

Joint US-Soviet Seminar on Conventional Arms Reduction in Europe

During the week 12-17 September 1988 an extraordinary series of meetings between US and Soviet arms control experts and policymakers took place in Moscow. The talks covered the upcoming negotiations on conventional forces in Europe as well as new developments in security thinking, East and West. The centerpiece of the week was a seminar jointly sponsored by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS). Also participating were members of the American Committee on US-Soviet Relations. (See box on page 4) The US participants met separately with senior civilian and military officials of the USSR Foreign Ministry and the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and with senior researchers of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies. (See boxes on pages 6 and 11)

The following report summarizes the exchange at the seminar on problems and prospects for conventional force reductions in Europe.

The East-West military confrontation in Europe is politically obsolete and should be built down." With these words, the former chief US negotiator at the Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reduction (M(B)FR) talks, Jonathan Dean, set the tone for the seminar. Similarly, Soviet participants maintained that NATO and the WTO must strive to "dismantle the offensive core" of their respective military forces. Calling for a nontraditional approach to conventional force reductions, the Soviet seminar co-chair, IMEMO deputy director Oleg Bykov, declared that the current situation is favorable for a breakthrough.

Participants on both sides agreed that the upcoming conventional stability talks (CST) should aim to increase security and stability in Europe, as well as permit cuts in the military spending of both sides. Most individuals at the seminar thought that, in working toward these goals, the talks should produce: (1) commonly-agreed data on the European conventional balance, (2) mutually acceptable procedures for verifying conventional reductions, (3) reductions to equal lower levels of offensive weapons, and (4) some overall further reductions in the forces of East and West. There was less agreement, however, on how quickly the two alliances should try to make deep cuts in conventional forces. Generally, more Soviets than Americans saw rapid progress as possible and necessary.

Western Concerns

Several US participants noted that many people in the West are not enthusiastic about the forthcoming talks, for various reasons: First, further denuclearization is unlikely until the NATO-WTO ground-force balance—perceived in the West as favoring the WTO—substantially improves. Further, some Western strategists insist that, even if the balance improved, NATO's

current ground forces should not be reduced because, given the length of the borders they must defend, their size is optimal. Significant NATO reductions, they argue, might endanger a key element of the West's strategy—forward defense. Even decidedly asymmetrical cuts favoring the West would not eliminate the need to defend the inter-German border against concentration and breakthrough by WTO troops.

Given these reservations, NATO leaders want to narrow the scope of the new talks. At this stage, they are unwilling to consider substantial NATO reductions in ground or air forces. To create political momentum for reductions, the US delegation members emphasized, negotiators will need to focus on confidence-building initiatives, such as a pullback of some forces stationed in central Europe.

PRESENTATION OF REDUCTION PROPOSALS

The seminar examined in detail two proposals for reducing conventional forces in Europe—one presented by Ambassador Dean, the other by senior IMEMO scholar Nikolai Kishilov. They also discussed a proposal by Randall Forsberg concerning the kind of data needed to negotiate and verify a significant cut in conventional forces.

Dean's Proposal

The objective of Dean's proposal is a 50 percent reduction over ten years in military personnel and offensive weapon systems deployed in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) region. Weapons in six categories would be reduced: tanks, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, armed helicopters, both ground-attack and fighter aircraft, and tactical surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).

Continued on next page.



Soviet and US analysts confer at IMEMO-IDDS seminar.

Reductions in personnel would occur in later phases of this process. (For a detailed presentation of Dean's proposal see *DDA* 1:5, July/August 1988.)

Principal Elements of Dean's Proposal

- At the outset of the negotiations the two sides should furnish detailed data—including locations—covering their air- and ground-unit holdings down to battalion level.
- Early in the process the two sides should establish a Restricted Military Area (RMA) in central Europe. All of the offense-capable weapon systems mentioned above would be excluded from the RMA. Given the unequal operational depth on the two sides, the area should extend 50 km to the west and 100 km to the east of the inter-German border.
- The first phase of reductions should affect all active-duty units in a "central region" including the FRG, France, the Benelux countries, and Denmark in the West, and the GDR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR western military districts in the East. In addition, a ceiling should be imposed on the number and holdings of reserve units in this area and farther back in the ATTU region.
- The reduction process should begin in the central region with cuts in each weapon category to a level 10 percent below the current level of the side with fewer weapons. Additional cuts of 10 percent should be made every two years. Once the process is underway in the central region, a schedule of similar cuts should follow in the broader Atlantic-to-the-Urals area.
- Reductions should be by units of at least battalion size. Reduced equipment should be destroyed or placed in secured storage. Alternatively, it could replace older equipment held by reserves. Personnel from reduced units should join the remaining active units or reserve units. However, a ceiling should be imposed on each side's total of active and of reserve units.

IDDS-IMEMO JOINT SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS

US Delegation Members:

Randall Forsberg, executive director, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies; board member, Arms Control Association; head of delegation. Ms Forsberg was a staff member of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute from 1968 to 1974.

Ambassador Jonathan Dean (Ret), arms control adviser, Union of Concerned Scientists. Ambassador Dean served as the deputy head of the US delegation to the M(B)FR talks in 1973-1978, and as head of the delegation in 1978-81.

Frank von Hippel, professor of public and international affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University; board member, International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity. Prof von Hippel also chairs the research arm of the Federation of American Scientists.

William Miller, president, American Committee on US-Soviet Relations; president, US branch of the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity. Mr Miller has served as staff director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and for the Senate Oversight Committee on Intelligence.

Ambassador Stanley Resor (Ret), partner, Debevoise and Plimpton; board member, Arms Control Association. Ambassador Resor served as US Secretary of the Army in 1965-74, and as head of the US delegation to the M(B)FR talks in 1973-78.

Edward Warner III, Senior Defense Analyst, RAND Corporation. Mr Warner served in 1976-78 as assistant air attache at the US Embassy in Moscow, and in 1978-82 as adviser on strategic weapons and arms control to the US Air Force Chief of Staff.

Also participating in the US delegation were IDDS staff members Alan Bloomgarden, Carl Conetta, and Robert Leavitt.

Soviet Delegation Members:

Oleg Bykov, deputy director, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO); co-leader of Soviet delegation.

Alexei Arbatov, head of Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO; co-leader of Soviet delegation.

Oleg Amirov, senior research fellow, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Nadezhda Arbatova, senior researcher, Department of West European Studies, IMEMO.

Yuri Fedorov, head of Group on International Security, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Alexander Kalyadin, head of Section on General Disarmament Problems, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Sergei Karaganov, head of department, Institute of Europe.

Nikolai Kishilov, head of Section on Conventional Arms, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Alexander Kislov, deputy director, IMEMO.

Alexander Kokeev, senior research fellow, Department of West European Studies, IMEMO.

Gennady Kolosov, senior research fellow, Department of West European Studies, IMEMO.

Alexander Kononov, head of Section on General Purpose Forces, Department of Military-political Affairs, Institute of USA and Canada Studies.

Vasily Krivokhizha, senior research fellow, Department on Military-political Affairs, Institute of USA and Canada Studies.

Vladimir Kulagin, deputy director, Research Coordination Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Major General Vadim Makarevsky (Ret), senior research fellow, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Valery Mazing, senior research fellow, Department of Military-Political Affairs, Institute of USA and Canada Studies.

Alexander Saveliev, head of Group on Assessment and Forecasting, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Yuri Streltsov, senior research fellow, Department of Disarmament Problems, IMEMO.

Vladimir Yerofeev, senior research fellow, Institute of Europe.

Also participating in the Soviet delegation were IMEMO researchers Vladimir Frangoulov, Igor Kobozev, and Yuri Usachev.

Special Problems: Surface-to-Surface Missiles and Aircraft

- Reductions of tactical surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) should be negotiated in separate US-USSR talks. The goal should be a ceiling for each side of 300 SSMs with a range under 50 km. Both sides should be free to arm these missiles with any mix they choose of nuclear and conventional warheads. Broader East-West talks on tactical nuclear reductions could also be initiated.
- The CST negotiations should cover all aircraft assigned to the central front—including Soviet interceptors and some US-based aircraft. To compensate NATO for the difficulty of transatlantic reinforcement and for the WTO's large air defense force, some US aircraft assigned to NATO should be exempt from reductions.

Verification Regime and Confidence-building Measures

- In addition to "national technical means" of verification, major emphasis should be placed on direct inspection as well as over-flights of military units, repair and production sites, and designated storage areas. The latter should be constantly monitored by means of on-site sensors.
- An annual inspection quota should be negotiated. In the first phase, 400-500 inspections per alliance per year should be sufficient.
- The two sides should furnish frequently updated data on the numbers, weapon holdings, and location of controlled units.
- The two sides should negotiate additional confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that place permanent observers at reduction-zone exit and entry points, ports, border crossings, traffic chokepoints, division headquarters, and airfields.

The IMEMO Proposal

Dr Nikolai Kishilov, head of the conventional arms section of the IMEMO Disarmament Department, discussed the proposal published in IMEMO's 1987 *Disarmament and Security Yearbook*. Kishilov said the proposal, although unofficial, illustrates the kind of agreement required to lessen the dangers of surprise attack, eliminate asymmetries in the two sides' offensive forces, and achieve meaningful bilateral reductions. (For official NATO and WTO positions, see box on page 8.)

Focus, Scope, and Means of Reduction

Like Dean, Kishilov stressed that the negotiations should focus on reducing personnel, units, and offense-oriented weaponry—including tanks, artillery, tactical missiles, and land-based strike-aircraft. Unlike Dean, however, Kishilov also suggested reductions in some naval strike aircraft. Reductions should cover active-duty divisional and nondivisional units—those comparable in readiness to Soviet category 1 and 2 units. The equipment withdrawn should be destroyed, reassigned for civilian use (if possible), or placed in secured, monitored storage facilities.

The IMEMO proposal suggests cutting personnel early in the reduction process where Dean proposed waiting until a later stage.

Reduction and Disengagement Zones

In the IMEMO concept, the Atlantic-to-the-Urals reduction area is subdivided into three concentric zones subject to weapon withdrawal schedules that could either succeed one another or



Ambassador Stanley Resor (Ret) presenting a proposal. Ambassador Jonathan Dean (Ret) and RAND analyst Edward Warner look on.

overlap. The first zone includes the FRG, the Benelux countries, and Denmark in the West, and the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary in the East. Measures implemented in this zone should include:

- Creation of a "disengagement zone" between NATO and WTO forces, extending 100 km on both sides of the inter-German border. The more maneuverable and offense-capable weapons of each side—including armed helicopters, tactical attack-aircraft, and tactical missiles—should be withdrawn from this zone. Tactical nuclear weapons should be excluded from a somewhat wider zone of 150 km on each side.
- Reduction in the number of combat-ready units within the first zone to a level 40 percent below the current number on the side with fewer units, and reduction of offensive arms and equipment (tanks, artillery, mortars, and multiple-launch rocket systems) to a level 50 percent below the current level of the side with fewer.

Along with the first-zone areas, the second zone should incorporate the United Kingdom and France, as well as the six NATO-designated reinforcement divisions based in the United States. To the East, the second zone should add to the first the USSR's Baltic, Byelorussian, and Carpathian border districts. The measures implemented in this larger second zone should include:

- Reduction in the number of combat-ready units by 25 percent to equal lower levels;
- Reduction of offensive arms and equipment by 30 percent to equal lower levels.

The third zone should incorporate all the remaining European NATO countries and parts of the United States. To the east, it should include Romania, Bulgaria, and the remaining eight European military districts in the USSR west of the Urals. In addition, the measures implemented in this zone should apply to the US marines deployed in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The measures implemented in the third zone should include:

- Reduction by 10 percent to equal lower levels in the number of combat-ready units;
- Reduction by 15 percent to equal lower levels of offensive arms and equipment, including both land- and sea-based strike

Continued on next page.

aircraft (fighters, ground-attack planes, interceptors, and non-strategic bombers).

Of the two proposals, IMEMO's calls for less ambitious cuts, except in its first zone (identical to Dean's "central region" minus France and the Western military districts of the USSR). However, where Dean suggests implementing his 50 percent cuts in phases stretched over a decade, and views the creation of a disengagement zone as a distinct step preceding reductions, the IMEMO proposal calls for establishing a disengagement zone simultaneously with reductions and suggests implementing its "more modest" cuts in a single phase.

The IMEMO proposal also differs from Dean's in proposing to count in the reduction process some US-based army personnel and Atlantic- and Mediterranean-based marine units. In addition, IMEMO suggests reducing holdings of naval tactical aircraft (an area of Western strength), but overlooks interceptors (an area of Soviet strength). The IMEMO proposal does not compensate NATO for the difficulty of transferring US-based aircraft across the Atlantic, nor does it take into account the WTO's superiority in air defense.

Both proposals call for an offensive-weapon withdrawal zone, but Dean wants an asymmetrical one where IMEMO wants a

symmetrical one. The IMEMO proposal also calls for a nuclear weapon free zone, which Dean avoids.

Data Requirements

Kishilov agreed with Dean on the importance of the two sides exchanging data on conventional forces before the talks begin. Kishilov suggested that this data contain the number of active and reserve divisions in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area, and specify their holdings in tanks, artillery, large mortars (over 100 mm), infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and attack aircraft. For the first reduction zone, details should be furnished on the number, location, and arms holdings of units down to battalion size.

DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSALS

On Nuclear and Naval Forces

Although generally enthusiastic about Dean's proposal, several Soviets said that it did not adequately cover tactical nuclear weapons. These, they said, are the single most dangerous offensive element in Europe. One Soviet analyst argued, "There cannot be nonprovocative defense unless there is also denuclearization."

Several US participants reiterated that NATO is unlikely to

FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH MILITARY ADVISERS TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Some participants in the IDDS-IMEMO joint seminar met later in the week with high-ranking military advisers to the Central Committee of the Communist Party to assess prospects for the upcoming negotiations on European conventional forces. The following are highlights of the meeting:

■ The Soviet participants agreed with the Americans that data should be exchanged before beginning the negotiations; and, they concurred that information on the location and weapon holdings of units is necessary for verification purposes. Could data be exchanged on forces other than those to be reduced or before the two sides reach agreement on what forces to reduce? According to the Soviet officers, these options are negotiable.

■ The Soviets were open to considering a variety of intrusive verification measures—including zonal overflights and the stationing of permanent observers at critical locations.

■ The Soviets stressed the need for a comprehensive approach to arms reductions and constraints. They pointed out that the Soviet Union had agreed to set aside the problem of controlling naval forces during the first round of CSBM talks at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). But now, they said, the problem must be addressed in some forum. As for aircraft, they argued that all ground-attack planes should be included in the conventional force talks. The Soviets assured the US delegation that on the Soviet side this would mean including all bombers except those having a strategic role.

■ Even the initial step in the reduction process should entail significant cuts on both sides, the Soviets emphasized. Neither the establishment of a disengagement zone nor the resolution of military asymmetries between the two sides should be seen

as a distinct step preceding mutual reductions.

One Soviet official proposed reductions in three steps: (1) eliminating asymmetries and making some substantial bilateral cuts; (2) reducing the remaining forces bilaterally down to about 50 percent of current levels; (3) lowering force levels further to a point where little or no offensive capability would remain on either side. "This," he declared, "is the way to security in Europe."

The Soviets were reluctant to incorporate "sub-phases" within the steps. A member of the US delegation mentioned the Soviet offer to cut 20,000 tanks if the West cut 1400 strike aircraft. Would the Soviets carry out this trade-off in a single step? "Sure, why not," one Soviet replied.

■ To questions from Americans about controlling reserve forces, one adviser responded that the possibility of ceilings or reductions of reserves was open. At any rate, the Soviets would furnish information on the size and weapon holdings of their reserves.

■ The US delegation suggested that the Soviet Union could help build political momentum for the talks by taking some unilateral steps prior to the talks. Among those mentioned were (1) early presentation of data on Soviet forces; (2) permission for the Western side to conduct surveillance flights over the WTO border region; (3) Modest withdrawals from the "zone of contact" between the two alliances. To this suggestion one Soviet replied that the WTO had made several unilateral initiatives in the past, but that the West had failed to reciprocate. Both sides needed to face the problem of building and maintaining political momentum, he insisted. Nevertheless, "These steps must be considered."

agree to further denuclearization at this time, but pointed out that Dean's proposal addresses Soviet concerns in several ways. First, it calls for reductions in dual-capable aircraft. Second, it proposes to limit nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles in separate talks.

Several Soviet attendees raised the question of controlling naval arms, especially sea-launched cruise-missiles, which are nuclear-capable and have ground-attack missions. Seminar participants generally agreed that in the short-term, the best forum for negotiating constraints on naval forces would be the second Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), due to begin in early 1989 in parallel with the CST talks. The Soviets emphasized the importance of the two alliances seriously examining in some forum the whole range of issues raised by naval forces.

On Aircraft

The Soviets underscored the importance of reducing tactical attack aircraft, arguing that the West has a notable advantage in that area. Soviet officials have estimated that NATO's numerical superiority in "strike aircraft" totals 1400 planes. (See "The Soviet Proposal for European Security" by Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, in the September 1988 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.) Some seminar participants argued that *all* aircraft slated for use in Europe, including those based in the United States, should be "controlled." However, this need not mean reducing US-based aircraft. "Control" could simply entail counting relevant US-based planes in the NATO total that would be used in negotiating reductions to take place in the European theater.

Several US delegation members questioned the Soviet estimate of a sizable NATO advantage in tactical aircraft. They contended that if Soviet interceptors are counted, the NATO numerical advantage disappears. Although they conceded that NATO has an edge in technology, they stressed that the WTO has an offsetting edge in ground-based air defense and a much larger force of interceptor aircraft.

Dean reminded the participants of the possible compromise contained in his proposal: the talks should cover *all* tactical aircraft slated for use in a European war, including those based in the United States and those designated "interceptors" on the WTO side. The balance of air power should then be adjusted to correct for the WTO's superior air defenses and the difficulty of reinforcing NATO with US-based planes.

The Soviet analysts disagreed among themselves about the value of reducing interceptors. Some insisted that such aircraft serve the defense and should not be reduced. Others pointed out that interceptors can play a supporting role in an offensive air strike or can even be reconfigured for a limited ground attack role.

There were also disagreements about reductions in combat helicopters. Some participants said they are important antitank assets and should not be subject to major cuts. Those who advocated reductions in helicopters differed with one another. Should limits and reductions apply only to *armed* helicopters as initially suggested in the Western nonoffensive defense literature, or should all *armored* helicopters also be subject to cuts—even if unarmed and used for transport rather than ground attack? Several analysts noted that unarmed, armored helicopters can easily be modified for ground-attack missions by adding weapons.

Throughout the dialogue about air and naval forces, the US

delegation conveyed the West's current reluctance to negotiate cuts in those areas. But both Dean and Forsberg concurred with the Soviets that power projection and deep strike forces are destabilizing and should eventually be eliminated worldwide.



Soviet analysts listen to US response to IMEMO proposal.

Reserves and Rapid Reinforcement

Forsberg pointed out that many people in the West fear that, should an East-West conventional war occur, the WTO might be able to outmobilize NATO during the critical first 50 days. To remove this potential advantage, she noted, NATO planners will undoubtedly want to limit the WTO's reserve forces.

In contrast, several Soviet analysts argued that mobilization capability beyond the first few weeks is not an issue, since neither side would initiate a war requiring more than a few weeks to win. They saw preemption and surprise-attack capabilities as posing much more serious threats to stability. The "short war" assumption was also evident in reports of the computerized war-modeling that IMEMO undertakes to test stability, in which researchers confine their modeling to the first two weeks of war.

Nevertheless, participants from both sides assessed measures that would alleviate Western fears about long-term mobilization. They agreed that ceilings could be placed on the number and strength of reserve units, that some reserve equipment could put into secured storage, and that in the longer term, cuts in reserve units might be negotiated.

Disposition of Withdrawn Equipment

Related to the issue of mobilization and reinforcement is the question of what happens to weaponry withdrawn from a reduction zone? If it is simply moved to an uncontrolled area in the rear, it could be rapidly reintroduced into the zone in a crisis. Although many participants believed the best solution would be to destroy such equipment, they also explored the two other main options: transporting withdrawn equipment back to the United States or behind the Urals, or partially dismantling it and placing it in secured storage.

Controlling Production

Some US delegation members expressed concern about the production of controlled weapons that would continue within the

Continued on next page.

reduction zones. Even if the new weapons were designated for use outside the zone or for permitted modernization within it, they could obviously be redirected at short notice. In other words, such facilities raise the possibility of a sudden "breakout" from the reduction regime.

Again, the seminar explored several measures that might lessen the problem. First, to ease the task of verifiably limiting arsenals within the zones, production numbers could be reported and new equipment stored and secured near the production sites. Second, to facilitate tracking new equipment as it is transferred from production sites, both sides could be required to specify the eventual destination of each major system.

A Restricted Military Area (RMA)

Seminar participants concurred that establishing the Restricted Military Area proposed by Dean would do much to reduce risk and build confidence. One Soviet analyst contended that such a zone would help create the political conditions needed to negotiate substantial reductions.

However, another Soviet noted that there is a trade-off between the political feasibility of disengagement zones and their military significance. Although a zone extending 150 km to the east of the central front might be meaningful militarily, creating it would be politically difficult because it implies a virtually complete Soviet withdrawal from the GDR. At any rate, establishing such a zone would afford defenders only 24 additional hours of warning in the event of an attack.

For these reasons many participants thought that disengagement zones should be viewed more as a means to increase trust and confidence than to reduce vulnerability to surprise attack. Further, some thought that to facilitate reaching agreement on an RMA, the width and measures to be implemented should be less ambitious than Dean's.

A Modified RMA

The possibility of a "tank thin-out zone" in central Europe was advanced by one Soviet participant, who felt it might be easier to negotiate than a zone from which all offensive arms are excluded. He pointed out that a thin-out zone could achieve defensive restructuring if armored and mechanized infantry divisions in the zone were stripped of several tank battalions, and if bridging equipment and ammunition, fuel, and spare part supplies were withdrawn.

One US delegation member offered another possibility: all offensive arms in the zone could be reduced by 50 percent and the excluded weapons moved a great distance from the zone. He argued that such measures would strongly undercut both the capability for surprise attack and for rapid reinforcement. At the same time, he argued, they might be more feasible politically than Dean's RMA because they would involve less ambitious withdrawals.

Soviet participants were not immediately prepared to accept the idea of a restricted military area extending farther to the East than to the West. When Americans stressed that such an asymmetry was necessary to allay NATO's anxiety about its lack of operational depth, Soviet analysts responded that the West had planned its deployments to compensate for this problem—for instance, by assigning ground missions to naval aircraft. In their view, the issue of operational depth could only be understood and

Continued on next page.

LIKELY OPENING PROPOSALS AT THE UPCOMING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS

Based on recent statements and documents, following is a summary of what each side is likely to propose.

NATO:

■ Highly asymmetric cuts in troops and in weapons essential for surprise attack: main-battle tanks (MBTs), 100 mm and larger artillery, armored infantry vehicles, and bridging equipment. Reduction targets should be set for both the central region and Europe as a whole. According to a suggestive draft proposal developed by the FRG defense ministry, first-phase reduction targets in the central region should be common NATO and WTO levels 5% below the current NATO levels in each category. Comparable cuts in military personnel should be made.

Based on NATO estimates, the WTO would need to remove 25,000 MBTs, 22,000 artillery pieces, 11,000 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 220,000 troops; while NATO would remove 800 MBTs, 400 artillery pieces, 400 APCs, and 9,000 troops. Thus, most critically, NATO wants each side's European tank force to number no more than 20,000 and for the Soviets' share of the WTO force not to exceed 12,000.

■ Concentration of the initial cuts in "stationed forces"—those not indigenous to the country in which they are stationed.

■ Ceilings on the forces of individual nations so that none would have more than (1) 30 percent of the European total in any offensive weapon category, (2) 30 percent of any central region total, or (3) 10-30 percent of any total held by stationed forces in the central region.

■ Exemption of combat aircraft from reduction, at least until a second phase, and of naval forces indefinitely.

WTO:

■ In the first phase, bilateral reductions designed to correct asymmetries, and in later phases, to remove the "offensive core" of both sides' forces. One possible initial reduction would eliminate 20,000 Warsaw Pact MBTs and 1,400 NATO tactical aircraft. A target ceiling for reduction should be set for each class of offensive weapons—a percentage of the lower of the two current levels in the class—and for each of two or three concentric zones. The earliest and most radical cuts should be made in the inner zone containing the central front. The weapon cuts should be followed by troop cuts of 100,000 to 150,000 over one to two years and then of about 25 percent of the remaining forces over the next five to seven years.

■ Inclusion particularly of tactical aircraft, but of other dual-capable weapons as well, in first-phase reductions.

settled by examining all the forces contributing to the conventional balance in Europe—including air and naval units.

Data Needs

The US and Soviet delegations agreed fully on the need for an early exchange of data—preferably before the talks begin—to avoid the M(B)FR experience of becoming bogged down in data disputes. Seminar participants felt that only with access to good data provided “up front” will negotiators be able to identify asymmetries and put a high priority on cutting those force that contribute most to the danger of surprise attack.

But can the two sides furnish data before agreeing on the categories of weapons to be reduced? If they supply preliminary data on all potentially relevant units and weapons, that might imply that all forces are subject to reductions—a position currently unacceptable to both sides. To sidestep this dilemma, US participant Stanley Resor suggested that each side “nominate” forces and weapon systems as candidates for reduction, and then supply data on all items nominated by either side. Both sides would, however, accept that exchanging data on a category does not constitute an agreement to negotiate reductions in it.

There was a lively discussion and some disagreement on the types of data to be exchanged. Each side should set a high standard, Randall Forsberg suggested, by furnishing detailed information on its own forces. She proposed that, to facilitate negotiating reductions (not just withdrawals from the front), the data include numbers of weapons specified by model and role. Negotiators will also need to know whether equipment is in active or reserve units, or in spare storage. Finally, Forsberg strongly argued that weapon totals should be provided both globally and by the country or Soviet military district of deployment. The data must meet these criteria, she said, if the two sides are to negotiate and verify “cuts and limits, withdrawals, limited demobilizations, ceilings, and major reductions.”

All present agreed that publishing data to Forsberg’s standards would greatly facilitate negotiating deep cuts; but analysts on both sides contended that the effort to compile detailed global data would face too many political obstacles and take too long. Some of the Americans were willing to accept less data on some reserve units, and forego data for global forces and data broken down by model in exchange for base-by-base totals within central Europe.

Forsberg responded that by omitting data on reserves and global force deployments, the two sides would limit the agenda of the talks to regional withdrawals. Real reductions in force levels, judged globally, would be unlikely. Further, since it would be impossible to control the growth of reserves, fears of longterm mobilization would remain or even increase. Others argued that the current focus should, nevertheless, be on short-notice and surprise attack capabilities; global cuts could come later.

The seminar discussion moved toward a possible solution to the dilemma: require varying levels of detail for active and reserve forces, for different zones, and at different stages of the reduction process. At first, highly localized information—including the location and holdings of units down to the battalion level but excluding specific weapon models—might be provided only for active-duty forces in the forward areas. As the reduction process proceeds, experience and confidence would increase, making it easier and more feasible to supply detailed data for more forces deployed in a broader area.

Verification

A surprising level of consensus emerged about the need for stringent, intrusive means of verifying withdrawals from the front. Most participants felt that the extensive verification measures outlined by Dean, although ambitious, would be workable. One Soviet participant pointed out that implementing Dean’s verification regime would give some military personnel a role to play after reductions release them from combat units. The Americans indicated that, in a reversal of traditional roles, some Western nations might be less willing than their Eastern counterparts to permit verification overflights and intrusive inspections.

Confidence- and Security-building Measures

Toward the end of the seminar, participants turned to the question of new confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that could complement the CST reductions. One Soviet analyst suggested that a future European CSBM regime should not only help diminish the risk of surprise attack and unintended conflict, but also facilitate the transition to defense-oriented force structures. Further, he said, it should constrain the full range of military activities including naval, air, and amphibious operations, as well as, preparations for ground warfare.

Dean observed that in the short-term the best confidence-building measures are a good data exchange and a good verification regime. He suggested establishing a jointly run center for verification that could also assist in crisis reduction activities and offer a forum in which to examine military doctrine.

Conclusion

Alexei Arbatov briefly summarized the major points of agreement that emerged during the seminar. First, he said, the two blocs should aim to reduce forces in Europe—personnel and offensive weaponry—to equal ceilings below either side’s current level. Second, to guarantee increased military stability, the reductions should be accompanied by some defensive restructuring. Third, accurate, detailed data are vital to the success of the talks. Fourth, the two sides need to reach a more precise and shared understanding of the offense-defense distinction. Fifth, negotiators should divide the Atlantic-to-the-Urals reduction area into sub-zones and develop measures appropriate to each. Finally, establishing a modest “restricted military area” or exclusionary zone might be an effective early confidence-building measure. □

THE GORBACHEV PLAN

On 7 December 1988 General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev announced these unilateral Soviet withdrawals in Europe (quoted from the *New York Times*, 9 December 1988):

- “Of the estimated 10,000 Soviet tanks in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, 5,000 would be withdrawn, along with 50,000 men.
- “In the European part of the Soviet Union, 5,000 tanks would be cut.
- “Of the total Soviet forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, 800 combat aircraft and 8,500 artillery systems would be cut.”

REPORT ON MOSCOW IGCC CONFERENCE, 2-8 OCTOBER 1988

Three weeks after the IDDS-IMEMO seminar a similar group of US and Soviet arms control specialists and policymakers engaged in a related dialogue. Co-sponsored by the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, the conference probed many of the same issues raised during the earlier seminar.

Western participants included former Ambassador Jonathan Dean; secretary general of the North Atlantic Assembly, Peter Corterier; IGCC associate director, Allen Greb; the former commander-in-chief of the US Army in Europe General Glenn Otis; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency representative John Gunderson; and University of Copenhagen professor, Anders Boserup. Among the Soviet participants were Lieutenant-General Victor Starodubov, aide to the International Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee; Ambassador-at-large OA Grinevsky; Vladimir Shustov and Vladimir Kulganin of the Foreign Ministry; Alexei Arbatov, head of IMEMO's Department of Disarmament and International Security; and Sergei Karaganov, department head at the Institute of European Studies.

Highlights

■ Several Soviets asserted that current Soviet policy assumes strong US political, economic, and military engagement in Europe—though at a reduced force level—and that this is preferable to US isolationism.

■ Leading Soviets proposed that armaments in Europe be reduced by 50 percent and they insisted that bilateral cuts be made right from the start. The West must make real cuts to justify asymmetrical reductions by the WTO, they argued. A good first step would be to reduce both the personnel and arms of the five NATO divisions in the FRG and the 15 WTO divisions in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

■ Several Soviets proposed that the Atlantic-to-Urals area be divided into northern, central, and southern reduction zones. They expressed little interest in a single, undifferentiated reduction zone.

■ A number of Soviets suggested that initial reductions could be made in a zone extending 150 km on *each* side of the frontline, with monitoring by low-flying aircraft. However, there were conflicting Soviet responses to Dean's suggestion that, to allow for the lack of operational depth in the West, the zone should extend 50 km to the NATO side and 100-150 km to the WTO side. One Soviet reiterated that the width of the zone must be equal on both sides, but another believed the Soviet general staff might accept unequal widths.

■ Members of both the Western and Soviet groups wanted verification dealt with from the outset of the new conventional force negotiations—not at the end.

■ Pointing to the historical role of tactical aircraft in Blitzkrieg assaults, the Soviets insisted that tactical air as well as ground forces be reduced. One leading Soviet called for cuts in ground-attack aircraft—whether designated for use against line-of-battle or rear-area targets—and in planes with both ground-attack and fighter capability. However, he argued that reconnaissance, transport, and strictly counter-air aircraft (interceptors) should be excluded from the talks. Reduced aircraft should be destroyed or placed in secure storage.

■ Some Soviets also wanted a ban on tactical surface-to-surface missiles and tactical missile defenses.

■ The Soviets underscored the need to control naval and air activities through new CSBMs to be negotiated in the second CDE.

■ Some Soviet support was expressed for two other CSBMs: establishing an East-West risk-reduction center in Europe, and withdrawing major ammunition and other stocks from the central front.