In recent history three examples
stand out to support the viability of
terrain-oriented, defensively- specialized
military structures: the Russo-Finnish "Winter
War" (1939-1940), the Battle of Alam Halfa
(summer 1942), and the Battle of Kursk (summer
1943).
In the Winter War the Finnish Army
relying on poorly equipped, guerilla-style
light infantry, operating without sizable
heavy reserves thwarted a large-scale
mechanized thrust. Despite an eventual Soviet
victory resulting from a grotesque imbalance
of forces, Finnish achievements in minimizing
damage and terrain losses remain remarkable.
Thousands of low-scale tactical victories
added up to strategic success.
At Alam Halfa the British Army
finally stopped Rommel's "Afrika Korps" by
employing a checker-board system consisting of
artillery/infantry strong points secured by
mechanized cavalry and backed-up by relatively
small elements of heavy armor in a
counterattack function. The tactical success
of the British forced the Germans to give up
an operational, if not strategic, offensive.
In the Kursk salient the Red Army's
layered defense -- up to 250 km deep and 750
km wide -- was based on
infantry/engineer/artillery components and
supported by heavy armor. The
tactical-operational victory won by the
Soviets was of strategic relevance. This is
parallelled by the fact that the "battle" of
Kursk had, indeed, grand dimensions: covering
an area larger than most East European
countries of today.
A review of these campaigns and
battles should serve to remove any sense that
defensively-oriented operations imply
passivity or that they need rely on stolid
fortifications like those of the Maginot line.
In all cases the defensive battle involved
intensive maneuver either within and around a
prepared area or unbounded by field
preparations but heavily dependent on terrain.
The examples should also dispel any
notion that defensively-specialized structures
entail homogenous light units or weapon
monocultures. Instead, the examples illustrate
a distinctive combined-arms synthesis -- one
that draws on the full-range of arms but
combines them in a unique fashion and ratio.
The battles of Alam Halfa and Kursk show
artillery ascendant in an anti-armor role; the
Winter War draws attention to the potential of
lighter troops -- as does the action of
anti-tank infantry at Kursk.
Finally, the three cases suggest
the flexibility of defensive arrangements. The
applications cover areas ranging from 2500
kilometers to over 300,000. Defensive
preparations range from the intensive (Alam
Halfa, Kursk) to the selective (Finland). The
Finnish case, in particular, shows that
defensive principles do not imply a single,
uniform application even within a single
nation. This flexibility makes the approach
relevant to a variety of terrain, demographic,
and economic conditions.
Russo-Finnish Winter War,
November-March 1939
The initial Russian attack, which
began after Finland refused to cede to Russia
naval basing rights and a large strip of land
along the Karelian Isthmus, saw 19 Soviet
divisions and 5 armored brigades (800 tanks)
take on nine Finnish divisions (100 tanks).
The tank balance was 800 Soviet to 100
Finnish; the balance in personnel, more than
400,000 Soviets to 175,000 Finns -- with 80
percent of the Finnish personnel drawn from
reserves.
The war commenced with the Red Air
Force attacking Helsinki and Viipuri, while
amphibious assaults were attempted along the
southern coast. The Soviet 7th Army conducted
the main ground effort, attacking northwest
from Leningrad into the Karelian Isthmus. The
Soviet 8th Army (four divisions) attacked
northwest across the border above Lake Ladoga.
In the far north a Russian column seized the
port of Petsamo on the Barents Sea. Finally,
several Soviet columns (six divisions total)
pushed westward along the eastern
Soviet-Finnish border.
The main effort into the Karelian
Isthmus confronted the Mannerheim defensive
line, which ran from the Gulf of Finland to
the Vuoksi River. Here the Finns had
concentrated their six active divisions. The
Russian effort proved futile. Dramatic failure
likewise met the attempts at amphibious
landing along the southern coast and the
thrusts by much larger ground forces above
Lake Ladoga and along the eastern border. Even
in the north the Russian units that had
successfully captured Petsamo were quickly
contained when they tried to move south.
The Mannerheim line along which the
Finns foiled the Soviet main effort was a
system of field fortifications knitted into
rugged terrain and wooded areas. Technically,
much of it resembled the defensive lines of
the First World War, although less extensive:
simple trench lines with prepared, mutually
supporting fire positions, constructed in
depth. Unlike the contemporary French Maginot
line, the Finnish defense did not feature
large fortress artillery except on its extreme
flanks.
The defensive line ran across the
Isthmus for about 43 miles (70 km) and was
anchored by heavy coastal batteries at
Koivisto in the west and Kaarnajoki and
Yllapaa at the Lake Ladoga end. The River
Vuoksi covered the eastern third of the
position. Between the Vuoksi and the Gulf of
Finland were broad stretches of lake and
swamp. Between and behind these natural
barriers the Finns laid their trench lines.
Despite the attention that many
accounts give to the Mannerheim line, the
Soviets suffered their most dramatic and
costly reversals in their efforts north of
Lake Ladoga and along the eastern border,
where well-prepared defensive positions played
little role. In these contests the Finns
relied on tactics, technology, and unit
structures that made the most of difficult and
enclosed terrain, and that were adapted to
defensive operations. The Finns also
benefitted from a road and rail communication
net that facilitated re-allocation of forces.
It is noteworthy that Reserves provided much
of the Finnish strength in the battles outside
the Karelian Isthmus.
In one of the Soviet thrust along
the eastern border the 163rd Division moved in
two columns over narrow roads through densely
wooded areas aiming for the village of
Suomussalmi. During the Division's advance,
Finnish Civil Guard units conducted continuous
small-scale flanking attacks. On 11 December
elements of the Finnish 9th Division blocked
the beleaguered and depleted Russian 163rd. A
Russian motorized division came to the aid of
the 163rd, but by 25 December both were
fighting desperately to extricate themselves.
Having circled around the invaders, the Finns
blocked their lines of supply and retreat.
They then waited until cold and hunger
exhausted the intruders before attacking in
force to break them up.
Farther to the north another thrust
involving three divisions made it halfway to
Gulf of Bothnia, past Salla to Kemijarvi,
before being driven back by a Finnish division
redeployed from the south by rail. In this
case, too, Civil Guard units served to slow
and attrit the advancing Russians, wearing
down the invaders and buying time for
redeployment.
North and south, the defense had
benefitted from rugged, broken terrain.
Numerous lakes, swamps, and thick forests
cramped the Soviet thrusts at every turn,
feeding them into narrow channels of advance.
The Finnish road and rail network barely
facilitated the Soviet advance. In those areas
where the lines connecting to Russia were
better developed, as in the south, they fed
into a deep and well-integrated net of
defensive works. However, along the 650 mile
north-south border, which spanned very
difficult terrain, few communication lines
connected the two countries and those were
mostly of poor quality. Back from the border,
the lines improved, facilitating force
re-allocation on the Finnish side. As long as
Finnish Civil Guard units could successfully
weaken and slow an invading force during its
passage through the most difficult areas,
regular units could redeploy relatively
rapidly from the south to block a break into
the Finnish heartland.
Although the Finnish operational
plan was well-conceived, the overall
geostrategic situation cast its success in
doubt. The depth of Finland, measured
east-west from its long border with Russia,
varies between 200 and 600 kilometers. During
the initial invasion, the theater force ratio
favored the Soviets by 5:2 in terms of
personnel and much more in terms of armor and
aircraft. Together with the advantage of
surprise, the disparity in combat strength
should have allowed the Soviets to assemble
overwhelming local force advantages. By
unleashing five widely-separated and
simultaneous ground thrusts (together with air
and amphibious assaults), the Soviets hoped to
bring all their power to bear at once, thus
drawing Finland's much smaller forces off in
several directions. A major success in any two
of these efforts might have been sufficient to
win Soviet war aims, which were moderate.
The Finnish forces, however, were
also prepared at the tactical level to make
the most of the advantages conveyed by defense
in broken and wooded terrain. Civic Guard
units were well-trained in small unit sapper
and guerilla tactics, refusing to meet the
Soviet thrusts in mass. A typical tactic was
to halt long columns of approaching armor and
motorized troops on narrow, poor roads and
attack their flanks and rear, cutting them off
from support -- a practice the Finns called motti
or "logging" tactics.
The Finnish units were trained to
move quickly across any kind of terrain,
strike fast, and withdraw -- thus compensating
for inferior numbers with tactical flexibility
and movement. The Finnish units were
well-equipped for conducting their chosen
tactics in their home environment. Good skis
and warm clothing were key to their combat
kit. They were also expert field innovators,
compensating for equipment shortages with
inventions such as the Molotov Cocktail.
More important than any individual
technology, tactic, or operational concept was
the consistent adherence of the Finnish
approach on every level to the requirements of
conducting a terrain-oriented defensive war
against a numerically superior foe. At the
strategic level the Finns entertained no
illusions about beating Russia if it chose to
bring the full brunt of its power to bear --
the strategic balance was too skewed. However,
the Finns could make conquest unappetizing
and, more important, buy time for intervention
by friendly powers. And, indeed, both France
and Britain, enrapt by Finland's resolute
resistance, seriously contemplated the
dispatch of a 50,000 soldier expeditionary
force. In the end, however, Swedish and
Norwegian opposition to intervention, and
concerns about opening a second front against
a new foe, eroded French and British
enthusiasm for intervention.
In February the Soviets renewed
their efforts, increasing their invasion force
to 45 divisions with a total of more than 1
million troops. On 1 February the Russian 7th
and 13th Armies, comprising 14 divisions,
launched massive attacks against the
Mannerheim line, which nonetheless held for
two weeks. The Russians also launched a large
force across the Gulf of Finland, landing in
the Finnish rear. By 12 March the war was
over. Victory had required three and one-half
months of fighting, a final theater force
advantage of more than five to one, and by
some accounts, 200,000 Russian lives. The
Finns, outgunned from the start, lost 25,000
lives.
Alam Halfa, 30 August-3 September
1942
The war for North Africa was
decided in Egypt between the months of July
and November 1942. Although most historical
attention has focused on the two swirling
battles of El Alamein that anchor this period,
it was the four-day battle of Alam el Halfa,
which came between them, that finally
exhausted Rommel's strength and set the
British firmly on the road to victory. What
unites all three battles, besides geography --
Alam Halfa is a ridge about 40 kilometers to
the southeast of El Alamein-- is the
importance of defensive preparations to the
conduct of operations on both sides. For two
years the combatants had ranged back and forth
over a 1000 kilometer stretch of desert. Now
the campaign would be decided in a four month
series of battles fought over a 60-kilometer
west-east stretch. Distinguishing these
battles were deep defensive areas -- marked by
minefields, wire, and strong points --
prepared by both sides along a line stretching
50 kilometers from the northern coast to the
impassable Qattara Depression in the south.
On the British side, the line served
to halt Rommel's summer offensive -- even
though the defensive positions had not yet
been fully articulated. However, when the
British attempted to assume the offensive in
the first battle of El Alamein, they were
unable to best Rommel in mobile armored duels.
Even on this relatively constricted playing
field and with German strength down,
fast-paced mobile operations gave the
advantage to Rommel. The British units were
less well-coordinated than the German and
their various combat arms fought in a
fragmented, not combined, fashion. These are
critical weaknesses under any circumstances;
mobile war greatly magnifies them.
When the British broke off their
attack, Rommel was happy to oblige. Although
he had proved able to parry their riposte, his
strength was insufficient to breech the
British defensive positions. Both sides took
time to receive reinforcements and build their
defenses. By the beginning of August, Rommel's
tank strength had grown by a factor of five.
British strength was also reinforced. In a net
assessment, the two sides entered the next
phase -- the battle of Alam el Halfa -- more
evenly matched than before. Although the first
battle of El Alamein had stopped Rommel, he
could still win the campaign -- providing
success in an effort to penetrate to the
British rear and cut off their main line of
communication east.
In some important respects the
battle of First El Alamein, which raged for 3
weeks, had not broken with the established
pattern of the North African campaign. It was
a battle of multiple parries, thrusts, and
ripostes -- although contained by geography
and the defensive disposition of the British
forces. Continuity was assured by the British
desire to "mix it up" with the Germans in
mobile warfare -- albeit, mobile warfare of a
more contained type. The subsequent four-day
battle of Alam el Halfa truly broke the mold:
for once, the defensive mode was to
predominate throughout -- and it would ensure
Rommel's eventual defeat.
On the eve of Alam Halfa the British
had 712 tanks available -- of which 500 would
figure in the armor battle; the Axis forces
had 515 tanks -- of which 440 mounted guns.
The defensive British line ran about 40
kilometers north to south, with its left flank
ending at the edge of the Qattara Depression.
This line was held by four infantry divisions
deployed in fortified "boxes" -- actually
large fortified areas about ten kilometers
deep, anchored by prominent ridges, and with
extensive minefields laid to give all around
protection. Direct- and indirect-fire
artillery as well as mortars covered the
minefields from mutually supporting positions.
The heavily-defended British
division areas stopped about 15 kilometers
short of the Depression, although the
minefields continued to the edge. At the point
that the British north-south line seemed to
"let up," a series of ridges turned eastward.
On and among these high points the British
deployed their armored brigades and additional
infantry and artillery, also protected by
minefields. The eastern-most of these ridges
was Alam Halfa.
A bird's eye view from the south
would reveal a continuous and deep "L"-shaped
defensive line resting squarely on good,
defensible terrain. The bottom leg of this "L"
ran east-west parallel to the Qattara
Depression and about 15 kilometers to its
north. Hence, an "open" corridor existed
between the "L" and the Depression -- but the
ground in this corridor was relatively soft.
And at the end of the corridor the British had
placed an armored division. The British plan
was to hold the northern area as strongly as
possibly while inviting and then threatening
from the flanks an enemy advance along the
southern corridor.
Rommel's only hope of preempting the
continuing build-up of British strength was to
breech the lightly defended minefields in the
south, push fast and deep along the southern
corridor, and then swing north toward the
coast and into the British rear area. This
line of advance was obvious, and Rommel knew
it; he could not surprise the British with his
choice of place. But he calculated that the
British would respond in typical fashion with
a fragmented and piecemeal armored riposte.
When Rommel attacked he discovered
that the minefield belt at the opening of the
corridor was deeper than expected. With their
advance slowed, the Axis columns clogged the
corridor and became easy targets for British
aircraft. Rommel tried to compensate for lost
time by turning north sooner than originally
planned, but this led his units onto soft
ground at the foot of a major British armored
position sitting astride the Alam el Halfa
ridge. Rommel pressed the attack but the
British, under specific orders from
Montgomery, refused to be drawn into mobile
warfare. Instead, they responded to the German
assaults and flanking maneuvers with fire from
well-sited tanks and numerous artillery
pieces.
Montgomery had modified an earlier
British plan by increasing the number of
artillery pieces allocated to the southern
flank from 50 to 250 guns. For almost two days
the Germans persevered under heavy artillery
and air attack while the British closed in
with additional armor, attacking Rommel's
right flank and sealing off the possibility of
advance to the northeast or east. The British
choice of ground and unit dispositions
facilitated their use of air power; while
British ground troops boxed Rommel's units,
British aircraft pummeled them. But Montgomery
was too rigid in his reluctance to plunge in
with armor; when the opportunity arose to
close the trap on Rommel by attacking the
weaker Axis units holding open the corridor in
the west, Montgomery refused it. The Germans
were thus able to retreat to their starting
point -- although at great cost.
Alam Halfa had permanently altered
the material balance to the advantage of the
British; perhaps more important, it had
altered the balance of morale. For once the
British were left in good order while the
Afrika Corps beat a hasty retreat. At Alam el
Halfa Rommel's time had run out. He would look
forward to the Second El Alamein, as he wrote
in his diary, as a "battle without hope."
Indeed, Second El Alamein would send Rommel
into strategic retreat -- but not before his
own defensive preparations gave the British a
nasty surprise. At the beginning of the 12-day
battle the force balance favored the British
by between 2:1 and 4:1, depending on the
standard of measure. However, the British
repeatedly failed to breech the deep German
minefields and rings of anti-tank guns,
exhausting much of their momentum in the
attempts. This, and a sudden bad turn in the
weather, gave Rommel the respite he needed to
retreat quickly to the west with the remnants
of the Afrika Corps.
The Battle of Kursk, July 1943
Operation Citadel -- the German
attack on the Kursk salient in the summer of
1943 -- was meant to rescue Hitler's effort
along the eastern front at a critical time.
During the previous winter and spring the
Wehrmacht had suffered defeat and reversal
before Moscow and Stalingrad as well as in
North Africa. An allied drive on Italy seemed
imminent. A shortening of the German line in
Russia could serve to strengthen the German
position there and free troops for use in
southern or western Europe. A withdrawal to
the west was the surest and easiest way to
accomplish this objective, but this option ran
counter to the spirit of Hitler's enterprise.
Hitler found hope in one operation
his army had executed during the previous
spring -- the successful encirclement of a
bulge in the Russian line at Izyum on the
River Donets. Despite setbacks elsewhere this
operation had constituted an advance, not a
retreat, and had bagged thousands of Russian
troops. Another bulge in the Russian line now
seemed ripe for attack: the 160-km wide Kursk
salient that ran between Orel in the north and
Belgrod in the south. A giant pincer movement
here could compromise hundreds of thousands of
Soviet troops and significantly shorten the
German line. As it existed in May 1943 the
salient's perimeter extended about 470
kilometers; a successful attack could shorten
this line by 250 kilometers. And, if launched
soon, the attack could avoid what Hitler
considered his most serious opponent: the
Russian winter.
Marshall Zhukov looked forward to
summer 1943 as the time to begin a general
counteroffensive that would eventually drive
the Germans back to Berlin. His intelligence
service told him of the German plans regarding
the Kursk salient; Reconnaissance, common
military sense, and experience with the foe
led him to the same conclusion. Although the
Russian High Command, and especially Stalin,
considered preempting any attack on the
salient, Zhukov thought otherwise.
"I considered it
pointless for our forces to go over to the
offensive in the near future in order to
preempt the enemy. It would be better for us
to wear them out on our defenses, to smash
their tanks, and then, by introducing fresh
reserves and going over to a general
offensive, to beat the main enemy force once
and for all."
After the war the head of the British
Military Mission to Moscow, Lieutenant General G
le Q Martel claimed to have played a key role in
advising against a preemptive move. Asked by his
Russian hosts to recount the reasons for British
victory in North Africa he had argued that the
British "success at Alamein was largely due to
the fact that we had let the Germans smash
up...their armored forces on our defenses. When
they were committed and had been badly knocked
about, then was the time to assume the
offensive."
At any rate, the Soviets' basic plan
evolved from an approach that they had already
employed in the battles around Moscow and
Stalingrad. They would allow the Germans to
open the attack, but under heavy artillery and
air bombardment. The Soviet armies would
defend every point with great determination,
forcing the Germans to fully commit, thus
revealing their main concentrations and points
of vulnerability. Once the German forces had
extended themselves and their momentum had
begun to flag, the Soviets would go over to
the offensive.
The Soviet plan (and Zhukov's
confidence) hinged on a degree and quality of
defensive preparation not previously seen in
the war. This time the Soviets could not count
on the weather as their ally. Instead, they
would transform the ground into an ally, and
claim their knowledge of that ground as an
ally as well. Expecting the attack to rely
heavily on tanks and aircraft, Zhukov
transferred antitank forces from quiet parts
of the front and from the GHQ reserve.
On a west-east line extending 170
kilometers from the salient's perimeter the
Soviets prepared six lethal belts through
which the Germans would have to pass. Behind
this they deployed the Steppe Front
(comparable to a Western Army group) as a
strategic reserve, and then another deep belt
of field fortifications along the east bank of
the Don River.
Field preparations in each belt
included:
- Alternate artillery, tank, and
troop positions (mutually-supporting and
protected or hidden),
- Antitank obstacles including
ditches (that could be flooded or set
afire), minefields, mined bridges, and
fields of dragon's teeth,
- Trench lines anchored on natural
obstacles and reinforced with pill boxes,
and
- Communications trenches and
protected, alternate supply depots and
Headquarters. The communications lines,
which tended to be arrayed perpendicular to
the front, could serve as lines of defense
from which the defenders could attempt to
laterally contain a penetration. Between
each line of fortification was a maneuver
zone in which units could redeploy under air
and artillery cover.
Within each belt the density of the
defense and troop deployment was not
homogenous, but corresponded to the degree of
expected danger. This was true not only on the
tactical level, where tank-able terrain and
important road lines received special
attention, but also on the strategic level,
where the extreme flanks of the Kursk salient
received special attention. On the tactical
level heavily-defended antitank areas were
created. Within these, battalion resistance
centers were set up and prepared for perimeter
defense.
The typical antitank battalion area
stood behind a deep layer of mines, obstacles,
and wire. In a forward trench, antitank guns,
antitank rifles, and machine guns covered the
layer of obstacles. Arrayed behind or just in
front of a second trench line were additional
antitank and machine guns as well as mortars
(which had sufficient range to reach out into
the forward minefields). Finally, behind a
third trench line, a less heavily defended
rear zone existed. Communications trenches
crisscrossed the area between the main
trenches. Pillboxes, protected firing
positions, and tank traps also dotted the
ground between the trenches. To simplify fire
control and make it more reliable, a network
of observation posts with permanent
communications was established. Mortar
detachments carefully adjusted their fire to
ensure rapid and accurate response to a
variety of contingencies.
Should an enemy thrust pierce the
forward line of a battalion area, troops in
the forward zone could fall back to alternate
sites, under cover of fire from the second
line of defense. This line could be further
reinforced from the rear area. Should the
battalion have to abandon its base, egress
through a rear trench could be covered by the
rear area units.
Complementing these more or less
fixed areas were mobile antitank detachments,
both at the division and Army level. Their
function was to reinforce threatened units or
establish a hasty defense should the enemy
find a gap between units. At the division
level the antitank detachments consisted of
one or two sapper companies; at the Army
level, an engineer battalion reinforced by
machine gunners. Complementing these were
artillery antitank reserves.
In the maneuver area between the
defensive belts indirect-fire artillery units
could deploy and tank units had freer play. If
reinforcement by mobile antitank detachments
of an area under attack proved futile, both
the defenders and their reinforcements would
withdraw. The defensive areas to the left or
right of the breech would receive these units
as reinforcement and prepare for all-around
defense. As the enemy thrust pushed into the
zone between the defensive belts, it would
meet friendly artillery, aircraft, and tank
units. If these could not defeat the
penetration from its flanks, they could at
least contain it. Should the enemy force
choose instead to push deeper forward, it
would confront another defensive belt. Success
would require nothing less than defeating six
such belts and then besting the Steppe Front,
waiting in the strategic rear.
As it turned out, the attackers did
not get nearly so far. On 5 July a German
force, comprising 2800 tanks, 1800 aircraft,
1000 assault guns in two large bodies,
attacked the north and south faces of the
bulge. Within the bulge there awaited a
Russian force comprising 3600 tanks and
self-propelled guns, 6000 antitank guns, 1000
Katyusha rocket-launchers, 12,000 other
artillery pieces, 3000 aircraft, and 1.3
million troops.
In the north, General Model's Ninth
Army was able to advance only 19 kilometers.
In the south, the Fourth Panzer Army halted
after 10 days, having progressed 32
kilometers. This more successful of the two
efforts failed, however, to bag much of the
Russian force, which simply withdrew deeper
into the defensive array, as planned. The
Russian counterattack commenced on 15 July. By
25 July the German armies called a halt,
having lost 100,000 men, 1000 tanks, and 1000
airplanes.
Reflecting on the battle, General
Walter Watlimont of the German Operations
Staff concluded that Kursk "was more than a
battle lost; it handed the Russians the
initiative and we never recovered it again
right up to the end of the war." By the end of
1943 the Russians had forced a withdrawal all
along the front south of Smolensk, recapturing
100,000 square kilometers of their territory.
Russian progress came at a high cost because
the German armies relied on defensive
operations to check the Russian advances.
Trading space for time, they repeatedly
withdrew behind hastily constructed defensive
lines. Still, they could not reverse the
decision at Kursk, which had turned the force
balance irreversibly to the Russians' favor.
What the situation had called for was a
strategic withdrawal. This Hitler refused to
contemplate until too late.
A Recent Counter-example: The
Failure of Iraqi Defensive Preparations in the
1990-1991 Gulf War
The most salient factor in the Gulf
War was a disparity in the capabilities of the
combatants far more pronounced than that found
even in Arab-Israeli conflicts. For instance,
the Allied-Iraq ratio in theater combat
aircraft was three-to-one; in advanced
aircraft, 25:1. Having marshalled an air force
three times as large as Israel's and many
times more capable, the allies fought the war
principally by means of air power -- talk of
AirLand Battle notwithstanding. Revised
intelligence estimates now show that the
Allies also enjoyed pre-war numerical
superiority in the number of ground troops in
the southern theater. Iraqi troops in and
around Kuwait numbered about 350,000, not
540,000 as originally estimated.
Compounding Iraq's disadvantages was
its political isolation, six months of
effective embargo, and the need to guard
against powerful enemies on several fronts.
These circumstances set this war apart from intra-regional
ones, historical and potential. Nevertheless,
the war holds some general lessons about
regional armed forces and their practice of
defensive operations. These lessons will
become increasingly relevant should the war's
outcome stimulate a new regional arms race, as
seems likely.
The war reaffirmed the weakness of
Arab air forces. Iraq's heavy investment in
air power was to no avail and worse: it
beggared other areas of military power that
might have proved more relevant to the
conflict. From a defensive perspective, Iraq
would have more wisely invested in modern,
mobile air defenses, basic electronic warfare
countermeasures, advanced mines and means for
their rapid emplacement, reconnaissance
drones, and high- performance multiple launch
rocket systems.
The war also revealed the
vulnerability of centralized air defense and
command, control, and communication systems.
Had the Iraqi leadership given its subordinate
air defense and army units more capacity and
freedom for independent action, the allied
"blitz" strategy could not have so easily
collapsed Iraq's defenses.
From the outset of hostilities,
Iraq's defenses seemed inert and
one-dimensional. For instance, although the
Iraqis stowed their most prized military
assets in bunkers under tons of concrete, they
failed to systematically employ simple,
complementary measures -- like infra-red- and
laser-masking smokescreens -- that would have
lessened the effect of Allied precision guided
munitions. Also, their air defense missiles
and guns seemed largely reliant on a single
means of target detection and acquisition:
radar. Electro-optical and imaging infra-red
backups, which would have proved more
resistant to Allied interdiction, were
relatively scarce.
The Iraqis were complacent in almost
every aspect of their defensive operations.
For instance, they showed little restraint in
operating their radar and C3I systems in the
pre-war period, thus providing the Allies with
volumes of tactical data. Also, ground
security for Iraqi air defense and artillery
systems was lax, leaving them vulnerable to
Allied special operations personnel -- many of
whom infiltrated into Iraqi-held territory
days and even weeks before hostilities
commenced.
The outcome of the war is an
indictment of "hybrid" armies -- or, more
precisely, of their hierarchial segmentation.
The Iraqi army in and around Kuwait evinced
two forms of hierarchial segmentation: first,
in the quality of troops and equipment;
second, in their deployment. The Iraqi command
placed the least well-trained and equipped
troops -- conscript infantry -- far forward to
take the brunt of an allied land assault. More
capable mobile units were far back in large
reserves, but these were not to support the
forward line as much as to engage allied units
once they penetrated it. Lacking true
cooperation, the various Iraqi forces could
not multiply each others' effect or cover each
others' weaknesses.
With inadequate air defense at lower
levels, Iraqi units had no recourse under
bombardment but to dig themselves into
immobility. The allies reserved the most
intense bombing for the weak frontline troops,
and sought especially to strip these of their
artillery assets -- calling to mind the
military maxim that an obstacle not covered by
fire is no obstacle at all. With centralized
control shattered, the forward troops quickly
surrendered to the advancing allies.
We cannot determine how well the
Iraqi defensive line along the Saudi border
might have withstood a mechanized assault if
not for 30 days of unopposed aerial
bombardment. Nor, at this time, do we even
know the true extent of these Iraqi defensive
preparations. Reports from the Marine Corps
units that assaulted the Iraqi lines in the
south indicate that these were much less
elaborate and complete than suggested in the
popular press, pre-war. Whatever its extent,
several design weaknesses in the system, apart
from the inadequacy of its air defense
element, were apparent. Lacking a significant,
integrated armored element, the forward
defense was virtually immobile at the tactical
level. Indeed, it was an infantry-based
defense with artillery in support, reminiscent
of the First World War. By contrast, a more
modern defensive system would emphasize
artillery and armor with infantry and air
power in support.
Moreover, like the Maginot line, the
simple linear orientation of the Iraqi system
precluded all-around defense. Penetrated at
one or a few points, such a system is
seriously compromised. The Iraqis repeated the
Maginot error on the operational level as
well: Having built a defensive line with a
flank left open, they failed to prepare for an
allied thrust around the open flank.
The weakness of Iraqi defensive
arrangements in Kuwait also derives, in part,
from their being undertaken in the context of
an offensive campaign. There is only
so much that can be accomplished in six months
across an expanse of 18,000 square kilometers,
especially when military personnel must also
control a hostile population. Furthermore,
operating in foreign territory precluded the
Iraqis quickly gaining intimate knowledge of
the terrain, such as that the Israelis
developed in the Golan in the period between
1967 and 1973. On the other hand, the
construction of Iraqi defenses in Kuwait were
transparent to the surveillance systems of the
United States, which had been closely
monitoring Iraqi activities since the
beginning of the crisis.
Citation:
Carl Conetta, Charles Knight and Lutz
Unterseher, "Defensive Military
Structures in Action: Historical Examples,"
(May 1994).
Link:
https://comw.org/pda/Defensive-Military-Structures-in-Action.html
(September 1997).
Originally
published in Condfidence-Building Defense:
A Comprehensive Approach to Security &
Stability in the New Era, Study Group on
Alternative Security Policy and Project on
Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute,
Cambridge, MA.
© Copyright
2014 by the Project on Defense
Alternatives (PDA). All rights
reserved. Any material herein may be
quoted without permission, with credit to
PDA.
With offices in
Washington DC and Cambridge MA, the Project on
Defense Alternatives develops and
promotes defense policy innovation that
reconciles the goals of effective defense
against aggression, improved international
cooperation and stability, and lower levels of
military spending and armed force worldwide.
PDA@comw.org
|