Tempting
Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian
Nuclear Use is
Misconstrued in Western Policy
Summary
(full version: HTML ‒ PDF)
Carl Conetta
Project on Defense Alternatives
06 February 2023
Beginning with its invasion of
Ukraine, Moscow has warned of the
possibility of nuclear conflict and world
war should US-NATO become directly involved
in the fight.[1] While US-NATO leaders have said
that these threats must, as a
matter-of-course, be taken seriously, they
have as a matter-of-policy treated
the prospect of Russian nuclear use as very
unlikely and easily contained. On balance,
Western opinion leaders have treated
Moscow’s talk of nuclear use more as a scare
tactic than a practicable option.[2] This is a serious mistake -
and one likely to increase the risk of the
outcome it minimizes.
Official US and NATO estimates of
the likelihood of Russian nuclear use
underestimate the risk for several reasons:
■ First,
official assessments evince a poor
understanding of Russian thinking on
extended nuclear deterrence, and they fail
to see how and why it is evolving.
■ Second,
they lack the "strategic empathy" essential
to weighing Russian motivations. They
discount Moscow's view of the present
contingency as an instance of big power
contention and how it took a decisive turn
beginning in 2014. They depreciate Moscow's
long-felt conviction that NATO's approach to
Russia's border threatens the stability and
security of the Russian state. [3] And they
offhandedly dismiss Moscow's view that
Kyiv's ongoing success in the war is due
substantially to Western support, making the
war a proxy Russia-NATO conflict.
None of these Russian perceptions
or assessments need be accurate to be
sincere and influential, if not determinant,
as Moscow contemplates its nuclear options.
■ Finally,
official US and NATO assessments of nuclear
risk may be distorted by "motivational
bias," which understates risk in light of
desired gains. In the present contingency,
ongoing brinkmanship - “staying the course”
- could possibly result in the enfeeblement
of Russia. And this would constitute a world
historic victory in what recent US national
security and defense strategies frame as
America's global strategic “big power”
competition with Russia.[4]
Crisis
Instability: The Certain Danger
In general, the likelihood of
nuclear use hinges on the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat that the prospective
user aims to deter. Perceived existential
threats are especially provocative. And
possession of a large nuclear arsenal (with
the vast majority of weapons held in
reserve) can lead potential users to
calculate that retaliation for a limited
strike would be similarly limited - and soon
followed by cease-fire efforts. In other
words, nuclear-weapon superpowers
feeling an urgency to act might be
inclined to believe that intra-war
deterrence would work to their advantage.
As the Russia-Ukraine conflict
stands today, however, the probability of
Moscow ordering a nuclear strike, as
such, on Ukraine remains low - even
should the Russian army continue to suffer
setbacks on Ukrainian soil. For a time,
Moscow will continue to have the option of
significant counter-value attacks using
conventional means. However, the
inhibitions on nuclear use mostly apply to
intentional use of nuclear weapons on
Ukrainian soil. There are effective
nuclear options that need not involve
attacking Ukraine or incurring casualties,
for instance: a demonstration blast in
remote areas of Russia. Such an action would
be intended to undo the NATO consensus for
war. However, it would also involve and/or
provoke abruptly heightened levels of
strategic force readiness on both sides of
today’s strategic divide, and this would be
uniquely dangerous.
Realistically, it's crisis
instability that poses the most likely
danger of nuclear cataclysm. Any
situation that prompts a bi- or
multi-lateral resort to peak levels of
nuclear readiness - a hair-trigger standoff
- greatly increases the likelihood of
accidental or mistaken nuclear use.[5]
A Russia-NATO
Proxy War?
The view that the
Ukraine conflict had become a proxy war has
shaped Russia’s thinking and talk about
nuclear use almost from the beginning of the
conflict.[6] Although there is
no consensus that the conflict fits one or
another definitions of “proxy war,” Kyiv's
surprising success depends on the
exceptional support it has received from the
United States, non-US NATO countries, and
non-NATO EU countries.[7] Furthermore, some
of Ukraine's patrons bring to the war their
own broader contentious relationships with
Moscow as well as objectives that exceed
those of Kyiv, such as the decisive
weakening of Russia and hopes for regime
change. What is key to Moscow’s behavior
is the perception that third party
involvement has fundamentally altered the
goals, stakes, and dynamics of the
conflict, rendering it a strategic
showdown between Russia and US-NATO with
global implications.
Also relevant to Russian
thinking, the war is embedded in
decades-long Russia-West contention over
Ukraine's development and orientation. The
war itself began in 2014, not early 2022,
and it flowed directly from the deposition
of Russia-friendly President Yanukovych by
the Maidan revolution, which had been
ostentatiously supported by the United
States. Of course, Moscow also has had its
hands in Ukraine's internal affairs for
decades. But this hardly subtracts from the
view of Ukraine as a long-standing site of
east-west contention. So, it should not be
hard to appreciate why Moscow might see
itself virtually at war with US-NATO in
Ukraine now. From here, there are only a few
steps to activation of Russian nuclear
threats, which are our principal concern:
■ First,
in Moscow's view, the war centrally involves
a critical Russian security concern: the
eastward expansion of NATO, an adversarial
military alliance. Indeed, the prospect that
NATO will soon roll up to a long Russian
border represents the apogee of concern
about expansion.
■ Second,
NATO's conventional military power and
potential greatly exceeds Russia's; Nuclear
weapons alone serve as levelers. Although
Ukraine has no indigenous capability
remotely comparable to NATO's, the alliance
has acted to greatly bolster Ukrainian
forces.
■ Finally,
Washington has made clear that America's
objective in the conflict goes beyond the
restoration of the status quo ante
bellum, raising concerns about
challenges to the integrity of the state.[8]
What has been clear
throughout the first year of the war is that
Moscow's threats of nuclear use and/or world
war were meant to dissuade direct US-NATO
intervention and limit Western material
support for the Ukrainian war effort.
However, the fact that nuclear threats have
so far had a dissuasive function targeting
US-NATO while Russia has relied on
conventional weapons to attack Ukraine does
not mean that careful management of US-NATO
involvement will preclude nuclear use.
Nuclear weapons are in the picture only
because Moscow anticipates a critical (if
not existential) challenge in the future -
“check” if not “checkmate” - by Ukrainian
forces already substantially enabled by
US-NATO. And this will substantially alter
Moscow’s status regionally, among the other
post-Soviet republics, and worldwide.
Can We Discount
Moscow’s Nuclear Threats?
Various reasons to
discount the possibility of Russian nuclear
use have been advanced, although none are
(or should be) truly reassuring.[9] To review them:
First,
Moscow’s doctrine on nuclear use specifies
that nuclear weapons will be employed
against conventional threats only if the
latter put at risk the survival of the
Russian state. However, Russian leaders (and
Russian nuclear doctrine) have also said
that nuclear weapons might be used to blunt
imminent threats to the “territorial
integrity” of Russia. What then is the
threshold for considering a threat to the
State to be existential? Clearly
something less than a march on Moscow in
progress. Speculation about Putin’s
political survival in the aftermath of a
costly catastrophic failure - and about
Russia’s political stability generally - may
pertain to this question. At any rate, it is
already known that the prospect of nuclear
use is under discussion within the Russian
military.
Moscow has drawn
various so-called “red lines” during the
course of the war, and several of these have
already been crossed - for instance,
cross-border attacks on Russia and attacks
on strategic assets (nuclear-capable
bombers). So is talk of “red lines” merely
bluff? It would be unwise to think so. "Red
lines" are not "trip wires" but boundary
markers (in US practice as well as Russian).
They delineate danger zones, like a sign
marking a minefield. How many steps earn a
decisive response is unclear. State leaders
fail to recognize this at the peril of us
all.
Second,
Moscow is supposedly unwilling to risk a
negative reaction from those nations and
regions that have so far refused to condemn
and/or sanction it - notably China, India,
Turkey, and much of the Global South. But
there’s no reason to believe that all
degrees, forms, and circumstances of nuclear
use would earn daunting levels of
disapprobation from Russia-friendly
governments. This is especially true if
Russia otherwise faces profound and
humiliating defeat, and if it offers “good
terms” for a cease-fire that are refused.
Also
figuring into the response calculus of
non-aligned nations would be the fact that
many value Russian power as a counterbalance
to US power; They do not want to see it
decimated. Thus, it should not be surprising
that sentiment in the Global South strongly
favors a diplomatic resolution of the
crisis. Polls in Mexico, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Kenya,
Nigeria, and South Africa show
public opinion to be supportive of
compromise. Related to this,
Russia’s international influence is based
partly on the belief that it cannot and will
not be cowed. In other words, simply
accepting a humiliating defeat would also
impose substantial reputational costs. And
it would as well diminish what ever extended
deterrence power derives from Russia’s
nuclear arsenal - the nation’s surest claim
to superpower status. As analyst Stephen
Schwartz points out: “nuclear deterrence
isn’t just about possessing nuclear weapons
but also being perceived by one's
adversaries as being both ready and willing
to use them under extreme circumstances.
Third,
Moscow will be confidently deterred from
using nuclear weapons by fear of US
retaliation and the risk of escalation to a
general Russia-NATO war. This proposition
holds that Moscow will realize that no
matter how bad the impending outcome of the
current conflict may seem, the resort to
nuclear weapons in any way or degree will
only and surely make matters worse for
Russia. But the truth of this proposition is
far from self-evident. Indeed, it departs
from basic tenets of nuclear strategy and
extended deterrence as extolled by both
Russian and US military leaders and
thinkers. (Of course, beliefs about extended
deterrence and escalation control need not
be sensible in order to be generally
influential; Here the issue is what Russian
strategic leaders believe.) Of course, the
prospect of retaliation and escalation is a
sobering concern regardless - but it cuts
both ways: Would the USA be willing to risk
Washington in a larger war in order to
shield Bakhmut? At any rate, Moscow may seek
options for nuclear use that it feels fall
below the threshold for sparking general war
between NATO and Russia.
Fourth
argument is that nuclear weapons would not
be sufficiently effective on Ukrainian
battlefields unless used in quantities that
would also put Russian troops at risk, cause
very substantial civilian casualties, and
have lasting radiological effects on Russian
occupied areas.[10] These are true
limitations that pertain generally to the
use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Nonetheless, both Russia and the United
States maintain stockpiles of these
munitions as well as operational concepts to
guide their use. Whether held for
warfighting or deterrence, no one who
stockpiles these weapons sufficiently
believes that all who possess them are
convinced of their non-utility.[11 ] At any rate, the
drawbacks mentioned here don’t address the
most likely ways that Russia could put
nuclear weapons to use.
Moscow can try to
achieve a strategic effect through the use
of nuclear weapons in ways that incur
minimal, if any casualties or collateral
damage. A warning blast would suffice - as
suggested by Anya Fink, a research scientist
at the Center for Naval Analysis.[12] This might involve
a single tactical weapon in a deserted area
or an underground test of a larger weapon
(perhaps at the old Novaya Zemlya test site
in the Arctic Ocean). Ulrich Kühn of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
sketched a similar scenario in 2018
involving a no-casualty demonstration blast
over the North Sea meant to deter NATO
action with regard to a hypothetical Baltic
conflict.[13] In any such case,
the point would be to signal that the
prospect of a qualitative leap in the
character of the war was at hand.
Although
demonstration blasts are consonant with
Russian doctrine and thinking,[14] this prospective
use of nuclear weapons to influence the
Russia-Ukraine conflict is also discounted
by some:
“A showcase
detonation of a nuclear warhead...will not
scare off Kyiv. What it will do is destroy
any remnants of Russia’s reputation as a
signatory of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and deprive
Moscow of Turkey, India, and China’s
amicable neutrality.”[15]
It may be true that,
on balance, leadership in Kyiv will
not be daunted by a distant demonstration
blast. But Ukrainian leaders are also
painfully aware that their nation’s present
and future are heavily dependent on the USA,
NATO, and the EU. A likely and achievable
aim of Moscow’s atomic demonstration would
be to collapse the European NATO consensus
for war and impel a process of negotiation.
And it is questionable that Moscow would
worry more about its loss of reputation as a
member of the CTBT than about the ongoing
decimation of its military power, the sure
advance of NATO to its borders, and its loss
of reputation as a great power. (Notably,
the CTBT is not yet in force, awaiting
ratification by the USA, China, India,
Pakistan, Iran, and Israel. Also, multiple
arms control agreements have been tossed
aside during the past two decades. And North
Korea has conducted six nuclear tests
between 2006 and 2017 resulting in an array
of sanctions comparable in some respects to
those already imposed on Russia.)[16]
Moscow might
alternatively collapse the NATO consensus
for staying the course by using a half-dozen
tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield
(with more held in ready reserve.) In this
case, it would not be the limited tactical
effect that would matter; Instead, what
would register is the strategic shock
accompanying any use of nuclear weapons. But
this alternative would come at much higher
cost and risk for Moscow; By contrast, a
demonstration blast would seem to signal
a modicum of restraint.
Not all observers who discount
Putin's threats necessarily believe that the
probability of Russian nuclear use is near
zero, however. Some - a “fear itself” cohort
- seem principally focused on how the fear
of possible nuclear outcomes may
unnecessarily handicap very desirable
military support and action.[17] This attests to the
fact that other considerations can weigh
into thinking about tradeoffs. These other
factors include the expected degree of
damage should use occur, response options,
the prospects of escalation control, and the
expected payoff for holding firm. One
enduring strain of strategic thought East
and West contends that nuclear conflicts can
be meaningful won and that escalation can be
controlled and limited.[18] Putative payoffs
for holding firm in Ukraine could include
the recovery of all stolen territory, the
discouragement of future instances of
nuclear threat, and even the decimation of
Russian power. Each of these would be
weighed against prospective risks and costs.
One prospective
causal chain leading to nuclear use begins
with NATO-empowered Ukrainian forces
resuming their successful advance:
As the ASU/ZSU
approaches the Russian border, increasingly
strikes Russian territory with missiles and
drones, and challenges Russian possession of
Crimea, it is very likely that Moscow will
perceive a critical challenge to its
national security, political stability, and
status as a world power. Unless US-NATO
leaders decide to advance negotiations at
this juncture (or before), Moscow may signal
dramatic escalation. This is especially true
if its battlefield forces seem to be in
disarray.
Russian escalation
could involve putting their strategic forces
on high alert and possibly beginning to
deploy some tactical nuclear units in an
ostentatious fashion.[19] This would prompt a
sense of nuclear emergency or crisis. A
dramatic additional step might be a nuclear
warning blast over or under Russian
territory. With or without this dramatic
additional step, Washington will similarly
raise the alert level of nuclear and
conventional forces. These developments
would represent a crisis more severe than
the 1962 Cuban missile standoff; This,
because a nuclear standoff today would occur
in the context of a very deadly ongoing war
occurring directly on the border of a
nuclear weapon superpower.
A more destructive
intentional use of a tactical nuclear weapon
or weapons - involving mass casualties and
material damage - is also possible. The
drawbacks summarized earlier (in section on
discounting nuclear threats) weigh against
this type of attack (ie. intentional fatal
use), but cannot preclude it. Also possible
is mistaken, accidental, or rogue use of
nuclear weapons. Experience (and common
sense) suggest that this last category of
use is more likely when tensions are greatly
elevated.[20]
How to weigh these
various dangers of nuclear use? Consistent
with our review of current dynamics, past
practice, and doctrine, we conclude that,
■ It
is likely that in response to a
comprehensive Ukrainian breakthrough Moscow
will move its strategic forces to "threat of
war" alert level and begin to deploy
elements of battlefield nuclear units.
■ Regarding
the additional or complimentary step of a
nuclear warning blast in Russian territory:
It is fair to say that it is unlikely, but
it would be unwise to bet high odds against
this eventuality
in the context of a collapsing Russian
effort.
■ The
use of even a limited number of tactical
nuclear weapons near or against the leading
edge of Ukrainian units would remain very
unlikely in any context. Still, it would be
irresponsible to simply ignore this
possibility. Protection of Ukrainian units
against radiological effects is essential
and should begin immediately.
■ Regarding
mistaken, accidental, or rogue use of
nuclear weapons under hair-trigger
conditions in the course of high-intensity
conventional war: Although no analytically
rigorous calculation of probability is
possible, it is judicious to postulate
(or assume) a likelihood of unintentional or
rogue use; This, in order to guide policy
and defensive preparations. A probability in
the range of 1/30 is (i) not implausible in
light of past experience in hair-trigger
nuclear standoffs [see ft. 20] and (ii)
minimally restrained in light of downside
risk. This is not meant as a hard and fast
estimate, but rather an injunction to “act
as if” in light of downside risk.
■ The
probability of escalation to a direct
Russia-NATO conflict will remain low,
although the eventuality cannot be reliably
excluded given current war objectives on all
sides and the trajectory of Russia-US
threats and counter-threats.
Russian nuclear use in Ukraine, either
intentional or unintentional, may invite
direct US intervention; Washington has
pledged as much. And a US-NATO attack of any
sort on Russia or Russian forces would
substantially increase the likelihood of a
nuclear response.
The experience of the
Cuban Missile Crisis remains relevant to
wisely managing the current confrontation.
Reflecting on the crisis 26 years after the
fact, US President Kennedy's
national security advisor McGeorge Bundy
estimated that the standoff had involved a
1/100 risk of nuclear war; Kennedy had
thought the chances of general war were much
higher - between 1/3 and 1/2.[21] The gap between
these two would seem irresolvable, but Bundy
finessed it by taking consequences into
account, writing that "In this apocalyptic
matter the risk can be very small indeed and
still much too large for comfort."
Although the probability of a
big power nuclear clash of any magnitude
over Ukraine remains low,
it would be irrational and irresponsible to
act as though we can roll the nuclear dice
and never come up "snake eyes."[22] Foremost
in today’s policy planning should be Bundy's
observation that even a very limited nuclear
exchange "would be a disaster beyond
history."[23]
ENDNOTES
1.◃ Anna Clara Arndt and Dr Liviu
Horovitz, Nuclear rhetoric and
escalation management in Russia’s war
against Ukraine: A Chronology (Berlin: German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, 03 Sep
2022); “Putin loyalist dials up
nuclear rhetoric as NATO partners push
for more weapons for Ukraine,” CNN, 19 Jan 2023; “Russian State Duma Head Joins
Officials Warning Of Nuclear Retaliation
In Ukraine,” RFE/RL, 22 Jan 2023.
2.◃ Gustav Gressel, "Signal and noise: What
Russia's nuclear threat means for Europe," European Council on Foreign
Relations, 2 Mar 2022.
3.◃ Moscow's perception of NATO as
threatening should not be surprising much
less incomprehensible. NATO was created in
opposition to Moscow and served as the
military counter-balance to the Soviet
alliance for 40+ years. NATO expansion was
both an instance and cause of the shared
failure to integrate Russia with the
post-Cold War European order. Regarding the
structural character of NATO, as analyst
Edward Luttwak has pointed out:
"NATO is not a security-talking
shop but a veritable military force,
complete with a hierarchy of operational war
headquarters, intelligence and planning
staffs, a joint surveillance force of AWACS
aircraft, an air defense network with radar
from Norway to Turkey and elaborate logistic
facilities... In other words, NATO is a
fighting force, temporarily at peace."
Edward N. Luttwak, oped, "A Look at Expanding NATO,” Washington Post, 06 Jul
1997.
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO
or its leading members have conducted
multiple regime-change efforts using both
non-military and military, covert and open
means. For Russia (or any nation), the close
proximity of a powerful strategic competitor
would constitute a potential "threat in
being." At minimum, close proximity would
give the alliance greater leverage over
Moscow. To compensate for NATO's eventual
spread to Ukraine, Russia would have to
substantially increase surveillance and
defenses along a ~2300-km border. It would
still be vulnerable to increased
cross-border surveillance, espionage, and
covert action. And, of course, there's no
easy way to compensate for the loss of
1,000-km of defensive depth.
Recognizing these realities in no
way justifies Moscow's recent actions or its
behavior in general. Recognition only serves
to illuminate the predictable paths of
Russian policy.
4.◃ National
Security Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: The
White House, Oct 2022).
5.◃
Such was the case during the Cuban crisis
when the commander of submarine C-19 had to
be dissuaded from firing a nuclear torpedo
when possibly under attack. (Out of touch
with Moscow and being signaled to surface by
US depth charges, the captain reportedly
believed that nuclear war might have already
commenced. Luckily, the fleet commander was
on-board to weigh against that option.)6 And
this was only one of three nuclear "close
calls" during the crisis (as reviewed
below). National Security Archive, The
Underwater Cuban Missile Crisis at 60, George Washington
University, accessed 01 Jan 2023.
6.◃
"Is the US now officially engaged in a proxy
war with Russia in Ukraine? It depends who
you ask; Part of problem is lack of agreed
definition," Independent, 09 May 2022. Also:
Lt Colonel Amos C. Fox, Ukraine
and Proxy War: Improving Ontological
Shortcomings in Military Thinking, Association of the
United States Army, 16 Aug 2022.
7.◃
For example, leading up to Russia's retreat
across the Dnieper, its standing on the west
bank had been deteriorating for weeks. Why?
"The arrival of Western weapons - US-made
HIMARS artillery systems and M777 howitzers,
French-made Caesar howitzers, German-made
Panzerhaubitze self-propelled artillery,
among others - gave Ukraine the ability to
hit Russian targets further behind the front
lines from a safer distance." "Bad
News Politically, Shrewd Move
Militarily? What Russia's Kherson
Retreat Means - And What It Doesn't," RFE/RL, 10
Nov 2022.
Representative of arms transfers
through mid-December, Ukraine had received
more than 500 tanks, more than 90 multiple
launch rocket systems (of which 20 are
HIMARS and 10 are the tracked M270 MLRS),
approximately 900 howitzers (of which about
400 are self-propelled), and ~60,000
anti-armor systems.
■ “Arms
Transfers to Ukraine,” Forum on the Arms
Trade, Jan 2023.
■ “List
of foreign aid to Ukraine during the
Russo-Ukrainian War,” Wikipedia,
Jan 2023.
■ “US,
NATO countries announce massive weapons
package for Ukraine,” NPR, 20 Jan 2023.
■ “Putin
Has A Problem: NATO Is Sending Artillery
and Tanks to Ukraine,” 1945,
16 April 2022.
More recently, the
USA, Germany, the UK, Poland, and Canada haven
agreed to send modern main battle tanks: M1A2
Abrams, Leopard II, and Challenger.
Additionally, the USA will be sending Bradley
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), Germany will
send the Marder IFV, and France will dispatch
the AMX-10RC.111 (The AMX-10RC is a more
lightly armored wheeled vehicle but it brings
a 105-mm gun to the fight - a tank-killer.)
■ “Factbox:
Tanks for Ukraine: who is lining up to
send them?” Reuters,
25 Jan 2023.
■ “The Ukrainian Army Could Form
Three New Heavy Brigades With All These
Tanks And Fighting Vehicles It’s
Getting,” Forbes, 17 Jan 2023.
■ “Ukraine
Gets ‘Tank Killers',” New York Times,
06
Jan 2023.
8.◃ "The
US has a big new goal in Ukraine: Weaken
Russia," Washington Post,
26 Apr 2022. Also: "US
war aims shift in Ukraine — and bring
additional risks," NPR, 27
Apr 2022.
9.◃
Viewpoint:
Russia Will Not Use Nuclear Weapons
■ George
Mitrovich, “Why
Hasn't Putin Gone Nuclear in Ukraine?” The National Interest, 17
Nov 2022.
■ “US
officials do not believe that Russia has
decided to detonate a tactical device,” NYT, 2 Nov 2022.
■ "Nuclear
war in Ukraine not likely," The Well, 27 Oct 2022.
■ "Putin
'Very Unlikely' to Use Nuclear Weapons:
Retired US General," Newsweek, 26 Oct 2022.
■ "Russia's
nuclear arsenal is huge, but will Putin
use it?" NPR, 17 Oct 2022.
■ “Will
Putin Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?
Local Experts Explain,” NBC Boston, 12 Oct 2022.
■ "Interview
with Paul Bracken: Could Russia Really Go
Nuclear?"Yale Insights, 11 Oct 2022.
■ William
Alberque, “Russia
is unlikely to use nuclear weapons in
Ukraine,” IISS Analysis, 10 Oct
2022.
■ “In
Ukraine Conflict, Nuclear Escalation Is
Possible, But Not Likely, Expert Says,” Texas A&M Today, 13
April 2022.
■ Olga
Oliker, “Putin's
Nuclear Bluff,” Foreign Affairs, 11 Mar
2022.
■ J.
Andrés Gannon, “If
Russia Goes Nuclear: Three Scenarios for
the Ukraine War,” CFR, 9 Nov 2022.
■ The
War Zone, “Nuclear
Experts On Chances Of Russia Using Atomic
Weapons In Ukraine,” 30 Sep 2022.
10.◃ Hans M. Kristensen & Matt
Korda, “Tactical
nuclear weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 30 Aug 2022.
11.◃ Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic
Nuclear Weapons, US Congressional
Research Service, Washington DC, 07 March
2022. Also: William A. Chambers, John K.
Warden, Caroline R. Milne, and James A.
Blackwell, An
Assessment of the U.S.-Russia
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Balance, Institute for
Defense Analysis, Jan 2021.
12.◃ “Russia's
nuclear arsenal is huge, but will Putin
use it?“ NPR, 17 Oct
2022.
13.◃ Ulrich Kühn, Preventing
Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO
Playbook (Washington DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
28 March 2018).
14.◃ Kofman and Fink, “Escalation
Management and Nuclear Employment in
Russian Military Strategy,” War on the
Rocks, 19 Sep 2022. Also: Kofman,
Fink, Edmonds, Russian
Strategy for Escalation Management:
Evolution of Key Concepts (Arlington Virginia:
CNA, Apr 2020).
15.◃“Strategic
Procrastination: What’s Russia’s Game
With Nuclear Signaling?,” Carnegie
Politika, 10 Nov 2022.
16.◃ “Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),” Nuclear Threat
Initiative, accessed 18 Dec 2022.
17.◃ Anne Applebaum, “Fear
of Nuclear War Has Warped the West’s
Ukraine Strategy,” The Atlantic,
(07 Nov 2022). Also:
■ Daniel
Bilak, “The
West must urgently overcome its fear of
provoking Putin,” Atlantic
Council blog, 25 Nov 2022.
■ Dan
Reiter, “Don’t
Panic About Putin,” Foreign
Affairs (7 Nov 2022)
18. ◃ John K. Warden, Limited
Nuclear War: The 21st Century
Challenge for the United States, Livermore Papers on
Global Security No. 4, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, Center for Global
Security Research, July 2018.
19.◃ To indicate a
higher state of Russian strategic force
readiness “land- and rail-based mobile
missile systems can be dispersed,
missile-armed submarines in port can be sent
out to sea, and bombers can be loaded with
nuclear weapons. Measures to enhance the
stability of command and control systems may
include the activation of reserve command
centers and reserve communication channels
and the deployment of mobile relay stations
for the transmission of commands to
submarines and bombers.” Of course,
half-steps along these paths would also be
obvious and would understandable stir great
concern. Pavel Podvig ed, Russian
Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge MA: MIT
Press, 01 Nov 2001); Chapter 2, "The
Structure and Operations of Strategic
Nuclear Forces Russian Strategic Nuclear
Forces".
20.◃ There have been
dozens of nuclear weapon-related accidents
since the 1945 as well as a handful of
publicly-known incidents of mistaken
near-use due to faulty perception of attack.
A high percentage of these false warnings
occurred during conflict crises - in 1956
during the Suez Crisis, 1973 during the
Arab-Israeli October War, and most
critically during the Cuban Missile Crisis
when a Soviet submarine nearly launched a
nuclear torpedo, US radar operators
separately mistakenly reported to the US air
defense command that a missile attack was
underway, and a US F-102 fighter armed only
with nuclear air-to-air missiles rushed to
protect a U-2 that had wandered into Soviet
air space. It should not be surprising that
mistaken perceptions or rash action cluster
around crisis period. Patricia Lewis,
Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas and Sasan
Aghlani, Too
Close for Comfort: Cases of Near
Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, Chatham House Report,
April 2014. Also:
■ “Close
Calls with Nuclear Weapons,” Union of Concerned
Scientists, 15 Jan 2015.
■ Jason
M. Weaver, “One
in a Million, Given the Accident:
Assuring Nuclear Weapon Safety,” US Department of
Energy, Office of Scientific and Technical
Information, 25 August 2015.
■ “Broken
Arrows: Nuclear Weapons Accidents,” Atomic Archive,
accessed, 30 Dec 2022.
21.◃ McGeorge Bundy, Danger
and Survival: Choices About the Bomb
in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random
House, 1988); Graham Allison, "The
Cuban Missile Crisis at 60: Six Timeless
Lessons for Arms Control," Arms Control
Today, October 2022.
22.◃ A roll of two dice
in which both turn up only one pip is "snake
eyes" - a losing roll. Its probability of
occurrence is 1/36.
23.◃ McGeorge Bundy, "To
Cap the Volcano," Foreign
Affairs 48, no. 1 (October 1969).
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