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America's New Deal with
Europe:
NATO Primacy and Double Expansion
PDA Research Monograph 5
Carl Conetta
October 1997
Assessing the prospect of NATO
enlargement, George Kennan (1997) writes as a
man who has seen his life's work completed and
then inexplicably undone. He asks:
"Why, with all the hopeful
possibilities engendered by the end of the cold
war, should East- West relations become centered
on the question of who would be allied with whom
and, by implication, against whom in some
fanciful, totally unforeseeable and most
improbable future military conflict?"
Former MBFR ambassador Jonathan Dean
observes that without America's "continual
pressure...on the European NATO states,
[expansion] would have died a natural death in
the NATO Council" (1997:35). So to answer George
Kennan's question we must look to the evolution
of post-cold war US policy. For the Clinton
administration, NATO expansion has less to do
with Russia than Germany, and more to do with
the Bosnia intervention and out-of-area
operations than with either Germany or Russia. A
collision with Russia is not the policy's aim,
although it may be its price. At any rate, it is
not a price that the Administration expects to
pay any time soon.
The premise of US post-cold war policy
toward Europe has been the pursuit of a new deal
in which the costs and benefits of engagement
would be re-balanced and yesterday's
burdensharing inequities rectified. In this
pursuit US policy has had to contend with
several European realities: unity efforts in the
West, instability in the East, the growth of
German influence, and the faltering of Russian
transition. The product of this encounter has
been the American demand for NATO preeminence
and "double expansion" -- Senator Richard
Lugar's phrase referring to the addition of new
NATO members and new NATO missions.
The most consequential of recent US
policy decisions -- the Bosnia intervention and
NATO expansion -- rest on a narrow tactical
accommodation between a Democratic president and
a conservative Republican congress. Public
opinion remains fluid and nothing resembling a
consensus on these issues exists within the
policy community, which is severely divided over
expansion. To understand the internal pressures
affecting American policy formation it is most
revealing to begin at the margins of the debate
-- with those who say that America should
relinquish its military engagement in Europe
altogether.
The collapse of Soviet power prompted
the most serious re-examination of America's
stake in European security in forty-five years.
For the first time since 1947, a chorus of
voices rose in favor of military disengagement
from Europe (Bandow 1994; Carpenter 1992; Layne
1993; Ravenal 1990- 91; Steel 1995). Although
not universally or strictly isolationist, the
"disengagers" as a group have challenged the
necessity of most large-scale US military
deployments abroad. With regard to Europe, a
representative view is that "NATO should be
dismantled" and "America should withdraw the
100,000 soldiers currently stationed in Europe"
(Gholz et al. 1997:18).
Although the renaissance of
"disengagement" opinion indicates how much US
discourse has changed, "disengagement" remains a
distinctly minority perspective. Apart from the
presidential campaigns of Pat Buchanan (1990),
disengagement finds only occasional
representation in political debates. The
predominant American position, spanning two
administrations, favors substantial engagement
with Europe. Notably, the conservative
Republican Contract with America
advocates a muscular brand of engagement --
unipolarist in tone, but certainly not
isolationist.
While disengagers typically embrace a
realist perspective to argue from the fact of
Soviet demise to a policy of disengagement,
engagement finds supporters within both the
American realist and liberal internationalist
tendencies. Thus, there is little consensus
among "engagers" on what facts, dynamics, or
prospects of the European situation are most
relevant to policy formation. But they agree
that the Soviet demise is not the end of the
story, and that the fate of Europe and America
are linked, if not indivisible. The differences
of opinion among engagers touch on many points
of analysis and policy regarding the post-Cold
War period, including:
- the present global distribution of
power -- unipolar, multipolar, or a mix of
unipolar military and multipolar economic;
- the extent of global interdependence
and the degree to which security is
"divisible";
- the prospects for mitigating
interstate anarchy and power politics;
- how selectively America should
engage with the world;
- the importance of Europe relative to
other regions; and
- the stance America should take vis
a vis its allies -- primacist,
traditional "leadership," or multilateralist.
Regarding Europe, engagers embrace
various policy planks and focus on several
different types of security challenges. Some of
their policy planks are exclusive of others;
some are open to combination. Engagers variously
propose that:
- NATO should be subsumed within a
broader European security architecture
transcending the Cold War division of Europe
-- perhaps based on the OSCE;
- The Atlantic Alliance should retain
its "traditional" form and US policy should
focus on NATO as the principal security
organization in Europe;
- The Atlantic relationship should
devolve towards a bi-lateral arrangement with
a more equal balance between its European and
American components;
- NATO should serve as the foundation
for a gradual and selective Western outreach
to the East;
- The centerpiece of Western outreach
to the East should be the gradual expansion of
the European Union and perhaps the WEU, but
not NATO; and,
- The Atlantic Alliance should
increasingly turn its attention to "out of
area" security concerns with NATO or some
integral subset of NATO serving as its
instrument.
A key consideration in weighing these
options is their burdensharing implications. And
burdensharing should be understood broadly to
comprise not only direct costs but also benefits
and issues of control. With regard to European
threats, engagers differ on how to define and
prioritize them. Their menu of concerns
includes:
- the possible re-emergence of an
aspiring continental hegemon;
- a spiraling of "big power"
interstate tension based on realist dynamics
and perhaps involving contention over an
unstable or insecure "middle zone";
- sub-national and transnational forms
of instability, including ethnic conflict,
mass migration, state disintegration; and,
- extra-territorial threats to
European security or interests posed by state
and non-state actors.
The persistent influence of the
disengagement idea resides in this: The
arguments among those who favor engagement echo
the disagreement between engagers and
disengagers. At the heart of both are questions
about the costs and benefits of engagement and
how these affect America's broader interests and
freedom of action.
Throughout the Cold War, the concerns
of disengagers found expression in burdensharing
arguments, although disengagement itself was
dismissed as a policy option. More generally,
America's isolationist impulse has found
expression in a tendency toward unilateral
action and a characteristic reliance on
"decisive" (that is, military) means. If global
interdependence required the United States to
take the path of international engagement and
cooperation, then it would seek to maximize its
influence in alliances and orient them toward
achieving "decisive results." Making this type
of hard bargaining both possible (vis a vis
allies) and necessary (for domestic political
reasons) was the fact that the United States,
although interdependent, enjoyed more power and
security than its allies.
For a variety of reasons the pressures
on the transatlantic link have increased in
recent years. Philip Gordon (1996) summarizes
these new pressures as including the end of the
Cold War, the shift in American priorities from
security to economic and domestic affairs,
changes in US trade patterns, and the growing
relative importance of other regions to both the
USA and Europe.
The disappearance of a global peer
challenger to America affects the intensity of
US interests everywhere. This has motivated a 20
percent reduction in US military expenditures
from the recent Cold War average (Conetta and
Knight 1997) and has given rise to an acute
American preoccupation with the casualty cost of
foreign involvements (Eikenberry 1996; Luttwak
1996). America's link to Europe has suffered
more in relative terms because the Cold War had
assigned Europe the unique status of "central
front."
Don Snider and Gregory Grant (1992)
confirm that "the criteria by which [the US
assesses] the strategic importance...of an
allied nation or specific region have become
much more practical and are now driven primarily
by economic ties." And many American realists
argue principally by way of economic
considerations to a shift in US emphasis from
Europe to Asia (Betts 1993/94). Few engagers
would qualify as "Europeanist" in the sense of
advocating a primary emphasis on Europe today.
More commonly, engagers combine economic and
other rationales to argue for a dual emphasis on
European and Asian core areas: "[t]he health of
the alliances with Japan and the major powers of
Europe is primary" (Binnendjik and Clawson
1995:114).
The most salient issues calling
America home are domestic ones. Within the
American political process, "[t]he focus on
domestic policy...draws support from across
the...spectrum" (Binnendijk and Clawson 1995).
Former JCS Chief Admiral William Crowe, for
instance, contends that the United States keeps
"looking overseas when our biggest long term
threats are at home." And Walter Russel Mead, a
dedicated internationalist, observes that "The
dollar is more at risk than the Monroe Doctrine"
(1993:12). Pointing to the Oklahoma City
terrorist bombing and the growth of a "permanent
underclass," Defense Intelligence Agency analyst
Russel Travers agrees that "the greatest threats
to future US national security may well prove to
be internal" (Travers 1997:113). Travers
suggests that the current world situation offers
a "strategic breathing space" that allows the
nation to attend more closely to the home front.
American policy discourse sees global
issues as connecting to the nation's economic
woes in two ways: through increased global
economic competition and the proclivity of the
United States to invest more heavily in defense
than do its competitors. Focusing on domestic
causes, US policy leaders have prescribed
variously that the government increase its
social and infrastructure investment, cut taxes,
eliminate deficits, or do some combination of
these. One constant is that most proposals would
squeeze the resources available to support the
nation's foreign and military policy. Seeing
this, an influential body of opinion already
predicts a defense policy "train-wreck" due to a
purported mismatch between military posture and
budgeting (Snider 1996).
Ronald Steel (1995) has called
attention to the predominance of domestic
concerns among the American public. Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr. (1995) has noted with alarm a
decline in public support for internationalist
goals, as recorded by the quadrennial Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) public
opinion survey. However, reviewing the CCFR
data, Eugene Wittkopf concludes that
"'isolationist' quite simply fails to
characterize today's public temperament"
(1996:94). Although Americans are less
internationalist today than a decade ago, public
support for global engagement still runs strong.
In comparing the 1986 and 1994 CCFR
surveys, Wittkopf finds that support for
"defending allies" (in general) is off 15
points, down from 56 to 41 percent; support for
defending western Europe is off 12 points, down
from 66 to 54 percent. However, survey questions
that mention the possibility of going to war
often tend to cool expressions of
internationalism. So the support for "defending
Europe" in 1994, after the Soviet demise but
during the Balkans crisis, is impressive. Asked
if they supported America's playing a less
specific "active part in world affairs," 69
percent of respondents in 1994 answered
affirmatively -- the highest level of support
for this position since the CCFR began its
survey in 1974.
Wittkopf concludes that Americans'
"foreign policy opinions remain firmly anchored
to a structure of largely internationalist
beliefs" (1996:104). This conclusion is
confirmed, especially with regard to Europe, by
other reviews of public opinion (Asmus
1994:79-95; Kull and Destler 1996; Morrison
1995:72-74). Depending on how questions are
framed, Americans favor engagement by majorities
ranging between 55 and 85 percent, and they
support the continuation of NATO by majorities
ranging between 60 and 75 percent. Nonetheless,
a moderate reduction in public support for some
forms of international engagement is clear, and
the evidence for significantly increased concern
about domestic issues is overwhelming. While
this does not imply a slide toward
disengagement, it does suggest a greater
sensitivity to the costs and benefits of
engagement. As Ronald Asmus points out,
Turning inward to give
higher priority to domestic priorities need not
be equated with isolationism; it can also be
interpreted as an attempt to create a new,
politically sustainable balance between domestic
concerns and international commitments
(1994:89).
Asmus only hints at how an acceptable
balance is determined by defining it as
"politically sustainable." Some American leaders
see the conflict between domestic and
international concerns as overstated. Joseph Nye
Jr., in arguing for robust global engagement,
has suggested famously that "The US is a rich
country that acts poor" (1992:93). Whatever the
truth of Nye's proposition, America gets little
leadership of this sort today -- and few leaders
can afford to give it. Public discourse on
almost all matters of policy presently operates
within a frame of "scarcity." This sensitizes
the public to burdensharing issues, and makes
its support for engagement contingent on
striking hard bargains. In an intensive survey
of American public attitudes on global
engagement, Steven Kull and I.M. Destler find
strong support -- 74 percent -- for America
doing its "fair share," but they also note that
support for specific acts of engagement" is
dampened by a widespread feeling that the US
[already]is doing more than its fair share"
(1996:4). Moreover, the authors find that
Americans often overestimate America's
contribution to cooperative endeavors.
As noted earlier, burdensharing should
not be understood in purely monetary terms.
America's contributions are measured in both
blood and treasure, and there also is the
question of what America gets in return.
Increased influence in joint ventures and the
achievement of "decisive results" are part of
the equation.
The burdensharing issue reveals the
ambivalence of pro-engagement sentiment in
America. Wittkopf's analysis of the CCFR polling
data exposes similar fault lines. Wittkopf
divides engagement sentiment into three
categories: standard internationalists,
hardliners, and accommodationists. Hardliners
incline toward unilateralism and military
solutions. Accommodationists favor
multilateralism and cooperative solutions to
security problems. Standard internationalists
pragmatically combine the militant and
cooperative approaches. Isolationists form a
fourth group. The four groups are approximately
equal in size.
Using data from 1994, Wittkopf shows
that "hardline" opinion is a moderate reflection
of isolationist opinion on a variety of issues.
Both tend to reject participation in
peacekeeping, detente with former adversaries,
and NATO expansion. By contrast,
internationalists and accommodationists
generally support these initiatives. Regarding
the "defense of Europe" and "defense of allies"
against aggression, however, internationalists
join with hardliners to form a supportive core,
while accommodationists and isolationists
cluster together in the opposite direction.
Hardliners are motivated to engage
when they perceive a traditional threat. They
probably rejected NATO expansion in 1994 because
no such threat was evident. Accommodationists
are more likely to support spontaneously what
they see as cooperative goals and initiatives.
They are much less impressed by hypothetical
portrayals of threat. However, when aggression
takes a clear and concrete form, they are ready
to respond. Thus, their general support for "the
defense of allies" rose sharply in the 1990 CCFR
survey, which occurred during the Gulf crisis.
It is also noteworthy that
accommodationist support for "the defense of
Europe" rose between 1990 and 1994, while
hardliners' support fell. Peacekeeping
operations in Bosnia formed the backdrop to the
1994 survey. Concern about Bosnia probably
motivated the increased willingness of
accommodationists to "defend Europe." By
contrast, hardliners recoiled from peacekeeping
in the Balkans, which involved neither
traditional threats nor traditional means.
The relevance of these results to the
debate over NATO expansion is two fold: (1)
hardliners' opposition to expansion will
probably relax and might even reverse should
they come to see it as a response to a
traditional threat; and, (2) accommodationist
support for expansion depends on their seeing it
primarily as an inclusive endeavor, not
exclusive. Both groups are key in their own ways
to support for European engagement -- but
devising a policy that can hold the support of
both is difficult.
Some argue that America's post-Dayton
European initiatives represent a decisive return
to Europe. US NATO Ambassador Robert Hunter
contends that, after a brief period of "doubt
and questioning," the issue has been settled:
the United States considers itself a "European
power."
We have realized in the
United States that security in Europe does
matter. It matters to us, and it is a priority
that we will pursue regardless of what other
distractions there may be elsewhere in the world
(1997:69).
Although the Ambassador's reference to
non-European events as "distractions" is only
rhetorical flourish, the Clinton administration
has taken several bold steps toward Europe in
the past two years. Not only has it committed US
troops to a European combat situation for the
first time in five decades, but it also is
extending America's commitments eastward, at
some significant risk. However, the
Administration's strong Europeanist declarations
since Dayton belie the conditional nature of
America's recent initiatives. In fact, the
"decisive" return to Europe assumes European
assent on a host of contentious issues:
burdensharing, expansion, out-of-area
operations, and the form that a European
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) will take.
The Clinton administration believes that a
framework now exists for resolving these issues,
but that framework may not outlive America's
involvement in the Bosnia crisis -- unless
another crisis catches Europe short.
The American "return to Europe" is the
most recent phase in the effort to find a policy
mix that reconciles America's post-Cold War
goals and current European realities.
Demonstrating remarkable consistency across two
administrations, these goals have aim to:
- Preserve the transatlantic alliance,
America's leadership position within it, and
the alliance's preeminent role in European
security policy;
- Consolidate Europe's improved
security situation and, as corollaries of
this, inhibit the rise of a new hegemonic
threat and help stabilize east-central and
eastern Europe;
- Reduce the cost of America's
commitment to European security and increase
West European responsibility for regional
security -- including Europe's shouldering of
the main burden of Eastern reconstruction and
stabilization; and,
- Motivate an increased European
commitment to America's extra-regional
security goals and operations.
Placed in the context of America's
global security strategy, this European policy
aims to transform the Atlantic alliance from a
net drain on US resources and energy to a net
gain. Indicative of America's new disposition
was the combination of major troop withdrawals
and Senator Richard Lugar's demand that NATO "go
out of area or out of business" (1993).
The number of American troops
stationed in Europe has declined by almost
two-thirds since 1986. Taking into account
operation and maintenance costs, infrastructure
investment, and reinforcement units, US military
efforts directed toward Europe have declined by
about 60 percent (Brown and Kupchan 1995:23-33).
This suggests that fully two-thirds of America's
post-Cold War defense cuts came out of its
European account. By contrast, the defense
efforts of NATO's European members has declined
far less since 1986 -- a reduction of 12-15
percent is a good estimate (Brown and Kupchan
1995; Conetta and Knight 1997).
America's European goals also have
entailed a policy of "NATO first and foremost."
In NATO, America's leadership position is
integral, and European energies are channeled
into the type of instrument -- a standing
combined and joint fighting force -- that
corresponds to America's unique capabilities and
policy inclinations. Potential challenges to
NATO preeminence come from two directions: above
(OSCE) and below (ESDI). US policy has been able
to push the OSCE into a non- competitive corner
through a combination of benign neglect and the
promotion and resourcing of alternative
institutions -- the NACC and PfP. Dealing with
ESDI has proved more complicated, however. It
remains one of two sticking points in the
American program. The other sticking point has
been policy toward Russia.
Summarizing the hopes that
multilateralists harbored for the CSCE, Richard
Ullman observed in 1991 that it is the type of
institution "that can tie all of Europe together
and, in particular, can reinforce the processes
of democratization in the USSR" (1991:150). The
role the CSCE process had played in mitigating
the East-West confrontation during the late
1980s led Stanley Sloan, a senior analysts with
the Congressional Research Service, to speculate
that it might prefigure a new European practice
of politics:
Instead of basing
stability of the system on the manipulations of
balance of power politics, as in the past,
collective security in a more cooperative
political environment would presumably be
embodied in the diplomacy of conflict
resolution, operated principally through the
CSCE" (1992:3-4).
The initiatives taken at the 1990
Paris Summit to develop the CSCE briefly
suggested that something of this vision might be
realized. But as Catherine Kelleher has pointed
out, "Despite extensive institutionalization,
states have failed to empower the CSCE by
neglecting [its] various crisis prevention and
peacekeeping bodies" (1994:313). It was not
surprising that the CSCE/OSCE proved inadequate
to the tasks arising from the Yugoslav crisis;
The organization had not had sufficient time and
resources to grow into its new, expanded role.
But efforts after 1992 to streamline its
executive function and enhance its operational
capabilities have not won US favor -- not even
with regard to peacekeeping functions.
US policy has tended to treat the
weakness of the OSCE as intractable, thus
justifying reliance on other organizations --
especially the NACC. Reflecting on the need of
European nations to consult on important
security matters, former CSCE Ambassador Lynn
Marvin Hansen has argued that "It is important
that these discussions take place in the NACC,
rather than CSCE, because of [its] relationship
to NATO and the possibility for some form of
military cooperation" (1994:127). From its
inception, the NACC had aroused some suspicion
that it might come to substitute for the CSCE
rather than supplement it. Catherine Kelleher
has observed that,
[T]rue to French fears at
the outset, the existence of an organizational
framework and appointed liaison representatives
led to increased consultation, and the emergence
of the NACC was viewed by some as an attempt to
develop a pan-European competitor to the CSCE
(1994:315).
American officials have often
explained their reluctance regarding OSCE in
terms of a general skepticism about collective
defense efforts. But there is much OSCE could do
short of attempting collective defense -- for
instance: peacekeeping. The only essential
attribute of OSCE is its inclusiveness. This
seems more to the point of Hansen's objection.
Of particular concern to the United States is
the weight and role OSCE might afford Russia, as
Hansen indicates in his discussion of CSCE/OSCE
peacekeeping:
[P]eacekeeping should be a
multilateral effort [that] seeks to integrate
east and west...The most likely large scale
volunteer in the CSCE context will be Russia
cloaked in the garments of the CIS. Thus, rather
than the integrative function which could take
place within the NACC, peacekeeping efforts by
the CIS would perpetuate the concept of two
Europes: one western and one eastern with the
second being under the protective hand of
Russia(1994:128).
Presumably, the NACC and PfP can
effectively contain Russian influence because
they are dependent and centered on NATO. An
alternative view might see the United States
directly balancing Russia in the OSCE (or, for
that matter, in NATO). But this allows for the
converse as well: that Russia might balance the
United States -- not across a Cold War divide,
but within a transatlantic decision-making
process.
US policy toward post-communist
Russia has been to hope for the best, while
doing little materially to aid Russian stability
and democratic transition. American diffidence
regarding aid to Russia has surprised even the
most strident of "shock therapists," Jeffrey
Sachs, who argues that the key missing
ingredient in the Russian reform effort was
Western assistance (Surowiecki 1997). But
appeals to aid the Russian transition have
proved politically unsustainable, given domestic
economic concerns. From a strict realist
perspective, there is little reason to even try:
Soviet collapse itself obviated a new Marshall
Plan -- especially for Russia, who even as a
reformed democratic power might contend with the
United States for influence.
Nonetheless, in the early years of the
post-Cold War period, the US proceeded with some
care when taking steps likely to provoke a
Russian reaction. Several events during and
after 1993 altered the American calculus: the
"second coup" and assault on parliament, the
electoral victories by Communists and Liberal
Democrats, the war in Chechnya, and US-Russian
disputes over Bosnia. These left few confident
that Russia would evolve on its own into a truly
reliable ally. Moreover, Chechnya substantiated
the continuing decline of Russian military
power. From 1992 to 1997, the US Defense
Department revised its estimate of how long it
might take Russia to reconstitute a major
conventional threat from two years or more to
10-15 years (Cohen 1997). In line with these
developments US policy toward Russia slipped
from one of "careful management" to one of
barely concealed disregard. Among other things,
the changed perception of the Russian prospect
opened the door to NATO expansion, although it
did not motivate it.
Regarding the possibility of eventual
Russian membership in NATO: US policymakers need
not assume the worst about Russia's future in
order to exclude this option. Former Secretary
of Defense Harold Brown observes that Russia
"almost surely will never become a NATO member;
its size geography, and history make it
unsuitable as part of a transatlantic security
organization" (1995). James Morrison of the US
National Defense University invokes power
balance considerations to exclude Russia:
Russia is too large.
Russia is far larger than any other European
member of NATO and admitting it to NATO would
change the balance" (1995:56).
The prospect of Europe assuming more
of the burdens and responsibilities of alliance
security efforts depends on greater cooperation
among European nations in both the economic and
security spheres. Likewise the goal of reducing
the potentials for future European conflict
depend on greater unity. These propositions form
the basis of American support for unity efforts.
However, as Europe assumes more of the
continental security burden, and as the United
States reduces its presence, the rationale for a
predominant American leadership role diminishes.
Thus, as Europe becomes more able to assume the
place in US global strategy that America
desires, there is less to compel it to follow
America's lead. S. Nelson Drew explains how this
dilemma took concrete form in European efforts
to institutionalize a distinct defense identity:
The United States...saw
the development of ESDI as a logical extension
of its long- standing desire for European states
to assume a more equitable share of the burden
of their own security, but the benefits of this
development to the US would be lost if it took
place in a manner that set up a competition for
scarce defense resources between NATO and ESDI
commitment(1995:20).
Complicating the management of the
dilemma is the fact that Europe and America
consistently differ in their calculations of how
much a burden each carries, and how much
influence each exercises or should exercise as a
result. Commensurate with its preferred approach
to security issues, the United States discounts
the value of Europe's contributions in the realm
of economic assistance, regionally and globally.
America also discounts Europe's relatively
greater (and more reliable) contribution to
non-NATO security institutions, such as the UN.
In turn, Europe discounts America's
contributions to European security because they
come at a distinct cost in terms of national (or
regional) independence. From a European
perspective, the American desire to "call the
tune" exceeds the extent to which America "pays
the piper." Given these disparate assessments
there is no deal that can feel entirely
satisfactory to both sides.
America's ambivalence toward ESDI is
reflected in its fondness for the "European
pillar" metaphor, first adopted by President
Kennedy as a counterpoint to European defense
community initiatives in the early 1960's.
Pillars seldom stand independently, except in
archeological ruins. Nor do they have an
autonomous identity: they are integral parts of
a larger structure. And, not incidentally, they
are weight-bearing elements. As Charles Barry of
the National Defense University observes "The US
regards the 'pillar' concept as a cooperative
caucus of European allies, the aim of which is
to achieve greater burden sharing within the
Alliance" (1996:73).
President Bush carried forward the
traditional American ambivalence regarding
European unity, which combined: (1) support for
economic and political union -- as long as it
did not imply economic exclusion of the United
States or unified European policy planks within
the Alliance; and, (2) resistance to the
evolution of any substantial independent
European defense institutions or formations
(Conry 1995; Kelleher 1994; Ruggie 1997). The
Bush administration's refusal to join the
European allies in Bosnia, however, motivated
some to pursue precisely the type of independent
configuration and capability that US policy
opposed. During its first year in office, the
Clinton administration assumed a more open
stance on ESDI and exercised America's wings, if
not feet, in Bosnia. This reflected a
reassessment of European unity efforts and a
reappraisal of what America would need to do in
order to achieve its broader objectives.
Despite American concerns about ESDI,
the actual practice of European unity during the
first half of the 1990's suggested that it was
insufficient to serve even the limited ends that
America had in mind. In the evolving American
view, the European response to the Balkan crisis
showed that Europe lacked both the unity and the
military capability to conduct the type of
operations that regional stability might require
-- to say nothing of contributing to
extra-regional expeditions (Taft 1993).
And even worse: with regard to some
issues there appeared to be a de-centralization,
if not re-nationalization, of European security
policy, with key nations or groups of nations
taking the lead where their interests were
paramount. This tendency seemed evident in
Germany's early leadership of European policy on
the Balkans crisis, which many American
policy-makers saw as contributing to that
situation's spiraling out of control.
Western Europe also had not lived up
to American expectations regarding outreach to
the East. Even though Western Europe gave much
more financial assistance than did the United
States, US policy was set on the expectation of
some substantial and early opening to the East
of the European Union. Within this general
picture, Germany stood apart. Its economic
engagement with the East was vigorous. By 1995,
it accounted for the majority of EU trade with
the so-called Visegrad group and Slovenia, and
it had become first among East European export
markets. The East was also focused on Germany as
its single most important source of aid,
investment, and technical assistance (RUSI
1996). Within the alliance, Germany had become a
consistent advocate of East European security
concerns and the leading proponent of a more
proactive Eastern policy.
In the growth of German influence
American realists have found confirmation for
their analysis of the European future. They
perceive a situation reminiscent of the period
before the First World War -- and in this
perspective Germany's power and geographic
position loom large. In the view of Conor Cruise
O'Brien "East of the Rhine there is emerging, in
all but name, a new German Empire, a greater
power than anything else on the Continent"
(1992/93:8).
As far as the present
century is concerned, there is no question of
confrontation between the new German empire and
the West. It is more a matter of distancing and
feeling different 1992/93:10).
The more orthodox of realist analyses
foresee an expanding potential for German and
Russian contention over the cluster of
non-allied and relatively insecure states that
lie between them. It also anticipates increased
friction between Germany and the other Western
European states, due to widening power
differentials and German predominance in the
East (Layne 1993; Mandelbaum 1996; Odom 1995).
The official American perspective is
less concerned about big power contention -- a
distant prospect -- and more concerned with the
problem of policy friction among the Western
allies. America recognizes that Germany is doing
much of the work -- in terms of trade, aid, and
investment -- that American policymakers had
envisioned for the EU. And it appreciates that
the German stake in the East and its relative
exposure to the repercussions of instability --
such as refugee flows -- guarantees that German
security policy will orient eastward. However,
the United States does not want to see Germany
assume de facto leadership of Western
policy toward the East. Even less does it want
to see the consolidation of a loose
German-centered group of states outside the
alliance, which would boost German influence and
link the alliance to a policy bloc beyond its
collective control. Certainly, the United States
wants to mitigate any pressures or concerns that
might lead Germany to pursue a more independent
course.
A comprehensive "new bargain" with
Europe began to take form in the last half of
1993, eventually evolving along lines set out by
several RAND Corporation analysts (Asmus et al.
1993, 1995, 1996). The bargain initially
comprised a more open stance toward ESDI/WEU,
and two initiatives advanced at the January 1994
NATO summit: the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and
the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). And, of
course, the bargain carried forward the
expectation, rooted in NATO's 1991 Strategic
Concept, that Europe would prepare for a bigger
role in out-of-area operations. American
involvement in the Balkans was to be the key to
winning European assent.
The PfP proposal, still sensitive to
Russian reservations, fell far short of East
European expectations. Perceived more as a
delaying measure than a firm step, it could not
have its intended effect: to reassure the
Visegrad group (especially) and re-center their
attention on the West as a whole. As early as
July 1994, when President Clinton gave his "when
and how" speech to the Polish parliament, the
United States began to push for more decisive
steps.
Although American policy came to
accept WEU as representative of the European
pillar, it continued to resist the WEU's
developing operational capabilities that might
duplicate, even on a small scale, NATO's.
Instead, the initial American view was that WEU
should serve as a legitimizing agency for
European action and as a venue in which European
nations might align their defense policies.
Unsatisfactory to Europeans, American policy on
ESDI continued to evolve after 1994, but the US
concern about competition -- with or within NATO
-- has remained central.
Regarding internal dynamics, "the
United States wants an ESDI that will not result
in the US facing fait accompli positions
at NATO consultative meetings" (Barry 1996:76).
With reference to the development of ESDI
competencies parallel to those of NATO, Lynn
Marvin Hansen has insisted that,
[Europeans] must resist
pitting organizations in which North Americans
do not participate against those in which they
do. Competition among the various institutions
comprising a European security order is a
senseless waste of talent and assets in an era
of diminishing resources(1994:118).
The CJTF concept embodied the goal of
"pillar-izing" ESDI and linking it integrally to
out-of-area operations. A virtual premise of US
policy since 1960 has been that Europe should
put NATO investment first and curtail the
development of independent capabilities and
formations duplicating those of NATO. A second
premise has been that Europe should increase its
defense investment generally -- and since the
Gulf War this imperative has focused especially
on the development of power projection
capabilities (Asmus et al. 1996; O'Hanlon 1997).
However, to the extent that recent European
policy has been consistent with the second of
these goals, it has contradicted the first.
The CJTF proposals aims for a more
consistent alignment of ESDI initiatives and US
objectives. The American concession is to allow
its allies to "borrow" NATO (or NATO-assigned)
assets on an ad hoc basis for multinational
operations. The American hope is that this will
keep the development of multinational European
forces in a NATO framework. For American
policy-makers this prospect casts Euro-forces
into an entirely different light. Within the
limits set by the CJTF concept, Lynn Marvin
Hansen allows that "the formation of distinctly
European forces may increase the possibility of
European states playing a distinctive role in
addressing challenges to security and stability
outside the traditional NATO area" (1994:130).
The CJTF proposal also failed to bring
the allies around, however. Its inescapable
limitation is this: Because CJTF operations
would remain dependent on NATO headquarters and
infrastructure or on assets governed by NATO
protocols, the United States would retain a
virtual veto over them (Cobhold 1997; Gordon
1997). For this reason, Commander Gert de Nooy
of the Royal Netherlands Navy concludes that
"although the much-quoted Separable but not
Separate might be politically desirable, it is
not tenable in military terms" (de Nooy 1997).
Philip Gordon shares this assessment, asserting
that the CJTF approach offers no more than the
"illusion of Europeanization."
The Allies agreed on a more formal and
well-defined role for WEU at the June 1996
Berlin ministerial, allowing that it might lead
CJTFs. However, the formal concessions did
little to resolve the substantive issues about
the exercise of a unified European voice within
NATO or of unified European military initiatives
outside of NATO (Ruggie 1997). In a reading of
the accord by NATO Ambassador Robert Hunter, the
WEU's prerogatives seem circumscribed by NATO's:
We have asked our friends
at the WEU to ask NATO first if they are
contemplating an operation. If the United States
and the WEU Associate Members...choose not to be
engaged, then the WEU will have our blessing to
proceed on its own with the use of NATO assets.
Let me underscore that the WEU, if it does not
call upon NATO assets, is free to undertake its
own activities at any time(1997:75).
Of course, the ambassador knows as
well as anyone on earth that many prime European
national forces are tied closely to NATO today,
and that unless the WEU develops, against US
desires, some of the operational facilities that
presently exist in NATO, there will be little
WEU can do on its own.
For the United States the principal
goals in seeking a new bargain with Europe have
been to maintain US leadership, unify Western
policy, enhance European stability, and "get
credible and reliable partners to assist it in
addressing security contingencies outside
Europe" (Asmus et al. 1996:93). The most
frequently mentioned non-European contingencies
involve defense of energy sources and
counter-proliferation activities. However, the
architects of the bargain caution that "it would
be a mistake to confine this new NATO mission to
specific geographic areas," although they allow
that, for instance, "The Danes would not be
expected to fight with NATO in the Spratley
Islands" (Asmus et al. 1996:99).
For Europeans, the most immediate
reason to compromise on ESDI and other
leadership issues was to encourage a fuller and
better integrated US involvement in the Balkans
operations. This was not a point lost on
Americans; as Charles Barry observes, "The US
role (or lack of one) in Bosnia, militarily, was
another factor favoring European cooperation on
ESDI" (1996:67). It is not surprising, then,
that the progress of the bargain has closely
tracked the evolution of America's Bosnia
policy.
Although intended to improve alliance
relations and re-establish American leadership,
US involvement in the Balkans initially had a
corrosive effect. This was due to its selective
and maverick character before Dayton. US
intervention initially comprised "standoff" air
support to UNPROFOR and independent initiatives
that often clashed with those of the allies. US
operations reflected the American proclivity for
"decisive action," and left the impression that
even partial American involvement entailed
dominant American influence. Thus, the Clinton
administration's activism did not resolve the
intra-alliance disputes. Indeed, tensions
increased as they focused on tactical issues --
with European ground troops, but not American,
held at risk. By late-1994 the situation had
grown sufficiently serious for the US Joint
Chiefs to warn that the disputes over Bosnia
could split the alliance. Senate leader Bob Dole
spoke of "a complete breakdown of NATO" and
Defense Secretary William Perry prepared a
personal White Paper suggesting a new course.
The price of moving Europe into the
general framework of the American bargain was a
decisive US commitment to the Balkans
operations: the provision of tens of thousands
of ground troops as well as air, naval, and
other forms of support. Of course, with
involvement on this scale came decisive American
influence over the operation -- but essentially
within the framework plan that the European
allies had formulated during the previous two
years.
While reaffirming America's commitment
to Europe, the Administration also sought
greater assurance that intervention in a
potential Eastern quagmire would be a one time
investment, not a recurring cost. Paradoxically,
the desire for "involvement limitation" elevated
the option of early NATO expansion. In the
official American view, the increase in
situational control that NATO expansion might
allow is more salient than (and serves to
diminish) the possibility of future
interventions in the East. While the official
rationale emphasizes the need to stem Eastern
instability, a more immediate goal is to
stabilize West European policies toward the
East and keep them within a reliable
institutional framework.
Expansion serves the goals of
stabilizing policy and increasing situational
control in several ways. First, it centers the
attention of the East on the Atlantic Alliance
as a whole (and especially on the United
States), rather than on Germany. Given the
East's anxieties about Russia, NATO and American
military links to the East constitute a strong
counterweight to German economic links. Thus,
expansion facilitates the formation of a
"balanced" Eastern policy caucus within NATO
comprising the United States, Germany, and the
new Eastern members. More generally, because
most prospective members are pro-American, their
inclusion "would...provide greater internal
support for US views on key security issues"
(Asmus et al. 1993). A final putative benefit is
that outreach reassures Germany that its allies'
are sensitive to its security concerns and
willing to guarantee its Eastern frontier and
its investments.
Within the policy community the
strongest support for sending ground troops to
Bosnia came from multilateralists and common
security advocates. Isolationists stood opposed.
Internationalist of a more realist bent were
divided. Those favoring a stricter selectivity
in US global engagement saw another Somalia in
Bosnia. Other realist internationalists, such as
Lt. General William Odom, saw the issue as one
of reconfirming the relevance of NATO and
rescuing American leadership in Europe. In
Odom's view "the feckless NATO policy in Bosnia"
was "to be expected as long as the United States
[remained] a passive complainer...unwilling to
commit significant ground forces" (1995:165).
Notably, President Clinton sold the intervention
to congressional Republicans as a means of
reasserting American leadership -- within the
strict limits set by his 1994 policy on peace
operations.
The Administration's NATO expansion
policy depends more heavily on congressional
Republican support than did Bosnia intervention,
for several reasons. First, treaty commitments
require Senate ratification. Second, NATO
expansion has divided the policy community more
deeply than did Bosnia. Multilateralists and
cooperative security advocates have swung into
opposition, seeing expansion as unnecessary and
likely to provoke a repolarization of Europe.
Realist internationalists are again divided, but
more energetically. Those favoring "selective
engagement" and, especially, those leaning
toward Asia see an increase in America's
long-term European commitments without a
commensurate gain. And many realists agree that
the policy will provoke Russia unnecessarily.
Others are closer to the Administration's
position, seeing Russia as weak and expansion as
a means to contain Germany and preempt big power
competition over the East. The Administration's
initiative has also gained the support of
old-style realists, who are less interested in
system dynamics than historically determined
power struggles. They add an anti-Russian
impetus to the pro- expansion camp.
In 1995, when the Clinton
administration began to accelerate NATO
expansion, Theodore Sorenson found it "hard to
imagine a more provocative decision taken with
less consultation and consideration for the
consequences." The Administration has had little
subsequent success in winning a supportive
consensus of informed opinion.
George Kennan (1997) calls expansion
"the most fateful error of American policy in
the entire post- Cold War era," predicting that
it will inflame Russia and "restore the
atmosphere of the cold war to East-West
relations." A June 1997 open letter to President
Clinton similarly perceives "a policy error of
historic proportions," that will endanger arms
control agreements and "bring the Russians to
question the entire post-Cold War settlement."
Illustrating the breadth of opposition, among
the letter's 40 signatories are former Senators
Sam Nunn and Gary Hart, Edward Luttwak, Robert
McNamara, Paul Nitze, Richard Pipes, John
Steinbruner, Paul Warnke, and former NATO
Assistant Secretary General Philip Merrill.
Advocates argue for expansion
principally from the need for strategic
stability in Europe, which requires attention to
both the problem of weak states and the
potential for big power competition over them
(Lugar 1993). Lt. General William Odom defines
NATO's task as ensuring that "Eastern Europe
does not become once again a region of
diplomatic competition among France, Germany,
Britain, and Russia" (1995:163). President
Clinton also adopted a realist approach to
stability issues when he embraced near-term
expansion in October 1996, arguing that "A gray
zone of insecurity must not re-emerge in
Europe." With clear reference to the century's
great wars, he observed that "Peace and security
are not available on the cheap," but that if
NATO fails to act now, "we will pay a much
higher price later on down the road" (Hunt
1996).
Ronald Asmus links the resolution of
Eastern instability to an increased capacity for
addressing concerns outside Europe, arguing that
"until Eastern Europe is stabilized, it will be
difficult if not impossible for the NATO
allies...to broaden their strategic horizon to
confront the serious challenges that lie further
afield" (1996:94). The Administration's February
1997 report to Congress on NATO enlargement,
uses the same rationale to link expansion to
out-of-area operations:
A Europe more secure in
its own borders will be more willing and able to
assist the United States in meeting challenges
to shared interest, including those that extend
beyond Europe's immediate borders (1997).
Attacking the stability rationale,
Jonathan Dean (1997) criticizes the reliance on
19-century models of European security dynamics
as an example of "historicism" and "false
analogy" that has led the Administration "to
believe that a weak Eastern Europe must
inevitably elicit aggressive behavior from both
Russia and Germany."
Administration analysts
[have] made a wholly pessimistic analysis of the
future of Russia (and of Germany as well) and
[have] decided that Eastern Europe must be saved
from possible aggression by Western action while
there [is] still time (Dean 1997:36).
Michael Brown (1995) summarizes the
arguments of expansion opponents in three
points: expansion is (1) unnecessary and
ineffective as a means of stabilizing eastern
European countries, (2) unwarranted by Russian
behavior, but likely to provoke negative
reaction, and (3) likely to overextend NATO at
time when organizational reform should be top
priority. John Ruggie (1997) also sees NATO
expansion as drawing attention and energy away
from more pressing issues: European integration,
the relationship between EU and NATO, and the
development of European out-of-area capabilities
via the CJTF. In an article prescribing enhanced
European projection forces, Michael O'Hanlon
sees the prospect put at risk by expansion:
The need for internal
reform to achieve greater real military
burden-sharing in NATO is another reason why
NATO enlargement is a bad idea. Transforming the
Alliance should be a higher priority than
expanding it; to the extent that the two create
tension, the former should win (1997:13).
A letter signed by 18 former
high-ranking State Department officials echoes
several of these themes and re-casts the
stability issue in terms of provocation:
In our view, this policy
risks endangering the long-term viability of
NATO, significantly exacerbating the instability
that now exists in the zone that lies between
Germany and Russia, and convincing most Russians
that the United States and the West are
attempting to isolate, encircle, and subordinate
them, rather than integrating them into a new
European system of collective security (Nitze et
al. 1995:75).
Michael Mandelbaum (1997), in opposing
expansion, concurs that the East does not now
need it and that NATO cannot afford it. He
departs from other opponents, however, in
thinking that pre-emptory containment of Russia
has some merit. But he sees the expansion
proposal as leaving out the most vulnerable
states -- the Baltics -- while bringing more
pressure to bear on them. Even with regard to
the first wave of new members, he thinks that
NATO will fail to invest the resources required
to make its new commitments credible.
The chief objection raised by most
opponents is that expansion will needlessly
provoke Russia and contribute to renewed
tensions in Europe. In several editorials the
New York Times has focused on the
implications for strategic arms control:
The key to consolidating
peace in Europe lies not in expanding NATO but
in encouraging Russia to live in harmony with
its neighbors and accept deep negotiated
reduction in its nuclear arsenal (1996).
The Times editorials argue
that increasing Moscow's already considerable
sense of insecurity may translate into Russian
intransigence on arms control, thus reciprocally
reducing Western security. Other opponents raise
the security dilemma more generally with
reference to the danger of continental
re-polarization. Former Ambassador Raymond
Garthoff (1997) argues that,
Expansion of NATO to
provide security for Western and Eastern Europe
would marginalize, if not exclude, Russia from
meaningful participation in European security
arrangements. ... We should have learned that no
one gains security by creating insecurity for
others. If legitimate Russian security interests
are not met, neither will the long-run interests
of Europe, the US, and the world.
Similarly Edward Luttwak (1997) warns
that "The attempt to defend against a now
nonexistent threat might bring it about, a
paradoxical outcome all too common in the annals
of strategy." The self- reinforcing character of
expansion is also evident in another way:
Russian opposition to expansion has come to
substitute for evidence of a more general
conflict of interest. Former Bush administration
official Philip Zelikow observes that "There are
no acute areas of political tension between
Poland and Russia, other than those created by
the NATO enlargement issue itself" (1996:13).
The substitution effect is also
evident in the response of Strobe Talbot to
Russia's claims that NATO expansion will compel
it to take countermeasures: "Enlargement is
going to happen; fighting it with threats will
only intensify the darkest suspicions about
Russia's intentions and future" (1995:27).
Senate majority leader Trent Lott (1997) echoes
this formulation, asserting that "Whether Russia
is ready to accept an enlarged NATO will be an
important sign of Russia's departure from its
imperial past." Thus, Russian objections
themselves become evidence of the need for
expansion. From this perspective there is no
issue of "legitimate Russian security concerns"
and little reason for negotiations -- a stance
that may itself be cause for Russian concern.
Both Talbot and former Secretary of
State Warren Christopher have tried to portray
NATO expansion as the resolution, not the
extension, of Europe's Cold War divisions -- a
tack that casts opponents as the purveyors of
old ways. Talbot writes that,
Freezing NATO's eastern
boundaries approximately along the line fixed by
Western and Soviet negotiators on Aug 13, 1945
would make sense if Europe's Cold War division
was natural and enduring. But in fact, that
division is becoming unnatural and anachronistic
(1995:27).
Talbot derives his analysis from
Warren Christopher's assertion that "Europe's
institutional arrangement should be determined
by the objective demands of the present, not by
the tragedies of Europe's past." In this
reading, however, the tragedy of the Cold War is
not the fact that Europe was divided, but rather
the fact of where it was divided.
Former National Security Council
official Charles Kupchan argues that, no matter
how expansion is packaged, it will remain
provocative because the fundamental problem is
that "NATO is still a military alliance that
concentrates power against an external threat."
Edward Luttwak amplifies this point, noting that
the West is offering more than membership in an
alliance; it is offering full participation in
an integrated multinational military
organization. "NATO is not a security-talking
shop but a veritable military
force...temporarily at peace," says Luttwak. "No
wonder that even the most sincerely liberal
Russians are dismayed by its eastward expansion"
(Luttwak 1997).
As an alternative to early NATO
expansion, opponents tend to favor the extension
of EU membership either followed by NATO after
an interval or not followed by it at all unless
Russian behavior so warrants (Harold Brown 1995;
Davies 1995; Dean 1997). Jonathan Dean argues
that "the real interest of the Eastern European
countries has been membership in the European
Union," and many expansion critics agree, seeing
NATO expansion as a less expensive or symbolic
substitute that has let the EU off the hook
(Luttwak 1997; Ruggie 1997; Zelikow 1996).
Another putative benefit of EU expansion is that
it would permit gradual integration of the East
without provocation of Russia. Some suggest that
an expansion of the WEU would also allow the
extension of security guarantees with minimal
provocation. In this perspective "it is the
centrality of the US component of a NATO-only
expansion that creates the problems" (Ruggie
1997:118).
Several leading proponents of early
NATO enlargement contend that neither
substituting the EU for NATO, nor making NATO
expansion contingent on Russian behavior
constitute acceptable alternatives (Asmus et al.
1995). In their view, EU expansion will not
occur soon enough to have the needed stability
effect in Eastern Europe. And making NATO
expansion contingent on a deterioration of
relations between Russia and its neighbors --
what they call the "Strategic Response" option
-- would require the West to take action when it
would be most provocative.
Asmus et al. present the problem of
provocation quite differently than do expansion
critics. While critics worry that expansion will
provoke repolarization and remilitarization,
Asmus et al. focus on the danger of provoking a
strategic or military crisis -- which assumes
that substantial repolarization and
re-militarization have already occurred.
However, it makes little sense to raise this
latter type of concern today unless one also
accepts unrealistic assumptions about how
quickly an anti-Western government could
consolidate power in Moscow, reinvigorate the
economy, and rehabilitate the military. Such a
process would involve many milestones and
opportunities to respond before crisis stability
became a serious concern. Of course, early
expansion also can proceed on the basis of a
strong presumption that a Russian threat will
re-emerge regardless of how the West acts.
Neither the RAND authors nor the Clinton
administration espouse this deterministic view,
but some significant sector of expansion
advocates do.
Henry Kissinger (1994), Zbigniew
Brzezinski (1994), and former National Security
Council official Peter Rodman (1994) see in
Russia a powerful authoritarian and imperialist
impulse that transcends its former Communism,
and on this basis they support early NATO
enlargement. No one expresses this view more
clearly than William Safire (1996):
In coming decades, Russia
-- with its literate population and rich
resources unencumbered by Communism -- will rise
again. Its leaders will [pursue irredentist
goals] under the guise of protecting their 'near
abroad.' The only way to deter future aggression
without war is by collective defense. And only
in the next few years, with Russia weak, do we
have the chance to "lock in" the vulnerable.
Although not espoused by the Clinton
administration, such views exert a stronger
influence in Congress. Jonathan Dean observes
that,
The primary reason many
members of the Senate majority today favor NATO
enlargement is suspicion of Russia. Russians are
right to conclude that many of these legislators
intend the enlargement of NATO as an
anti-Russian measure (1997:4).
The Administration's position more
reflects a disregard for Russia than an actual
antagonism -- and so it pursues early expansion
as part of a broader program and with little
regard for its potential repolarizing effects.
However, having failed to fashion a wider policy
consensus, the administration remains dependent
on congressional Republicans. They may lock the
Administration on a confrontational course when
other questions bearing on US-Russian relations
come up for decision. These include not only a
variety of arms control measures, but also the
timetable for future waves of NATO expansion.
Senate majority leader Trent Lott has already
expressed concern about the plight of the
Baltics and other (non-Russian) states left out
of expansion's "first wave." Of course,
inclusion of the Baltics would pose a challenge
of an entirely different order -- but each step
creates conditions for the next.
Most recent public opinion polls show
majorities or pluralities of Americans
supporting expansion (Kull 1997). When survey
questions specifically refer to Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic, support runs higher than
60 percent. Support decreases when expansion is
framed more generally, as in a January 1997 poll
by the Pew Research Center (1997) that found 45
percent of the public in support and 39 percent
opposed. Specific mention of new defense
commitments further weakens support. An April
1996 survey by the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy that spoke of "defending new members
against attack" found only 44 percent supporting
expansion and a plurality of 47 percent opposed.
Similarly a survey by the Program on
International Policy Attitude (PIPA) found that
public support dropped sharply when NATO
expansion was associated with a $1 billion
increase in defense spending (Kull 1997).
Without this qualification Americans supported
expansion by a margin of 62 percent to 29
percent. With the cost estimate added, support
dropped to 46 percent and opposition increased
to 44 percent.
Using focus groups the PIPA survey
established that the most attractive rationale
for NATO expansion was that it would increase
interstate cooperation and reduce conflict
potentials. By contrast, "traditional arguments
in favor of NATO expansion that stressed the
Russian threat and...competition with Russia
were most unpopular" (Kull 1997:14). However,
arguments against expansion that suggested a
need to placate Russian opposition were also
unpopular (Pew 1997). In short: the public does
not see Russia as a threat today and does not
want to proactively assume a threatening stance,
but it also will not countenance an angry
Russian reaction to expansion.
The PIPA survey found that the most
powerful argument against expansion (even among
supporters) posed the alternative of developing
"something new...that includes Russia, rather
than treating Russia as an enemy" (Kull
1997:11). And, the idea of including Russia in
NATO typically receives majority support in
surveys. The PIPA researchers further found that
among their respondents "a strong majority
supports pacing NATO expansion in a way that
accommodates Russian concerns." Thus, popular
support for NATO is complex. It is sensitive to
some of the reservations expressed by opponents
of the current expansion plan and prefers an
inclusive approach to Moscow. But it is also
ready to assume a defensive position should
Moscow react negatively to expansion.
America's new deal with Europe
encompasses a range of issues: the relation
between NATO and EU/WEU, enlargement,
burdensharing, and out-of-area operations.
American involvement in the Balkans is the glue
that presently holds the bargain together. The
first real test may come when the crisis
subsides or America withdraws its contingent.
Other tests are forthcoming as well: Who will
pay for NATO enlargement? Will the future
functioning of WEU and the CJTF satisfy the
Alliance partners on both sides of the Atlantic?
Will Europe improve its power projection
capabilities and join America in non-European
operations?
The new deal also depends on
developments in America and relations with
Russia. Today major features of US policy hinge
on a tenuous political coalition. Until a
broader and more resilient consensus on foreign
policy takes hold, it is difficult to say how
America will negotiate future turns in its
bargain with Europe or how it will deal with the
repercussions of NATO expansion. All that is
certain is that America's commitment to Europe
will come at a higher price than before.
Regarding the effects of expansion:
the greatest concern is the future stance of
Russia. The march of current policy makes it
increasingly difficult to diffuse Russian
concerns. And this calls attention to what the
American bargain has left undone:
The task of devising a new
security architecture for Europe...will not be
completed until there is an enduring, full place
in that architecture for all European states,
including Russia (Dean 1997:4).
Having faced an opportunity to uproot
the Cold War divide, Western leaders may prove
themselves incapable of doing better than simply
relocating it. Their deficit is less one of
imagination than will. It is lack of will that
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