On the Threshold of Change:
South African Defence Review reflects the continuing struggle to define a military policy for the new era
Project on Defense Alternatives
Carl Conetta, Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher
October 1996
The submission in October 1996 to the Joint Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Defence of the draft Defence Review:
Report on Posture is a major milestone in the establishment of a democratic
security policy for the Republic of South Africa. Especially
important in this document is the recognition that the greatest threats to the
South African people are social and economic in character. In
line with this the Review also annunciates the need to channel
the state's financial resources to the alleviation of poverty and
unemployment. Equally significant is the Review's commitment to a
"war prevention" approach to military security challenges and its
commensurate emphasis on regional common security arrangements,
defense cooperation, peace support operations, and arms control.
With regard to more traditional military defense measures, the
Review's preclusion of preemptive strike options merits special
note. This bold declaration is an important step toward
reducing security tensions and fears in the region by
limiting the exercise of South African military power in accord
with international law -- although its concrete
impact on regional crisis stability depends on the reduction of South Africa's present capacities for pre-emption.
Regrettably, the Council on Defence, which includes the Minister
of Defence and the Chief of the National Defence Force, decided
in late October to strike the language in the Review
that prohibits pre-emption. However, Parliament will revisit
this issue when it reconvenes in 1997.
The Defence Review also affirms that the SANDF will have a "primarily
defensive orientation and posture." (Chap 1, Sect 30.) More
important it recognizes that defensiveness is not only a matter
of intent, but also "has implications for doctrine, training, and
force design." (Chap 1, Sect 30.)
The Defence Review goes much further than the preceding Defence
White Paper in specifying the elements of a new defense posture.
Still, a number of problems remain. Many stated policy
objectives and design directives are open to multiple and
conflicting interpretations, and some vital information is
missing. Occasionally, the Review seems to be at war with itself:
the guidance and concepts laid out in some chapters find only a
distorted reflection in others.
The most serious problems regard force requirements and design.
This is unfortunate because the determination of force
requirements and design constitutes the critical step in
translating political guidance into a material product. Problems are also evident in the
discussions of peace support operations
and military industrial capabilities. Because the resolution of
the issues in these areas will determine the ultimate effect of
the review process the remainder of this commentary examines them
closely.
Although exhaustive in many respects, the Defence Review fails to
provide the type of information necessary to gauge how well it
reflects the government's guidance. Indeed, even information of
the most fundamental sort is missing. How large will the SANDF
be in total? How many people of what status will it employ? How
many weapons systems of what type will it possess? How much
money will it require? Although the review presents four force
options and clearly favors one of these, none are associated with
tables of equipment and none include "bottom line" personnel
numbers or budget figures. (The personnel and budget figures
that the Review presents are for combat units only, and this
constitutes only an unspecified fraction of the total SANDF
requirement for people and funds.)
In order to make an informed judgement Parliament needs to know
the total projected equipment, personnel, and budget associated
with each of the options presented in the Review. Such
information would allow valid comparisons of the different SANDF
options with previous force configurations -- for instance the
SADF of 1970, 1980, and 1990 -- and with the other armed forces
of southern Africa. Such comparisons are key in accessing the
appropriateness of a proposed force to the needs and character of
the present period.
The Defence Review assesses each of the options in light of
various possible threats and missions. The potential threats
range from a major invasion to punitive raids to internal
disorder. With regard to threats, the Review also makes
assumptions about the "warning time" or "lead time" during which
the SANDF can make preparations: the shorter the warning time for
a particular threat, the larger the defense force that South
Africa must keep ready.
However the Review gives decision-makers little clue about the
character or magnitude of the threats that it is planning
against; nor does it reveal the "warning times" that its planning
assumes. Lacking this information it is impossible to judge the
plausibility of the Review's conclusions regarding the adequacy
of each of its force options. Indeed, the Review provides little
basis for determining whether or not the range of options
presented is skewed. Although the Review adopts a so-called
"threat independent" approach to planning -- meaning that it does
not attempt to identify threat states -- it bases its
calculations on "nominal threats" or hypothetical aggressor
forces. These and other important inputs to defense planning
should be open to discussion because taken together they
determine the Review's conclusions about sufficiency.
The South African military today is among the top 20 in the
world, considering both quality and quantity of troops and arms.
It is more powerful than all of its neighbors combined. But what
about threats from outside the region? Since WWII only a few of
the world's nations have shown the capacity and willingness to
project and sustain significant amounts of combat power over
intercontinental distances: the United States, France, Great
Britain, and the Soviet Union (together with Cuba). Today, the
French and British could each probably manage an intercontinental
intervention force of no more than 30,000 troops (all services).
During the last decade of the Cold War the Soviet-Cuban team
could manage no more than 100,000 troops. Of course, today the
Russian capacity to project and sustain significant combat power
over intercontinental distances is virtually non-existent.
The United States alone could and can manage intercontinental
interventions involving 500,000 troops or more -- and this only
given an extended deployment period and uncontested access to a
developed base infrastructure. A more rapid deployment over
intercontinental distances is an entirely different matter.
Without prepositioned troops and equipment, even the United
States would be hard pressed to deploy a mixed heavy-light force
of 100,000 troops in less than a month. The French and British
might each manage 15 percent of that and the Russians even less.
Long-range power projection and force sustainment are the most
demanding, dangerous, and expensive missions that a military can
undertake. Although the number of nations capable of such
operations could increase in the coming years, the likelihood of
a regional intervention by a force of 50,000 troops must be
judged as quite low for the next 10 or 15 years. Significantly,
even the smallest of the force options presented in the Review
should be able to achieve, on full mobilization, some critical
defense objectives with regard to such an intervention force. It
could ensure, for instance, that any attempt to occupy or
compromise South African territory would incur a very high cost
for the aggressor, if not catastrophic failure.
It is surprising, therefore, that the Review regards even the
most robust of its force options, which would involve more than
100,000 troops after mobilization, as flatly failing to provide
for the contingency of major invasion -- except as a
reconstitution base. How large of an outside intervention are
the Review's authors planning against? What probability of
occurrence do they assign this contingency? How much deterrence
or defense capability do they see as necessary with regard to low
probability threats? These questions underscore Parliament's
need to know the specific assumptions that drive defense
planning.
Any calculation of requirements is complicated by the fact that,
while South Africa today faces no clear and present military
threat of substantial size, the future is uncertain. But
"uncertainty" is a slippery concept; it can be misused to make
good news appear bad, or to rivet our attention on issues of
secondary concern. The good news is that South Africa is today
certainly and substantially more secure from military threats
than it has been at any time in the past 25 years. Moreover, the
future regarding military threats is certainly brighter today
than it has been in many decades. Unfortunately, we can say with
equal assurance that the situation regarding nonmilitary threats
to stability is not so good: a variety of social, economic, and
environmental crises beset the region. If left to fester these
crises will someday find a military expression -- but they need
not. This is the paradox that weighs on security policy makers:
buying too much insurance against low probability military
threats will beggar South Africa's ability to address the types
of clear and present regional problems that generate military
threats over time.
The most improbable of military threats -- that of a large-scale
invasion or incursion by a big power -- plays a major role in the
Defence Review's conceptualization of a "core force." This core
force supposedly constitutes a minimum necessary foundation for
reconstituting the type of military that could deter or counter a
big power threat. The emphasis on maintaining an expansion core
rather than a huge standing military is meant to balance two
things: the low probability that an invasion threat will arise
and the dire consequences to South Africa if it does.
Maintaining a reconstitution base is an economical way of hedging
against the emergence of future threats. Nonetheless, the
prospect for economy will be lost if planners construe a
potential future threat of extreme proportions -- for instance: a
regional intervention by a hostile force comprising 100,000
troops. This could lead South Africa to maintain a too large
reconstitution core.
The imagination is always richer than the treasury, and there are
competing uses for every available rand. Nonetheless, if policy-
makers feel that they cannot discount highly unlikely scenarios,
they will need more than the concept of "force reconstitution" to
make defense preparations affordable. Two adjustments in
planning may prove helpful. First, with regard to potential
future threats of very large scale but very low probability the
nation could settle for a modest level of "military insurance."
Planners could aim for something less -- after reconstitution --
than the capability needed for a decisive defensive victory.
They might, for instance, seek the capability to slow and limit
any very large-scale aggression, extracting a high price from the
aggressor and buying time for international support to take form.
This capability would become the goal of reconstitution.
A second and complementary way of dealing with extreme scenarios
is to adopt a competitive strategy. Should South Africa find
itself confronted by a nation or alliance possessing greatly
superior military resources, it could choose to compete in a
different sphere. It could adopt a political-military or
political-diplomatic defense. In the final analysis South
Africa's most valuable security asset is its currently excellent
regional and international standing. The combination of a
competitive political-diplomatic strategy and modest defensive
military objectives offers an affordable and sensible way to
hedge against the remote possibility of a large-scale invasion of
the region. This would permit South Africa to maintain a smaller
reconstitution base today and devote more of its resources to the
solution of clear and present problems.
The Defence Review states that "certain military industrial
capabilities must be maintained to support defense
requirements," (Chap 3, Sect
9.9.) but what these are in particular is never stated.
Presumably the requirement for military industrial capabilities
will be addressed in the forthcoming section of the Defence
Review on the Defence Industry and Procurement.
However, the shape and size of the core force promulgated in the
Report on Posture is clearly related to the industrial
efficiency requirements of maintaining substantial portions of
the relatively large South African defense industry built up
under the old government.
The Review recognizes that South Africa has regained its status
as a member in good standing of the international community,
which should give the nation increased access to global arms
markets -- especially in the event that it is challenged by an aggressor.
But, so far,
the Review fails to explore how or in what areas South Africa
might rely on arms transfers for future procurement.
The Defence Review also says that "major weapon systems may take
up to 15 years to develop and commission..." (Chap 3, Sect 8.5.)
This is true enough as an outside limit, but weapon systems are
frequently developed in half this time and often can be acquired
from other nations and adapted or improved in a few years.
Facing emergencies, nations have been known to acquire and
integrate new weapons in six months. There are many ways to plan
for the modernization and reconstitution of an arsenal. It would
be a mistake to assume that 15 years is required absolutely for
the introduction of new systems. If policy makers accept this
assumption they could commit South Africa to an unnecessarily
high pace of continuous military modernization. This would be a
very expensive proposition -- and one that could prompt concern
among neighboring states.
The Defence Review asserts that planning must also assume that
"any future enemy will have sophisticated weapons and systems."
(Chap 3, Sect 40.1.) But it offers no standard of "sophistication." Should South Africa prepare
to match the most
technically advanced of the world's armed forces? This would
require SANDF research, development, and procurement efforts to
pursue the limits of technical feasibility. Clearly, economy and
proportion demand a more modest goal. A selective modernization
is in order -- one that corresponds to an assessment of South
Africa's special competencies and vulnerabilities. In this,
special attention must be paid to regional potentials and trends.
Although neighboring states may acquire some items of advanced
design, the average technical level of regional armed forces will
remain modest by the standards of rich and middle-income
countries. Planners should also keep in mind that what counts in
assessing a potential threat is not the mere presence of a
technology but its presence in militarily significant quantity
and the capacity of its possessor to support it.
In order to hedge against the low-probability threat of a major
power intervention sometime in the future, South Africa should
maintain a skill base capable of improvisation and integration of
higher technology enhancements to the force. Technical
improvisation is already a special competency of the South
African defense establishment, but it need not be supported at
the high level typical of recent crisis periods.
As a concrete expression of its commitment to develop a security
partnership with its neighbors South Africa should adopt a
clearly nonprovocative, defensively-oriented military posture.
This has been accepted by the Defence White Paper, but
interpreted restrictively by the Defence Review. The Review
asserts that "the doctrine of the SANDF will be based on a
strategic defensive posture." (Chap 2, Sect 16.) However, it
also asserts that, in order to repel aggression, "appropriate
offensive capabilities will be required at the operational
level." (Chap 2, Sect 17.) Although the extent of these
capabilities is nowhere spelled out, the Review elsewhere
describes the SANDF as "primarily defensive" in orientation and
posture. (Chap 1, Sect 30.) These various formulations and
omissions are confusing. A closer look is warranted.
Generally speaking, the "operational level" of war refers to that
level at which a military's various services and branches join to
fight as a team. It is the level at which a military's overall
method of war is manifest. The Review tells us that the SANDF's
method of war will combine offensive and defensive action of
rather large scale in "appropriate" proportion. The statement of
defensive orientation at the strategic level means that South
Africa does not intend or plan to use its military to serve
aggressive goals. Thus, the offensive potential of the SANDF
would be used only in a counter-offensive fashion. This
provision has the nature of a "political promise" to one's
neighbors -- a pledge of self-restraint. However, it does not
imply structural limitations on the capacity for cross-border
offensives, and the Defence Review suggests few such
restrictions. The crux of the issue from the perspective of
crisis stability is this: will South Africa structure its armed
forces to defend the nation from within its own borders?
In several places and ways the Defence Review answers this
question in the negative. With regard to South Africa's use of
offensive power against an adversary it notes that in times of
crisis the government may declare appropriate exclusion zones --
presumably located on the territory of a neighboring state.
(Chap 2, Sect 18.) A more explicit clarification occurs in
Chapter 8, which addresses force design. Here the Review
examines as one of four options (Option 4) a force design that it
characterizes as "purely defensive." Distinguishing this option
is the assumption that "the SANDF fights only on South African
territory." Significantly, the Review's assessment of this
option is overwhelmingly negative. It derides it as involving
strategic gaps that "pose serious risks to [the] government
regarding its ability to ensure the security of its people."
(Chap 8, Sect 64.) It also concludes that the option is among
the most expensive available. These conclusions about Option 4
are difficult to corroborate: as noted above the Review fails to
provide sufficient information for an independent assessment.
The Review leaves no doubt, however, that the authors of the
Force Design chapter are presently ill-disposed toward the idea
that South Africa can do without a "forward defense."
Regardless of political constraints applied at the strategic
level, a failure to constrain structurally the capacity for
cross-border offensives would render moot several important
precepts set out in the Defence Review. First, a capacity for
rapid, large cross-border offensives certainly also entails a
considerable capacity for pre-emption, which the draft Review elsewhere
disavows. Second, the Review states that any deterrence
capability "should not be counter-productive in that it triggers
an arms race." (Chap 2, Sect 12.5.) However, if South Africa
retains and modernizes a relatively large military possessing a
considerable capacity for large-scale offensive action, other
nations may be inspired to follow suit -- as best they can. If
they are unable to keep pace based solely on indigenous
potentials, they could seek defense cooperation arrangements with
outside powers. They also could opt to acquire weaponry of
little military value but high political impact such as Scud
missiles and chemical weapons. It does not take a fortune teller
to see where this road leads. A historian will do.
Contemplation of common action-reaction cycles clarifies how,
despite a nation's good intentions, its defense preparations have
often contributed to the instabilities they are meant to
alleviate. In the end, military structure and arsenals speak
with greater effect than words.
As noted above, the Review's chapter on force design examines
and, essentially, rejects a defensive option. It offers no
reason to believe, however, that the sole defensive option it
presents is the best one available. Notably, the Review
describes its example as deficient in operational mobility and
lacking the wherewithal to eject an invader. But neither these
characteristics, nor the high cost of the model, are typical of
all such models -- for instance, those employed by Finland,
Sweden, and Austria. A defensively-oriented military should and
can have the capacity to eject an invader, although it would go
about the task in its own way. First it would seek to impede,
halt, and contain the incursion. Next it would aim to unbalance
and weaken an intruder through relatively small-scale, local
counterattacks. Finally, after the intruding force has been
substantially weakened, it would seek to expel it from the
country.
By contrast a military that defends in a more offensively-
oriented way might seek to launch a large-scale counter-offensive
very early in the war. Such a counter attack might go after a
piece of the adversary's territory to use as a bargaining chip or
it might seek to "hit the intruding force deep in its rear area,"
regardless of whether this involves large-scale cross-border
operations. From one perspective such actions might seem only
fair; after all, the defender is responding to a presumably
unprovoked act of aggression. However, there is a problem in
that a capability for cross-border counter-offensives is
indistinguishable from a capability for cross-border aggression.
Typically such a capacity derives from having a large proportion
of units that combine long-range mobility and logistics, high
firepower, and a degree of mobile protection sufficient to permit
long stays in hostile territory.
What would a structurally defensive military look like? Without
doubt different circumstances would produce different models.
And, for any particular set of circumstances, there would be
multiple ways of achieving defensiveness -- some better than
others in terms of stability effects and cost. Contrary to what
the authors of the force design chapter imply, offensive
capabilities would not be entirely lacking in a defensive
military. However, the offensive components would be smaller and
fewer in number than in an offensively-oriented model. This is
possible because the counter-attack units would work closely with
defensive units and would seek to exploit "home court" advantages
that convey a competitive edge. (These include local popular
support, familiarity with the terrain, prior preparation of the
defense zone, and relatively shorter supply lines.) Moreover, as
stated earlier, the defensively-oriented force would not attempt
a "clean sweep" counter-offensive until an intruder had been
depleted substantially. Also characteristically, the offensive
element would be "tethered" in some way to home territory --
for
instance, by its dependence on other, lower-mobility units, field
preparations, or semi-static communication and logistics
networks. The most unique trait of defensively-oriented military
units is this: whatever their degree of offensive power, it
declines rapidly should they leave their national context and
attempt to drive deep into hostile territory.
Significantly, a defensively-oriented military may have some
units with longer-range or "operational" mobility. This is
especially important for nations such as South Africa that have a
relatively long border to defend and cannot bear the cost of
maintaining a thick defensive belt all along their frontier.
Within a defensive concept, however, longer-range "rapid
deployment" units would not have a high offensive potential when
they arrived at a trouble spot. Instead, they would be equipped
to assume defensive roles with the immediate objective of halting
an aggressor or reinforcing local defenses. Typically, such
forces consist of easy-marching (motorized/light mechanized)
infantry and engineer units with good defensive firepower,
immediate artillery support and no -- or only minimal --
counterattack elements (such as armor and attack helicopters).
Oddly the SANDF planners came to precisely the opposite
conclusion when choosing attack helicopters over transport
versions in the design of their defensive option. Rapid
allocation of forces is a key component of a good defense and
transport helicopters can have an important role in delivering
troops, anti-armor weapons, and other force components to a
crisis point. Trading these transport vehicles for attack
helicopters would seem to contradict the intent of a defensive
posture by extending the reach and fire power of a rapid
deployment force that already possesses considerable cross-border
offensive potential. Obviously this could cause concern among
neighbors and have a potentially negative impact on regional
stability. Moreover, reducing the number of transport
helicopters in the tradeoff will increase South African force
allocation problems in defense operations and likely make South
Africa's home defense less resilient.
The Review's chapter on force design seeks to close the door on
the defensive option. But the needs of the nation and the region
demand a renewed process of innovation and experimentation.
Extensive consultation with national militaries experienced in
this approach -- Finland, Sweden, and Austria, for example --
would facilitate such a process.
The Defence Review states that South Africa will fulfil its
responsibility to participate in international peace support
operations authorized by the United Nations and sanctioned by the
appropriate regional security organization. The Review lists a
variety of peace support operations, and it concludes that these
may require a wide range of military instruments. However, it
provides no further guidance regarding the types of peace
operations that South Africa should actually undertake or
regarding the specific capabilities associated with them. This
is a serious shortcoming.
The Defence Review wisely advises caution in committing to peace
support deployments because such operations are new to the
Defense Forces and because the Forces are presently preoccupied
with the demands of integration and rationalization. There is an
additional reason for caution with regard specifically to Peace
Enforcement Operations which are distinguished by the substantial
likelihood of combat action. It will be many years before
regional security organizations have the political and technical
wherewithal to command such complex and risky operations. But,
in the absence of an effective multinational command structure,
neither the region nor the continent may yet be prepared to see
South Africa lead the way in such missions.
Until regional cooperative security arrangements mature, South
Africa might best restrict itself to participation in less
controversial forms of peace support: traditional peacekeeping,
preventive deployment, and humanitarian assistance missions.
These are the missions for which there is growing demand and in
which South Africa can participate with relatively low risk.
Moreover, these missions offer a means for reducing the
requirement for peace enforcement operations. For instance,
earlier and more substantial missions of this simpler sort could
have significantly stabilized conditions in Somalia and the
former-Yugoslavia.
Traditional peacekeeping, preventive deployment, and humanitarian
assistance missions mostly require inputs of light infantry and
air transport. They do not depend on new investments in
sophisticated technology or heavy armament. Moreover, if
deployments along these lines remain infrequent they will have
little impact on the size and shape of the armed forces of South
Africa.
It may take a decade or more of regional institution building and
experience with the less demanding types of peace support before
South Africa feels prepared to attempt peace enforcement
missions. These would require a different level and type of
long-range military capability. Its character and quantity
should be a matter of fully ventilated democratic debate in the
meantime. However, a prerequisite to informed debate is a
clarification of the distinctions and the overlap among the
various regional missions that South African forces might
undertake. Until the MOD clearly specifies the distinct
requirements associated with each of the possible peace support
missions, political authorities run the risk of buying a costly
war horse when what they desire is a more modest draught animal.
Finally, it is not clear presently how much peace support
capability would exist under the various options examined in the
Defence Review. Peace support operations are treated as
secondary to the national defense function of the SANDF.
Although the Review states that the "SANDF will perform its
secondary functions chiefly with its core defense capabilities,"
it also notes that peace support deployments may require
additional structure and funds. (Chap 3, Sect 9.7.) This may
confront decision-makers with a choice of either spending more
than they currently plan in order to fund peace operations or
rethinking the purpose and functions of the core force and the
allocation of resources within it.
The Defence Review takes an important step toward a new defense
policy for a new South Africa. Although the gaps in information
are a shortcoming, and the extent of innovation in force design
is insufficient, the Review's articulation of cooperative
security, arms control, and peace support policies represents a
critical break with the past. Perhaps most important, the Review
embodies South Africa's commitment to an open and democratic
process of policy development and implementation. As always
in a democratic process, much remains
to consider and debate as South Africa moves forward to build a lasting national
consensus on security issues.
Citation:
Carl Conetta, Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher, "On the
Threshold of Change: A Commentary on the October 1996 Draft of
the South African Defence Review." Project on Defense
Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA,
January 1997.
http://www.comw.org/pda/sadrcom.htm
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