{"id":25621,"date":"2025-05-06T17:17:57","date_gmt":"2025-05-06T21:17:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/comw.org\/pda\/?p=25621"},"modified":"2025-05-08T16:59:56","modified_gmt":"2025-05-08T20:59:56","slug":"european-defense-first-the-horror-vacui","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/comw.org\/pda\/european-defense-first-the-horror-vacui\/","title":{"rendered":"European Defense: First the Horror Vacui, Then What?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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European national security institutions continue churning through the stages of shock following Trump’s betrayal, dealing with the sudden loss of the familiar and relatively comfortable continuity over the last seventy-plus years of US leadership and dominant position within NATO.\u00a0 Former President Joe Biden has just now (May 2025) spoken out against the undoing of his NATO revival efforts<\/a>.<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Below is a recent commentary by German military analyst Lutz Unterseher, followed by a short list of recent articles and interviews that preview the likely changes to European national security policy. Only one thing is sure: there will be many changes.<\/div>\n
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European Defense: First the Horror Vacui, Then What?<\/em><\/span><\/strong><\/div>\n
by Lutz Unterseher, guest correspondent from Berlin, 6 May 2025, initially published at Un-Diplomatic<\/a>,\u00a0<\/em>11 April 2025.<\/strong><\/div>\n
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President Trump has opened Europe\u2019s eyes, but not in the manner I might have hoped: American protection against the \u201cnew threat\u201d from Russia is now conditional on arbitrary demands from Washington, such as devoting 5 percent of GDP to defense, and even then it\u2019s not a reliable guarantee.<\/div>\n
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Trump has pulled the rug from under NATO\u2019s reason for existing. For most of the alliance\u2019s history, Europeans were more than willing to believe in a US security guarantee in the semblance of \u201cextended deterrence\u201d\u2014the somewhat ambiguous appendage of America\u2019s strategic nuclear forces to European defenses. All the while, though, analysts in Washington were exploring concepts for employing \u201ctactical\u201d nuclear weapons in a way they hoped would confine an actual nuclear war to European soil. This history of American thinking about\u2014and investments made in\u2014the ultimate weapon undermined the story of America as Europe\u2019s protector.<\/p>\n

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If Europe opened its eyes to history, it would realize the United States had not made Europe secure all these years; the myth of American protection via NATO was a fiction of convenience for European politicians to avoid thinking too hard about that which might provide genuine continental security.<\/p>\n

But with Trump exposing the lie of American reliability, the child has fallen into the well: Europeans now feel exposed\u2014naked, one might say\u2014in a space that seems empty and unprotected:\u00a0horror vacui<\/em>.<\/p>\n

In a frantic search for a military shield, the Europeans scramble to meet a portion of Trump\u2019s military spending target. Officials talk about raising spending to between 2.5 and 3.5 percent of GDP. For several of Europe\u2019s more developed countries, that level, still well short of Trump\u2019s demand, would seriously undermine the welfare state, just at a time when democracy is under strain everywhere.<\/p>\n

Large increases in military spending will further postpone many already overdue investments in national infrastructure across Europe. As a result, Europe\u2019s economy will slip behind the United States and other major economic blocs, accelerating a world of competitive economic nationalisms.<\/p>\n

Such a thrust aligns perfectly with Donald Trump\u2019s vision\u2014one he can realize more effectively by pushing Europe\u2019s defense spending higher than by resorting to harmful trade tariffs, though he\u2019s doing both.<\/p>\n

There should be no doubt that Russia poses a threat to Europe. Yet, it is worth noting a few basic facts, not to downplay matters, but to maintain clarity:<\/p>\n

-Ukraine, despite its relative weakness, has stood up to Russia\u2019s superior force for more than three years, even though Western arms support often arrived too late and frequently did not match the country\u2019s needs.<\/p>\n

-In 2024, European Union countries spent \u20ac326 billion on defense. In contrast, Russia, including its internal security outlays, spent about half of that. The EU nations also do not have significantly fewer military personnel overall.<\/p>\n

-Importantly, Russia cannot project its entire military against Europe\u2014security requirements in the Far East and Central Asia tie down a considerable portion of Russia\u2019s military.<\/p>\n

Considering these facts, a dramatic arms buildup in Europe is hard to justify. Under current tensions, the priority should be to set aside nationalisms, pool resources, and form a truly integrated European army, working within EU institutions, ideally \u201cborrowing\u201d NATO\u2019s existing infrastructure.<\/p>\n

This joint force should be dedicated to strategic defense, protecting the home territory. Expensive, high-end tools for long-range power projection will be superfluous. US capabilities in NATO do not need one-for-one substitutions. Nonetheless, at the operational-tactical level, a European defense force should retain a force structure and force posture capable of flexibly supporting neighbors under threat. But that requires a disciplined strategy and budget, not arms-racing with Russia or panic-spending to compensate for an extortionist America.<\/p>\n

What about responding to nuclear threats? Since the American deterrent is not guaranteed to be available to Europe, attention turns to France. Its nuclear \u201cminimum deterrent\u201d is sufficient for stability, serving as an ultimate insurance policy, not as a provocative means of nuclear warfighting. Paris has already signaled that it might be willing to \u201cEuropeanize\u201d its strategic capability. That is good enough for our period of transition.<\/p>\n

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Lutz Unterseher <\/strong>is a sociologist and political scientist. As director of the Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS) since 1980, he originated the concept of\u00a0Confidence-Building Defence<\/a>. Working in international relations and military theory, he has detailed defense strategies and force postures in consultations with political parties, governments, and armed forces. His recent publications on European defense include\u00a0Ukraine: Options for a Confidence-Building Defense<\/a>\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0\u201cEuropean Army\u201d: A Thought Experiment<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

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Selected sources on European officials\u2019 reactions to the shock of Trump\/Vance\/Hegseth undermining NATO and the commitment of support for the defense of Ukraine:<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cEuropean Group of Five (E5) Defence Ministers\u2019 meeting in Paris (12 March 2025) \u2013 Joint Statement,\u201d UK\u00a0Ministry of Defence<\/a>, 13 March 2025.\u00a0https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/publications\/european-group-of-five-e5-defence-ministers-meeting-in-paris-12-march-2025-joint-statement\/european-group-of-five-e5-defence-ministers-meeting-in-paris-12-march-2025-joint-statement<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cEU-UK defense deal in sight at May summit,\u201d by\u00a0Jon Stone<\/a>,\u00a0Politico<\/em>, 14 April 2025.\u00a0https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-uk-defense-deal-in-sight-at-may-summit\/<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cMerz and Macron can restart Europe\u2019s Franco\u2013German engine,\u201d S\u00e9bastien Maillard<\/a>,\u00a0<\/strong>Chatham House, 1 May 2025.\u00a0https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2025\/05\/merz-and-macron-can-restart-europes-franco-german-engine<\/a><\/p>\n

John Mearsheimer responds on the Judging Freedom Podcast<\/em> (1 May 2025) (minutes 9 to 13) to a clip of former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Richard Shirreff (Ret.) addressing the future of European security\u2014<\/em>very worthwhile four minutes.<\/em><\/p>\n

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