Dueling with Uncertainty:
The New Logic of
American Military Planning
Carl Conetta
and Charles Knight
February 1998
[ An earlier, abbreviated version of this article
appeared in the March/April 1998 Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists as "Inventing Threats." ]
It was remarkable testimony for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs:
"I'm running out of demons. I'm down to Kim Il Sung and Castro."
The context for General Colin Powell's 1991 remarks to Congress
was the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and America's recent
victory in the Gulf War. When the Soviet Union collapsed soon
after, an article in Aerospace Daily, a leading defense
industry newsletter, recalled Powell's remarks and predicted:
"Pentagon Budget Headed for $150 Billion -- Half Current Level --
By 1996."
What a difference six years can make. Introducing the May 1997 Quadrennial
Defense Review, Defense Secretary William Cohen warned that
"new threats and dangers, harder to define and more difficult to
track, have gathered on the horizon." Contrary to Aerospace
Daily's forecast, Secretary Cohen sees keeping the Pentagon
budget at $250 billion or slightly more -- about 77 percent of the
1991 level.
A Counsel of Pessimism
The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review seeks to lead the United
States into the next century with a defense budget only 23 percent
lower than the average for the Cold War period of 1976-1990.
Despite Secretary Cohen's warning, however, there is no profusion
of actual threats to justify this course. The preservation of
high-levels of spending instead reflects a novel way of thinking
and talking about military requirements.
Beginning with efforts at the RAND Corporation during the late
1980's, the focus of defense planners has shifted from "the clear
and present danger" of Soviet power to the intractable problem of
"uncertainty." Along with this shift has come a new type of
Pentagon partisan -- the "uncertainty hawk."
Uncertainty Hawks forsake "threat-based" planning for new methods
variously called "adaptive," "capability-based," or
"scenario-based" planning. These methods seek to release planning
from the "tyranny of scenario plausibility," as RAND analyst James
Winnefeld puts it.[1] Any hypothetical danger that seems remotely
"possible" is deemed worthy of attention. In this approach, the
concrete assessment of interests, adversaries, and trends matters
less than does the unfettered exercise of "worst case" thinking.
A fixation on uncertainty colors all of the major post-Cold War
policy blueprints -- the 1993 Bottom Up Review, the Quadrennial
Defense Review, the Joint Staff's Joint Vision 2010,
and even the independent National Defense Panel report, Transforming
Defense, which was issued in December, 1997. Lost in these
documents, however, is any real appreciation of America's profound
post-Cold War security windfall.
Puzzling Evidence
Today no nation even approximates America's singular combination
of size, stability, economic vitality, military prowess, and
geographic insulation. The strength of America's allies further
reinforces its substantial security margin. The countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development -- the
"West" -- now constitute three-quarters of the world economy;
these states plus other long-time American allies account for 72
percent of world military spending. By comparison, current and
potential adversary states -- including Russia and China --
account for 18 percent. This adds perspective to the recent
decline in Pentagon spending. Despite the cuts, America's share of
worldwide military spending increased from 27.5 to 32 percent
between 1986 and 1995. Whereas the United States spent only
two-thirds as much on defense as did "potential threat states" in
1986, it spent 76 percent more than this group in 1995. [2]
Western dominance is reflected also in arms transfer trends.
Between 1986 and 1995 the US share of the arms export market grew
from 22 percent to 49 percent; the aggregate share of NATO
countries grew from 44 percent to 78 percent. This change occurred
in the context of a 55 percent contraction in the market. Thus,
not only has the general diffusion of military power slowed
dramatically, it has come substantially under the control of the
United States and its allies.
A Shattered Calculus
Attention to details confirms what the overview of global trends
suggests. But recent official analyses miss both the forest and
the trees. With the collapse of Soviet power and the return of US
defense spending to pre-Reagan levels, threat assessment has taken
a great leap backward. The 1993 Bottom Up Review set the
post-Cold War standard, promoting the image of regional "rogues"
wielding huge arsenals of armored vehicles and combat aircraft --
so much dead weight, as the Gulf War showed.
All tanks are not equal, as the Gulf War amply demonstrated.
Quality makes a difference. A simplistic "bean count" of the North
Korean arsenal shows a country commanding almost 4000 tanks and
more than 700 combat aircraft. However, a 1995 study by the
Brookings Institution that uses a Pentagon methodology to take
quality into account, cuts the challenge down to size.[3] It shows
the North Korean military possessing the American equivalent of
less than 4.5 heavy divisions and 2.5 fighter wings -- about 1500
tanks and 250 fighters. And even this calculation overlooks
America's war-winning advantages in troop quality, logistics,
communications, intelligence, and information systems.
The Bottom Up Review also glossed over the considerable
and growing capabilities of America's regional allies. Looking at
the Korean balance, the Brookings analysis shows the North's
advantage over the South to equal about one and one-third US
divisions and an equal amount of air wings. Against this net
requirement the Bottom Up Review prescribed deploying the
equivalent of 3.5 heavy division and 14 air wings as well as 100
bombers. Meant to satisfy the demand for "decisive force," this
proposed allocation instead fed a debate over whether the Pentagon
could pull it off in two theaters at once.
Twilight of the Rogue Giants
Rather than redress the Bottom Up Review's shortcomings,
last year's Quadrennial Defense Review compounded them.
Notably, it failed to revise the estimate of regional foes,
despite their having suffered four years of decline. In contrast,
the National Defense University's Strategic Assessment 1997,
which is not an official document, has observed that the Korean
situation was "significantly different at the end of 1996 than it
was in 1993." Surveying the poor state of the armed forces and
economies of both North Korea and Iraq, the Strategic
Assessment concluded that the United States most likely
would face "declining military challenges in both areas,
especially in Korea."
Turning to Iran, the other bete noire of US planners, the
Assessment similarly found that its conventional forces
"on the whole are not improving" and their "ability to conquer
ground is deteriorating." The Iranian military has not recovered
from the Iran-Iraq war, nor has the Iranian economy recovered from
the 1979 revolution. Economic stagnation and sanctions together
have held Iran's planned $10 billion military modernization
program to less than 40 percent of its goals.
The concurrent decline of North Korean, Iraqi, and Iranian power
is not merely fortuitous. Stripped of superpower patronage, these
nations stand exposed to global trends that distinctly disfavor
rigid and narrow economies. The military ascent of these states,
and others like them, was dependent on a circumstance that no
longer exists: the East-West Cold War.
The Masque of Uncertainty
Against the evidence of diminished and diminishing threat, the
"uncertainty hawks" erect a view of the strategic environment as
thoroughly turbulent and allowing few, if any, reliable forecasts.
"The real world defies prediction," advises RAND Corporation
analyst James Winnefeld. David Abshire, president of the Center of
Strategic and International Studies, borrows the language of chaos
theory to describe the post-Cold War period: "The new strategic
landscape is not rigid and linear but highly fluid and
unpredictable."[4] Uncertainty and instability form the central
motif of both the Quadrennial Defense Review and Transforming
Defense. Similarly, Joint Vision 2010 frames its
force development program with the observation that "accelerating
rates of change will make the future environment more
unpredictable and less stable."
The agnosticism of the Uncertainty Hawks extends not only to the
specifics of discrete future events, such as the succession in
Russia or Iran, but also to the general character and magnitude of
possible threats. Uncertainty envelops events and trends equally.
Even with regard to our future national interests, we are groping
in twilight, if not the dark. "Uncertainty is a dominating
characteristic of the landscape," according to Paul Davis, editor
of a 1994 compendium of RAND Corporation planning studies, New
Challenges for Defense Planning. "Most striking," writes
Davis, "is the fact that we do not even know who or what will
constitute the most serious future threat."[5] This artful
formulation eludes the significance of America's post-Cold War
status as sole global military superpower, and it distracts from
the poverty of today's potential threats by wondering who will
rank first among them. (What is truly "most striking" is the fact
that questions such as these now mesmerize America's preeminent
defense planners, supplanting yesterday's more mundane problems --
such as gauging the Soviet capacity to launch one million prime
troops in a short-warning assault across the European front.)
The new planning methods supposedly tame uncertainty by varying
the assumptions that drive military planning -- assumptions about
America's future national interests, the identity and number of
possible threats, the character and magnitude of these threats,
how fast they can develop, and how quickly the United States can
respond. The end result is a vast array of hypothetical conflict
scenarios that serve to define US military requirements.
In a 1992 report prepared for the Joint Staff, RAND Corporation
analyst James Winnefeld argues that in order to tame uncertainty
planners must break free of the "tyranny of scenario plausibility"
and consider "discontinuous scenarios...in which there is no
plausible audit trail or storyline from current events."[6] Among
the "non-standard" scenarios that RAND Corporation analysts favor
are defense of the Ukraine or the Baltic states against Russia,
civil wars in Russia and Algeria, a variety of wars with China,
contention with Germany, and wars aligning Iraq and Syria against
Turkey, and Iraq and Iran against Saudi Arabia.
More discretely, the Quadrennial Defense Review uses
unnamed "wild card" scenarios to help define requirements.
Although describing these as individually improbable, the Review
asserts that, given a whole set, there is a better than even
chance that one or more will occur. Of course, to catch those "one
or more" the United States would have to hedge against the whole
pack. One of the Pentagon's "wild cards" may be a scenario
involving war in 2015 with China and North Korea, which the Navy
used recently to test the cost-effectiveness of its planned SC-21
surface combatant.
Playing with Wild Cards
Without doubt, simulations -- including nonstandard ones -- can
aid planning. The question is: To what end? And to what effect?
Exploring "wild cards" in order to identify warning signs or to
define limits is one thing; Using them to establish force
structure or modernization requirements, quite another. Especially
suspect would be using scenarios that are detached from declared
US interests to define current requirements; this would put the
military "cart" before the political "horse." Another, broader
concern is how the effusion of improbable conflict scenarios
affects public policy discourse overall.
Conflict scenarios, both wild and tame, can gain more credibility
in the telling than they deserve. Cognitive researcher Massimo
Piattelli-Palmarini calls this the "Othello effect," referring to
the trail of plausible but false suppositions that led Othello to
murder his wife, Desdemona. Even the most farfetched scenarios
comprise a number of steps or links each of which may seem
plausible or even probable given the one that came before.
Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,
the residual impression is one of plausibility. Omitted are the
many branches at each step that would lead to a neutral or even
positive outcome. The resulting snapshots, although numerous,
offer a highly-selective view of what the future may hold. And the
fact that only the negative outcomes are articulated and exercised
can distort the general public impression of risk.
Living with Uncertainty
There is no escape from uncertainty, but there is relief from
uncertainty hysteria. It begins with recognizing that instability
has boundaries -- just as turbulence in physical systems has
discernible onset points and parameters. The turbulence of a
river, for instance, corresponds to flow and to the contours of
the river's bed and banks. It occurs in patches and not randomly.
The weather also is a chaotic system that resists precise
long-range forecasting, but allows useful prediction of broader
trends and limits.
Despite uncertainty, statements of probability matter. They
indicate the weight of evidence -- or whether there is any
evidence at all. The Uncertainty Hawks would flood our concern
with a horde of dangers that pass their permissive test of
"non-zero probability." However, by lowering the threshold of
alarm, they establish an impossible standard of defense
sufficiency: absolute and certain military security. Given finite
resources and competing ends, something less will have to do.
Strategic wisdom begins with the setting of priorities -- and
priorities demand strict attention to what appears likely and what
does not.
The world may be less certain and less stable today than during
the Cold War, but it also involves less risk for America. Risk is
equal parts probability and utility -- chances and stakes. With
the end of global superpower contention, America's stakes in most
of the world's varied conflicts has diminished. So has the
magnitude of the military threats to American interests. This
permits a sharper distinction between interests and compelling
interests, turbulence and relevant turbulence, uncertainties and
critical uncertainties. And this distinction will pay dividends
whenever the country turns to consider large-scale military
endeavors, commitments, and investments.
From "Two War" to "New War"
More than any other force development goal, the ability to fight
and quickly win two near-simultaneous major regional wars has kept
defense spending high. And it has fed the impression of military
readiness and modernization shortfalls. Although both the 1993 and
1997 reviews linked the two-war requirement to Korean and Persian
Gulf scenarios, they also described these as merely illustrative.
Officially, the two war requirement is generic. As the Quadrennial
Review put it: "We can never know with certainty when or
where the next major theater war will occur" or "who our next
adversary will be." The issue, however, is not our ability to
predict events, but our willingness to clarify and weigh interests
-- at least when it comes to sending hundreds of thousands of
Americans to war.
Outside Europe only the Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf
qualify as areas in which perceived US interests, vulnerable
allies, and significant threats might converge to compel very
large-scale US intervention. Recognizing this helps to contain
both uncertainty and requirements. Similarly, stricter attention
to risk factors would put into perspective the supposed need for a
capability to fight and win two major wars simultaneously.
Since 1945 the United States has fought three major regional
conflicts -- one every 15 or 20 years. Whether the future holds
more major wars or less, two war contingencies will occur much
less often than single ones -- even if war in one region boosts
the chances of an attack elsewhere. A "second war capability"
might cost America two-thirds as much as the first -- perhaps $50
billion a year. But it would serve its full purpose only a
fraction as often. Is it worth spending $3 trillion dollars over
60 years to meet a double war contingency that might occur only
once? Yes, if delaying a full response to the second war would
entail a catastrophic loss for the nation. This is the type of
bargain we accepted during the Cold War, but today's regional war
scenarios do not fit the bill. What they lack are adversaries and
interests of sufficient magnitude.
The Quadrennial Defense Review holds tenaciously to the
two war strategy as originally conceived, but cracks are appearing
elsewhere in the consensus. Senator Charles Robb has proposed a
variety of more economical ways to meet a two war requirement,
including greater reliance on the reserves to "fill out" the
second war capability. The December 1997 National Defense
Panel report calls the entire concept into question. Noting
that "the current posture minimizes near-term risk at a time when
danger is [already] moderate to low," the Panel worries that the
two war construct "may have become a force-protection mechanism --
a means of justifying the current force structure." However, the
Panel does not hold out any hope of budget reductions. Instead, it
seeks to redirect more resources toward preparing for the putative
security challenges of the post-2010 world. These gather under the
headings of "asymmetric warfare," "military-technical revolution,"
and a "re-emergent peer competitor".
Asymmetric Warfare
Both 1997 defense reviews and Joint Vision 2010 speculate
that the West's foes will turn to unconventional methods and
weapons to sap or circumvent Western strengths. The Quadrennial
Review foresees "increasingly sophisticated asymmetric
challenges involving the use of chemical, biological, and possibly
nuclear weapons; attacks against the information systems of our
forces and national infrastructure" as well as insurgency,
terrorism, and environmental destruction. Joint Vision 2010
asserts that "our most vexing future adversary may be one who can
use rapid improvements in its military capabilities that provide
asymmetrical counters to US strengths, including information
technologies." Content to register these possibilities, however,
the reports decline to explore their limits or gauge how much of a
problem they pose.
The Vietnam War amply illustrated the potential of asymmetric
warfare -- and its limits as well. Although masters of
unconventional war, the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong
allies were dependent for success on the shield and support of a
superpower -- the Soviet Union -- as well as neighboring China.
Outside similar circumstances, the potential of asymmetric methods
is limited.
In the post-Soviet era, few if any "non-peer" nations would plan
or attempt a major military confrontation with the United States,
although they might blunder into it, as Iraq did in 1990. Still,
none can afford to set aside the funds needed to indulge
dare-the-superpower fantasies, even by asymmetric means.
Primarily, what will shape the armed forces of regional powers and
developing nations in the coming decades will be local challenges
such as old-fashioned cross-border threats and internal
insurgencies.
The real core of the asymmetric warfare threat involves the spread
of cheap ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. This
poses a real, but well-defined potential threat -- mostly to US
regional operations. Relative to former-Soviet capabilities, the
threat is quite limited, involving a handful of countries. All of
the recent defense reviews implicitly acknowledge this, seeking to
devote only a small part of US military forces and investment to
meeting this challenge specifically.
To find a more sophisticated and comprehensive threat, scenario
writers must work backwards from perceived Western
vulnerabilities. "What would it take to defeat the United States?"
is the question that conjures their visions of asymmetric warfare.
But the fact that we can spot theoretical "windows of
vulnerability" in the edifice of Western strength does not mean
that real-world foes can climb through them. And it certainly does
not mean that enemy ladders are already rising against our walls.
Technology Diffusion
When Uncertainty Hawks turn to assess the danger of technology
diffusion, the actual capabilities and efforts of potential foes
matter less than their theoretical access to the military
marketplace. The National Defense Panel, for instance,
sees the world providing "all nations with more or less equal
access to defense-related technologies." Joint Vision leaves no
doubt about where this leads: "Wider access to advanced technology
along with modern weaponry...and the requisite skills to maintain
and employ it will increase the number of actors with sufficient
military potential to upset existing regional balances of power."
What is lacking is any general evidence of a rising curve of
technological competence among our likely adversaries. Russel
Travers, an analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
surveys the modernization efforts of America's allies and
adversaries alike in a Spring 1997 Washington Quarterly
article, concluding that the idea that America is in danger of
losing its technological superiority "does not hold up."
Similarly, in a 1994 Foreign Affairs article Ethan
Kapstein of Harvard University's Olin Institute anticipates that
"by the early 21st century, the United States will be the sole
producer of the world's most advanced weaponry." This is because
"rising costs and declining defense budgets are putting pressure
on the world's inefficient defense producers, and most of them are
collapsing under the strain."
In the real-world marketplace, nations' access to cutting-edge
weapon systems is quite selective and differentiated -- like an
individual's access to Maserati sports cars. And more so today
than yesterday. The plain fact is that all but a handful of
nations lack the capacity to build, buy, integrate, support, and
effectively use cutting-edge military systems in significant
quantity. The shortcomings of lesser-developed countries are
rooted in socioeconomic conditions that, in most cases, show no
near-term prospect for improvement. They may attempt to absorb
elements of advanced technology and fighting concepts -- but,
lacking a superpower patron, none are likely to be nearly so
successful as Iraq circa 1990. Nevertheless, the reliance
on theoretical "market access" to gauge the diffusion problem
treats anyone's technology as though it were everyone's. Thus,
every advance in American capabilities can serve to rationalize
the next. This portends a continuous, solitary arms race in which
the United States labors to outdistance its own shadow. In the
end, technical feasibility alone defines requirements.
As with asymmetric warfare, the real core of the diffusion threat
is proliferation of medium-range missiles and weapons of mass
destruction. The prospect of any more intensive technological
competition than this hinges on the emergence of a new, major
rival to the United States.
The Threat with No Name
The Quadrennial Review sees the rise of a peer competitor
as improbable before 2015. However, like the Bottom Up Review,
it hedges against an earlier than expected arrival. To help decide
near-term policy, the Review relies on simulations of war
in 2014 with what might be called a "half-way peer" -- a regional
great power with armed forces significantly larger and more
capable than those of Iraq, Iran, or North Korea.
The plausibility of this scenario depends on its details, which
the Quadrennial Review typically neglects to provide. Who
is this threat? Why are we fighting it? What capabilities have
planners given it? Even setting these questions aside, fighting
simulated contests 17 years in advance begs the issue of how best
to prepare for challenges that do not exist today and may not
exist tomorrow.
The regional great powers and peer competitors that presently
enthrall planners are only hypothetical constructs. Separating
hypothesis from reality would be a process of emergence.
Superpowers do not take shape easily or quickly. Their advent
takes time and involves an extraordinary convergence of
circumstances and trends -- political, economic, geographical, and
military. Tracking these provides a way to gauge the real danger
of peer emergence.
Meeting the challenge of a peer rival, should one begin to
gestate, would involve a race between its emergence and the
ability of the United States to reconstitute sufficient additional
military power. Given America's incomparable military-industrial
base, it would enjoy a unique advantage in any such competition.
Today's huge gap between the United States and any potential rival
defines America's strategic reaction time -- its margin of safety.
But that is not true for Uncertainty Hawks. They argue that the
historical example of Nazi Germany's rapid ascent makes a
reconstitution strategy untenable. But modern armed forces take
much longer to develop than during the 1930s; combat vehicle and
aircraft development, for instance, takes three to five times as
long. And even in the 1930s major threats did not spring up full
grown. Already by 1928 Germany's manufacturing output was fifty
percent of the combined total of France, Great Britain, and
Russia, and its per capita output was much higher. By 1935 it was
leading the world in defense spending. Today, America must look
among its allies to find any remotely comparable potential
competitor -- and none of these spend one-fifth as much as we do
on defense.
The prime candidates for future peer rival status are Russia and
China. A dozen years of dedicated investment might resuscitate a
significant portion of the Russian armed forces, as it did ours
after 1978. But Russia's military has much further to go than did
America's -- it is in ruins -- and Russia must first rehabilitate
its economy and governing structures. The Chinese prospect is even
longer term. If it's economy holds out, it might in 20 years
compare economically to the United States as Poland does to Sweden
today. That might put a Soviet-style challenge within its reach.
In the meantime, China is just beginning to inject 1980s
technology into select portions of its armed forces. Their feeble
1996 exercises around Taiwan suggest not much improvement in power
projection capability since the disastrous 1979 tangle with
Vietnam. The Strategic Assessment surmises that China's military
in 1996 was "probably two decades away from challenging or holding
its own against a modern military force." Paul Goodwin of the
National War College puts "the window for China becoming one of
the world's major military powers...at somewhere between 2020 and
2050." Surveying the prospects worldwide Russell Travers, the DIA
analyst, concludes that "no military or technical peer competitor
to the United States is on the horizon for at least a couple of
decades."[7]
Certain Force
Uncertainty has breathed new life into declining and hypothetical
threats. And current policy prescribes that the US military do
more than simply prepare to respond to these. The Quadrennial
Review proposes an expanded peacetime role for the Pentagon
in shaping the strategic environment. "Environment shaping" is
meant to encompass all the diffuse ways, apart from crisis
response, that the US military might protect and promote US
interests. Key to environment shaping are overseas presence,
military assistance programs, and military-to-military contacts.
An important environment shaping goal for the Pentagon is to
discourage military competition with America and stem the
emergence of hostile regional hegemons. As the Quadrennial
Review sees it, the United States can stop difficult
relationships from evolving into military contests by projecting a
sense of overwhelming American power. And it can stem arms races
by winning them in advance. Of course, this assumes that countries
will not view such peremptory moves as provocative or as providing
sufficient reason to gear up their own military efforts. The Strategic
Assessment 1997 warns that this type of dissuasion is a
"two-edged sword" because it may "lead others to believe that
their interests are at risk, in which case they may decide they
have no choice other than the use of force." More generally, the
Pentagon's increased interest in environment shaping suggests to
some observers an incursion on the traditional domain of
diplomatic and nonmilitary initiatives. The National Defense
Panel
largely avoids the term, and it strongly affirms that the
"most effective tool" for enhancing regional stability "should be
diplomacy."
The goals and methods of the Quadrennial Review lead it to
embrace a uniquely high standard for defense sufficiency: the
maintenance of US military superiority over current and potential
rivals. As Defense Secretary Cohen sees the current situation,
"Without such superiority, our ability to exert global leadership
and to create international conditions conducive to the
achievement of our national goals would be in doubt."
Tunnel Vision
Among the visions that guide present policy, one is absent
conspicuously: a world in which economic issues have displaced
military ones as the central focus of global competitions and
concerns. Failing to engage this prospect, the recent defense
policy reviews are oblivious to the opportunity cost of military
spending. And it is this lapse that gives license to their
speculative methods and overweening goals.
A recent RAND Corporation paper argues against reduced defense
spending on the basis that "the US defense burden is now quite low
by historical standards."[8] Defense Secretary Cohen likewise
accentuates the post-Cold War decline in the proportion of gross
national product that America devotes to defense. But it is a
peculiar parochialism that compares today's defense investment
rate with that of the Reagan era while ignoring comparisons
between the United States and its competitors.
The United States continues to invest more of its national product
in defense than does its allies, more than the world average, and
much more than its chief economic competitors. By disregarding the
requirements and consequences of increased global economic
competition, present policy makes an unacknowledged bet about the
future: The Soviet Union is gone and no comparable military
challenge to the West exists, except as distant possibility.
Nonetheless, the American prospect depends as much as ever, if not
more, on the specifically military aspects of strength. Of this
much, the Uncertainty Hawks seem certain.
Notes
1. James Winnefeld, The Post-Cold War Sizing Debate:
Paradigms, Metaphors, and Disconnects (Santa Monica: RAND,
1992) page viii.
2. For 1986, "potential threats" include the former Warsaw Treaty
states, China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and
Vietnam. For 1995, Russia and Belarus replace the former Warsaw
Treaty states.
3.Michael O'Hanlon, Defense Planning for the Late 1990's:
Beyond the Desert Storm Framework (Washington DC: Brookings
Institution, 1995).
4. David Abshire, "Toward an Agile Strategy," Washington
Quarterly (Spring 1996) page 43.
5. Davis, "Protecting the Great Transition" in New Challenges
for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa
Monica: RAND, 1994), page 140.
6. Winnefeld, page 15.
7. Travers, "A Strategic Breathing Space," Washington
Quarterly (Spring 1997), page 107.
8. Paul Davis, et al., "Adaptiveness in National Defense: the
Basis of a New Framework," RAND Issue Paper, August 1996.
Citation: Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, Dueling with
Uncertainty: the New Logic of American Military Planning, Project
on Defense Alternatives. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute,
February 1998.