The Logic of Peace Operations:

A starting point for determining the special military requirements imposed by peace operations is the question, What is the defining logic of such operations that differentiates them and war? A recent US Army manual on peace operations sees the following distinction:

In war, consent is not an issue of concern for the military commander. In peace operations, however, the level of consent determines fundamentals of the operation. ¹

Characteristically, peace operations involve (i) an action program or mandate to which the principal parties to a conflict consent, at least partially, and (ii) intervention by an agent not involved in the conflict that acts to monitor, facilitate, supervise, and/or enforce implementation of the action program -- in some cases because local consent to the program is insufficiently robust or self-sustaining. Robust or not, consent serves as the lever that enables the world community and its representative field force to achieve goals that would be unattainable otherwise, except at prohibitive cost. ²

Wars, by contrast, tend toward becoming bilateral affairs in which each side pursues the destruction of the other's military capability -- at least to the extent that the achievement of political goals requires it. Thus, the defeat, destruction, or incapacitation of some relevant portion of an opponent's military power is viewed as a necessary enabling condition for a program of political action. Wars could be said to have two moments: one military, the other political. Although the military moment should always serve and conform to the political, it is also distinct: Within a vector set by politics, it has its own immediate goal and measure of success, which is military victory.

Comparing peace enforcement operations to war, a US Army Infantry School white paper usefully notes that,

Settlement, not victory, is the goal of all peace enforcement operations. The measure of success will always be political, not military. ³

This precept calls to mind the role of police, as it is conceived ideally. Consider the hypothetical example of police officers acting to quell an altercation. Depending on how the disputants respond to an order to desist, the officers may have to physically restrain, disarm, or even injure one or both. These acts do not, in themselves, make the officers a party to the dispute, even if events require them to focus their restraining power primarily on one of the disputants.⁵ Nor does it make the disputants "police enemies", whose capacity to resist must be broken utterly or whose cooperation is not desired and sought. Indeed, police interventions typically involve a mix of cajoling, warning, and force -- albeit with the threat of greater force (or trouble) held obviously in reserve.

Regarding peace operations, the least challenging scenario is one in which the parties to a conflict are mutually committed to ending hostilities and enacting a settlement, but remain suspicious of each other or worry that the close proximity of their fighting forces will spark an unwanted engagement. In this case, an outside agent may act to embody or facilitate the already existing consensus of the parties -- a circumstance that typifies simple or "traditional" peacekeeping operations. Here the analog for the outside force is a referee or mediator, not a police officer. In these cases, the deployment of "traditional" blue helmets -- armed lightly and only for self-protection -- will suffice.

More difficult are situations in which local political and military leaders exert only incomplete control over their combatant forces, or situations in which military and paramilitary forces are partially independent of central political control. The most demanding situations are those in which one or more of the warring parties have not yet completely resigned themselves to seeking their ends through peaceful means, and those characterized by a general breakdown in public order. In these cases, the main impetus for a peace operation may come from the broader community of states, who see a serious threat to regional peace or to humanitarian standards in the conflict or in its effects. ⁶

When momentum for the peace program originates outside the affected area, local consent may be uneven and grudging, perhaps resting partially on external inducements, sanctions, or the threat of sanctions. Indeed, in some cases combatants may agree to negotiate a program of conflict management, limitation, or resolution simply because doing so is the sole alternative they have to a more vigorous form of outside intervention. Where local consent is variegated and unstable, the peace operations force must be prepared to operate in an environment of potential hostility, which warring factions or groups may direct at each other, at the mandated action program and its representatives, or both.

If consent is the lever arm of peace operations, the fulcrum is the capability of the field force to protect itself and deter a descent into a general state of violence. ⁷ The field force combines this lever and fulcrum into a synergetic system through a doctrine that prescribes a defensive military stance and the discrete use of force at minimum necessary levels. ⁸

The "lever arm and fulcrum" system will not function if the fulcrum -- that is, the field force -- cannot protect itself or lacks sufficient strength to plausibly deter attacks. For this reason, the tactical units of the field force -- in this case, battalions and companies -- should closely resemble typical "middle weight" military units in their equipment and capabilities. This criteria should be applied with reference to a prototypical "worst case" threat for these types of conflict -- which means a military or paramilitary opposition employing, at best, mid-level technology and exhibiting low- to mid-levels of organization and professionalism.

The implication of the preceding discussion is that a UN legion will distinguish itself from a typical middle- weight force, such as the French Force d'Action Rapide, at the tactical and small-unit levels not by its equipment or combat capability as much as by its tactics and techniques of first resort -- presence, communication, persuasion, mediation, and negotiation, which imply special training and a high level of discipline and professionalism. On the theater level, however, the force would appear clearly different from one designed for warfighting. Peace operations do not encompass operational-level offensives. Nor should a peace operation field force be expected to erect a robust defense against protracted and intensive theater- wide military assault. Consequently, the capabilities associated with such missions are notably absent. In the instance of a large-scale offensive, these would include substantial reserves of heavy armor, deep-strike combat aircraft, and a preponderance of self-propelled long-range artillery under armor.

Peace Operations Mission Taxonomy and Field Functions

A review of typical peace operations missions will help us identify the structural characteristics of a suitable field force. Of special interest among these missions are the following: ⁹

• Preventive deployment to forestall violence between communities or states;
• Monitoring or supervision of a tense situation, stalemate, ceasefire, or settlement;
• Establishment, monitoring, or supervision of cantonment areas, demilitarized zones, or buffer zones between warring parties -- which may involve interposition by the field force;
• Support, supervision, or implementation of a process of disarming and demobilizing of the warring factions;
• Protection and support of humanitarian assistance efforts;
• Noncombatant evacuation under threat;
• Establishment of protective zones;
• Protection and support of national reconstruction and reconciliation efforts -- including the conduct of elections;
• Assistance in the maintenance and restoration of general civil order; and
• Enforcement of sanctions.

This mission taxonomy provides a guide for deciding the structure and mix of field units for the proposed force. Missing from this list are those peace enforcement missions that clearly involve full-fledged war: for instance, theater-wide counter-offensive campaigns. As noted above, the proposed legion is not designed to undertake this type of campaign. (It is also worth noting that some of the missions listed above would not routinely require a force more capable than traditional "blue helmet" peacekeepers. In cases where lightly armed peacekeepers are both available and judged able to safely enact a UN mandate, the proposed legion should not be used in their place.)

The proposed legion is geared toward contingencies in which the threat of armed resistance is real and present. Beyond this, its specific structures conform to the "field functions" implied in the mission taxonomy. In this analysis, "functions" are routine activities that field units may have to undertake in the course of performing a mission. Identifying these functions is an intermediate step in designing a force structure that is suited to the achievement of mission objectives. With regard to the mission taxonomy presented above, relevant field functions include (i) observing, monitoring, and patrolling, (ii) protection, (iii) control, and (iv) defense. Observing and monitoring are functions that are often best suited to specialized reconnaissance and surveillance units -- cavalry. However, some forms of observing and monitoring imply static observation sites -- which can be staffed by infantry. Patrolling in detail -- that is, on foot -- can also count as a form of observing and monitoring and, it is a task for infantry.

Protection

Protection activities are also emphasized in the mission list. These may be usefully divided into several categories: protection of sites, protection of areas, and protection of UN-supported activities. Protection of sites -- such as government buildings or communication facilities -- can depend largely on infantry in a static mode. Protection of areas can range from regular patrolling (as a means of maintaining order and supporting site protection) to full-blown area defense. The latter encompasses the defense of protected areas (for instance, safe havens and force lodgements) against concerted raids or even massed assault. (Defense of protected areas is addressed separately below.) Area patrolling can involve either cavalry or dismounted infantry -- depending on geographical scope, terrain, and threat.

Protection of UN-supported activities -- such as electoral activities, humanitarian relief, or the conveyance of people or goods -- poses special problems. It often implies protection on-the-move through hostile or uncontrolled areas. Even when the protected activities are more or less stationary, they may be intermittent and scattered throughout a country, occurring both in areas that are closely controlled by the UN force and areas that are not. Protection of convoys requires cavalry -- not only in a guard role, but also in a screening role. The guard role involves providing protection up close; the screening role, forward reconnaissance and the spoiling of ambushes. Protection of activities that are relatively stationary -- for instance, food distribution from fixed sites -- may permit reliance on infantry. Nevertheless, should these protected activities be scattered and intermittent, operational mobility will be key.

Control

The peace operations mission taxonomy also implies a number of control functions for the field force. These efforts may involve requiring belligerents, the local populace, or both to behave in some prescribed fashion or to abstain from some proscribed behaviors. Control functions include, for instance, movement control or denial, area policing in support of civil order, interposition, search and seizure activities, or cantonment of belligerent forces and stockpiling of their weapons. These functions, unlike those in the protection category, require the field force to assume a proactive stance and interact with belligerents or potential belligerents in ways that might incur resistance or a violent response -- even assuming strict even-handedness and a high level of discretion and professionalism on the part of UN units.

The types of units required for control functions will depend, of course, on the specific control functions that an operation involves and the extent to which the belligerent parties consent to control. It will also depend on the tactical situation: the task of supporting law and order in a well-defined and limited area -- say, a city -- is much easier if well-organized belligerent groups are already effectively excluded from the area or have been co-opted into the policing function. Also, control functions are generally less challenging if they occur amid a high-density of friendly forces. This, because units can reinforce each other more easily, if necessary, under conditions of high force density. Some missions and functions, however, will require the field force to deploy relatively small or even very small packets across a large area. ¹⁰ Examples are (i) general movement control, which may require numerous, small checkpoints, (ii) the detailed disarming or supervision of warring parties, and (iii) the occupation for deterrent or "buffering" purposes of numerous, contested sites.

Because control activities are proactive and, in some cases, intrusive, they test the limits of local consent. The amount of leverage tactical units bring to such activities will depend on their resilience and fighting power. Resilience requires inter alia various means of passive self-protection -- armoring, defensive field preparations, and the wise choice of deployment sites -- some of which are not relevant in wide-ranging control activities. Regarding fighting power: tactical units on average should have at minimum a manifest capability to stalemate most units of comparable size that may oppose them. A margin of superiority is gained through unit cohesion, leadership, and skill and, at the operational level, through superior intelligence and command and control.

The criterion of adequacy is met fully if units are likely to produce a deterrent effect -- that is, if their manifest combat capability can dampen belligerents' eagerness for a fight. This capability must be clear on the tactical level -- if not in every contact between the UN force and the belligerent, which would be infeasible, then in most contact between units of company-size or larger. ¹¹ The desired deterrent effect cannot derive solely or primarily from "rapid reaction units" held in reserve on the operational-level or distributed throughout the field force. This, because in peace operations the challenge to deterrence too often originates suddenly and on the small-unit level, reflecting the poor discipline and weak command structure of belligerent "armies." To have any hope of deterring violence, field force units must be attuned to the perspective and calculus of lower-level belligerent commanders, who often act semi-autonomously.

Paying attention to the combat capability of UN field units should not imply that they will very often resort to arms in fulfilling their control functions. They are (or should be) oriented doctrinally to operate within a context of consent, which they work to preserve and reinforce through a discrete application of minimum necessary force. Providing these units with a deterrent capability down to the tactical level is meant to allow them to simultaneously fulfill their missions and avoid actual fighting. Consider the hypothetical example of a UN unit given the task of supervising the disarmament of a belligerent unit that is reluctant to comply despite the agreement of its higher-level political leaders: The UN unit might next choose to develop the situation by delaying or even blocking the egress of the recalcitrant unit while contacting higher authorities. Although this action is nonviolent, there is no doubt that it could elicit a violent response.

In other situations, the best course might be to permit some temporary "leakage" in the control regime -- for instance, by permitting a belligerent unit to pass a check point -- while striving to catch the leak farther down the line, perhaps through the political intervention of higher authorities. Sometimes the local balance of forces may compel a UN unit simply to step aside. Clearly, a UN infantry team staffing a transportation checkpoint could not contain a heavily-armed company-size unit that was determined to pass. Nonetheless, designing UN units to be strong on average for their size is worthwhile. The survival of the team in the preceding example might depend on it -- as might its capacity to delay the transgressor and communicate the problem to higher authorities in a timely way.

Field commanders cannot afford in any case to be sanguine about leakage in control regimes because the precedent will inspire repetition, thus increasing the likelihood of major confrontation. In sum, tactical weakness increases not only the dependence on operational reserves -- that is, quick reaction forces -- but also increases the likelihood that rapid reaction forces will have to be called into action, which is an eventuality that can put at risk the consensual basis for an entire operation.

Our analysis of control functions suggests that UN tactical field units should have higher average levels of protection, mobility, and firepower than can be achieved by pure infantry forces. Of course, in many situations foot infantry are indispensable. Operations in enclosed terrain require them; so do some tactics, such as house-to-house searches and intensive foot patrols. However, because peace operations tend to be low-force-density affairs and often require scattered deployments, the ability to quickly withdraw or redeploy infantry is essential. Thus, all infantry should be motorized, at least. In other words, troop transport should be organic to all tactical units.

Defensive Operations

Our overview of functional requirements concludes with an examination of defensive operations per se. The most demanding of potential defensive operations involve (i) protection of specified areas under chronic attack by well-equipped belligerent units and (ii) withdrawal or redeployment of the UN force while under concerted attack. Among the basic requirements for such operations are dedicated anti-armor assets, substantial artillery assets, and combat engineer capability (which is essential to countermobility operations and the construction of field fortifications). ¹² Generally speaking, the capacity of the UN force to defend itself will rest on (i) the baseline resilience, combat capability, and mobility of its tactical units -- which should be at least as good or better on average than that of the belligerents' units and (ii) the clear superiority of its theater C3I facilities. In a net assessment, the field force's margin of superiority derives principally from its better training, discipline, leadership, intelligence, and communication.

Both types of defensive operations mentioned above require that key weapons of the defense be mobile -- although mobility of artillery fire can substitute partially for mobility of units. The second type of operation -- a fighting withdrawal -- imposes high mobility requirements on all force elements. None must be left waiting due to lack of dedicated transport. A shortfall in this regard will not only extract a price at the moment of crisis: It can exert a drag on an operation from beginning to end as commanders seek to compensate for the vulnerability of the force. In such cases, UN units might be able to avoid becoming literal hostages, but only by allowing an entire operation to fall hostage in a political-strategic sense.

A fighting withdrawal requires high-mobility screening and covering units able to fight from successive positions and effectively delay and disrupt an attacker. Defense of safe havens may also require forward screens, although the bulk of "deeper" defensive actions is conducted by artillery and helicopter units. Tactical counter-attacks are an essential element of any defense. In the case of peace operations forces, these actions would be limited mostly to short, sharp engagements under artillery cover and with the immediate goal of convincing an attacking force to disengage. The purpose of such actions could be to rescue a friendly unit in crisis or relieve pressure on a safe haven perimeter.

The UN field force might also resort to smaller-scale counterattacks while performing its protection and control functions. Usually the aim would be to compel an attacker to desist, not to completely destroy the attacking units. In some cases, however, both the political freedom and tactical necessity to press a counterattack will exist. An example is counter-battery fire aimed at a belligerent's artillery that has been shelling a protected area.

Peace operations of the sort we have in mind for the proposed UN force would not include theater-wide or operational-level offensives or counter-offensives -- such as Desert Storm. Thus, although the field force needs, for the reasons outlined above, some counter-attack or "shock" capability, this capability would constitute a relatively small portion of the force. In our view, the most efficient way of providing this capability is by folding it into cavalry units, thus producing "light armored cavalry." Limits on offensive action also imply a reduced requirement for long-range, self-propelled artillery -- reduced, that is, relative to the numbers employed routinely in modern warfare. ¹³

Summary of Force Structure Design Guidelines

Summarizing the clearest and most important of the design guidelines suggested by the preceding analysis, a UN peace operations field force should:

• Have tactical units with higher levels of protection and firepower than is common for modern light forces;
• Comprise units that are mechanized or motorized; in the case of motorized units, transportation assets must reside at the battalion level or below;
• Possess a higher proportion of cavalry units than is common for modern forces of comparable size; A sizable portion of these assets should be equipped to fulfill the function of a small, lightly armored strike force; ¹⁴
• Possess dedicated anti-armor units employing vehicle-mounted anti-tank missiles to compensate for a relative paucity of tanks;
• Possess a higher proportion of special intelligence and engineering assets than is common for a modern force of comparable size;
• Possess more artillery than has been common for peace operations forces, but much less artillery of the self-propelled armored variety than is common for modern mechanized forces;
• Require few attack helicopter assets -- but more helicopters of the armed scout and anti-tank variety than has been common in recent peace operations.

Notes

1. US Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, final draft, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, September 1994), Section 1, p 14.

2. Analyzing the subcomponents and permutations of "consent" is central to discussions of peace operations doctrine, generally, and to efforts to distinguish peacekeeping and peace enforcement, in particular. John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra suggest a spectrum of consent based on how the belligerents, the local populace, and the UN force regard each other and the mandate. The British Army manual usefully distinguishes between consent on the operational and tactical levels -- or, "consent for" and "consent within" an operation. The latter (tactical) is often unstable, sometimes requiring the application of force to achieve mandated objectives. However, maintaining consent on the operational level enables the tactical use of force. Another important variable in the consent equation is the degree of international consensus supporting a mandate.

For analysis of these issues, see US Army, Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations, Section 1, pp 14-16; British Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping, third draft, Headquarters Doctrine and Training, 1994, Section 2, pp 5-18; the British manual's principal author, Charles Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," Survival (Autumn 1994); Mackinlay, "Improving Multinational Forces"; Mackinlay, "Problems for US Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping," in Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead, McNair Paper No. 25; and, Mackinlay and Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations."

3. The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at Brigade and Battalion," US Army Infantry School White Paper in, Operations Other Than War: Peace Enforcement (Fort Benning, Georgia: USAIS, 1993), p 6.

4. US Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, p vi.

5. The analogy of peace operations and police functions needs qualification. A field force with a peace enforcement mission may strive for the ideal status of a "policing agent" (albeit with a limited mandate), and yet never attain it. It is quite possible for an intervention force to act even-handedly in the pursuit of a mandated goal -- say, disarmament of a population -- and, nonetheless, earn the reputation of being partisan. This, because its mandated activity -- general disarmament, in this example -- may serve to level a playing field that otherwise favors one side in a conflict. As Kenneth Allard points out, "In societies where peacekeeping may be needed, the distribution of arms reflects internal power structures that can be expected to fight to maintain their position." In such cases, Allard asserts, "there should be no mistaking the fact that the troops given this mission have been committed to combat." Police, by contrast, are asked to enforce laws that are supported, usually, by a strong social consensus, and they operate within a context of pervasive supporting institutions -- a context notably absent in most peace operations contingencies. For this reason the goals and the implementation of a mandate must take into account both local and international consensus, and must be sensitive to the marginal utility of each control step taken. With regard to the Somalia operation, Allard contrasts disarming the population in general and "simply controlling or confiscating the arms [that] may overtly threaten the peacekeeping force," which he sees as a "qualitatively different" in terms of practicability. Allard, Somalia Operations, pp 61-66 and 89-91.

6. Many observers have noted that in such situations there may be little "peace" to keep or enforce. This is a good argument for retiring the terms "peace enforcement" and "peace operations," which may convey false impressions about the nature of these operations. In fact, what they involve is conflict management, limitation, and resolution -- most often attempted without the full cooperation of all the parties to the conflict.

7. In describing consent as a "lever arm" we mean that it and its subsequent modalities -- such as, persuasion, mediation, and negotiation -- are the means by which the work of the operation gets done. In suggesting that the military capabilities of the UN field force constitute a necessary fulcrum, we recognize that the degree of local consent is actually limited. Ideally, the field force will serve in such circumstances as a compelling presence whose potential for combat will not have to be brought to bear. On the relationship between local consent and the use of force, see Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping"; and, John Mackinlay, "Problems for US Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping."

8. In the eventuality of combat between UN and local belligerent units, the roles of lever and fulcrum are reversed on the tactical level: the UN unit's military capability becomes a lever with which a recalcitrant belligerent unit is "moved." Of course, a resort to force on the part of UN units can disturb the consensual basis of an entire operation. If the peace operation as such is to proceed, then the UN's tactical use of force must rest firmly on the fulcrum of a broader popular consent to the peace operation. This particular combination of consent and force will not work if the UN operation has failed to keep straight and cultivate the more generally appropriate relationship between consent and force: generally, consent and its modalities -- persuasion, mediation, etc. -- are the lever; military capability, the fulcrum. As Charles Dobbie writes, "[A] strong consensual peacekeeping framework at the operational level marginalizes opposition and facilitates the use of minimum necessary force." Dobbie, "A Concept for Post- Cold War Peacekeeping," p 145.

9. Mission taxonomies for peace operations can be found in US Army, Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations; British Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping, third draft, Headquarters Doctrine and Training, 1994; Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping," International Affairs, (July 1993), pp 451-464; Mackinlay and Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," pp 116-118; and, Commander Martha Bills, USN, et al, Options for US Military Support to the United Nations (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992).

10. During the Somalia operations the US 10th Mountain Division's light cavalry squadron played a key role. After action reports noted that squadron operations "were characterized by extended communication distances, the need to cover large areas of responsibility, and continuous operations." Lawrence Vowels and Maj. Jeffrey Witsken, "Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry," Armor< /i> (September-October 1994), p 28.

11. Of course, providing UN field forces with better protection and increased capability is not sufficient by itself to enhance their deterrent effect. Rules of Engagement are important, too. Any new capabilities will be tested by some belligerent, sooner rather than later. If the force enters the field governed by overly restrictive Rules of Engagement, local belligerents will soon expose its apparent strength as hollow.

12. Fixed-wing air power can also contribute significantly to defensive operations, of course. In cases where the aggressor has a capable air force, defensive air power may be essential. Nevertheless, we do not now propose the development of UN fixed-wing combat air units because (i) adding any significant complement of these would greatly increase cost and force complexity, and (ii) the reluctance of UN members to support mandated operations is focused presently on ground power contributions, not air power.

13. A force equipped to perform the functions outlined above in situations involving belligerents of middling capability would also have considerable offensive capability against smaller, lower quality forces. In rare cases the Legion might use this power in a concerted fashion. An example is a contingency in which a belligerent with limited capability and no popular base undertakes to routinely violate a mandate that is widely supported by both the local populace and other belligerents. This example assumes that a very substantial local majority views the belligerent in question as a "criminal" or mercenary element, and that no significant portion of the population views the belligerent as representing their interests. In such a case the UN force might act to disarm and disband the belligerent, and do so without upsetting the essential consensual basis of the operation. It is important to recognize, however, that political leaders have a limited capacity to make such determinations in a disinterested fashion. Hence, whenever the UN force targets a belligerent for this type of action, it is entering upon dangerous ground. Lest there be confusion: the effort to capture General Aideed during UNOSOM II does not meet the criteria set out above.

14. As noted earlier, a light cavalry squadron played an important role in US operations in Somalia, which fully tested the units operational mobility and flexibility. Such units cannot, however, also play the role of light "shock" or attack units. For this role a somewhat heavier type of unit is required -- one with some capability against armor. Even with regard to the pure light cavalry role -- essentially reconnaissance, screening, and convoy duty -- the Somalia experience suggests that current US units are too lightly armed and too lightly supported: "Somalia indicates ... that division light cavalry squadrons need to be more robust and self-sustaining." Vowels and Witsken, "Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry," p 30.

Citation:
Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, "The Logic of Peace Operations: Implications for Force Design." Originally published in Vital Force: A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for the Creation of a UN Legion, October 1995, Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA.
http://www.comw.org/pda/webun.htm (September 1997)

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