). Behind this general preference there are differences¹⁸ between statements and actual behaviour, in the intensity of working towards acceptance, in measuring the effects of NATO enlargement, in expected procedures of joining, etc. The attitudes towards EU membership seem to be the same in statements and in acts. The advantage of the EU option is in its public image. It was elaborated publicly and was open to public debate. Slovenians were informed about costs and benefits on many occasions.

The political parties follow the public pattern of evaluating the EU. They have different opinions on some specific questions connected with EU membership, but all parliamentary parties do not see any other alternative for the future of Slovenia. The status of NATO within the political milieu is not so clear as the EU status.

The Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), centre left and liberal oriented government party, states that Slovenia's membership in EU and NATO has a national strategic meaning. Membership in the EU and NATO would accelerate economic progress, include Slovenia in the democratic world and increase Slovenian influence in the international community. Party members are sure that Slovenia fulfils the five criteria, published in the Study on NATO Enlargement (political democracy, market economy, protection of human rights, democratic civilian control over the military, settled relations with neighbour countries). The advantage of Slovenian membership in NATO is that it will not damage Russian interests, since Slovenia never belonged to the Warsaw Pact.

The Slovenian People's Party (SPP), centre right oriented, second largest govemment party, understands the rapprochement of Slovenia to NATO as a question of Slovenian internal policy, of social stability and economic development, as well as foreign policy. It stresses the need to inform the Slovenian public on all aspects of joining the Atlantic Alliance and other Western organisations.

The Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DPPS), centre left, the smallest government party, competed as an independent party for the first time in the elections of November 1946 (and competed as a group of pensioners' interests inside the United List of Social Democrats in the elections of 1992). The leaders of this Party think that membership in NATO should be made on the basis of national consensus. NATO should respect Slovenian geostrategic importance and declare an interest in having Slovenia a full member.

The Social Democratic Part of Slovenia (SDPS), centre right, oriented party, is the largest opposition party in the Slovenian parliament. Its President, Janez Jansa, was one of the former ministers of defense and one of the most important political leaders in the independence process of Slovenia. The Party has set out as its primary goal the participation of Slovenia in the European integration process. The leaders of the Party stress that their party began to work for NATO membership in 1989. According to them, NATO offers economic security. The Party was very critical towards some leftist Slovenian parties which were supposedly (according to the SDPS) blocking co-operation with NATO through various machinations. It supports a referendum on NATO.

The Slovenian Christian Democrats (SCD), right, conservative oriented party, does not appear in the media with a standpoint on NATO. In its programme, NATO membership is expected around the year 2005

The United List of Social Democrats (ULSD), left, social democratic oriented party, showed some scepticism about Slovenia joining NATO. Its scepticism derived from the lack of information on Slovenia's obligations, costs and benefits regarding NATO membership. The Party sees Slovenia's inclusion in the circle of developed Western European countries as being the most beneficial reason. The Party supports negotiating initiatives from Slovenia, meaning that the government should negotiate the duties, costs and responsibilities, not just accept the dictates from NATO. The Woman Forum in this Party opposes NATO membership. It demands a public debate on Slovenian defense strategy in which NATO would be only one of the alternatives. The other alternatives should be a new European military alliance (such as the WEU), armed neutrality, a Demilitarised Slovenia, etc. The Youth Forum of the United List of Social Democrats decisively opposes Slovenian membership in NATO as it would become the dumping-place of nuclear and other weapons from North Italian cities. The alternative should be gradual demilitarization of Slovenia.

The Slovenian National Party (SNP), right, nationalist oriented party, oscillates between reservations about and support for NATO membership. The cost of membership burdening the Slovenian economy is regarded as the greatest obstacle. The Party indicates that the key goal of NATO enlargement lies with the USA selling weapons to all potential members of NATO. It also fears for Slovenian sovereignty if the territory or air space is put at the disposal of NATO units, operating in SFOR. On the other side, the SNP stresses that Slovenia belongs to the civilizational circle of NATO since Slovenians were American Allies in World War II.

3.3.4. Co-oporation between Slovenia and NATO in Practice
In December 1991, the formation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) did not include Slovenia, as the countries which had formerly been members of the Warsaw Pact and all member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), replacing the Soviet Union after its dissolution on 20 December 1991) were the first to be invited to join its ranks. Slovenia did not fall into this framework, since the former Yugoslav federal state was never a member of the Warsaw Pact. There was some dissatisfaction among the Slovenian public because NATO had already become a symbol of political prestige in Central and Eastern Europe and any kind of access to it was desired. Although the security situation in Slovenia had already for the most part been stabilised, Slovenian political leaders became increasingly convinced that living safely on the edge of the Balkans would be better under the NATO umbrella.

On 30 March 1994, after signing the Framework Document, Slovenia joined the Partnership For Peace programme, which had been anounced at the beginning of 1994.¹⁹ The Framework Document defined the objectives and values of preserving democratic societies, their freedom, the maintenance of international law and also the expectations of NATO concerning the signatories. The Presentation Document as the second step in PfP was formulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, verified by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and handed over to NATO Deputy Secretary General Sergio Balanzino on 20 July 1994. The Presentation Document was the basis for the Individual Partnership Programme, prepared in 1995.

By spring 1995, Slovenia had already started to implement a Planning and Review Process²⁰ introduced within the Partnership for Peace programme. In January 1996, Slovenia exchanged its observer status in the NACC for full membership and in April 1996 began an individual dialogue on accession to NATO. NATO became a part of everyday political vocabulary in Slovenia, along with various paradigms such as the Partnership for Peace, civil-military relations, NATO enlargement, NATO membership and collective defense. In Slovenian political and diplomatic circles it was possible to detect from 1994 onwards growing self-confidence and the conviction was formed in public opinion that Slovenia was the most perfect candidate for membership in NATO.

The year 1997 was decisive in Slovenian efforts to move closer to NATO. In January, experts' delegations from Slovenia and NATO Headquarters negotiated Slovenian co-operation in SFOR. In March 1997, US Senator Joseph Biden, visited Ljubljana and declared that Slovenia is the economically best prepared candidate for NATO. In April, the Parliamentary Statement on support of Slovenian membership in NATO was signed; it was just in time, because on 24-26 April, a huge international conference was organised by the defense Research Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Its topic was Central-Eastern Europe and Euro-Atlantic security; it was understood as a sort of final professional lobbying for Slovenia's joining NATO.

Even though public expectations in Slovenia on the Madrid NATO Summit on 8/9 July 1997 were great, Slovenia did not receive an invitation to join NATO in the first round. This fact had a somewhat sobering effect on Slovenian political leaders as well as on the Slovenian public.

3.3.5. The EU Option in Slovenian Politics
Slovenian sympathies for the EU stemmed from the significant trade that Slovenia had with its member states. The official recognition of Slovenia in January 1992 also deepened Slovenian sympathies for the EC/EU. Its symbolic meaning was in opening the road to Europe and the world (in May 1992 Slovenia became a member of the United Nations, in February 1993 a member of the World Bank, in May 1993 a member of the Council of Europe). Slovenia and the EU signed a Trade and Co-operation Agreement which came into force on 1 September 1993. In October 1994, Slovenia joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In June 1995, Slovenia and EFTA signed an agreement on establishing a free-trade area, and finally, again in June 1995, Slovenia and the EU initialled the Europe Agreement. One year later, in June 1996, Slovenia and the EU signed the Europe Agreement and Slovenia applied for full EU membership.

The Slovenian government established a Ministry for European affairs in October 1997. In December 1997, the European Council decided to begin accession negotiations with the five best prepared CEECs for EU membership in March 1998, including Slovenia.

Complementary with efforts to join the EU, Slovenian diplomacy agitated for non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council. The Slovenian candidacy succeeded, gaining a large majority of votes in the UN General Assembly in October 1997, which meant that Slovenia's mandate in the Security Council will last two years, starting on 1 January 1998.

4. Public Opinion on Slovenia's Foreign Policy Goal to Join NATO and the EU

Slovenian national security policy should not be merely an expression of the specific security needs of Slovenia, but should also take into account the civilizational and cultural requirements of modern times. Only such a concept will make it possible for Slovenia to develop into an open and democratic society in the areas of security and defense. The attainment of a general and common social consensus on the model of national security is of extreme importance. The fundamental elements of such a consensus are the expectations, inclinations and views of the general public as regards the national security policy of Slovenia. The attitudes of the public and the policy decision makers sometimes correlate. They might also be contradictory. It is important to review the influence of public opinion in time of correlation with politicians, but also in cases of controversies between the politicians and public attitudes or in cases of controversies among the politicians themselves.

Regarding the standpoints of Slovenia parliamentary parties in the pre-Madrid (July 1997) time, there was a full consensus expressed on the necessity to join NATO. There were certain doubts and reservations concerning the speed and transparency of the accession, which were not very influential in the general pro-NATO course. In "diplomacy to the public", the representatives of the government advertised only the benefits of NATO accession. They pointed out greater security, greater distance from the Balkans, a sense of belonging to Western civilisation, lower defense budgets, development of military industry, better access to modern military techniques and technologies, plus greater efficiency of the Slovenian army. There were hardly any doubts expressed, although forecasts for a lower defense budget were not put forward.

The issue of the Balkans as a possible threat is surprising, because after Dayton peace is internationally monitored and Slovenia has established diplomatic relations with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM. In December 1997, some big steps were made in establishing (parliamentary) relations between Slovenia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The fact is that the Balkans has an image of a "troublemaker" in the mind of an average Slovenian politician and a negative image could be ascribed to anybody neighbouring to the Balkans.

It should be added that in all wars in the Balkans the countries of the region were fighting among themselves, alone or in the alliances, which means that the endogenous, local factor of instability is of utmost importance.

4.1. Attitudes on NATO in Slovenian Public Opinion
In Slovenia political spheres an atmosphere acknowledging the indisputable advantages of admission to NATO has been created. This perception has been popularised by party leaders and the media, as well as by non-governmental organisations (notably, the Atlantic Council of Slovenia). In the period prior to the parliamentary elections in November 1996, motivated by campaign tactics, some party leaders were expressing doubts about the actual necessity for joining NATO. The political élites brought their opinions into line very fast. They could not ignore the prevailing public opinion, in which a trend of increasing support for NATO has been observed.

4.1.1. Support for NATO Membership
Between the end of 1994 and October 1996 public opinion polls showed an increase in public support for the government's efforts to join NATO. The upward trend been recorded in all population categories and has at the beginning of 1997 stabilised at around 60 percent of respondents in favour of government policy. At the same time, the number of those who disagreed with this policy also rose, but only slightly. From late 1994, when the question on NATO membership was asked for the first time, to March 1997, large changes occurred in the undecided category. The share of these respondents fell and according to the survey from March 1997 stabilised at around one-fifth of total population polled (see Table 2). The most interesting point in these surveys came out in the October/November 1997 survey on an extended sample, when the proportion of public opinion, despite the lack of an invitation to NATO in between (July 1997), remained nearly the same as in March 1997, when pro-NATO public and political euphoria was at its peak. The percentage of supporters was around 9 percent lower than in March 1997, but the lost supporters went to the group of the undecided, not to the opponents, as would be expected from the sobering effect of Slovenia staying out of the first round of NATO enlargement.

Entry to NATO is most favoured by the group of respondents aged 46 to 60, males,²¹ with vocational or high school education, employees and pensioners. Disagreement with this policy is highest in the group of respondents under 30 years, highly educated, farmers and self-employed. In the group of undecided, the majority were women (housewives). It is interesting that respondents who oppose admission to NATO are generally against any international integration of Slovenia. In the group of respondents who opposed Slovenia's accession to the European Union, 40 percent of respondents did not support the government working for an admission to NATO.²²

The USIA published slightly different figures. In its survey of 1996, 32 percent of Slovenians were strongly in favour of Slovenia becoming a full member of NATO, 39 percent somewhat favour, 13 percent somewhat opposed and 11 percent strongly opposed Slovenia becoming NATO member.²³

4.1.2. On What Does a Possible Admission to NATO Depend?
The greatest influence on a possible admission of Slovenia to NATO is, according to Slovenian public opinion, attributed to Slovenian diplomacy (see Table 3). This opinion is held mostly by males with high school education, with centre-right and centre-left political orientation. One quarter of the respondents think that the speed of Slovenia's accession to NATO will depend mostly on NATO itself. These respondents are predominantly under 30, with university backgrounds, from urban centres and supporters of the two social-democratic, currently opposition parties (United List of Social Democrats, Social Democratic Party). One fifth of respondents attributes responsibility for the speed of admission to the Slovenian Ministry of Defence and to the Slovenian Army. This opinion is held mostly by respondents with primary school education, students and the respondents with Christian-democratic political orientation. Again, women prevail among those who could not decide. In general, female respondents were rather undecided regarding the issues of Slovenian defense policy.

It is obvious from the documents adopted by government and parliament that Slovenian political élites reconciled their policies involving basic foreign security directions. Also, public opinion polls confirmed that these directions enjoy public support. The problem is that the concensus was achieved mainly on the emotional level. For example, agreement on admission to NATO was achieved mostly without any particular knowledge of this objective. There has been no study commissioned, elaborated or presented, which would assess what or how much Slovenia can contribute to integration into NATO, what can be expected from it and what will have to be renounced. The decision about NATO was taken ad hoc by political élites as well as by the general public. Thus, the Slovenian Government could in its rapprochement to NATO count on a high agreement index, which was, however, based predominantly on the emotional appeal of NATO. Although politics in general is often emotionally coloured, in particular when knowledge on the matter is insufficient, it will be vital for any future important issue related to external security that it will rationally decided. Otherwise a stable and long lasting functional and a guided consensus will not be attainable. A rational decision will be possible only on the basis of comprehensive knowledge of relations with NATO, which the Slovenian public still lacks. Lack of integral information was also evident from results of the survey POLITBAROMETER 3/97 (FSS-POMCRC), conducted in March 1997, where 16.4 percent of the respondents considered themselves well-informed about Slovenia's rapprochement to NATO, while 30.1 percent considered themselves ill-informed.

4.1.3. Reputation by NATO Admission²⁴
When we claimed that Slovenia's decision for admission to NATO was an emotional one, we assumed that it was mostly based on emotional arguments. The December 1994/January 1995 public opinion poll showed that the most convincing public arguments for joining were those related to an improved international reputation of Slovenia.²⁵

The respondents had three groups of statements at their disposal to agree or not to agree with. One group consisted of statements on the political nature of admission to NATO, as: enhancing the country's reputation, strengthening of military security, easier way to European integration, loss of sovereignty. The second group of statements touched the internal defense/military outcomes of admission, as: lifting the arms embargo, accession to modern weapons, more efficient army, sending troops outside Slovenia, defense industry co-operation, increasing defense budget. The third group related to the foreign armed forces, which are presented through the symbol of military bases. Slovenia never had any foreign military bases on its territory, so people do not have a real impression, except if they can remember the barracks of the former Yugoslav army, which were some kind of military bases. The statements referred to the bases as an environmental threat, as a loss of territory, as a source of social disturbances and as employers of civilian population. In all of the three groups there were advantages and disadvantages. The highest support got the statement that admission to NATO would mean access to modern weapons (over 70 percent) and three reputation indicators (growing reputation, increasing security, approaching to Europe) also received a high degree of support (over and around 60 percent). The lowest agreement was with statements on losing sovereignty and on bases as employers. Opinions on these two statements were almost equally dispersed among those who agreed, who disagreed and who didn't know. It means that the attitudes towards these statements were very contradictory.

It is possible to extrapolate a common pattern of thinking, in which respondents predicted the advantages of admission to NATO at the abstract or general level, but expected disadvantages in nearly all practical matters -- budget, bases, troops in out-of-border operations. The indicator of loosing sovereignty received the highest percentage of "don't know" replies (35.2 percent). The respondents were faced with different dilemmas about the relationship between the domestic and the external dimension of state sovereignty. Slovenia had just gained its sovereignty, for which it had been striving for many decades. In addition, Slovenia would like to gain security guarantees for the external dimension of sovereignty, which is provided by NATO. However, Slovenians are not sure whether these two dimensions of state sovereignty are controversial or complementary, if state sovereignty would or would not be limited in case of getting NATO security guarantees.

Although generally supportive of NATO membership, Slovenians remain largely reluctant to assume responsibilities they may be required to shoulder. This discrepancy may reflect a lack of understanding of what full NATO membership entails. It may reflect Slovenian self-confidence and egoism. In 1996, a majority of Slovenians (76 percent) were sure that if Slovenia were in NATO and another country attacked Slovenia, NATO would probably come to its aid. This percentage was higher than in any of the CEECs surveyed (Bulgaria 47 percent, Czech Republic 68 percent, Hungary 57 percent, Poland 63 percent, Romania 64 percent, Slovakia 67 percent).²⁶ Another point on the reverse side concerns NATO commitment and the Slovenian degree of readiness for potential obligations. According to the USIA survey from 1996, Slovenians were less supportive to send Slovenian troops to defend another NATO country, to have NATO troops stationed in the country, and to increase the percentage of the national budget spent on the military rather than education and health care, than the majority of other CEECs surveyed.

4.2. Support for EU Membership
Surveys on Slovenia's accession to the EU became very frequent after the July 1997 decision of the European Commission to recommend Slovenia for full membership negotiations. The Information Office of the Slovenian Government decided to start a very broad campaign to ascertain the state-of-affairs in the Slovenian public regarding the EU and to inform the public on activities, advantages and disadvantages of EU membership. Nothing similar had been done before for NATO. An important task belonged to the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Science, one of the most reliable public opinion research institutions in Slovenia. It is supposed to permanently (every month) measure public support for the EU by the POLITBAROMETER survey.²⁷ In addition, it conducted a survey on "The Attitudes of Slovenians towards European Integration and the Accession to the EU"²⁸ with an extended sample of 2031 Slovenians (3 October-7 November 1997) and with a sample of opinion leaders (realised N = 286) from 11 leadership groups (conducted in November 1997).

4.2.1. European Orientation of Slovenian Public Opinion
According to the USIA survey of 1996,²⁹ 32 percent of Slovenians strongly favour full membership in the EU, 45 percent somewhat favour this goal, 13 percent somewhat oppose and 7 percent strongly oppose EU membership.

The findings of the POLITBAROMETER polls partly correspond to the USIA survey. They use as indicator the benefits expected from EU membership. The first poll, done in March 1995, showed that 53.5 percent of respondents thought Slovenia would benefit from EU membership, 24 percent thought that it would not benefit and 22.6 percent of respondents remained undecided. The ratio between benefit and non-benefit was 2.2:1. All later measurements have basically followed this ratio.³⁰

If respondents were to vote in a referendum next Sunday, would they vote for EU membership or against? This question was asked for the first time in March 1997, when 55 percent of respondents answered "for" EU membership and 26.2 percent "against". The ratio 2:1 remained almost the same until the survey in December 1997, when the "for" votes reached 61.4 percent, 18.7 percent of respondents would vote against EU membership and 20 percent remained undecided. The percentage of voting for EU in the case of a possible referendum was slightly higher than expectations of benefits from the EU (54.6 percent).³¹

The EU membership seems to be a concept of youth, of respondents who are highly educated, self-employed and employed in the non-economic sphere, of students, of those living in bigger cities and with party preferences to the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (centre-left), to the United List of Social Democrats (left), since more than 65 percent of respondents from these groups would vote for the EU in a referendum.³² The greatest opposition to EU membership can be found among housewives, those living in rural regions and in the groups with party preferences to the opposition, Slovenian National Party, Slovenian Christian Democrats, Social Democrats of Slovenia (the parties with centre-right political orientation).³³

4.2.2. The European Union as a Security Framework (Opinion Leaders' Standpoint)
The POMCRC Survey on the EU from 1997 involved the analysis of the opinions and orientations of public opinion leaders³⁴ in which the security aspects of the EU were elaborated, among others. It is not a usual standpoint in Slovenia, the majority of people still perceive the EU as an economic issue and NATO as political-military issue. The opinion leaders who were interviewed partly by standardised and partly by non- standardised interview gave quite "correct"³⁵ answers when explaining EU aims, structure and Slovenian inputs and outputs at different stages of association.

4.2.2.1. The Benefits of the EU
The public opinion leaders were representatives of 11 groups: university, government, local authorities, lawyers and judges, parties, media, economy, religious communities, trade unions, non-governmental organisations, artists; the realised sample was 286 interviews. When they were asked if Slovenia would benefit from the EU membership, 93.7 percent of answers were "yes". Only 4.5 percent thought that it will not have any benefits, 1.7 percent didn't reply. The opinion leaders favour EU membership, but not because of general enthusiasm. They made very rational judgements about benefits and costs. Some of them concluded that in this historical moment no other possibility exists. The economic and political consequences for those staying outside would in some cases be so disadvantageous that in spite of the unattractiveness of the EU it would be better to be in than to stay out. The opinion leaders did not have any serious alternative to the EU, as far as Slovenia was concerned. Some of them quoted CEFTA, EFTA, regional arrangements, neutrality and independence as well as co-operation with the USA and the Balkans.

4.2.2.2. Reasons to Join
In a non-standardised question opinion leaders were asked to indicate the reasons why Slovenia should join the EU. They opted mostly for economic reasons (economic stability, greater market, competitiveness, welfare). The second, less important group of reasons was concentrated around the "Europeanization" of values and thinking (openness, tolerance, exchange of knowledge, de-monopolisation). The third group of reasons concerned security (greater distance from the Balkans, good neighbourly relations). Slovenia would become a part of a stable political environment and of a broader European security system that would help to resolve the defense problems of a small state. One university respondent indicated that Slovenia would stay in the Balkans if it did not join the EU; staying in the Balkans would mean being a cordon sanitaire for Europe, outside the Schengen doors forever. The media respondent ironically noted that a small nation, like Slovenia, with its inferiority complex would feel more secure with bigger and important kinship around it.³⁶ We may conclude with the idea of Malnar³⁷, that the European Union as a big community means a security shelter against the pressures of individual states. It means the organised system of security is at so high a level that Slovenia as a small state could not afford to go it alone.

4.2.2.3. National Sovereignty of Slovenia and Accession to the EU
The loss of national sovereignty is one of the strategic questions concerning the EU. Opinion leaders had different opinions, but most expected a partial loss and that the transfer of sovereignty would be less than the benefits of becoming EU member. Other typical opinions were as follows:

• There are also positive effects on sovereignty. By joining the EU Slovenia would get the right to take part in crucial decisions on European matters, which it could not influence from outside. if Slovenia acquired more security, the reduction of sovereignty did not mean its loss. As a small state Slovenia had already limited sovereignty; by joining the EU the situation would improve.
• One group (the second largest) of opinion leaders had very specific, but interesting views on sovereignty. They stressed the need to re-evaluate the whole concept of national sovereignty. The situation of states in the modern globalised political reality could not be measured by the classic criteria of sovereignty. The classical sovereignty understood as autonomy of the nation state in fact meant isolation from the essential loci of transnational decision-making. Therefore, classical sovereignty today meant less sovereignty compared with integration in a broader framework. More sovereignty could be exercised in co-operating than in staying formally independent and having nothing to say on global issues.³⁸

4.3. Concluding Remarks on Public Opinion on NATO and the EU
On the basis of both direct and indirect indicators derived from the results of the representative public opinion surveys from 1994 up to 1997, the following can be concluded:

First, the desired national security system of Slovenia should be based on Slovenian military and defense traditions and on the values of modern Slovenian society.

It should be noted that throughout its history, the military activities of the Slovenian population have been permeated by the tradition of the self-defense organisation, which has its origin in "civil society" and defensive self-reliance which originated in the partisan movement of World War II.

The basic aim in shaping the Slovenian national security system is to design a system in which the principles of expediency, economy, a correlation between the estimated level of threat, the available security capacities and the security culture in Slovenia should be taken into account. The security system should be internally balanced and should be a complete unit combining the professional activities ofthe state bodies, social and societal activities (volunteer, non-governmental organisations) and the activities of the individual the citizen. The national security system should also be rational. This means that the state should earmark for the formation and maintenance of its national-security system a relatively low percentage of the national income, which should be lower than the percentage allocated to health, research or science.

Second, the results tend to emphasise that there is no significant discrepancy between public opinion and the views of the Slovenian authorities with regard to national security within the European security framework, created by NATO and the EU.

Third, it appears that the question of joining NATO and the EU is being approached In a realistic way. On the basis of these results, one can see that there is a need for the Slovenian population to be promptly and thoroughly informed concerning all advantages and disadvantages of full membership in NATO and the EU.

5. Conclusion
Slovenia as a newly established European country is successfully directing its internal development toward a stable and democratic society and market economy. In relations with other countries, Slovenia acts on the principles of co-operation and peaceful resolution of conflicts and, therefore, contributes also to international stability and security. We can prove these statements with the following facts: Slovenia is a full member of the UN (in the period of 1997-1999 a non-permanent member of the Security Council) and OSCE; an active member of PfP and EAPC; an associated partner of WEU; a member of CEFTA, member of Alpe-Adria (regional economic and political co-operation initiative of Italy, Slovenia and Austria), member of the Trilateral (military co-operation of Italy, Slovenia and Hungary; in this framework a common military unit -- a brigade -- was formed). Slovenia is member of SECI (the American initiative for stability and security in South-Eastern Europe). Slovenia signed the Europe Agreement with EU and is in the process of negotiating full membership in the EU. Slovenia also has bilateral military co-operation with many countries (USA, Italy, Hungary, Austria, Czech Republic, Albania, etc.). All these are proofs how a small state can build up its domestic and international political prestige which is one of the important elements of guaranteeing security in the framework of contemporary European security settings.

Notes

1 Borut Suklje, Foreword, in: Janko Prunk, A Brief History of Slovenia: Historical Background of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana: Zalozba Grad, 1996, pp. 3-5, here p. 3.

2 Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences, London: Hurst & Company, 1995, p. 7.

3 See Bennett, note 2, p. 8.

4 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, London: Penguin Books, 1993, p. 235 (first edition 1992).

5 The term "Third World" describes the underdeveloped and developing countries, mostly in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

6 The Territorial defense (TD) was a military formation armed with light infantry arms and its structure was based almost entirely on the military reserve. The Yugoslav Constitution (1974) defined the TD as one of the two elements of the Yugoslav armed forces (the other being the YPA). Each former Yugoslav republic organised its own TD as a local territorial combat units.

7 Stefan Sarvas, The Changed Role of the Military in Society, in: Peter Talas/Reka Szemerkenyi, Behind Declarations: Civil-Military relations in Central Europe, defense Studies, Special Edition, Budapest: The Institute for Strategic and defense Studies, 1996, pp 45-48, here p. 47.

8 Marin Edmonds, Armed Services and Society, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988, pp. 123-131.

9 Ljubica Jelusic, Legitimnost sodobnega vojastva [Contemporary Military Legitimacy], Ljubljana: Fakulteta za druzbene vede [Faculty of Social Sciences], 1997, p. 204.

10 Anton Bebler, Introduction, in: Anton Bebler (ed.), Round Table on Switzerland and Slovenia Facing the Challenges of EU and NATO Enlargement, organised by the Graduate Institute of International Studies and the Institute of European Studies, University of Geneva in co-operation with the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia at the UN Office at Geneva, Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences, defense Research Centre, 1997, pp. 1-6, here p. 5.

11 There existed close ties between the Croatian military commanders, Minister of defense (ex-businessman in USA) and top rank American military circles, which became apparent especially during the operation "Storm" in August 1995. Operation "Storm" was categorised by Vukadinovic as a key step to the Dayton Agreement and as a result of a strategic partnership between small Croatia and the US superpower in South-Eastern Europe. Source: Radovan Vukadinovic, Hrvaska zunanja politika: Od oblikovanja drzave do regionalne sile [Croatian Foreign Policy: From Establishing the State to Regional Power], in: Teorija in praksa, Vol. 34, No. 1, Ljubljana 1997, pp. 84-98, here p. 96.

12 Anton Grizold, Slovenia's National Security in a New European Environment, Koln: Bundesinstitut fur Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 12-1997, p. 7.

13 Slovenian Economic Mirror, Ljubljana: IMAD, Vol. 12, No. 2 (February 1997).

14 Marjan Svetlicic/Peter Stanovnik, Slovenia and the European Union, in: Anton Bebler (ed.), note 10, pp. 19-43, here p. 20.

15 Paul Phillips/Bogomil Ferfila, The First Five Years. Slovenia, Quarterly Magazine, Vol. X, No. 2, (Summer 1996), pp. 4-8, here p. 5.

16 Anton Grizold, Slovenia and European Security Integration, in: Peace and the Sciences, Vol. 28 (September 1996), pp. 20-30, here p. 20.

17 Anton A. Bebler, Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia, in: Constantine P. Danopoulos/Daniel Zirker (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 195-211, here p. 201.

18 The analysis of political parties behaviour was prepared for defense Research Centre by: Marjan Malesic, Politicne stranke na Slovenskem: zaznava NATA, Ljubljana, Obramboslovni raziskovalni centre, Fakulteta za druzbene vede, 1997. [Political Parties in Slovenia: the Perception of NATA, Ljubljana: defense Research Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences, 1997].

19 Slovenia was invited on the basis of the Declaration (items 12-16), concluded at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 10/11 January 1994.

20 Slovenia started the Planning and Review Process (PARP) as one of the 14 Partner states. In this biennial cycle Slovenia expects to advance interoperability and transparency between itself and NATO.

21 63.2 percent of men supported NATO membership (48 percent among women) and only 17.9 percent of men were undecided (34.2 percent women) in the poll; see the POMCRC poll from Oct./Nov. 1997.

22 Niki Tos et al., EUROBAROMETER, Ljubljana: FSS, POMCRC, October 1996.

23 The New European Security Architecture, Public Attitudes Toward European Security, Washington: USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, September 1996, p. 10.

24 For more information on this topic and other public opinion findings in the same survey, see: Igor Kotnik, The Presentation of the Public Opinion Survey Results about the Slovenian Public and the NATO Relation, in: Igor Kotnik, Slovenia and NATO, Ljubljana: Atlantic Council of Slovenia, 1995, pp. 91-100.

25 The results are quoted according to the survey: Anton Grizold et al., National Security of Slovenia, December 1994/January 1995, N=1050.

26 See note 23, p. 26.

27 POLITBAROMETER is a survey, which is conducted every month from the January 1995 on. It comprises telephone conducted interweaves with anticipated sample of 1700 telephone numbers and with an average of 60 percent of realised sample. It is ordered by the Information Office of the Government of Slovenia and conducted under leadership of Niko Tos at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre.

28 Niko Tos et al., Stalisca Slovencev o evropskem zdruzevanju in pridruzevanju EU, Ljubljana: Fakulteta za druzbene vede, Centre za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in mnozicnih komunikacij, 1997 [The Attitudes of Slovenians Towards the European Integration and the Accession to the EU, Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre, 1997]. Further referred as POMCRC Survey on EU.

29 See note 23, p. 13.

30 Niko Tos et al., POLITBAROMETER 12/1997, Ljubljana: FSS, POMCRC, December 1997, p. 23.

31 See Tos, note 28, p. 24.

32 Niko Tos, Press conference on the occasion of presenting the results of the polls, mentioned in the note 28, to the media in November 1997.

33 See Tos, note 28.

34 See Tos, note 28. The Final Report: Opinion Leaders on Slovenian Accession to the EU, Ljubljana: FSS-POMCRC, 23 December 1997. The report was prepared by Brina Malnar.

35 The word "correct" is deployed intentionally. Slovenian public opinion shows a lack of information and the Information Office of the Government has to work hard to educate Solvenians about basic facts of the EU. The illustration of the level of knowledge is the data, that respondents, when asked to say what country was the last accepted to the EU, mostly chose Austria (31.2 percent), but the second place was occupied by the Czech Republic (17.9 percent). There were also 42 percent of "don't know" replies (source: POMCRC Survey on EU, Oct./Nov. 1997, the database).

36 See Tos, note 28, pp. 19-20.

37 See Tos, notes 28 and 34, p. 23.

38 See Tos, notes 28 and 34, p. 85.

Citation: Anton Grizold and Ljubica Jelusic, Slovenian Security in the European Perspective, Project on Defense Alternatives Guest Publication. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, September 1999.
http://www.comw.org/pda/9909slov.html

© Anton Grizold and Ljubica Jelusic, 1999.

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