Defense Sufficiency and Cooperation:
A US Military Posture for the post-Cold War Era
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Project on Defense
Alternatives
Briefing Report 9
Carl Conetta and Charles Knight
12 March 1998
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This paper presents a comprehensive and strategically
coherent US military force posture option for a
fifteen-year period beginning in 1998. It begins with a
brief review of those strategic trends and security
issues of special concern to the United States and a
summary of key US interests and security policy
objectives. This is followed by a description of a
military strategy for the coming period and guidelines
for restructuring US armed forces. Finally the force
structure is detailed with service and component end
strengths, major units, major equipment holdings, and
total military budgets for the years 1998 through 2012.
This study was commissioned by the Council on Foreign Relations
in the summer of 1997 for its project, Defense
Policy Review: Future Visions for US Defense Policy.
It served as the "expert background material" for one of
four options. The Council project set parameters for the
options that included the assumption that the US will
continue to have "a range of interests around the globe,
will remain committed to alliances that further the
protection of these interests, and will be willing to
station and use US military forces overseas." According
to the Council's guidelines the four options were
intended to "highlight different (realistic) ways to get
to the same basic endpoint."
Although the Council's parameters were conservative in
relation to the continuity of key aspects of US security
strategy, we at PDA felt that within these constraints
there is ample room for further reductions in US
military forces. The Council force structuring exercise
offered an excellent opportunity to make this point. It
should be noted that PDA's process was to move logically
from strategy to force structure, and finally to budget.
In other words, we did not know the budget outcome until
we calculated it from the details of the force structure
which in turn was derived from notions of force
employment in the strategic scheme.
Readers should not consider what follows as PDA's
preferred force structure, but rather as our
presentation of a feasible option which is easily
distinguishable from current DoD plans. What appears
here in the specifics is not necessarily what we would
advocate either as an endpoint or as a transition. For
instance, PDA would probably advocate significant
investments in the apparatus of collective international
security such as enhanced peace and stability operations
capacity in the United Nations (see PDA's Vital Force). Such
investments begun now would likely reduce the
requirements for US national military forces later,
allowing for even smaller forces and budgets in the
second decade of the next century. However, we might
advocate that US forces be slightly larger in the next
decade than those presented in this paper in order to
reduce risk while international capacity is built and
other aspects of cooperative security are
institutionalized. This sort of development was outside
the scope of the Council exercise.
Special thanks to Dr. Randall Forsberg and the staff of
the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies
(IDDS), Cambridge, MA, USA for providing essential time
series data and for analytical support used in the
section on aircraft modernization and for the derivation
of aircraft budget projections. The data is published in
the IDDS Almanac: World Combat Aircraft Holdings,
Production, and Trade.
1.1 Increased economic competition
and stratification
Globalization of the economy and "third wave" economic
development will continue unabated with two primary
effects relevant to national security: (i) increased
economic competition among nations and (ii) continuing
marginalization of first- and second-wave economies.
Particularly hard-hit will be command-style economies,
nations overly dependent on primary and extractive
industries, and nations deficient in transportation,
telecommunications, and scientific-technical
infrastructures. Advanced information technologies will
continue to spread, but in a distinctly uneven fashion.
1.2 Continuing post-Cold War recession
in the world military system
- Lacking big power subsidies and assistance, former
Cold War proxy states will be more at the mercy of
world economic trends than in the recent past; the
strategic power of these states will come to reflect
more closely their indigenous potential.
- The capacity of most underdeveloped states to import
expensive suites of armaments will continue to
decline. Likewise, with few exceptions, the capacity
of "third world" states to sustain indigenous
production of most types of major modern weapon
systems will decline.
- Defense investment will continue to recede even in
economically advanced nations. This will occur as a
consequence of (i) the lack of a paramount military
threat and (ii) the increased pressures of
international economic competition. Especially
affected will be the capacity of second-tier powers --
such as France and Germany -- to sustain full-service
arms industries and "cutting-edge" research and
development establishments.
Notably, the worldwide reduction in military investment
does not necessarily imply a reduction in the frequency
of conflicts or warfare deaths. Other dynamics,
discussed below, may actually prompt an increase in
violence, including interstate violence. However, in
conflicts not involving advanced states, the
overall "technical intensity" and pace of warfare will
decrease.
1.3 Military Technical Revolution
- Now in its third decade, the MTR may begin to have a
profound effect on how the armed forces of some
advanced technological states are organized -- that
is, the MTR may become a "revolution in military
affairs." The enabling factor will be the post-Cold
War drawdown in the size of military establishments
and budgets, which may motivate a quest for much more
efficient structures and methods.
- Access to the MTR/RMA, however, will be quite
selective. Economically underdeveloped nations will
lack the capacity to build, buy, integrate, support,
or effectively employ cutting-edge military systems in
operationally significant quantities. These
shortcomings are rooted in socio-economic conditions
that, in most cases, show no prospect for substantial
improvement during the next 15-20 years. Most of these
states are by necessity fixated on problems of
internal instability and old-fashioned cross-border
threats, rather than advanced military competition,
and their mass militaries serve a secondary (but
critical) function as a repository of surplus labor.
This complicates any simple substitution of quality
for quantity.
1.4 Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Asymmetric Warfare
Economically underdeveloped Western rivals may
increasingly turn to asymmetric forms of warfare --
terrorism, insurgency, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMDs). (WMDs may be used in a tactically offensive
manner or simply as a deterrent shield that enables the
use of other, low-intensity means.) Even nations that do
not contemplate running afoul of the West may put
greater emphasis on WMDs due to resource constraints.
These nations may also pursue other forms of force
substitution, trading off tactical flexibility in order
to increase their regional military leverage. For
instance, (i) sea mines may substitute for offensive
naval forces and (ii) ballistic or cruise missiles,
modestly enhanced to achieve greater accuracy and
reliability, may substitute partially for combat
aircraft. However, the nature of regional military
confrontations and the domestic functions of regional
militaries will preclude the wholesale adoption of
asymmetric means.
1.5 Global centrifugal forces
Several developments and trends will combine to subject
several regions of the world to severe centrifugal
pressures, which at their worst will manifest as
uncontrolled mass migration, the collapse of state
structures, and widespread communal violence. In some
cases, these developments will precipitate or involve
interstate conflict.
Contributing factors, which vary from region to region,
include the precipitous collapse of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, the deepening economic and political
marginalization of many nations, the sharp reduction in
the North-to-South flow of assistance and capital,
demographic and environmental crises, and the prevalence
of weak or unresponsive state structures.
Even within richer states, the rapid economic and
cultural change attendant on globalization and
technological revolution will generate centrifugal
pressures, manifest as various forms of extremism,
intolerance, and class antagonism.
1.6 An opportunity for greater
international cooperation; a risk of global
repolarization
On balance the world is less polarized politically and
ideologically today than at any time in living memory.
For the next decade and probably longer, the West will
have an opportunity to lead the world in expanding the
scope and depth of cooperative international endeavor.
This opportunity partly reflects the "un-bloc-ing" of
existing global institutions and partly reflects the
solitary triumph of Western values and
political-economic institutions.
However, the inclusive global and regional institutions
that exist today -- such as the UN and OSCE -- are
underdeveloped, under-resourced, and too often
ineffectual or inefficient. Only the G7/OECD states have
the resources and stability to undertake global activism
or underwrite the building of new global institutions
and regimes. But these states are reluctant to assume
the obligations of global policeman and guarantor. And,
although other nations often turn to the West for
leadership, they are also fearful that any exclusive
"leadership group" will fail to adhere to a consensual
code of conduct.
Thus the prospects for greater cooperation and Western
leadership are far from uncomplicated. Indeed, there is
a danger that the next 20 years could see the beginnings
of renewed global polarization, should some states
perceive that the post-Cold War system is exacerbating
inequalities and producing a global class order of
distinct "winner" and "loser" states. Should it seem
that the G7/OECD group is seeking a permanent hegemony,
states outside their orbit may coalesce into
counter-balancing blocs. These would initially
crystallize on a regional basis around existing fault
lines in the world system -- for instance, Islamic
versus non-Islamic states -- but could eventually
involve new alignments and even a loose global
coalition.
2.1 Economic issues
Present economic trends pose two challenges for the
United States that have important implications for our
long-term security.
- First, to secure its competitive economic advantage
the United States must invest more in its
transportation, communications, and technology
infrastructure, and it must boost the average skill
level of its workforce.
- Second, to ensure high-levels of political and
social stability, it must avoid increased economic
stratification and take steps to better address
domestic "quality of life" issues (such as crime, drug
use, health coverage, social security, and urban
decay).
A failure to meet these challenges will undermine
important sources of national strength, reducing the
nation's long-term strategic flexibility. There are
various, alternative ways to address these imperatives,
but all of them put a premium on how we use scarce
national resources. Moreover, the drive to reduce
government expenditures and taxes, which partly reflects
the economic concerns mentioned above, puts an
especially high premium on how federal resources are
used. Finally, the pending problems in the funding of
social security and Medicare will reduce federal budget
flexibility.
2.2 The potential re-emergence of a
peer military rival
Today the United States faces no peer military rival or
alliance. The probability that such a rival could emerge
before 2015 is very small. Given more than 20 years,
however, Russia possibly could reorder itself, recover
economically, reorient politically, and rebuild its
military. For China, 30-50 years would be needed to meet
all the prerequisites of global superpower status. Other
candidates for future peer rivalry include current
allies -- for instance, Japan or Germany. In either
case, however, a virtual revolution in domestic politics
and foreign policy would be required as well as a long
period of dedicated military expansion. In all cases,
the evolution of a new peer military rival would be
marked by a series of distinct milestones.
2.3 Major Regional Conflicts and the
threat posed by Rogue Giants
The next three decades could see the outbreak of several
major regional wars -- but not all the possible cases
would involve direct military threats to critical US
interests. In only a few cases would the United States
feel compelled to undertake a major intervention. These
would involve large-scale attacks on important regional
allies by what might be called "rogue military giants."
What distinguishes these giants are strategic goals
distinctly antagonistic to Western interests, patterns
of behavior that deviate widely from international
norms, and armed forces comprising the rough qualitative
equivalent of three or more US heavy divisions,
three or more US F-16 air wings, and 300,000 or more
people under arms. In the future as in the recent past,
the regions where such states pose a special problem for
the United States are Northeast and Southwest Asia.
- Since 1993 the invasion threat posed by the "rogue
giants" has diminished significantly, and it will
continue to recede. This positive development reflects
these states' loss of superpower patronage, their
relative economic weakness, the impact of Western-led
sanctions, and the improvement in the defense
capabilities of their intended victims.
- Circumstances will push rogue states toward greater
dependence on long-range and remote-action "area
weapons" as means of coercion and deterrence. These
systems include missiles, mines, and Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Rogue states may also attempt to employ
means of low-intensity warfare, such as terrorism and
insurgency, to destabilize US allies.
Russia as a Regional Power: Although unable to
reconstitute itself as a global military superpower in
less than 20 years, Russia could reconstitute itself as
European regional military "superpower" within a
shorter time span. Achieving this status would involve
fielding a military as capable as the next three
European powers combined. In any case, however, the
western and west-central European states will be in a
much better relative position than during the Cold War
-- both in terms of strategic geography and resource
base. Generally speaking, America's European allies and
friends are and will remain able to carry a
significantly greater share of their defense burden than
during the Cold War.
China as a Regional Power: In the next 15 years
China could significantly increase its level of military
expenditure. Its first priorities would be to relieve
the miserable living conditions of its uniformed
personnel and bring its armed forces' technology solidly
into the 1970s. Only a small portion of the Chinese
military might integrate 1980s military technology. The
other states of the region will retain the collective
capacity to counter-balance any Chinese buildup --
certainly in so far as Chinese power projection
capabilities are concerned. Taiwan, standing alone,
would have greater cause for concern. But a successful
invasion of Taiwan would remain beyond China's capacity,
and China is presently disinclined to seriously pursue
this course. In any case, for the foreseeable future,
modest American defensive support for Taiwan -- on the
scale of a few carrier battle groups, 4 wings of
ground-based aircraft, and some ground-based air defense
units -- would decisively swing the effective local
balance in Taiwan's favor. But a war over Taiwan is
not likely and the Taiwan issue is not
representative of the type of challenge that China's
development poses. Generally speaking, the
disagreements among the region's states are not
comparable in kind or intensity to those that divided
Europe and the world during the Cold War.
2.4 Lesser regional threats
These include threats of violence and smaller-scale acts
of coercion or aggression targeting (i) American allies
or friends, (ii) US citizens or important US assets
abroad, or (iii) important "global community assets" --
such as freedom of navigation. The antagonists in such
actions may be states or subnational actors. Possible US
military responses include preventative or deterrent
deployments, straight-forward defense or
counter-offensive actions (albeit on a much
smaller-scale than in MRCs), retaliation, and citizen
rescue or evacuation.
Contingencies at this level of conflict have been much
more frequent than large-scale contingencies in the past
and will continue to be. The scale of American response
ranges from actions by a few dozen special operations
personnel up to short campaigns involving joint task
forces of as many as 40,000 personnel. These
contingencies tend to entail forces "lighter" on average
than those typically involved in MRCs.
The post-Cold War military recession will have several
contradictory effects at this level of conflict:
- Regarding the conventional threats posed by smaller
states: the intensity of these will recede but not as
much as in the case of the overblown rogue giants.
- The frequency with which smaller states are willing
to openly invite America's ire will also probably
decrease.
- Action by non-state actors (i.e. terrorism) may
increase -- partly because states will sponsor it as a
form of asymmetric struggle and partly as a result of
greater instability at the state level.
2.5 Regional stability problems
These contingencies often have the character of
"internal affairs," but their offshoots -- genocide,
mass migration, starvation, epidemics, mass criminal
behavior -- can destabilize entire regions. In some
cases, these regional effects will directly and
immediately involve critical US interests; in these
cases, the United States may take the initiative in
organizing and equipping these operations, while also
being careful to maintain their multinational character.
In other cases, the material effect of these
contingencies on important American interests will be
only indirect and cumulative -- involving, for instance,
the gradual erosion of international codes of conduct.
In such cases, action is still vital and America may
still take the lead in organizing a response, but
resource constraints and competing security demands may
require that US involvement occur only as part of a
strictly balanced multinational effort.
2.6 Other transnational dangers
A variety of transnational dangers will emanate from
areas of instability. These include uncontrolled flows
of refugees, international criminal activity, and
contraband substances. America's combat military
services will have a role to play in mitigating these
dangers, although routine responsibility for addressing
them will belong to other agencies -- such as the Coast
Guard, INS, FBI, ATF, and DEA.
2.7 The spread of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
The uncontrolled flow of conventional arms and,
especially, the proliferation of WMDs has the potential
to prolong and critically aggravate problems of regional
conflict and stability. Weapon proliferation greatly
increases the threat to our military personnel and our
citizens abroad. Moreover, the proliferation of WMDs and
their means of delivery may augur new direct threats to
our homeland (although these will remain far less severe
than during the Cold War).
This section traces the derivation of international
security objectives and priorities from core or vital
interests and national security strategy. Core, vital,
or fundamental interests are reviewed first. Then, based
on an initial application of national security strategy,
a set of international security objectives is produced.
Finally, priorities are set among these objectives and
other important objectives based on a second application
of national security strategy.
3.1 America's core vital interests
The core or vital interests of the United States are
defined by the following national policy imperatives:
- To protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the United States;
- To protect the lives and property of its citizens,
and to ensure their fair treatment abroad;
- To ensure the economic well-being of the nation,
preserve its democratic way of life, and guarantee the
right of its people to live in peace; and
- To protect freedom of international navigation,
communication, and commerce, including open and equal
access to the "global commons" -- international
waters, territories, and air space.
The interests that these imperatives embody are "vital"
and "core" in the sense that (i) the life and prosperity
of the nation depend on them uniquely; (ii) they are not
derivative of other interests, but instead are
"fundamental;" (iii) their value is not subject to any
simple cost-benefit analysis; and, (iv) there is a broad
and enduring national consensus supporting them.
Strategic Guideline: The National Security
Strategy (NSS) of the United States serves in part to
translate core or vital interests into foreign policy
objectives. Relevant to this, the NSS holds that it is
preferable to address potential challenges to core
interests early in their development, before they can
impinge critically on those interests. Also relevant to
America's choice of foreign policy objectives is its
lack of aggressive goals and its democratic values,
which enable and incline it to take advantage of the
benefits of international cooperation in the security
sphere. Thus, as a matter of national security strategy:
- The United States will remain comprehensively
engaged in global affairs,
- It will seek to pursue its security objectives in
cooperation with other states, and
- It will emphasize measures of conflict prevention
and deterrence.
3.2 US International security policy
objectives
America's international security policy reflects the
core imperatives or objectives enunciated above, and
also seeks to establish an international environment
that is conducive to the achievement of these core
objectives. The United States would do best in a world
characterized by:
- stable democratic societies,
- open and secure commerce,
- strict and effective limits on the role of armed
force in global affairs, and
- shared, communal responsibility for ensuring global
stability and security.
Such a world does not exist today and will not be
easily or certainly attained. Nonetheless, as an "ideal
destination" or end-state, it can serve to guide policy.
In line with the nation's enduring core interests and
its national security strategy, the United States will
seek to:
- Preserve and strengthen its relationships with those
nations that share its values and interests, cooperate
closely with them in the formulation and execution of
common security and defense efforts, and share with
them in a proportional way the burdens and costs of
these cooperative efforts;
- Support the expansion of the community of open,
democratic, and stable societies;
- Generally oppose acts of international aggression
and threats of aggression; expand the sphere of
security cooperation and help develop more effective
means for cooperative responses to aggression;
- Support efforts to progressively reduce the role of
force in international affairs and, especially, to
restrict the use of force to defensive ends, narrowly
defined;
- Encourage and support the pacific resolution of
international and civil conflicts; support a
strengthening of global and regional mechanisms for
conflict prevention, mediation, limitation, and
resolution;
- Encourage and support bi- and multilateral arms
control and reduction efforts -- especially those
affecting nuclear weapons; Encourage and support the
development and implementation of confidence- and
security-building measures in zones of conflict, and,
more generally, encourage and support increased
military transparency;
- Increase and strengthen the controls on the
international transfer of weapons and dual-use
technologies, focusing especially on the proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and on transfers
of those conventional weapons most essential to
long-range offensive operations;
- Encourage a more consistent and wider respect for
basic human rights, vigorously oppose gross and
flagrant violations of these rights, and strengthen
the institutional foundation for promoting and
protecting these rights;
- Respond in cooperation with others to address
transnational problems (such as the drug trade,
environmental degradation, and mass migration) and
intra-national problems (such as ethnic conflict,
state collapse, and humanitarian disasters) that
threaten regional stability; and help strengthen the
institutional basis for responding effectively to such
crises;
- Strengthen collective and institutional support for
the efforts of troubled and poorer nations to achieve
(i) more stable conditions of life for their people
and (ii) more effective and responsive modes of
governance.
Strategic Guideline: The NSS reconciles these
objectives with each other and with other national
goals, and it sets priorities among them. It also
chooses among the policy instruments available to the
nation and sets their relative weight. Key to the
strategizing process is an acute sensitivity to resource
constraints and changes in the security environment. The
following strategic insights and principles determine
the priorities among the nation's various
security-related objects:
- Maintaining America's long-term economic health
and social stability are key. The current era
presents the nation with both a unique opportunity and
an imperative to increase infrastructure and social
investment as a matter of national security
strategy. This shift in emphasis reflects (i)
the reduction in the magnitude and severity of
immediate, near-term, and mid-term military threats to
the national interest; (ii) the requirements of
meeting increased international economic competition,
and (iii) the need to maintain social stability and
solidarity in the face of rapid economic and
technological change. Longer-term strategic
uncertainty also provides a reason to cultivate the
fundamental sources of national strength. Looking
forward 30 years we cannot confidently predict the
types of challenges the nation may face; investing in
the fundamentals ensures the greatest degree of
long-term national flexibility.
- Increasing our emphasis on nonmilitary &
cooperative means for achieving security objectives
is key. Increased emphasis on nonmilitary means
is consonant with the increased importance of conflict
prevention, mediation, and resolution. As for
increased security cooperation: it is an important
national security goal in its own right, serving to
reduce the potential for conflict among the
cooperating nations. Cooperation is also a key
economizing measure, allowing the United States to use
its leading international position to "leverage" group
action while sharing security burdens.
- America's armed forces remain pivotal to the
nation's national security policy. Although the
current era presents an opportunity to fashion a world
in which force plays a significantly reduced role,
that world does not exist today and will not be easily
or certainly attained. America's armed forces are key
to meeting the continuing military threats to the
nation's core interests and key to guarding against
the possibility of new threats in the future. The
armed forces will also play a critical role in
addressing problems of instability and they will be
important as well in conflict prevention and arms
control efforts.
- A reduced threat implies a smaller military and a
reduced military budget. The reduction in the
magnitude and severity of present threats and the low
probability that a new peer or near-peer military
rival will emerge during the next 15-18 years permits
a reduction in the size of America's military forces
and budget. This is also consistent with the national
strategic requirement to place greater emphasis on
nonmilitary security efforts, which should receive
increased funding. And it is consistent with the
strategic need to invest more heavily in cultivating
the fundamental long-term sources of national
strength.
- Meeting post-Cold War military challenges
requires substantial military restructuring. The
character of the military security challenges that
face the nation have changed dramatically and
America's military must adapt accordingly. More than a
simple reduction in size, this requires fundamental
restructuring of the armed forces and an adjustment in
their procurement priorities.
3.3 General implications for US
military restructuring
Military restructuring must balance several distinct
imperatives and do so in a way consistent with broader
national objectives and national security strategy.
These imperatives are:
- Restructure the armed forces to efficiently and
economically deal with those threats and challenges
that are most likely to arise during the next 15-18
years or that already face the nation;
- Incorporate hedges against (i) the possible
re-emergence of a peer or near-peer competitor 15-18
years in the future, (ii) the possible long-term
implications of the military-technical revolution, and
(iii) the possibility that shorter-term challenges may
turn out to be more demanding than expected;
- Retain the historical emphasis of our military on
"quality over quantity" -- quality of personnel,
equipment, organization, and doctrine.
- Improve the basis for multinational cooperation.
America needs armed forces that are built and bred to
cooperate closely with those of like-minded nations.
The military strategy of the United States recognizes
the unique opportunities and challenges of the post-Cold
War era. Among the challenges are new sources of
instability, the continuing threat of interstate
aggression, and the possible evolution of new forms of
threat. However, the present era also poses an
opportunity to expand the basis of security cooperation
and work more closely than ever before with other
nations in restricting aggression and addressing the
sources of instability. What the long-term future holds
is uncertain, but the steps we take today will help
decide that future. America's military strategy
charts a vigilant path of progress toward a more
cooperative and stable security environment. The
strategy embodies three imperatives:<
- Deter and defend against current and likely threats;
- Create and consolidate the conditions for a more
cooperative and stable international environment; and,
- Guard against a possible resurgence of global and
large-scale military threats.
Looking more closely at each of these elements:
- The United States seeks through the use of its armed
forces to deter and defend against present and
foreseeable military threats to the nation, its
people, its interests, and its allies worldwide. The
United States also cooperates closely with its friends
and allies in seeking to secure from military threat
vital "world community assets," such as freedom of
navigation.
- The end of the Cold War has presented a unique
opportunity to advance toward a strategic environment
in which nations cooperate more closely and
consistently than ever before, and in which force and
the threat of force play a distinctly smaller role in
international relations. Looking to the future, the
United States will play a leading role in helping to
realize this opportunity. Following from this, the
United States will:
- seek to increase the scope and depth of
international military cooperation, and to establish
a sounder institutional foundation for such
cooperation.
- It will join with others to vigorously address the
problems of post-Cold War instability that presently
beset several regions of the world. Multinational
stability efforts will include measures of conflict
containment, limitation (including action against
genocide), mediation, and resolution (including
traditional peacekeeping).
- Finally, America's efforts to bring about a more
pacific and stable strategic environments will
include support for the gradual negotiated reduction
of national arsenals, the implementation of
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)
in zones of conflict, and efforts to limit the
proliferation of offensive weapons, especially WMDs
and their means of delivery.
- By no means is success guaranteed in our efforts to
foster and consolidate a more peaceful international
environment. In light of strategic uncertainty, US
military policy includes a variety of steps that guard
against a resurgence of major military threats and
especially against the possible re-emergence of a peer
military antagonist. These steps include:
- Maintaining a strong and expansible military
establishment, a robust training base, and a lively
innovative military culture;
- Adhering to the principles of gradualism and
reversibility in implementing the reductions in our
armed forces that are dictated by broader national
security strategy;
- Maintaining and strengthening our core alliances
and security relationships;
- Strengthening our national intelligence gathering
capabilities;
- Maintaining the best-equipped and trained Reserve
armed forces in the world; and
- Maintaining a military research and development
establishment and a defense industrial base that is
second to none by a substantial margin.
4.1 Military cooperation
Multinational cooperation in addressing military
security problems is an important goal in its own right.
Often it is also the most pragmatic path to success,
serving to (i) bring more capability to bear in the
pursuit of mission objectives and also serving to (ii)
distribute security burdens and responsibilities more
equally among allies and friends.
As noted above, the United States will seek to increase
the scope and depth of military cooperation, including
the conduct of military operations. However, with regard
to those security problems that bear on its critical
interests, the United States reserves the right to act
alone, if it must. Conversely, with regard to some types
of operations -- for instance, peace operations
outside core areas of interest -- the United
States will be disinclined to act on a large scale
except as part of a well-balanced multinational
effort.
- America's alliance and bilateral defense commitments
with its long-standing allies anchor its cooperative
security efforts. These commitments are key to our
military and national security strategies partly
because they involve nations with whom we share core
interests and values, and with whom we have a long and
productive history of cooperative effort. For these
reasons, we will seek to expand military
cooperation with these nations in combined efforts
outside the core areas covered by existing security
agreements -- developing and using such
instruments as NATO's Combined and Joint Task Force.
- In the future, the United States also will rely more
than in the past on less formal and ad hoc
coalitions to achieve some important military security
objectives. We will seek to improve the basis for such
cooperation through various forms of peacetime
engagement with the armed forces of other nations, and
we will seek to improve the capacity of appropriate
global and regional security institutions to sponsor
and coordinate multinational efforts, especially
peacekeeping and other stability operations.
- An important objective in pursuing multinational
military cooperation is the creation of an
effective and efficient "division of labor" among
like-minded states. With regard to some types of
military forces and assets, the United States alone
has the capacity to develop, maintain, support, and
employ them in great quantity. The United States can
employ these unique assets to multiply the
effectiveness of others' armed forces, and it can use
them to form a vital core of capabilities for
multinational task forces.
- The "division of labor" principle will be important
not only in peace operations but also in regional
defense and deterrence. In helping friends and allies
deal with large-scale local threats, it has never been
the intention of the United States to substitute
American power for allied power or to assume a
disproportionate share of local defense burdens. Now,
as regional conventional military threats have
diminished in scale, our allies can assume a greater
share of local defense burdens. The United States can
increasingly configure its regional defense
contribution according to a principle of complementary
defensive support that emphasizes force
multipliers and those vital capabilities that are
missing from local defense forces.
- One implication of America's increased emphasis on
facilitating increased multinational cooperation and
achieving a multinational "division of labor" will be
a change in the balance of America's armed forces. For
instance, the proportion of long-range air power,
special operations forces, artillery, engineering, and
other combat support and combat service support assets
will increase. Another area of proportional increase
will be Command, Control, Communication, Computation,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
assets.
4.2 Priorities in the use of US armed
forces
The interests and concerns of the United States extend
worldwide, but they are not everywhere equal and the
same. Political realities, both foreign and domestic, as
well as constraints on time, assets, and resources
require that we set clear priorities in pursuing our
security objectives. To do otherwise would risk
undermining the very foundations of our global
involvement. Multinational cooperation substantially
increases our capacity for effective action -- but also
involves and imposes limits. Therefore, in planning to
meet contingencies both large and small, the United
States identifies "core areas of concern." These include
Central America and the Caribbean, Europe, Northeast
Asia, and North Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian
Gulf. As a tool for setting priorities, the concept of
"core areas of concern" pertains to our planning efforts
across the spectrum of conflict.
4.2.1 Major Regional Contingencies
- Outside Europe there are only two areas in which the
needs of our allies, the intensity of our interests,
and the magnitude of local threats might coincide to
compel very large-scale US combat operations,
including the deployment of 100,000 or more ground
troops: the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. In these
core areas, the United States is willing to act
decisively and on a large-scale even if it must act
with local allies only.
- Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and
Central America and the Caribbean are also areas of
core US concern. Nonetheless, there is little or no
likelihood of very large-scale US combat operations in
these areas during the next 10-15 years (at least),
either because the threats in these areas will not
warrant it, or our allies will not require it, or
both.
- Outside the areas of core US concern, the conditions
for a direct, large-scale conventional threat to
immediate and critical US interests do not exist.
Thus, the United States would only rarely contemplate
large interventions (that is, involving 80,000
personnel or more) outside the core areas, and then
only as part of a truly balanced and broad
multinational effort. Furthermore, should significant
levels of instability exist in a core area, portending
a possible near-term crisis, the United States would
not contemplate large-scale military involvement
outside the core at all.
4.2.2 Lesser Regional Contingencies
Military action to counter smaller-scale aggression
involves fewer material constraints. However, here too,
the United States needs to act with a clear sense of
priorities because any use of military power involves
opportunity costs and risks. We cannot act anywhere at
any level without constraining to some degree our
ability to act elsewhere.
- The United States will remain prepared to act on
this level promptly and decisively to counter attacks
and threats of attack against US allies and friends,
US citizens, or important US or "world community"
assets.
- The United States prefers and will seek
multinational cooperation even when confronting
smaller-scale threats to its vital interests,
but will not consider such cooperation a precondition
for action in such cases.
- The US is also eager to act against smaller-scale
aggression more generally, even if it does not
directly involve vital US interests. But in
these cases, a context of real multinational
cooperation will usually be a precondition for US
military action.
4.2.3 Stability Operations
- A context of multinational assent and cooperation is
often a precondition for the success of stability
operations. Thus the United States will seldom
undertake such operations unless such a context exists
or can be created.
- In addition, the decision to undertake such
operations will depend on (i) the urgency of the need,
(ii) the identification of significant stability
objectives that are achievable, (iii) the availability
of the resources and time needed to achieve these
objectives, (iv) the likely cost in casualties, and
(v) the competing security and stability demands on US
resources. These criteria are not proposed as a
series of hurdles; what matters is the balance among
them. Given an urgent need and a real
possibility of achieving significant stability
objectives, the United States is willing to make a
substantial investment to realize success, and
it will strongly encourage others to do the same.
- The United States will judge the "urgency" of a
situation in terms of (i) human cost, (ii) near-term
regional stability effects, and (iii) longer-term and
indirect effects on the strategic environment. When
choices must be made, a contingency's proximity to
core areas of US concern is an important factor in
determining urgency.
- In general, the importance of broad multinational
cooperation and burdensharing as a pre-requisite to US
action is directly proportional to the size and
difficulty of a proposed operation and its distance
from core areas.
- With regard to the issue of competing demands: the
US will strictly limit and reduce its commitments to
stability operations should war or crisis threaten in
a core area. If the United States is already engaged
in a major regional contingency, it will most likely
refrain from initiating unrelated stability
operations.
4.3 Strategy for fighting major
regional wars
Today there are only two core regions where the
interests of the United States and the needs of local
allies might possibly converge to require very
large-scale unilateral US intervention: the Arabian and
Korean peninsulas. Our abiding interest in these area is
evident in long-standing military cooperation and
assistance policies and in the well-developed military
reception and support facilities that these areas
possess. Several other unique features would facilitate
effective US defense efforts in these regions: in Korea
the United States has a powerful ally; in the Persian
Gulf, American air power has proved uniquely effective
in blunting large-scale conventional aggression.
During the past six years the military balance in both
the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula has
improved dramatically. In addition, the United States
has established a virtual permanent military presence in
Southwest Asia, prepositioned more equipment in both the
Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, and has improved its
strategic lift capability. Moreover, the combat power of
US military units has also increased significantly and
will continue to do so with the completion of near-term
modernization programs. Together these developments
significantly reduce the net requirement for US units
slated for large-scale regional crisis response.
Regarding most categories of military power, the net
requirements of confidently defeating a large-scale
cross-border attack in either of these regions are
judged to be between 45-55 percent of the forces
deployed for Operation Desert Storm (ODS). However, in
some categories, a larger proportion may be required:
the need for combat helicopters may range between 60-80
percent of the ODS deployment; the requirement for
tube-artillery systems, between 75 and 110 percent; and
the requirement for MLRS systems, between 100 and 180
percent of the ODS deployment. Although these
requirements are expected to decline during the coming
decade, America's Total Force will be sized with them in
mind. Two areas in which requirements may increase are
theater ballistic missile defense and NBC protection.
- In the eventuality of a large-scale cross-border
attack in Korea the US will plan to employ as many as
220,000 personnel (active and reserve), 600 combat
aircraft (all-service, including bombers), 2 aircraft
carriers, 30 other major surface and subsurface
combatants, 3-4 ground force division equivalents (including
USMC), 400 combat helicopters, 700
tube-artillery systems, and 200 MLRS launchers.
- In the eventuality of a large-scale cross-border
attack on the Arabian peninsula the US will plan to
employ as many as 280,000 personnel (active and
reserve), 700 combat aircraft (all-service, including
bombers), 2 aircraft carriers, 18 other major surface
and subsurface combatants, 4-5 division equivalents (including
USMC), 300 combat helicopters, 500
tube-artillery systems, and 350 MLRS launchers.
4.3.1 Fight in phases
Should war break out in one of these theaters of core
concern, the United States would fight in distinct and
deliberate phases.
- The United States would initially deploy a
"defensive shield" with the aim of halting the attack.
This shield would rely heavily on forward deployed,
prepositioned, and indigenous assets as well as fast
deploying US units based outside the region.
- Once a robust defensive shield was in place,
additional assets -- mostly air and missile power --
would be brought to bear to atrite enemy forces while
a larger and heavier US offensive element deployed.
- The final phase would be a large-scale and decisive
counteroffensive.
4.3.2 Dealing with two wars at once
With our focus on only a few regions of core concern,
the probability that the United States would have to
conduct two major regional wars simultaneously is very
low. Indeed, it is unlikely even given a thirty-year
time span. For this reason, and because there are
critical competing demands on our resources, we will not
size or configure our active-component armed
forces to complete on their own two large-scale
offensive-defensive campaigns simultaneously.
Nonetheless, as long as there is a real and present
danger of large-scale aggression in two theaters of core
concern, we must and will hedge against the possibility
of overlapping attacks in both.
- In the case of a major attack in either theater, a
defensive shield of mostly active-component units
would immediately deploy there and Reserve combat
units would begin to mobilize.
- In the other theater, forward deployed units would
be placed on high alert and they would be reinforced
with a modest "deterrent" package.
- The large, offensive force increment for the first
theater would be held back as a hedge against an
attack in the second until more Reserve units
mobilized. As these units became available, they would
provide the flexibility for the United States to fully
commit to a single war (with mostly active combat
units in the field) or conduct a double war if
necessary (relying on a mix of active and reserve
combat units).
- The United States would not choose, however, to
conduct two large-scale air-ground counter-offensives
simultaneously. Instead, we would maintain an active
defense posture in one theater, while completing
offensive operations in the other. With the completion
of war in the one theater, some combat assets could
swing to the other.
Although the probability of major regional conflicts
involving the United States on the scale of the
envisioned Korean and Arabian scenarios is expected to
recede further during the next 15 years, the United
States will retain sufficient capacity to
- rapidly deploy in succession either (i) two
defensive shields or (ii) one full defensive/offensive
package for Theater One plus an "enhanced deterrence
package" for Theater Two,
- while holding back for other purposes a force equivalent
to one-third of our total active-component combat
forces, and do so
- without having to mobilize more than 70,000
reservists.
Should the two-war scenario occur, meeting it fully
would require substantially reducing the forces held
back for other purposes and increasing the reserve
mobilization to 250,000 personnel.
4.3.3 Hedging against a resurgent
Iraq or North Korea
To hedge against the possibility that either Iraq or
North Korea will manage to substantially increase their
conventional power during the next decade, the United
States will:
- Continue to press our allies on the Korean and
Arabian peninsulas to maintain, upgrade, and increase
their defensive capabilities;
- Especially press members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council to cooperate more closely in defense matters,
and
- Undertake a major initiative to ensure greater and
more effective participation by our core allies in
regional defensive efforts. NATO countries should play
a bigger role in meeting a Persian Gulf contingency;
Japan should play a significant airpower and logistic
support role in meeting a Korean peninsula
contingency.
4.4 Strategy for managing multiple
LRCs and Stability Operations
Smaller-scale contingencies will demand more of
America's attention, principally because of (i) the
increased need for stability operations and (ii) a
possible increase in the incidence of terrorism. At this
end of the operational spectrum, the actions that will
place the greatest quantitative demand (due to their
relative frequency) on the US military are of three
types: (i) retaliatory raids and deterrent deployments,
(ii) small-scale wars and combat operations like Just
Cause, and (iii) stability operations.
- In the first category, most operations will involve
brief deployments of 5,000-8,000 personnel and often
center on carrier battle groups. However, in core
areas, deterrent deployments could involve as many as
30,000 personnel, including ground troops.
- In the second category, operations may require
20,000 to 30,000 personnel.
- The final category, stability operations, will
usually involve deployments of between 3,000 and
50,000 personnel.
Regarding the frequency of such operations: It would
not be surprising in the next decade if the United
States had to conduct two or three of the first
category, one or even possibly two of the second
category, and six or seven of the last category.
Setting aside the smaller retaliation and deterrence
operations (which will usually involve a carrier battle
group), the United States will be prepared to field
60,000 people in LRCs and stability operations during a
typical year without eroding our overall, long-term
preparedness. On average such operations are expected to
last nine to ten months: retaliation, combat, and
deterrence operations will have a shorter average
duration; stability operations, a longer one. Moreover,
we will have the capacity to occasionally field
a cumulative total of up to 100,000 in such operations
-- perhaps once every four years -- without "breaking
the system." Unlike the case of major regional war,
active-component personnel will predominate in these
operations.
In the event of intervention in a major regional war:
The system will have the capacity to maintain some
personnel in other operations. In the case of having to
fight only one major regional war, the United States
will have the capacity to field simultaneously as many
as 30,000 personnel in a smaller-scale operation.
4.4.1 How many simultaneous
operations?
Our approach could be summarized as providing a "1.2 war
capability" or a "one MRC plus one LRC" capability.
Looking further back in history, however, comparisons to
Cold War capabilities are complicated. By today's
standards, we sought during the Cold War a capability to
conduct a global campaign equivalent in magnitude to
three or more Gulf Wars!
Setting aside the major regional war scenarios, the
planned capability could also be called a "six
smaller-operations capability." However, from a
strategic perspective, there is a trade-off between the
size and number of such operations. The simultaneous
conduct of six operations involving an average of 5,000
personnel each will be well within our capacity. But the
United States will not normally attempt to conduct more
than three "smaller-scale" operations simultaneously
if each involves more than 20,000 personnel. Push the
requirements for each operation much above the
40,000-personnel level, and the Unites States would not
normally attempt to conduct more than two such
operations simultaneously. These various criteria
reflect the need to keep our military in good
functioning order today for the contingency that may
develop next year. And this includes hedging against
even low probability/low frequency events like major
regional wars.
All things considered, the descriptions of the planned
capability that together most accurately reflect how it
will be used are: "an active-component 3 LRC capability"
or an "active-component 1.2 war capability."
4.5 The conduct of Stability
Operations and their associated requirements
These operations include traditional peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance, actions to prevent or halt
genocide, and conflict limitation, management, and
resolution efforts. The demand for such operations has
increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War and
will remain high. Looking to the future, the United
States may feel compelled to undertake more of these
than in the past. More important than increasing the
frequency of US peace operations, however, is that the
United States act sooner and more effectively in those
that do meet its criteria for action.
With regard to stability contingencies the strategy of
the United States is to deploy as rapidly as possible a
decisive capability tailored to mission requirements.
If the United States and its partners cannot mobilize
sufficient resources to be reasonably confident of
achieving at least a minimum of important stability or
humanitarian objectives, we will not deploy. Of course,
it is impossible to predict with certainty how long an
operation will take to achieve mission objectives, but
competing security and stability needs strictly
preclude any open-ended commitments.
When the United States deploys, it will do so with the
resources it judges are required to perform the mission
within a determinate period of time. (It will
not, however, publicly declare a "time limit"; such a
course of action would undermine the prospects for
mission success.) Nonetheless, time is a key factor in
calculating the cost of an operation, and as the costs
of any one operation rise, they impinge on our capacity
to achieve our overall, long-term stability program. The
United States will make a modest allowance for slippage
in original time schedules, but pushed beyond this, it
will move to substantially reduce mission objectives or
terminate the mission.
4.5.1 Special requirements
Several characteristic features of stability operations
are key to defining their requirements: Such operations
are typically multinational and multi-dimensional, and
they often involve a unique interplay between consent
and violence (or the threat of violence).
- The involvement of different national contingents
and both civilian and military elements requires
special efforts to ensure adequate communication and
planning interfaces. The division of labor, allocation
of responsibility and authority, and chain of command
must be clear. Combined planning -- multinational and
civilian/military -- must be continuous. To meet these
requirements, headquarters staffs will be larger than
usual, communication units must be robust, and
sufficient numbers of "liaison officers" must be
available.
- The multi-dimensional character of these operations
will also require that a field force employ a larger
than usual proportion of combat support and combat
service support assets, such as engineers, military
policy, civil affairs, medical, and logistics units.
- Finally, the interplay of consent and force in these
operations imposes special requirements.
4.5.2 The use of force in Stability
Operations and its implications for force structure
Typically, stability operations lack a designated foe.
(Conflict itself and its effects are taken to be "the
enemy.") An important enabling factor for success is
some substantial degree of assent to the operation by
the local contestants and citizens. However, assent to
the operation's mandate is often partial, unstable, or
"patchy." Localized attempts to violate or resist the
mandate, and localized attacks on the field force, will
occur. When this happens, however, it does not necessary
imply a comprehensive collapse of assent.
In order to preserve the broader context of consent,
the response to mandate violations will be discriminate:
Preferably, it will focus on the violation and the
immediate violators, and it will involve the minimum
force necessary to ensure mandate implementation and
force protection. When a more remote retaliatory action
is required, it will target important assets, not
leadership -- unless that leadership has come to be broadly
perceived by local citizens as a criminal element.
The most important guideline, however, may be this: when
resistance to a mandate is haphazard or episodic,
violence can often be deterred on the small-unit level,
provided that the operation's small units are
sufficiently capable and their capabilities are
obvious. This often implies a need for units that
are heavier than typical light infantry.
- Medium-weight ground units may provide the optimum
mix of strategic mobility, tactical mobility,
protection, and firepower, but they cannot undertake
all essential tasks. Hence, the optimal ground force
will often mix light, light mechanized, and mechanized
infantry units.
- A vital part of US planning for such operations will
be provisions for the possible collapse of local
consent or a decision by one of the contestants to
"declare war" on the operation. This would imply a
fundamental change in the character of the
contingency. The mandate's authorizing agency and the
operation's participants may decide to meet the
challenge or they may decide to terminate the
operation. The decision is case dependent. Either way,
a capability to comprehensively protect the force
and extract it under fire is necessary.
- The complex and often mercurial nature of stability
contingencies also points to the need for
substantial intelligence, reconnaissance, and
communication capabilities. Adding to this
requirement is the importance of minimizing violence.
Given adequate and timely information we can often
avert or forestall violence. The most serious
shortfall in recent stability operations has involved
human intelligence gathering capabilities. But
advanced information technologies are also essential
to success. Thus, the United States will employ a
full-spectrum of its information capabilities in these
operations.
5.1 Changes in emphasis among combat
function areas
- An increased emphasis on air power, indirect
fire, and information assets
The future force will reflect an increased emphasis on
combat air (including helicopters) and artillery in
supporting ground combat operations; the balance
between fire and maneuver will shift in favor of the
former. This reflects an increased potential for
delivering precision fires from the air and the
ground, and it reflects a desire to reduce the
exposure of and threat to our close combat units. It
is also consistent with the strategy of maintaining
and providing unique force multipliers to coalition
and alliance forces. Important initiatives in this
area include the addition of new precision munitions
and the increase in numbers of all-weather day/night
delivery platforms. Also important is the growing
number of the Army's MLRS launchers and the Navy's
ships equipped with Vertical Launch Systems. With
regard to land forces the proportion of combat
helicopters and artillery systems to ground maneuver
units will increase.
Information assets are increasingly important across
the operational spectrum. These will be largely exempt
from reduction and, thus, will become a relatively
more prominent part of the force. Procurement will
emphasize high-leverage surveillance and
reconnaissance systems, systems for improved joint
communication and information fusion, and a full-range
of economical increments to existing capabilities
serving high-demand mission areas.
- Preserving special airpower assets: bombers and
C3ISR/EW aircraft
Within the total combat air fleet, USAF bombers and
support aircraft (including C3ISR and EW planes) will
comprise a bigger slice (relative to fighters) than in
the current posture. (Nonetheless, the ratio of
Fighter Wing Equivalents to ground force divisions and
naval combat ships will increase.) The retention of
present levels of support aircraft -- especially C3ISR
and EW planes -- partly reflects the increased
significance of information warfare. It also
recognizes these assets as key to the creation of an
allied division of labor and as key to America's
capacity to provide defensive support -- short of
combat units -- to its friends. Finally, many of these
assets have important parts to play in arms control
efforts, stability operations, strategic intelligence
efforts, and even drug interdiction. Although fewer in
number than presently planned, bombers are given an
increased role in the proposed structure because they
(i) play an important deterrent role and (ii) serve as
a hedge against the continuing (although diminished)
possibility that America will have to undertake two
regional wars simultaneously.
- A lighter, more mobile ground force
Light mechanized or motorized ground units will play a
bigger role in both large and small combat
contingencies as well as peace operations. Such units
-- often called "medium-weight" -- are more mobile
strategically than heavy units, and have better
protection, firepower, and tactical mobility than pure
light infantry. Such units provide a flexible and
affordable means of long-range force projection and
are particularly well-suited to stability operations.
Moreover, as the experience of comparatively light
USMC units in the Gulf War proves, they can also play
a substantial role in major "mid-intensity" conflicts
when supported by information assets, missile
artillery, and combat aircraft and helicopters. If
configured as "air-mechanized" units, they can form a
critical part of an early arriving regional crisis
response force. Light mechanized forces are especially
well-suited to smaller-scale conflict situations, such
as the Panama and Grenada interventions. And the
recent experience of stability operations suggests
that in these contingencies participating units also
need greater average protection and mobility than that
typical of current Army and Marine Corps light
infantry.
- Greater emphasis on special operations forces
Special Operations units are increasingly important
across the spectrum of conflict. Moreover, America's
SOF assets, considered as a whole, represent a
capability that is unique in the world. As such, they
are key to developing a sensible division of labor
among Western allied nations. Finally, they have
proved themselves an essential enabler of ad hoc
multinational cooperation in the field. In the future,
Special Operations units should comprise a larger
proportion of US forces; indeed, some types of these
units should be increased in number absolutely. It is
also important, however, that the United States become
more careful in how it employs these assets. Generally
speaking, they should be used at the high end of the
their capability and not in roles for which other,
less specialized units are adequate. In the future,
the Special Operations command will constitute the
field headquarters for some operations, and
experiments should continue to explore how attaching
conventional force elements to the command can produce
unique capabilities. There will also be much closer
cooperation between the Special Operations Command and
the USMC, which will retain 6 active-component MEUs --
all "special operations capable." In the future, MEUs
will attach to the SOCCOM on occasion. In turn, larger
packages of SOF units than is common today will
occasionally support MEUs in roles appropriate to
their capabilities.
- A greater emphasis on combat support and service
support
The future force will place greater emphasis on combat
support and service support. This reflects the
increased demand for some forms of combat support and
service support due to stability operations (which may
not involve actual combat). It also reflects an
increased emphasis on providing "defensive support" to
allies in the form of force multipliers. This is
consonant with seeking a division of labor that takes
account of the unique strengths of America's armed
forces, but that does not substitute American power
for allied efforts. Also, to facilitate multinational
operations and combined civil-military operations, the
future force will provide for increases in the size of
field headquarters.
5.2 A revolution in combat
organization
The organization of America's basic combat units is
trailing badly behind the two revolutions --
military-technical and strategic. In order to improve
flexibility, efficiency, and the fit between units and
their missions, the armed services of the United States
will restructure their combat units -- from the largest
to the smallest -- into post-Cold War, information-age
organizations. Substantial reform does not require a
large additional infusion of new technology; the
military-technical revolution has already been underway
for 30 years and the United States is already its
undisputed leader. The disappearance of a peer military
competitor and the shift toward smaller regional
contingencies and stability operations also create a
possibility and necessity for organizational change.
Today the backwash of organizational intransigence is
impinging on the nation's security strategy and
increasing the vulnerability of units deployed to the
field. Less than 15 percent of the nation's deployable
active-duty combat force are engaged in field
operations, field exercises, or other contingent
activities at any one time, but OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO
problems are reportedly so bad that the service chiefs
argue strenuously against even marginal reductions in
personnel. Moreover, as our likely military adversaries
seek to increase their reliance on long-range and
remote-action "area weapons" (like SCUDs and mines), we
persist in planning to deploy enormous,
highly-concentrated combat units.
To bring combat organizations in line with the two
revolutions the services will accelerate organizational
reform, incorporating several guideline principles:
- "Principal warfighting units" will be constituted at
a lower level of organization than today -- for
example, in the Army this role will devolve from the
division level to the brigade;
- The principal "field operations management unit"
(for the Army, the Corps) will gain a greater span of
control, in the sense of controlling more units.
However, the units they control will be of a smaller
types: for the Army, brigades rather than divisions.
- The new and smaller "principal warfighting units"
will become more balanced than they are today, but
they will not replicate on a smaller-scale the
full range of organic capabilities that had belonged
to the larger units whose place they are usurping.
Instead, more support will reside at the management
(Corps) level -- to be attached or allocated to the
warfighting units as needed.
- Management (Corps) headquarters will become somewhat
larger and highly modularized, able to deploy in
larger or smaller versions and able to attach parts of
themselves to lower level headquarters. The main
warfighting headquarters -- brigade HQs for the Army
-- will also become larger, reflecting their greater
responsibility. And they will be designed to receive
supplementary "plug-ins" from their management units.
A suitably expanded brigade headquarters will become
able to command smaller field operations.
- At levels below the principal warfighting
organization, some units will become less redundant
and smaller, consonant with the greater capability
that recent equipment bestows and the less capable
threats they are today likely to meet. For the Army
these lower level units are battalions, companies, and
platoons.
Changes along these lines will facilitate much greater
flexibility in sizing and tailoring force packages to
meet threats and challenges. Field packages will not
appear to be "balanced," but instead "tailored" to the
task at hand. The size of deployments can be reduced
without loss of essential capabilities, allowing
more rapid deployment and reducing sustainment
requirements and OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO problems. In the
field, units will be enabled to operate in a more fluid
and dispersed fashion; force concentrations will become
less dense.
The implications of these organizational guidelines are
different for the different services:
- The Marine Corps is already highly modularized in
its design, having for years sought to do more with
less. The principle change for the Marine Corps is an
even greater emphasis on battalion and brigade size
deployments.
- Central to the Navy's future combat organization
will be Surface Action Groups comprising three, five,
or seven ships -- cruisers, destroyers, and frigates.
One or two attack submarines may supplement these, but
not necessarily. Surface Action Groups can operate
alone or be configured to support an aircraft carrier
or a Marine amphibious assault group. Smaller,
task-oriented deployments will become the norm.
- The Air Force will revive its experimentation with
"composite wings," but these will not attempt to
integrate organically the full-range of Air Force
capabilities. Generally speaking: squadrons should
become smaller (12 or 18 aircraft), wings should
become larger and more varied (90-120 aircraft).
5.3 Changes in Service Roles,
Missions, and Organization
Service missions and organization will reflect more
closely a division of labor based on special
responsibilities in one of three dimensions: air, land,
sea (littoral); concomitant with this, the services will
become more inter-dependent and "joint" in character.
- Space and information operations in particular will
be developed as joint areas of endeavor.
- The Services' central organizations for
communications, intelligence, medical support, legal
services, chaplains, public affairs, and logistics
will be substantially integrated; the services'
procurement departments will also take major steps
towards integration.
5.3.1 US Air Force and other
elements of US airpower
In the future the proportion of fighter/attack aircraft
in the US arsenal belonging to the USAF will increase.
- The USAF has principal responsibility for air
superiority and long-range (deep) strike operations
(including bombers); it will also provide fixed-wing
air defense and close air support for the Army.
- Naval combat airpower will play a more limited role,
being especially important in naval operations,
smaller ground operations (especially those involving
the USMC), the opening phases of major ground
operations, and in keeping sea-lanes and littoral
areas secure throughout the duration of ground
operations, large and small.
- USN and USMC combat airpower will operate more
closely; their air power infrastructures will be
substantially integrated.
- Naval missile power will play a bigger role relative
to naval airpower as Aegis ships armed with Vertical
Launch Systems come to predominate.
5.3.2 The Navy-Marine Corps team
These two services will emphasize littoral warfare and
operations. Less important for the USN in the future
will be generalized offensive and defensive sea control,
anti-submarine warfare, and continuous worldwide
protection of SLOCs. Operations of these sorts will
become more "contingency-driven." Nothing like the fleet
once needed to fulfill the offensive, defensive, and
deterrence roles set out in the maritime strategy is
needed today or in the foreseeable future. Nor will the
USN have any special claim on a so-called "presence
mission."
- For smaller contingencies and operations outside
Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Korea, the USN-USMC will
often play a leading role, especially if friendly air
bases are not nearby. As noted above, with regard to
major contingencies the USN-USMC team will be
especially important during initial deployment and
will bear continuing responsibility for maintaining
local sea control and guaranteeing sea-side access to
theaters of conflict.
- In all cases the USN-USMC team are responsible for
amphibious operations.
- The USMC will also have special responsibility for
civilian rescue and evacuation operations.
- With the retirement of the land-based ICBM force
there will be a substantial relative increase in the
Navy's strategic nuclear role -- a first step toward
giving the Navy primary responsibility for maintaining
America's nuclear deterrent.
5.3.3 The US Army-USAF team
These services will fight across the warfare spectrum,
but together bear special responsibility for larger,
heavier, and longer-term contingencies on land. This
special responsibility has a geographical corollary, but
it is not a limit: the Army-Air Force team bear leading
responsibility for defense and deterrence in Europe and
on the Korean and Arabian peninsulas.
- The Army will provide missile artillery support and
some air defense support for the Marine Corps.
5.3.4 Reserve components
Reserve component armed forces will play a bigger role
in the future posture than in the present one. This is
consonant with (i) the absence of a short-warning global
war threat, (ii) a shift away from preparations to
conduct early, large-scale counter-offensives in two
regions simultaneously, and (iii) a greater emphasis on
air power, combat support, and combat service support
functions -- all areas in which reserve component forces
have excelled.
- Especially notable is the expanded role afforded the
Navy and Marine Corps Reserves.
- Army Reserve and National Guard combat units will be
brought back into the heart of preparations for
handling two major regional wars simultaneously.
- The Army National Guard division structure will be
retired in favor of maintaining and fully supporting
17 enhanced brigades; these brigades will be grouped
into five "division-like" groups that will serve an
administrative function only.
5.4 Force modernization strategy:
Adapting to the two revolutions --
military-technical and strategic
Military modernization occurs at three levels:
platforms, subcomponents, and the "system of systems"
architecture. The current military-technical revolution
has focused principally on architecture and
subcomponents, rather than platforms. Progress has been
especially profound in the areas of C4ISR and precision
guidance. Developments in these areas promise to
dramatically boost combined-arms synergy and allow much
greater accuracy and efficiency in force allocation --
that is, in our ability to choose and constitute the
right force for the right job and then deliver it to the
right place in a timely fashion.
During the Cold War, the United States sought to
procure in great quantity the most advanced equipment
available for all segments of its armed forces. This
reflected a strategy of matching Soviet quantity with
American quality, as well as an awareness that the
Soviet Union -- a peer power -- was also modernizing
continuously. There is no such competition today and
none is likely for some time. This gives us greater
freedom in setting the pace and extent of our military
modernization. And we need to exercise this freedom in
order to maintain a proper balance among modernization,
readiness, and force structure, while also ensuring a
proper balance between military preparedness and the
other aspects of our national strategy.
We can maintain an appropriate balance and hedge
against an uncertain future by differentiating our
military R&D and military procurement objectives.
- For each area of military technology the goal of
research and development will be to explore the
boundaries of what is technically feasible. In other
words, "requirements" are set by the limits of
physical principles and the imagination.
- Our R&D strategy will provide a hedge against
unforeseen developments by fully funding research
efforts and moving select technologies fairly far
along in the development process -- short of actual
procurement.
- Acquisition policy will follow a different logic. It
will reflect an assessment of "real world" military
force development trends -- especially those shaping
the forces of current and potential "threat states."
Specifically, we will track their capacity to (1) buy
or produce, field, integrate, maintain, and
effectively utilize (2) suites of advanced weapon
systems (3) in operationally-significant numbers.
- Modernization will emphasize "modularized"
subcomponents and suites of subcomponents, not
platforms. This will provide the freedom to "drop in"
new capabilities as they become available and are
needed.
- Modularization will increase flexibility in several
ways. First, it will allow us to tailor individual
weapons and platforms to specific missions and
threats. Second, it will allow us to peg current
acquisition to actually existing levels of threat
while retaining the capability to quickly upgrade our
weapons and platforms by moving new "drop-in"
subcomponents from prototype status into mass
production.
As a whole, our force modernization efforts will be
geared to ensure that the United States maintains a
distinct qualitative advantage over potential
adversaries in all pivotal combat functions and a
substantial advantage at the level of the "system of
systems." This, together with the superior quality of
our troops, superior leadership, high unit readiness,
and unequalled sustainment capability is the formula for
maintaining our advantage in the field.
6.1 Personnel
|
TOTAL |
USAF |
USN |
USMC |
USA |
Active |
945 |
280 |
260 |
95 |
310 |
Reserve |
690 |
170 |
130 |
50 |
340 |
Subtotal |
1635 |
|
|
|
|
Civilian |
450 |
|
|
|
|
Total |
2085 |
|
|
|
|
The option reduces personnel and force structure over
an eight-year period. Overall it prescribes a 35 percent
reduction in active-component personnel from 1997
levels, a 23.4 percent reduction in reserve-component
personnel, and a 31.7 percent reduction in civilian
personnel. Looking at the Total Force of active and
reserve uniformed personnel, the reduction from 1997
levels is 30.6 percent. However, the number of
full-time reservists will be reduced by only 7 percent
during the period, from 150,000 to 140,000.
Personnel
Reduction Schedule |
|
Active |
Reserve |
Civilian |
1997: |
1457 |
900.9 |
806 |
1998: |
1390 |
865.0 |
755 |
1999: |
1260 |
835.0 |
670 |
2000: |
1230 |
820.0 |
630 |
2001: |
1200 |
785.0 |
595 |
2002: |
1090 |
750.0 |
565 |
2003: |
1060 |
725.0 |
535 |
2004: |
1040 |
700.0 |
490 |
2005: |
945 |
690.0 |
550 |
Change %
1997-2005 |
-35 |
-23.4 |
-31.7 |
The proposed option does not reduce force structure as
much as it does personnel because it incorporates a
number of organizational changes that increase the
proportion of personnel serving in the deployable
field force (which includes combat, support, and
sustainment units). The actual reduction in the
deployable field force (including the sustainment
pipeline) and counting both active- and
reserve-component units is approximately 28 percent. In
essence, the option prescribes that a Total Force
with 69.4 percent as many personnel as today's
re-allocate enough of its people to ensure a
deployable field force that is 72 percent as large as
what today's military can manage.
6.2 Strategic forces (1500 deployed
warheads):
560 air launched cruise missiles; B-52 platform
840 warheads; Trident II D5 platform (5 warheads per
missile)
100 nuclear bombs; B-2 platform
Special features:
- 2000 additional warheads kept in reserve stockpile,
- Tactical weapons retired,
- Land-based missiles retired,
- US adopts "No first use of WMDs" stance,
- US pursues multilateral negotiated reductions to
minimum, deterrence arsenals: 300-800 deployed
warheads,
- Strategic missile defense efforts restricted to
research.
6.3 US Air Force
6.3.1 Strategic systems
- Bombers (28 primary unit assigned; 41 total
inventory):
- B-52: 24 active. Total inventory: 36
- B-2: 4 active. Total inventory: 5
- Associated strategic weapons:
- 560 cruise missiles;
- 100 nuclear bombs.
- Air defense fighters:
- F-16: 60 reserve. Total inventory: 80
6.3.2 Tactical bombers and fighters
- Bombers (84 primary unit assigned; 125 total
inventory):
- B-1: 24 active; 24 reserve. Total inventory: 72
- B-2: 12 active. Total inventory: 16
- B-52: 12 active; 12 reserve. Total inventory: 36
- Fighter/Ground Attack (1152 primary unit assigned;
16 fighter wing equivalents. Total inventory: 1744)
- F-15: 144 active; 72 reserve. Total inventory: 324
- F-15E: 144 active. Total inventory: 216
- F-16: 216 active; 396 reserve. Total inventory:
950
- F-117: 36 active. Total inventory: 54
- A-10: 72 active; 72 reserve. Total inventory 200
6.3.3 Other aircraft
- Observation, Reconnaissance, Command, and Electronic
Warfare:
- OA-10: 36 active; 36 reserve. Total inventory:
100
- U2: 29 active. Total inventory: 32
- E8 JSTARs: 16 active. Total inventory: 20
- RC-135 Rivet Joint: 10 active. Total inventory:
14
- EC-130H Compass Call: 10 reserve. Total
inventory: 14
- EC-130E ABCCC: 6 active. Total inventory: 8
- WC-130H: 8 reserve. Total inventory: 10
- E3 AWACs: 29 active. Total inventory: 33
- EC-135: 8 active. Total inventory: 12
- Special Forces
- AC-130: 12 active; 6 reserve. Total inventory: 21
- EC-130E: 6 reserve. Total inventory: 8
- HC-130: 12 active; 4 reserve. Total inventory: 18
- MC-130: 32 active. Total inventory: 38
- MH-53: 33 active. Total inventory: 40
- MH-60: 6 active. Total inventory: 10
- Principal Cargo and Tankers:
- C17: 60 active. Total inventory: 72
- C5: 70 active; 35 reserve. Total inventory: 121
- C130: 150 active; 150 reserve. Total inventory:
360
- KC-10: 54 active. Total inventory: 59
- KC-135: 224 active; 248 reserve. Total inventory:
550
6.4 US Navy
- Strategic Missile Submarines: 7
- Attack submarines: 30 active, 6 reserve
- Aircraft carriers: 6 active, 1 reserve
- Major surface combatants: 78 active, 18 reserve:
- Cruisers: 24 active, 2 reserve
- Destroyers: 36 active, 4 reserve
- Frigates: 18 active, 12 reserve
- Mine Warfare: 13 active, 13 reserve
- Amphibious Lift: 18 active
6.4.2 Combat aviation
Fighter and Attack: 20 squadrons active, 4 squadrons
reserve. 252 active, 50 reserve; 456 total inventory.
4.2 USAF fighter wing equivalents.
USMC aviation contributes 4 additional squadrons so
that all aircraft carriers support 4 wings of fighter
aircraft. The USMC's 48 F/A-18 aircraft are counted
under the USMC totals. Marine aircraft can be freed from
their carrier role, if necessary, and replaced by
activating USN Reserve units.
Electronic warfare and SEAD: 6 active, 1 reserve
squadrons. 66 total inventory.
6.5.1 Combat units
- Active combat units:
- 12 infantry battalions and 2 each of tank, light
armored reconnaissance, and assault amphibious
battalions. (Approximately 1.5 division
equivalents.)
- Reserve combat units:
- 6 infantry battalions. (Approximately 0.5
division equivalents)
6.5.2 Selected combat support and
aviation units
- Artillery:
- 11 battalions: (2 self-propelled 155-mm, 6 towed
155-mm, 3 towed 105-mm.)
- Combat aviation:
- 5 attack helicopter battalions/squadrons (AH-1
Super Cobra).
- 18 attack/fighter aircraft squadrons (8 F/A-18C,
4 F/A-18D, 6 AV-8B) -- approximately 3.7
normalized wing equivalents.
- 4 EA-6B squadrons
6.5.3 Major combat equipment (unit
assigned and total inventory, including
prepositioned and other duplicate sets)
Ground combat
equipment (unit assigned/total inventory) |
M1A1 tanks: |
116/260 |
Light Armored Vehicles: |
300/400 |
Armored Assault Vehicles: |
416/780 |
Self-propelled 155-mm artillery: |
48/65 |
Towed 155-mm artillery: |
144/255 |
Towed 105-mm artillery: |
54/70 |
Note: total inventory includes
provisions for prepositioning. |
|
|
Combat aviation |
Attack helicopters: |
90/150 |
Fighter/Attack aircraft |
264/396 |
Note: Primary unit assigned USMC
aircraft constitute 3.7 FWEs. |
6.6 US Army
6.6.1 Combat Units
- Active combat units:
- 10 heavy brigades, 12 light. (7 division
equivalents.)
- Reserve combat units:
- 9 heavy brigades, 8 light brigades -- all
"enhanced". (5 division equivalents.)
- Heavy brigades by type, active/reserve:
- 2 armored cavalry regiments,
- 3/4 armored,
- 5/5 mechanized infantry
- Light brigades by type, active/reserve:
- 1 airborne (one battalion equipped with AGS-type
weapon),
- 3 air assault,
- 1 Light armored cavalry regiment,
- 1 Air-mechanized infantry
- 1/2 Light mechanized infantry (with LAV-type
wheeled vehicles),
- 4/6 Light infantry (all motorized, riding either
trucks or Hummers),
- 1 Ranger.
6.6.2 Selected combat support units
- Artillery units:
- 24 MLRS battalions,
- 50 Self-propelled artillery battalions (155-mm),
- 27 Towed artillery battalions (7 155-mm, 20
105-mm).
- Note: some or all towed 155-mm could be replaced
by light MLRS system.
- Aviation units:
- 24 Apache attack squadrons,
- 6 Air Cavalry squadrons (various types).
- Air defense units:
- 15 battalions, Stinger vehicles,
- 10 battalions, Patriot.
6.6.3 Major combat equipment
Ground combat equipment
(unit assigned/total inventory) |
M1 tanks: |
1750/2955 |
M2/3 fighting vehicles: |
2130/3550 |
Light Armored Vehicles (wheeled): |
1320/1650 |
MLRS launchers: |
648/750 |
Self-propelled 155-mm artillery: |
1056/1456
(650 Paladin) |
Towed 155-mm artillery: |
168/210 |
Towed 105-mm artillery: |
360/432 |
Stinger air defense vehicles (Avenger,
Bradley, LAV): |
936/1120 |
Patriot launchers: |
420/500 |
|
|
Combat aviation
|
AH-64C/D: |
628/790 |
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior: |
192/240 |
6.7 Special Operations Command
Approximately 25,000 uniformed personnel (included in
Service personnel totals):
- Air Force: 12 active, 4 reserve squadrons.
Approximately 150 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
- Navy: 6 SEAL teams, 6 special warfare units.
- Army: 12 active, 4 reserve Special Forces
battalions; 3 active Ranger battalions; 3 aviation
battalions with approximately 150 helicopters.
6.8 Force deployment
- Reduce foreign stationed personnel and routine naval
presence from worldwide total of 215,000 to 160,000.
- In Europe reduce stationed troops from 108,000 to
75,000 (plus 5,000 afloat).
- In Japan and Korea reduce ground presence from
80,000 to 65,000. Asia total: 75,000.
- On Arabian peninsula: USN rotations, Air Defense
units, USAF rotations of 2-4 sqds, preposition 2 USA
brigade sets & division base set, USAF base set,
reception personnel; deterrent deployments as needed
and exercises.
6.9 Prepositioning of Equipment
Europe: Reduce central POMCUS sets to from 4 to 3
heavy brigades. Remove Norwegian prepositioned assets
(USMC & USA). Retain 1 armored brigade set in Italy
and 1 USMC MPS squadron in Mediterranean.
Northeast Asia: Preposition 2 army brigade sets
in South Korea. Retain 1 USMC MPS squadron at Guam.
Southwest Asia and Indian Ocean: Preposition 2
Army brigade sets plus Army division base set and USAF
base set on Arabian peninsula. At Diego Garcia maintain
afloat 1 Army brigade set plus theater support, 2 USAF
ammunition ships, and 1 USMC MPS squadron.
6.10 Strategic lift
6.10.1 Military Sealift Command
comprises:
8 SL-7 Fast Sealift Ships.
8 Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on, Roll-off cargo ships.
(Another 8 LMSRs are used for Army afloat
prepositioning.)
2 Hospital and 2 Aviation ships
8-15 additional ships chartered as needed
6.10.2 Ready Reserve Fleet
comprises:
32 smaller Roll-on, Roll-off cargo ships.
24 break bulk cargo ships.
4 Lighter Aboard SHips (LASH) and 3 sea barges.
8 tankers
8 cranes
2 troop carriers
6.10.3 Airlift fleet comprises:
72 C-17s
121 C-5s
37 KC-10s (employed as lifters)
24-96 KC-135s (employed as lifters)
The reduced force structure requirement set out in the
proposal implies reduced modernization goals for most
types of equipment. However, some types are maintained
at or near currently planned levels: combat helicopters,
artillery, and electronic warfare, command and control,
and reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft. The option
actually increases the number of light armored combat
vehicles in the US arsenal.
Because of the overall reduction in modernization
requirements, recapitalization of the arsenal can
proceed at a slower rate: some programs are delayed a
few years and others proceed at a slower pace. In
essence, some of the older systems in the US inventory
need not be replaced in the near-term because they are
being "reduced" instead. Reduced requirements also imply
some abatement of the "bow wave" problem, and the option
takes additional steps to further reduce this problem.
These include some near-term procurement that is not
otherwise necessary, but that allows a "flattening-out"
of the future (next generation) procurement curve.
7.1 Ground forces
The proposed posture provides for the comprehensive
modernization of land forces with the bulk of related
acquisition dollars spent between 2010 and 2018. In the
shorter term (covered by the first two five-year plans)
ground force acquisition focuses on towed artillery
systems, wheeled utility vehicles, the provisioning of a
"light mechanized force" initiative, and new utility and
cargo helicopters for both Army and Marine Corps.
Specific guidance includes:
Aviation: Cancel the Army Comanche
helicopter program. Continue upgrade of Apaches
and provision of Kiowa Warrior armed scouts until
requirement of 790 AH-64C/D and 240 OH-58D is fulfilled.
Delay procurement of follow-on USMC and USA armed
helicopters until after 2010 with capabilities geared to
overmatch existing or foreseeable threats at that time.
Cancel the USMC V-22 program and instead purchase
medium-lift alternative; The option budget assumes a mix
of navalized UH-60s and CH-53s. Accelerate
acquisition of Remotely-Piloted Vehicles with
increased emphasis on nondevelopmental items and
mission-suitable technology.
Amphibious fighting vehicles: Proceed with
acquisition of reduced number of new Amphibious
Assault Vehicles (790 vs. 1013) for the USMC
beginning in 2005 or 2006. The AAAV program is delayed
by one or two years and reconfigured to reflect new era
tactical requirements. Among these is a reduced
requirement for the AAAV to function as a heavy infantry
fighting vehicle (or companion to the Abrams tank) in
high-intensity armored combat.
Heavy armored vehicles: Continue upgrade of
Abrams tanks to M1A2 status for a total of 860 systems,
but slow the procurement rate. Also, upgrade 1600
Bradleys to A3 status, but at a slower rate than
previously planned. Delay production of new tank and new
IFV until after 2010.
Light armored vehicles: Begin development of
Army light mechanized and motorized brigades based on
HMMMVs, LAVs, and trucks. The Army will receive and
adapt 350 LAVs from the USMC and procure an additional
1300 vehicles through 2010 (gradually converting
some mechanized infantry and cavalry units to the new
light mechanized configuration). Equip some LAVs with
105-mm low pressure guns to serve as mobile gun systems.
Artillery and missile systems: Continue
procurement of light-weight 155-mm towed howitzer
with total program objective of 465 systems for USA and
USMC. Delay production of Crusader until 2004 and
procure a reduced number (650) over six to eight years.
Explore feasibility of limited acquisition of small MLRS
system (HMMMV-mounted) and FOG-M system to augment light
force capabilities.
Deep attack missiles (ATACMS and ER-MLRS) and
precision munitions: Continue procurement at
slower rate and with reduced acquisition objectives to
reflect reduction in heavy armored units, reduction of
threat, and change in land force mission priorities.
Digitalization and C4ISR systems: Continue
research, development, and procurement tailored to
reduced force size. Slow the pace of digitalization
efforts to ensure quality and efficient integration.
7.2 Air forces
Through 2005 fixed-wing air power modernization focuses
on (i) C-17 procurement, (ii) procurement and
integration of E-8 Joint Stars aircraft for a total
fleet of 13 planes, (iii) a variety of upgrades to
aircraft to improve all-weather, day-night, and
precision-weapon delivery capabilities, (iv) procurement
of new precision munitions (in quantities commensurate
with a reduced threat), and (iv) acquisition of a
limited number of new, current generation
fighter/ground attack aircraft. Production of next
generation fighter and attack aircraft will occur
between 2006 and 2026 with the great majority of the new
aircraft being produced between 2010 and 2020. Specific
guidance includes:
C-17: Limit near-term procurement to 72
aircraft. Forty-eight aircraft are already in the
force. Thirty-six more will be added between 1998 and
2004.
Combat fighter program: The option permits
retirement of all aircraft by or before their
twenty-third year of service and insures that the
average age for USAF and USN/USMC high- and low-end
fleets does not rise above 15 years. It is able to
achieve this while also postponing production (relative
to current plans) and stretching delivery over a 16-year
period because the proposed force structure calls for
significantly fewer combat aircraft than the current
plan. Finally, the proposed program insures that the
United States will enter the period after 2015, when
re-emergence of a new peer competitor becomes most
possible, with a relatively young and up-to-date
combat air fleet.
- The option requirement for USAF fighter, ground
attack, close-air support, and armed observation
aircraft is 1924 planes.
- The option requirement for USN and USMC fighter,
ground attack, and CAS aircraft is 920 planes.
Specific guidance for fighter modernization is:
F/A-18: Cancel development and production of
the E/F model and instead procure 124 of the C/D model
through 2006 at a rate of 18 per year. Reduced
near-term threat makes acquisition of the E/F model
suboptimal. In light of reduced carrier base,
acquisition of 124 F/A-18 C/D models is sufficient to
act as a "bridge" to delivery of the navalized JSF
beginning in 2012.
F-15, F-15E, and F-16: Procure 48 air
superiority F-15s, 36 F-15Es, and 36 F-16s during
period 1998-2004. This ensures an acceptable
average age for the USAF's fighter fleet despite a
planned delay in the procurement of a follow-on to the
F-15. It also relieves the "bow-wave" problem in the
production of the JSF and keeps the average age of the
USAF multirole fighter fleet within acceptable limits.
F-22: Postpone and reconfigure (or cancel)
as noted in next item.
New model fighter and attack aircraft: Two basic
types will be acquired during period 2004-2022: a
"high-end" model and a "low-end" model (JSF) -- each in
several varieties for use by the USAF and USN/USMC. A
reconfigured version of the F-22 may serve as the
high-end model, but the post-Cold War environment does
not call for an aircraft as comprehensively capable as
the current F-22 version. However, the lower-end
estimate for the per unit cost of the F-22, $90 million
(1997 USD), is an acceptable upper limit cost
for the basic USAF air superiority model of the future
fighter.
- A total of 510 "high-end" aircraft will be produced
between 2006 and 2022.
- The USAF will receive 216 air superiority models and
144 ground attack models.
- The USN will receive 150 navalized air superiority
models (beginning in 2007).
Joint Strike Fighter: The first production
models will be completed in 2009; the last of the series
will be produced in 2025 or 2028. The basic JSF model
will not exceed a total per unit cost of $55 million
(1997 USD).
- The USAF will receive between 1264 and 1464 planes.
- The USN and USMC will receive 770 planes, replacing
the F/A-18, EA-6B Prowler, and the AV-8B Harrier
(beginning in 2010).
Specialized ground support aircraft: The USAF
will explore the feasibility of a follow-on to the
A/OA-10 -- that is, a low cost alternative to employing
the JSF in this role -- for production beginning in
2009. This aircraft will function in a variety of ground
force support roles not suitable for helicopters. It
will also serve in higher-threat peace operations and
counter-insurgency operations. The total requirement
is for 300 "CAS" and observation aircraft; the goal
for unit cost is $25 million (1997 USD). If such
an aircraft is judged infeasible at this price, the USAF
will procure 200 additional JSF for CAS roles (already
counted in the JSF acquisition total) and 100
non-developmental observation/counter-insurgency
aircraft.
"Silver bullet" aircraft: The USAF will conduct
an on-going design and research effort exploring a
potential follow-on to the F-117. Production of this
futuristic "deep attack" fighter is contingent on the
emergence of a peer military rival to the United States
and, thus, would not likely commence before 2015 (if at
all). Should production be deemed necessary, the likely
acquisition goal will be 60 aircraft. (The proposed
budget does not provide for acquisition of this
aircraft.)
7.3 Naval forces
The proposed option recapitalizes most of the Navy's
fighting ships and boats after 2010. Consistent with the
current age of the fleet and historical standards for
useful service life, the lion-share of procurement
occurs between 2012 and 2027. Again, Option D's capacity
to reconcile these standards with a delay in procurement
is due to a substantial reduction in the size of the
fleet relative to its Cold War precursor. Procurement of
fleet support ships -- which received less attention
during the 1980s -- occurs at a steadier rate throughout
the period 1998-2030. Key guidelines for fleet
modernization are:
Strategic systems: Cancel D-5 missile
production; cancel reconfiguration of Trident
submarines for D-5 missile.
Attack submarines: With fleet requirement set at
36 boats we can cancel procurement of the NAS
and explore lower cost option to enter production
at rate of one per year in 2004, rising to two per year
in 2005. These new boats will begin to enter the fleet
in 2006. This approach allows the retirement of all
boats in or before their twenty-third year of service
and keeps the average age of the fleet below 16 years at
all times. By 2017 the average age of the 36 boats in
the fleet will have declined to 10.5 years.
Aircraft Carriers: Cancel CVN 76. The
reduced force structure allows postponement of new
aircraft carrier acquisition until 2009. This new
carrier will actually enter the fleet in 2013 or 2014.
After this one, a new aircraft carrier will enter the
fleet every three or four years.
Destroyers and other major surface combatants: End
procurement of DDG-51 destroyers after production of
42 vessels. Completion of the final four ships in
this production run will occur at a rate of one every
two years through 2006. After this, the USN will not
have to add new destroyers or cruisers to the fleet
until after 2012.
The option retains 28 frigates in the surface fleet,
active and reserve, to serve in missions including
shipping escort, SLOC security, shipping interdiction,
coastal patrol, and in other roles involving
lower-intensity naval threats. The budget provides for
new production of frigate class ships beginning in 2008
and continuing through 2018. However, depending on the
security environment, DOD may decide at that time to
substitute acquisition of moderate-cost destroyer class
vessels.
Amphibious ships: The option provides for
four LPD-17 ships only, which will be produced at
a rate of one every two years through 2006. These ships
together with eight Dock Landing Ships (LSD 41-49) and
seven Wasp-class helicopter/dock landing ships will
constitute the core of the amphibious warfare fleet
through 2012 (when a new cycle of amphibious ship
procurement begins).
Sealift: The option ends acquisition of
Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ships (LMSRs) with
delivery of the sixteenth ship. Previously DOD had
planned to acquire 19 of these ships. The proposed
option also cancels the purchase and conversion of
five smaller Roll-On/Roll-Off ships for the Ready
Reserve Fleet.
8. Defense Budget 1998-2012
The tables below present three five-year plans. Force
reduction occurs in the period 1998-2005. Modernization
occurs throughout the period covered by the plans, but
budgeting for modernization "shakes-off" the effect of
force reductions in 2004 and begins to show regular,
marked increases after 2005. While personnel spending
stabilizes in 2005, modernization reaches a plateau in
2011.
Option
FYDP 1998-2012 (1998 USD) |
|
98 |
99 |
00 |
01 |
02 |
Total |
Personnel |
68.5 |
62.5 |
60 |
58 |
54 |
303 |
O&M |
92 |
88 |
86 |
84 |
78 |
428 |
Procurement |
37 |
36 |
34.4 |
35 |
35.6 |
178 |
R&D |
30.8 |
29.3 |
29 |
28.4 |
27 |
144.5 |
C&H |
8 |
8.5 |
11 |
8 |
8 |
43.5 |
other |
.7 |
.7 |
.6 |
.6 |
.9 |
3.5 |
051 TOTAL |
237 |
225 |
221 |
214 |
203.5 |
1100.5 |
050 Total |
249.5 |
236.5 |
231 |
222 |
211.4 |
1150.4 |
As % GDP |
3 |
2.8 |
2.7 |
2.5 |
2.3 |
|
|
03 |
04 |
05 |
06 |
07 |
Total |
Personnel |
54 |
51.7 |
51 |
51.2 |
51.5 |
259.4 |
O&M |
74 |
72 |
70 |
70 |
69 |
355 |
Procurement |
38 |
39 |
40 |
43 |
45 |
205 |
R&D |
27 |
27.5 |
27 |
28 |
28.5 |
138 |
C&H |
9 |
7.2 |
7.2 |
7 |
6 |
36.4 |
other |
1 |
.6 |
.8 |
.8 |
1 |
4.2 |
051 TOTAL |
203 |
198 |
196 |
200 |
201 |
998 |
050 Total |
209 |
204 |
202 |
206 |
208 |
1029 |
As % GDP |
2 |
* |
* |
* |
2 |
|
|
08 |
09 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
Total |
Personnel |
51.8 |
52 |
52.2 |
52.4 |
52.6 |
261 |
O&M |
69.5 |
70 |
70 |
70.5 |
71 |
351 |
Procurement |
49.8 |
54.5 |
54.8 |
55.6 |
55.5 |
270.2 |
R&D |
28 |
28 |
27.5 |
27 |
26.5 |
137 |
C&H |
6 |
6.6 |
6.6 |
6.5 |
6.4 |
32.1 |
other |
.9 |
.9 |
.9 |
1 |
1 |
4.7 |
051 TOTAL |
206 |
212 |
212 |
213 |
213 |
1056 |
050 Total |
212.5 |
218 |
218 |
218 |
217.5 |
1084 |
As % GDP |
* |
* |
1.96 |
1.9 |
1.87 |
|
The budgets reflect the effects of a number of non-monetary
cost inflators to account for improvements in
living standards (and wages) and for the increased costs
and capabilities of the material and technology used to
fulfill force structure requirements. There are some
countervailing tendencies as well:
- The integration of improved communication and
computation technologies and the adoption of
"information age" organizational structures and
routines is assumed to improve efficiency. This
partially offsets the inflators associated with the
O&M account.
- The "technology" cost inflator is assumed to produce
increases in capabilities that may allow additional
reductions in force structure and personnel sometime
after 2012.
- The model assumes that tighter budgetary constraints
(compared to the 1980s) and a reduced emphasis on
cutting-edge technologies will mitigate technology
cost inflation.
Because of the effect of inflators there can be no
"steady state" budget and a straight-forward comparison
of the proposed budgets with those of the previous 12
years is difficult. However, if the option's program of
restructuring and reductions could be completed with today's
wage standards and technology costs held constant, the
budget would probably average approximately $192
billion (1997 USD), with the procurement portion
of the budget averaging approximately $42 billion.
As a percentage of GDP, the National Defense budget
gradually moves down below 3 percent, reaching the 2
percent level in 2003. It first moves below 2 percent in
2010.
Citation: Carl Conetta and
Charles Knight, Defense Sufficiency and Cooperation:
A US Military Posture for the post-Cold War Era,
Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #9.
Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, March 1998.
http://www.comw.org/pda/opdfin.html
Copyright ©
The Commonwealth Institute. All Rights Reserved.
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