A. Introduction

Today the United States is reliving the type of military means-ends mismatch that characterized much ofthe cold war period. Even the level of expenditure is similar. Projecting to the end of the currentdrawdown and beyond, it seems defense spending will stabilize at a level between 80 and 85 percent of theaverage for the period 1975-1990. Nonetheless, spending cuts have stimulated concerns about readiness,about the "hollowing" of our armed forces -- also familiar from the years of the post-Vietnam drawdown. At the same time, nonmilitary national priorities are pressing against the defense budget. This pressureshould not be mistaken for a simple call of "butter not guns." As surely as the turmoil of the 1960s andthe economic difficulties of the 1970s revealed national weak spots, the issue of social and economicrenewal today involves national security. It is a question of reinforcing and husbanding the fundamentalsof national strength. Nothing else that we can do today will better prepare us to deal with possible newthreats 25 or 30 years hence.

In another sense, existing priorities put at risk not just a "peace dividend," but peace itself. There is nonational security issue more critical to our future than the future of Russia. And yet the West cannot find aquantity of grant aid for Russia that is greater than the amount our nation will spend on defense in a singlemonth of a single year. Likewise, regarding peacekeeping operations: the world frets as the annual bill forUN operations in 20 nations approaches just 2 percent of annual American defense spending, which iscurrently about 50 percent of all defense spending worldwide.

In our analysis, the Bottom Up Review (BUR) fails to fully appreciate the revolutionary events of the pastfew years. In assessing the strategic and military challenges that face our nation, it misconstrues thestakes, the threats, and the operational risks. As a result the BUR prescribes an active force structure thatis larger than needed. More than any other single factor it is the maintenance of an oversized active forcestructure that threatens readiness and modernization, while also limiting the resources available for newand nonmilitary security initiatives.

B. Strategic

Strategic wisdom begins with the setting of priorities, which is a prerequisite for rationally relating meansand ends. The Bottom Up Review announces a variety of goals and guidelines -- including a new emphasison multinationalism and the ability to win two near-simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). However, the BUR fails to set clear priorities among the goals it advances. Although we have interestseverywhere, our interests are not equally distributed. In some places we must be prepared to act on alarge-scale and with local allies only, if we must. In other places we may not need or desire to involveourselves even on a modest scale unless acting as part of a truly balanced and broad multinationalcoalition. Unfortunately, the BUR does little to help us tell one instance from the other.

During his confirmation hearings last year former-Secretary Aspin said that the United States would makejudgements about foreign intervention on a case by case basis. This criteria, which is no criteria at all,combines with a spirit of global activism to give the impression of expanding US military commitments. Although we may hope that open-ended statements of US interest or intent will contribute to deterrence,they are just as likely to contribute to miscalculation on the part of friends and adversaries. Inevitably, thelimits of our interest are revealed by events, lending to an impression of American indecision andweakness.

In addition, expansive or vague goals do not provide helpful guidance to force planners. Indeed, an open-ended military activism virtually guarantees that a mismatch between means and ends will become ourpermanent condition. Nothing that has been said since Mr. Aspin's departure has dispelled thisimpression. However, in fairness, the tendency toward expanding commitments predates the currentadministration. It was strongly evident, for instance, in some of the planning scenarios examined by the1992 Defense Planning Guidance document.

A clear set of strategic priorities based on the specification of vital interest would simplify the calculationof defense requirements and help bring those requirements within reach. Where and under whatconditions should the US contemplate making the ultimate commitment of large numbers of groundtroops? Where and when is balanced multilateral co-operation a necessary precondition for major USmilitary involvement? The issue is not our ability to predict events, but our willingness to clarifyinterests. Uncertainty has become the watchword of defense planing, but this phrase cannot absolve theresponsibility to clarify interests, set limits, and establish priorities.

Although it is true that world events are less predictable today than during the cold war era, it is equallytrue that the stakes for the US in most of the world's varied conflicts are far, far lower. Just as we mustdistinguish between interests and vital interests, we can and must distinguish between uncertainty andcritical uncertainties. During the cold war period, our global contest with the Warsaw Pact (and at onetime, China) greatly amplified our interest in many distant conflicts -- conflicts that we would haveotherwise viewed as less than critical to our national interest. With the cold war now behind us, ourmilitary policy toward distant conflicts and places should more closely reflect inherent values.

C. Core Area Coalition Defense

Today there are only two regions outside Western Europe where the interests of the United States and theneeds of local allies might converge to require large-scale US intervention, including the possible dispatchof hundreds of thousands of ground troops: the Arabian and Korean peninsulas. Our abiding interest isevident in long-standing military cooperation and assistance policies and in the well-developed militaryinfrastructures that these areas host. We might call a policy that emphasizes defense of these regions andWestern Europe a Core Area Coalition Defense. Outside these areas of core interest we would only rarelycontemplate substantial commitments of ground troops -- say, more than a division -- except as part of atruly balanced and broad multinational effort. When crisis threatens in the core we would not contemplatelarge-scale military involvement in outside areas at all.

An emphasis on core area coalition defense would not be an abdication of our broader globalresponsibility -- the moral responsibility to oppose aggression generally. It would, however, place ourresponsibility into a context of national interest, and balance it against the responsibility of other greatpowers. If the world community is not yet ready to respond effectively and in concert to events that callout for intervention, then we should use our leverage to stimulate the evolution of appropriate cooperativeinstitutions. What we should not and cannot do, however, is shoulder the lion-share of responsibilityourselves. Although not strictly beyond our means, this type of unilateral or quasi-unilateral globalismwould not be sustainable politically. Even if it were, it would most likely be counter-productive in thelong-run. At any rate, the United States also has at its disposal substantial nonmilitary means with whichit can influence distant events, and these should prove far more effective in the post-Soviet era than before. What is required is not isolationism, but a discriminate engagement -- discriminate in scale and in ourchoice of ends and means.

The Bottom Up Review does not measure-up very well against the notion of Core Area Coalition Defenseor the rule of strict multinationalism outside core areas. While asserting a commitment to multilateralism,it neglects the concept as a criteria to limit the range of US commitments abroad. When discussing majorUS military intervention outside Europe the BUR focuses on the Korean and Persian Gulf scenarios, butdescribes them as merely illustrative. Verging on clarity and a statement of priorities, the BUR retreatsinto uncertainty -- much as General Colin Powell did during his September 1993 BUR press conferencewhen he concluded a discussion of the two-war scenario with the disclaimer, "we really don't know wherethe conflict will occur"¹ Of course, the question is not one of knowledge, but of interest andcommitment.

The roster of future major conflicts may include wars between Belarus and Lithuania, India and Pakistan,Vietnam and China, Sudan and Ethiopia, and many, many others. Nonetheless, today's force planningneed not seek to provide a capability to intervene quickly and on a large scale across this range of possibleconflicts. A more limited focus on the Korean peninsula and Persian Gulf -- not as illustrative scenarios,but as core areas of concern -- can and should have a significant affect on force planning, for severalreasons:

• As already mentioned, these areas possess very substantial military infrastructures, whichare geared to support US intervention. In addition,
• Refining our strategic focus makes the forward positioning of troops and the prepositioningof war stocks a viable means for alleviating the challenges of rapid deployment.
• Refining our focus also allows us to concentrate our diplomatic, intelligence, and militaryassistance efforts, and it reduces the training challenge that faces our Reserve armed forces,thus permitting greater reliance on this resource.
• Finally, each of the core areas has characteristics uniquely favorable to deterrence anddefense. The Persian Gulf is especially well-suited for the application of American airpower. On the Korean peninsula, the South's military is qualitatively superior in mostrespects to its northern rival.

D. Hedging Against the Prospect of a Future Peer Competitor

The BUR also defends its "two war" force structure as providing a hedge against the possible emergence ofa new "grand threat." Although uncertainty is appropriate in this case, the way the BUR seeks to redress itis not.

Much of the concern about a re-emergent peer competitor centers on the Russian prospect. Certainly, thepolitical climate in Moscow does not inspire confidence. Assuming economic recovery, Russia couldeventually field a national military 60 percent as capable as those it once commanded through the WarsawPact. Of course, the geostrategic position of Russia is not as worrisome as the position occupied by theSoviet Union/Warsaw Pact during the cold war. Reclaiming this position would require Moscow to pursuethe long, costly, and unpredictable course of war. For now, the task of European deterrence and defensecan be largely borne by European active-duty and reserve troops. Looking forward 12, 15, or more years,events may someday compel the United States to revise upward its level of commitment to Europeandefense. Such developments will not occur overnight, however -- nor even over a period of just a fewyears.

Future decades also hold the possibility that new adversarial powers or alliances will emerge, fieldingmilitary threats substantially greater than today's adversaries. The farther we look into the future, the lesswe can preclude this possibility. It is equally true, however, that the surest steps we can take now toreduce the likelihood of global re-polarization tomorrow are diplomatic in nature. The military issuesraised by the possibility of a future "peer competitor" do not concern the armed forces we are buildingtoday as much as they concern the military after next. As suggested above, the best way to address theseissues today is through attention to the technological, economic, and social foundations on which we willbuild the military after next.

Although it is sensible to incorporate in our current defense posture a hedge against the unexpected mid-term emergence of a new "grand threat," this hedge should involve reconstitution units -- not fully activeones. A reasonable goal would be the capability to increase the size of our active military by 15 percentover a period of 18 months. (The CBO has reviewed some reconstitution options in a 1992 report,Structuring US Forces After the Cold War.) Emphasizing an active-force reconstitution capability is aneconomical way to hedge against an uncertain future. Unfortunately, the BUR has let the concept fallthrough the cracks.

E. Threat Assessment Takes Two Steps Backward

Derivative of the current fixation on "uncertainty" is a shift from a threat-based to capability-based formof force planning. Rather than pegging force structure to the requirements of meeting specific adversaries,the new approach seeks to ensure that a general range of military capabilities are at the disposal of nationalcommand authorities. Of course, "threats" still figure in the calculation, but they have become speculative,composite "mug shots." Force requirements are assembled from a variety of simulated conflict scenariosthat range from those that are critically relevant to US national interests to some that are only marginallyimportant (for instance, the controversial "Lithuania scenario" examined in the draft 1992 DefensePlanning Guidance).

The Bottom Up Review depicts a "representative" regional military threat that resembles no threat inparticular. The BUR examines eight categories of military strength: personnel under arms, tanks, armoredfighting vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, naval vessels, submarines, and SCUD-class ballisticmissiles. In each category a range of values is given for the representative threat. However, amongAmerica's likely future adversaries, only one nation -- North Korea -- scores near or above the upper rangein more than one or two of the eight categories. Generally speaking the BUR substantially overestimatesthe air and naval power of potential threat states, and underestimates the degree to which their armedforces are personnel intensive.

More significant and disturbing than the tendency to overstate equipment holdings is the BUR'spresentation of quantitative measures of military power, and its failure to present a net assessment ofthreat that fully takes into account the strength of local allies. One incontestable and abiding lesson of theGulf War is that weapon and troop "bean counts" give no reliable indication of combat power. Aninformed national debate cannot proceed on this basis. Of course, the BUR's conclusions reflectqualitative assessments -- but until some version of these are introduced into the public debate we cannotfully judge the assumptions that drive our defense planning.

G. A Second Look at the Korean Strategic Balance

Examining the confrontation on the Korean peninsula we can see how a qualitative net assessment mightinfluence our judgement of requirements. The Congressional Budget Office and an independent study byCBO analyst Michael O'Hanlon have relied on the TASCFORM methodology to measure the conventionalbalance on the Korean peninsula² The 1990 ground force ratio, expressed in terms of normalizedUS armored divisions, was found to be three divisions for the North against two for the South. Thebalance in normalized US air wings was equal: two each. Arguably, not much needs to be added to thisbalance on the Southern side to reliably guarantee deterrence. Of course, a large-scale offensive with theaim of toppling the northern regime would be a much more demanding objective.

Although suggestive, the TASCFORM scores do not tell the whole story. The scores do not take intoaccount "soft" factors such as training level and morale, or fully take into account logistics and command,control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities -- which we know were critical in deciding theoutcome of the Gulf War. There is little reason primae facie to assume that North Korea is superior inthese respects to either pre-war Iraq or South Korea, whose defense expenditures per active duty soldierhave for years outpaced those of North Korea by factors of three- and two-to-one, respectively.

Attention to the fundamentals of strength on the Korean peninsula is encouraging. The population of theSouth is twice as large as that of the North; the GNP of the South is more than ten times greater. Currently, the South compares to the North in population and economic strength as Germany compares toPoland. Regarding defense spending, the South compares to the North as Germany compares to Italy. Ifthe South cannot mount a credible conventional defense, we would be justified in asking, Why not? Infairness, however, the recent alarms about deterrence and defense on the Korean peninsula are not issuingfrom the South Korean government.

H. Air Power and the Strategic Balance in the Persian Gulf

Although the balance between friends and adversaries in the Persian Gulf area is not nearly as favorable asthat on the Korean peninsula, it is also not as troublesome as the BUR implies. In most of the categories ofstrength by which the BUR measures major regional threats, Iran and Iraq fall below the lower range. Inonly two categories out of eight do either Iran or Iraq reach the middle range. In only one category --citizen under arms -- do they meet or exceed the upper range. Nonetheless, TASCFORM scores computedby the CBO do show 1991 Iraqi and Iranian ground forces to be 2-1/2 and four times more powerful,respectively, than the combined ground forces of the Gulf states. (The CBO concluded that Iraq possessed2.1 US ground force equivalents; Iran possessed 1.3.) In the air, however, the situation is reversed. SaudiArabia and the other Gulf states together possess twice the air power of Iran and at least one-third morethan Iraq -- again, not accounting for differences in C3I.

Do the BUR conflict scenarios take the favorable Persian Gulf air balance fully into account? At least onestudy that figured prominently in the BUR process did not -- RAND Corporation's New Calculus:Analyzing Airpower's Changing Role in Joint Theater Campaigns ³ Although the studyemphasizes that the early arrival of air power is key to stopping a mechanized invasion, it excludes fromits simulations the air forces of the Gulf states, which today field over 560 combat aircraft.

I. Regional Threats Viewed in the Context of Development Trends

As a planning document the BUR must look into the future ten or more years. It is appropriate to expectthat it would view potential regional threats in the context of ongoing development trends. The BUR haslittle to say that is optimistic about military trends in the South. This, despite the fact that since 1985 totalmilitary expenditures and arms imports by nations of the South have been declining -- as has thepercentage of citizens under arms. Although some nations of east Asia are bucking this trend, it isotherwise general, and reflects both economic conditions and the dissolution of the WTO/USSR. Thisdownward trend will likely continue in all regional states formerly allied with the WTO or favoring"command style" economies. With the WTO no longer functioning as a coordinating center, supply depot,and training camp for conflict with the West, we can expect individual "threat states" to be substantiallyless flexible or durable in war than they were during the cold war period. However, we should not ascribethese developments solely to the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a global competitor. In general,socio-economic conditions in the South place insurmountable obstacles in the way of states who try tofield armed forces that are simultaneously large, modern, and well-trained.

J. The MRC "Building Block" -- a Force for All Seasons?

Realistic, affordable planning for very large-scale operations demands a focus on real, not composite or"representative" threats, and it demands a qualitative net assessment that fully accounts for the strength oflocal allies. Such an approach would lead us to abandon another centerpiece of the BUR's capabilities-based approach to planning: the standardized MRC force package or "building bloc." This package admitslittle variation: 10 fighter wings, 100 bombers, 4-5 divisions, 4-5 Marine Corps brigades, and 4-5 carrierbattle groups. However, given differences in terrain and environment, allied and adversarial strength, andlikely style of war for the Korean and Gulf scenarios, the same package cannot be suitable for both --unless it involves substantial redundancy. The required degree of redundancy would grow with the rangeof contingencies that the package is meant to cover. This becomes a real problem of economy as soon aswe consider fielding more than one such package.

K. Must We Accelerate the Pace of Regional Interventions?

None of America's likely regional adversaries possess a military capability ten percent as great as that ofthe former Warsaw Pact. Even less impressive is the durability of these nations and their armed forces inwar. This fundamental fact is lost in the BUR. As a result the BUR exaggerates the operational challengesfacing US armed forces. In this, the Bottom Up Review continues a trend evident in earlier planningdocuments and studies, including the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the 1991 MobilityRequirements Study, Rand's New Calculus, and a 1992 Rand study on the future of the Reserves, Assessingthe Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces. All of these documents and studies share theview that the challenges of the post-Soviet era require the United States to significantly reduce the timeinterval between initial deployment and the beginning of decisive counter-offensive operations⁴

The 1992 DPG posits the goal of prosecuting a Southwest Asia war in 100 days -- from deploymentdecision to victory. In the DPG a war on the Korean peninsula requires five months; overlapping wars onthe Korean and Arabian peninsulas require eight. Similar guidance surfaces in the Mobility RequirementsStudy and the Rand study on the Reserves. The first of these studies measures strategic lift capabilityagainst a purported requirement to deploy 4 2/3 Army divisions anywhere in the world within eight weeks. (In Operation Desert Storm the Army needed 12 weeks to deploy a force this size.) Because deploymentplanning studies have not assumed that large-scale deployments would be restricted to only select "coreareas," they must limit their reliance on the options of land-based prepositioning and forward unitdeployment, and they cannot assume the availability of well-developed theater military infrastructures. This, of course, boosts lift requirements.

The 1992 Rand study assesses US Reserve armed forces against an assumed requirement to deploy toSouthwest Asia a very large, offense-capable ground force as soon as available lift permits. In this case,US regional command staffs explicitly advised Rand that deployment time lines should not be relaxed toallow reserve participation. Given such guidance it is not surprising that these studies conclude,respectively, that the US must substantially upgrade its strategic lift capability and that the future role ofUS reserve combat units is quite limited. (The "synergy" of these conclusions is potentially significant: ifthe utility of Reserves is decided by how fast we can deploy force packages, then increased lift capacityimplies a smaller role for Reserve combat units.)

These studies and guidance documents project a vision of future regional war fighting that is very differentfrom the reality of Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Whereas ODS had distinct defensive and offensivephases with the defensive phase lasting months, future interventions will seek to compress these phases. Most important, the documents treat the capacity for accelerated regional war fighting as a baseline USmilitary requirement. In this view, it is luck alone that explains Iraq's failure to extend its originaloffensive deep into Saudi territory. Moreover, this view precludes or belittles the possibility of reliabledefensive operations: instead, defense demands the capacity for large-scale counter-offensive operations.

L. The Persistence of "Central Front Logic"

The BUR, in common with the post-1990 planning studies and documents of the Bush administration,transposes a European central front logic onto regional contingencies, suggesting that short delays indeployment or reliance on defensive operations risk catastrophe. Ultimately, this view discountsAmerica's freedom of action in the post-Soviet era and understates its profound strategic advantage overregional powers such as Iraq. The key steps in this error is to exaggerate the wherewithal of regional foesand understate the options available to American commanders.

In the conflict simulations reported in Rand's New Calculus study, for instance, Iraq invades Kuwait andSaudi Arabia with a force approximately twice as large as the one that overran Kuwait in early-August1990. Although Iraq has demonstrated in past wars a capacity to flood areas over time with vast numbersof troops and equipment, it has not been able to sustain very large-scale and deep blitz-style operations,such as those envisioned in the Rand study, even when facing peer powers. On the more limited scalerepresented by the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 1988 offensive to reclaim the Faw peninsulafrom Iran, force ratio advantages of 10:1 or better were key to Iraqi success.

The Iraqi attack on Al-Khafji illustrates the real vulnerability of Iraqi-style armed forces when conductingoffensive operations against Western forces. Attempted early in the war (in fact, before the involved Iraqiground units had suffered intense or prolonged air strikes), the Iraqi attack proved disastrous. Relativelylight Marine Corps units and somewhat heavier Gulf-state units, together with a fraction of the Coalition'savailable air power, demolished an Iraqi ground force several times their size. In this short battle coalitionair power was able to destroy more Iraqi equipment than in any comparable period of the air war becausethe offensive required the Iraqis to concentrate and expose their units.

The battle of Al-Khafji suggests that defensive operations emphasizing air power are more effectiveagainst nations like Iraq than the current debate admits. Significantly, the United States was able duringthe Persian Gulf crisis to deploy 300 tactical combat aircraft to the Gulf within one week. As noted earlier,the Gulf state air forces, with nearly 600 combat aircraft in their inventories, already enjoy qualitativesuperiority over Iraq and Iran. On the Korean peninsula, at least rough parity exists between North andSouth Korean air forces; in addition, the United States maintains more than 200 combat aircraft in thenortheast Asian theater during peacetime.

The application of central front logic to regional conflict scenarios violates all sense of proportion. Inyesterday's East-West confrontation along the European central front the WTO had the capacity to fullytest our strength and enjoyed the advantage of position. A Western loss or sacrifice of 140 miles wouldhave meant the loss of all Germany. The loss of Germany would have likely led to the fall of continentalEurope. In terms of America's strategic interests, such a loss would have been incalculable; the cost ofreversing it, unimaginable. We managed this challenge by maintaining a very dense forward defense,building a capacity for large-scale rapid reinforcement, and adopting a strategy that prescribed earlyoffensive action. The capacity to undertake large-scale counteroffensive operations early in the war wasviewed as key to our ability to "fight outnumbered and win." Although the management of the centralfront confrontation was extraordinarily expensive, the expense was widely felt to be commensurate withthe stakes.

There is no valid comparison between the cold war "central front" scenario and any of the regional conflictscenarios we face today. The overriding fact is that none of our regional adversaries can quickly or easilyachieve an irreversible fait accompli of real significance. Even if an aggressor in a Persian Gulf war, forinstance, is able to rapidly drive as far south as the United Arab Emirates (350 miles from the Kuwaitiborder), the United States and its allies could certainly roll up the invading force in no more than a year,and then proceed to extinguish the aggressor's military capabilities. It is this incontestable fact, and notAmerica's capacity to win within 100 days, that provides the foundation for deterrence in the region.

M. The BUR's Two War Strategy: Recipe for Mismatch

We have argued that the Bottom Up Review misconstrues both the strategic stakes and the operational risksinvolved in Major Regional Conflicts. The bill for these errors comes due when the BUR turns itsattention to the two-war scenario.

The BUR recognizes that the probability of the United States having to fight two short-warning MRCsnearly simultaneously is quite low. If, as we contend, there are really only two contingencies outsideEurope in which the United States should contemplate large-scale unilateral intervention, it is quiteunlikely that the two-war scenario would come to pass even given a thirty-year period. How muchinsurance against this eventuality is the United States willing to buy, year in and year out, over thirty ormore years? Former-Secretary Aspin initially sought an economical answer in the "Hold-Win-Hold"formula for fighting two overlapping wars. However, having failed to bring assessments of threat andoperational risk into a post-Soviet perspective, the Secretary could not win assent to the concept, whichwas roundly criticized as "too risky." As a result, the requirement for meeting the short-warning two-warscenario grew to approximate two MRC force packages. Efforts to resource this structure within budgetlimits have predictably given rise to concerns about maintaining readiness and completing the next cycleof modernization.

Contrary to the assertion of critics, however, win-hold-win was not a "one war" strategy. It was, instead, a"one victory at a time strategy." Despite its reputation, the concept is neither bold nor reckless. Instead, itis a sound and well-tested formula for doing more with less. Simply stated, the prescription for fighting atwo front war is to concentrate first against one foe, then against the other. This concept has foundexpression in Napoleonic and Prussian practice, in German strategy during the First and Second WorldWars, in allied strategy during the Second World War, and in Israeli practice during its multi-front wars. Itwould be an especially trustworthy strategy in the hands of a nation or alliance that enjoys a profoundstrategic advantage over its foes.

N. Toward a Sustainable Force

A realistic appraisal of new era threats and operational risks should permit a war fighting strategy evenmore efficient than "win-hold-win." The United States could seek to fight all MRCs in distinct anddeliberate defensive-offensive phases. In the case of war, the United States would initially deploy a"defensive shield" only. A second force increment -- the "decisive edge" -- would be held back as a hedgeagainst war in other theaters while Reserve combat units were readied. As the Reserves combat unitsmobilized, they would provide the flexibility for the United States to fully commit to a single war (withmostly active combat units in the field) or conduct a double war (relying on a mix of active and reservecombat units).

By focusing plans for large-scale intervention on core areas only and by adopting a "phased" approach toconventional war fighting, the United States should be able to reduce the BUR active-component forcestructure by 20 percent or slightly more. This is because our armed forces would not have to keep two fullMRC "building blocs" on active status. Instead, the active components would comprise sufficient combatunits for two defensive shields -- each equal to about 60 percent of the requirement for decisive offensiveoperations -- plus a smaller strategic reserve. (This total force should also be enough to fight and win 1 MRCs.) The focus on core areas will ensure that most forward deployed units count toward the MRCrequirement.

By permitting force structure reductions this proposed alternative would postpone and substantially reducemodernization needs, while releasing substantial funds to support both modernization and force readiness. There is, of course, a price: in the case of near-simultaneous wars on the Korean and Arabian peninsulas,we would have to depend more on Reserve combat units than currently planned, and we would have toaccept that the final achievement of all war objectives could take a year.

Defense Secretary Perry recently stated before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that heconsiders it "entirely implausible that we would ever fight two wars at once." By this he may mean thatlarge wars of critical importance to the United States are few in number and, hence, unlikely to coincide. Or he may mean that even if they do coincide the United States would probably not attempt to win themsimultaneously. At any rate, the Secretary asserted that the principal purpose of having enough forces tofight a second war was deterrence. Significantly, the requirements of deterrence are quite often less thanthose of winning; they are certainly less than the requirements of winning quickly.

O. Conclusion

The goal of reducing and restructuring America's armed forces while maintaining their readiness poses adaunting challenge for planners and policy makers. In this light, the greatest threat to the efficientreduction and restructuring of America's armed forces is the failure to establish goals that are sufficientlyattuned to new strategic realities to stand the test of time. The United States cannot afford to stumbletoward realism. Every year that we postpone difficult decisions means another year in which goals andplans will have to be revised. Such a cycle is inimical to a smooth and coherent transition to a post-coldwar security posture.

Notes

1. "DOD Bottom Up Review," Department of Defense Press Conference,Reuter's Transcript Report, 1 September 1993.

2. Structuring US Forces After the Cold War Costs and effects ofIncreased Reliance on the Reserves (Washington DC: CongressionalBudget Office, September 1992) pp 49-51; Michael O'Hanlon, The Artof War in the Age of Peace (Westport: Praeger, 1992) pp 66-70.

3. For a thorough critique see Rand's "New Calculus" and the Impasse ofUS Defense Restructuring, PDA Briefing Report 4 (Cambridge:Commonwealth Institute, August 1993.)

4. For critical evaluations see "Adapting US Armed Forces to the NewEra -- Selected Force Size and Modernization Issues," PDA BriefingMemo 6 (Commonwealth Institute, 1993); Rand's Mew Calculus and theImpasse of US Defense Restructuring (Commonwealth, 1993); andWilliam Kaufmann, Assessing the Base Force -- How Much Is Too Much? (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1992.)

Citation: Carl Conetta, Mismatch: The Bottom Up Review, Project on Defense Alternatives. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, 10 March 1994. Written Testimony for the Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives.
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