Tempting Armageddon:
The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is
Misconstrued in Western Policy
The
probability of Russian nuclear use related
to the Ukraine war is rising - but
why?
Neither Washington nor Brussels fully
apprehend the risk
Carl Conetta
Project on Defense Alternatives
1 February 2023
Introduction
[open Endnote list in
separate window for reference]
Beginning with its
invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has warned of the
possibility of nuclear conflict and world war
should US-NATO become directly involved in the
fight. Moscow’s threats have waxed and waned
over time as the war has progressed; Presently
- early 2023 - they are insistent.[1] While
US-NATO leaders have said that these threats
must, as a matter-of-course, be taken
seriously, Washington and Brussels have as a matter-of-policy
treated the prospect of Russian nuclear
use as very unlikely and easily contained. On
balance, Western analysts and opinion leaders
have treated Moscow’s talk of nuclear use more
as a scare tactic than a practicable
option.[2] This is a serious mistake - and
one likely to increase the risk of the
outcome it minimizes.
This article tracks
and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear
threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related
interplay between Moscow and Washington, the
factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear
use, the nuclear options available to Russia,
and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers
dismiss these options as impracticable. We
conclude that the probability of Russian
nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is
rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward
toward Crimea and the Russian border while
also increasing their retaliatory attacks on
recognized Russian territory. On its present
trajectory, the crisis may soon run a risk of
nuclear conflict greater than that experienced
during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.[3]
Official US and NATO
estimates of the likelihood of Russian nuclear
use underestimate the risk for several
reasons:
■ First,
official assessments evince a poor
understanding of Russian thinking on extended
nuclear deterrence, and they fail to see how
and why it is evolving.
■ Second,
they lack the "strategic empathy" essential to
weighing Russian motivations. They discount
Moscow's view of the present contingency as an
instance of big power contention and how it
took a decisive turn beginning in 2014. They
depreciate Moscow's long-felt conviction that
NATO's approach to Russia's border threatens
the stability and security of the Russian
state.[4] And they offhandedly dismiss
Moscow's view that Kyiv's ongoing success in
the war is due substantially to Western
support, making the war a proxy Russia-NATO
conflict.
None
of these Russian perceptions or assessments
need be accurate to be sincere and
influential, if not determinant, as Moscow
contemplates its nuclear options.
■ Finally,
official US and NATO assessments of nuclear
risk may be distorted by "motivational bias,"
which understates risk in light of desired
gains. In the present contingency, ongoing
brinkmanship - “staying the course” - could
possibly result in the enfeeblement of Russia.
And this would constitute a world historic
victory in what recent US national security
and defense strategies frame as America's
global strategic “big power” competition with
Russia.[5]
During the past 75
years, we have only once or twice before
veered this close to general war between the
top nuclear powers. We should not be cavalier
as the dice are being rolled once again. In
what follows we review the putative thresholds
for nuclear use set out by Moscow, and how
they have evolved over the past year.
Crisis Instability:
The Certain Danger
The likelihood of
nuclear use hinges on the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat that the prospective
user aims to deter. Perceived existential
threats are especially provocative. And
possession of a large nuclear arsenal (with
the vast majority of weapons held in reserve)
can lead potential users to calculate that
retaliation for a limited strike would be
similarly limited - and soon followed by
cease-fire efforts. In other words, nuclear-weapon
superpowers feeling an urgency to act might
be inclined to believe that intra-war
deterrence would work to their advantage.
Still, as the
Russia-Ukraine conflict stands today, the
probability of Moscow ordering a nuclear strike,
as such, on Ukraine remains low -
even should the Russian army continue to
suffer setbacks on Ukrainian soil. For a time,
Moscow will continue to have the option of
significant counter-value attacks using
conventional means. However, the qualifier
noted above is critical: the inhibitions
on nuclear use mostly apply to intentional
use of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil.
There are effective nuclear options that
need not involve attacking Ukraine or
incurring casualties, for instance: a
demonstration blast in remote areas of Russia.
Such an action would be intended and likely to
have a powerful psychological effect not
easily mollified by official US reassurances
to NATO allies and other countries. But such a
gambit would also involve and/or provoke
abruptly heightened levels of strategic force
readiness on both sides of today’s strategic
divide, and this would be uniquely dangerous.
Realistically, it's
crisis instability that poses the greatest
danger of nuclear cataclysm. Any
situation that prompts a bi- or multi-lateral
resort to peak levels of nuclear readiness - a
hair-trigger standoff - greatly increases the
likelihood of accidental or mistaken nuclear
use. Such was the case during the Cuban crisis
when the commander of submarine C-19 had to be
dissuaded from firing a nuclear torpedo when
possibly under attack. (Out of touch with
Moscow and being signaled to surface by US
depth charges, the captain reportedly believed
that nuclear war might have already commenced.
Luckily, the fleet commander was on-board to
weigh against that option.)[6] And this was
only one of three nuclear “close calls” during
the crisis (as reviewed below).
Russian Guidance on
Nuclear Use
The 2020 statement of
official Russian doctrine on nuclear weapons,
Foundations of State Policy of the Russian
federation in the Area of Nuclear
Deterrence,[7] defines several
situations in which these instruments might be
brought into play. Not surprisingly, the
situations include response to an adversary's
use of "nuclear weapons or other Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMDs) on the territories of
the Russian Federation and (or) its allies."
This is a fairly standard statement of nuclear
deterrence, although extended - as in the US
case [8] - to cover other WMDs and the
nation's allies. Also similar to US policy is
the allowance to use nuclear forces to deter
various forms of non-nuclear non-WMD attack on
"critically important state or military
objects... the disablement of which could lead
to the disruption of retaliatory actions by
nuclear forces."
Finally, Russian
doctrine sees using nuclear weapons to blunt
"aggression against the Russian Federation
with the use of conventional weapons when the
very existence of state is in jeopardy." A
comparable provision in US nuclear policy is
the use of nuclear weapons to deter
non-nuclear, non-WMD attacks "that have a
strategic effect against that United States or
its allies and partners."[9] Notably, the
cohort of “allies and partners” under the US
umbrella is rather numerous, including more
than 48 nations.[10] However, the scope of
possible US nuclear weapon employment is
supposedly constrained by the proviso that the
USA "will not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that
are NPT compliant." (NPT = Non-Proliferation
Treaty.) For practical purposes, this narrows
potential targets to China, Russia, Iran, and
North Korea - although Pakistan and India also
formally meet the criteria.
Since the onset of the
Russia-Ukraine war, a number of Kremlin
statements seem to have moved beyond the
limits defined in the 2020 guidance document.
Putin, in his February 24, 2022 address
announcing the start of Moscow's attack on
Ukraine, warns off any nation that "tries to
hinder us, or threaten our country or our
people," promising an immediate response
involving "consequences that you have never
faced in your history."[11] This he puts into
the context of "fundamental threats against
our country that year after year, step by
step, are offensively and unceremoniously
created by irresponsible politicians in the
West," principally meaning the expansion of
NATO, but also referencing Western support for
the 2014 ouster of Ukraine President Viktor
Yanukovych and the collapse of the Minsk
agreement affecting Ukraine’s eastern rebel
areas. Putin's address underscores that
Moscow’s interest in Ukraine relates in fair
part to its big power contest with the United
States.
Although it’s hard not
to hear a nuclear threat in Putin’s February
address, the implied consequence for the
United States might be any type of attack on
the US mainland or even the defeat of any
threatening Western forces by conventional
means. Putin might also simply be conveying a
willingness to go to war with NATO over
Ukraine, despite the likelihood it would
escalate to the nuclear level.
The
Moscow-Washington Dialogue of Threat
Following the West’s
strong condemnation of Russia’s invasion and
the imposition of sanctions, Putin ordered
(Feb 27) Russian nuclear forces to a so-called
“special regime of combat duty.” Although US
intelligence agencies reported no evident
increase in alert level, Russian Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu said the move involved
increasing the personnel readiness of
strategic force units; Other expert observers
thought the move may also have involved
increasing the readiness of command and
control systems.[12] The announcement - which
clearly stirred concern in the West - served
principally to reinforce Putin’s earlier
warning against Western intervention. Soon
after this, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov worried (Mar 2) about the advent of a
world war saying that if it “were to occur, it
would involve nuclear weapons and be
destructive.”[13] President Biden on March 11
sought to allay concerns, especially among
apprehensive allies, about the possibility of
world war, asserting: "We will not fight a war
against Russia in Ukraine. Direct conflict
between NATO and Russia is World War III,
something we must strive to prevent."[14]
US funding and
material support for Ukraine surged in March
2022 as Russia’s military effort continued to
falter. On March 26, Pres. Biden made his
controversial remarks in Poland, calling Putin
a butcher and advancing the need for regime
change, asserting "For God's sake, this man
cannot remain in power."[15] Although not
diplomatic, Biden’s words - which he pointedly
refused to amend[16] - probably spoke louder
than diplomacy in both Russia and Ukraine.
Moscow predictably expressed alarm over
Biden’s statement.
Coinciding with
Biden’s remarks, former-president Dmitry
Medvedev (currently deputy chairman of the RU
Security Council of Russia) reasserted on
March 26 a right to use nuclear weapons in
some circumstances of conventional conflict -
specifically, “when an act of aggression is
committed against Russia and its allies, which
jeopardized the existence of the country
itself, even without the use of nuclear
weapons, that is, with the use of conventional
weapons.”[17]
On March 28 Putin
spokesman Dmitry Peskov also linked the use of
nuclear weapons to an existential threat to
Russia by any means. However, he further
specified that, with regard to Ukraine, “No
one is thinking about using a nuclear
weapon.”[18] Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
reinforced this point on April 19, asserting
that Russian forces would use "conventional
weapons only."[19]
Moscow’s rhetoric soon
hardened again as US Secretary of State
Blinken and Defense Secretary Austin visited
Ukraine and Poland in late April, announced a
large new tranche of military aid and
expressed US objectives exceeding simple
support for Ukraine’s war effort.[20] US
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that,
apart from assisting Ukraine’s defense,
America sought to see “Russia weakened to the
degree that it can't do the kinds of things
that it has done in invading Ukraine.”[21]
This goal suggests a deep and lasting
decrement in Russian conventional military
capability. And it conveys a sturdy US
commitment to supporting a protracted
high-intensity war should Russia not surrender
its position in Ukraine.
On April 25, Russian
Foreign Minister Lavrov returned to warning
about the dangers of a World War III, saying
“the danger is serious, real” and it should
not be underestimated. Asserting that the
Western supply of weapons to Ukraine "adds
fuel to the fire," he averred that "NATO, in
essence, is engaged in a war with Russia
through a proxy and is arming that proxy.”[22]
He concluded by saying “war means war." Putin
also returned to promising a “lightning fast”
response “If anyone sets out to intervene in
the current events from the outside and
creates unacceptable threats for us that are
strategic in nature.”[23]
A Russia-NATO Proxy
War?
The view that the
Ukraine conflict had become a proxy war has
shaped Russia’s thinking and talk about
nuclear use almost from the beginning of the
conflict.[24] However, there is no expert
consensus on what defines a “proxy war”; Thus,
there’s no agreement on whether the
Russia-Ukraine conflict qualifies as one.[25]
While Russian leaders insist “yes,” most
Western leaders say “no”.[26] (Former US
Defense Secretary and CIA Director Leon
Panetta is an interesting exception.)[27]
Non-governmental expert opinion varies
although most outside observers seem to accept
the “proxy” nature of the conflict - some
casting it in a positive light, others
negative.[28] (Positive acceptance of the
“proxy war” label is based on seeing the
conflict as a necessary instance or preamble
to a decisive Russia-NATO reckoning.) However,
for our purpose, which is discerning
Russian thinking on nuclear use related to
this conflict, neither the definition
of “proxy war,” nor its applicability to this
case matter. What matters are the criteria
guiding Russia thinking and action.
It should be clear
that Ukraine's leaders and armed forces need
no external motivation to oppose a foreign
invasion. And Kyiv is not simply doing
Washington's bidding. So the conflict does not
conform to one particularly narrow definition
of “proxy war.” At the same time, Kyiv's
surprising success depends on the exceptional
support it has received from the United
States, non-US NATO countries, and non-NATO EU
countries.[29] And, as noted above, some of
Ukraine's patrons have clearly articulated
objectives that exceed those of Kyiv. What
is key to Moscow’s behavior is the
perception that third party involvement has
fundamentally altered the goals, stakes, and
dynamics of the conflict, rendering it
a strategic showdown between Russia and
US-NATO with global implications.
To review some
elements of the outside support afforded
Ukraine:
■ Global
financial and material support for Ukraine
during 2022 (up until 20 November) totaled
more than $120 billion of which $45 billion
was for military ends.[30]
■ Representative
of arms transfers through mid-December,
Ukraine had received more than 500 tanks, more
than 90 multiple launch rocket systems (of
which 20 are HIMARS and 10 are the tracked
M270 MLRS), approximately 900 howitzers (of
which about 400 are self-propelled), and
~60,000 anti-armor systems. [31]
■ Additionally
conveyed have been air defense assets,
tactical vehicles, helicopters, fighter-attack
jets, small arms and tactical gear, and many
tens of millions of rounds of bullets and
shells.
■ Equally
important in sustaining and upgrading
Ukraine's fighting forces has been training
support, underway for six years, and guidance
in force restructuring and the adoption of new
tactical concepts.[32]
■ Most
important has been ongoing support in
operational planning, communications,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
and target identification.[33]
Also relevant to
Russian thinking, the war is embedded in
decades-long Russia-West contention over
Ukraine's development and orientation. The war
itself began in 2014, not early 2022, and it
flowed directly from the deposition of
pro-Russia President Yanukovych by the Maidan
revolution, which had been ostentatiously
supported by the United States. The uprising
was not a “coup,” however, as some contend; It
had clear popular support in Ukraine’s west
and north. Moreover, Moscow also had
its hands in Ukraine’s internal affairs. Of
course, this hardly subtracts from the view of
Ukraine as a long-standing site of east-west
contention. And it should not be hard to
appreciate why Moscow might see itself
virtually at war with US-NATO in Ukraine now -
whether or not one concludes that the conflict
is formally a "proxy war." From here, there
are only a few steps to activation of Russian
nuclear doctrine, which is our principal
concern:
First,
in Moscow’s view, the war centrally involves a
critical Russian security concern: the
eastward expansion of NATO, an adversarial
military alliance. Indeed, the prospect that
NATO will soon roll up to a long Russian
border represents the apogee of concern about
expansion.
Second,
NATO’s conventional military power and
potential greatly exceeds Russia’s; Nuclear
weapons alone serve as levelers. Although
Ukraine has no indigenous capability remotely
comparable to NATO’s, the alliance has acted
to greatly bolster Ukrainian forces.
Finally,
Washington has made clear that America’s
objective in the conflict goes beyond the
restoration of the status quo ante bellum,
raising concerns about challenges to the
integrity of the state.[34]
Western commentators
may dismiss as a gaffe Biden’s advocacy of
regime change in Russia, but Russian state
managers would not. Also consequential was
Defense Secretary Austin’s expressed intent to
see Russian conventional military power
decimated. In July, National Security Advisor
Jake Sullivan confirmed the goal of an
enduring reduction in Russian national
wherewithal:
"Our
strategic objective is to ensure that Russia's
invasion of Ukraine is not a strategic success
for Putin, that it is a strategic failure for
Putin. And that means both that he be denied
his objectives in Ukraine, and that Russia
pay a longer term price in terms of the
elements of its national power."[35]
[Emphasis added]
The eventuality of a
weakened Russia having to face an emboldened
NATO on its border is treated by Moscow as an
emergent existential challenge - in chess
terms, “check” if not “checkmate.” Considering
the incomparable aid the West has provided
Ukraine, Moscow may already see the current
war as a pivotal showdown with the West - or
so its rhetoric implies. This possibility and
what it might portend was addressed by the US
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines
in her May 10 testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee. She said that the US
intelligence community sees Russian nuclear
use as unlikely “unless there is effectively
an existential threat to [Putin’s] regime and
to Russia, from his perspective.”[36] However:
“We do
think that could be the case in the event that
he perceives that he is losing the war in
Ukraine and that NATO, in effect, is sort
of either intervening or about to
intervene in that context, which would
obviously contribute to a perception that he
is about to lose the war in Ukraine.”
[Emphasis added]
Along similar lines,
Heather Williams, director of the Project on
Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, avers: Putin has “been
trying to deter NATO from getting involved
conventionally.”[37] And, "That's why he's
been making these nuclear threats all
along...”
Washington and
Brussels agree that putting NATO troops on the
ground in Ukraine or involving NATO combat
aircraft in the fight would run a serious risk
of catastrophic response. But what about
real-time intelligence and reconnaissance
support that substantially multiplies the
defensive and offensive power of Ukrainian
forces? What about pivotal (if not decisive)
material support? What about stated objectives
that exceed the restoration Ukrainian
sovereignty?
Moscow’s insistent
focus on NATO involvement reflects the fact of
broader, longer-term Russia-NATO strategic
contention and the magnitude of power that
NATO brings to any fight. But the role of NATO
becomes especially significant if and when
Moscow views the security or stability of the
Russian state at stake. An unequivocal
front-line statement of this logic is provided
by Alexander Khodakovsky, a former commander
in Ukraine's Security Service who presently
leads a pro-Russia Donbas forces:
"We're
a country that is now fighting the entire
Western world, and we don't have the resources
to defeat the NATO bloc with conventional
means. But we have nuclear weapons for that.
We built them specially for such
situations."[38]
Khodakovsky specifies
that nuclear weapons might be used if "NATO
countries cross certain thresholds," although
he fails to specify those thresholds.
Russian Threat
Messages & Meaning
Russian rhetoric about
world war and nuclear dangers receded somewhat
after May 1 and throughout most of the summer
as Russian forces made slow progress in the
east and south of Ukraine.[39] Up to this
point, Moscow’s regular references to the
potential for world war and its allusions to
its nuclear capabilities were efforts to
constrain Western support for Kyiv. As
Moscow’s operational situation seemed to
improve, it relaxed the warnings - thus
signaling that its resort to nuclear
brinkmanship was limited and conditional.
In mid-August, Russian
Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu called
speculation about the use of nuclear weapons
"a lie," asserting that "From a military point
of view, there is no need to use nuclear
weapons in Ukraine to achieve the goals
set."[40] However, he also pointed to Russian
doctrine on nuclear use, which allows for a
nuclear response to conventional threats in
extraordinary circumstances. And, reinforcing
the sense of a “proxy war,” he drew critical
attention to the West’s increasing supply of
munitions and equipment, transfer of "huge
financial resources," and assistance in
training, intelligence, and planning. As
Shoigu frames the challenge, “In Ukraine,
Russian servicemen are confronted by the
combined forces of the West...”
A week later (Aug 22)
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov
affirmed that nuclear weapons would be used
only in response to an attack - principally a
nuclear attack, but possibly also to stem a
conventional attack "when the very existence
of the state is threatened." That seems a high
bar, but Ryabkov also asserted that the
growing degree of Western aid and involvement
in Ukraine was "pushing it" - that is,
increasing the danger of a major Russia-NATO
clash.[41]
Clearly, Moscow
adjusts its nuclear pronouncements in accord
with its reading of the challenge it faces at
any particular moment. Of course, the
immediate source of the challenge is the
Ukrainian military. But Moscow ascribes the
relative success of the AFU/ZSU to Western
support, and this matters only when it matters
on the battlefield. Importantly, Moscow is not
threatening nuclear responses to specific
Ukrainian actions, only warning that Western
support may enable Ukrainian advances that
earn such responses.[42] The criteria would
involve not only the nature of the targets hit
by Ukraine, but the strategic import of any
Ukrainian advance and the fact that Western
support enabled it. Also, as became evident
later in 2022, there is no simple “trip wire”
whereby a toe over a line prompts a nuclear
response.
Ukrainian Offensive
Prompts Renewed Nuclear Threats
Moscow’s talk of a
possible resort to nuclear weapons revived in
earnest with the surprising success of the
Ukrainian counter-offensives that began in
early September.[43] Putin’s September 21
speech announcing the partial mobilization of
veterans, also emphasized the role of the West
in enabling Ukraine’s battlefield successes.
He pointed to Western reconnaissance support,
Ukrainian attacks employing Western weapons
against "the Belgorod and Kursk regions" of
Russia, and the possible delivery of
longer-range US weapons (presumably ATACM
missile and Patriot missiles). He concluded by
asserting that "In the event of a threat to
the territorial integrity of our
country and to defend Russia and our people,
we will certainly make use of all weapon
systems available to us. This is not a bluff."
[44]
More explicit in
specifying nuclear threats was
former-president Dmitry Medvedev, now deputy
chairman of the Security Council of Russia. On
September 27 he asserted that "Russia has the
right to use nuclear weapons if necessary"
should Ukraine commit "a large-scale act of
aggression that is dangerous for the very
existence of our state."[45] More
permissive was his September 22 statement
extending Russia’s nuclear umbrella over the
four Ukrainian regions claimed by Moscow as
part of Russia. He vowed that as parts of
Russia these regions could be defended using
"strategic nuclear weapons and weapons based
on new principles.”[46] Along similar lines,
at the September 30 event annexing four (only
partially-occupied) regions of Ukraine, Putin
vowed to defend Russia "with all the forces
and resources we have."[47]
In these September
statements there is a seeming shift in
Moscow’s avowed guidance regarding nuclear
use. While Medvedev reiterates the option of
using nuclear weapons to stem conventional
attacks that jeopardize “the very existence of
state," both he and Putin also suggest a
seemingly lower threshold: a threat to the territorial
integrity of Russia. Actually, the
latter simply specifies the boundary across
which Moscow might perceive an
imminent threat to the stability of the state
- something more than a cross-border missile
strike, but something less than a march on
Moscow. The 2020 Russian nuclear doctrine
document specifies that nuclear forces are
meant, among other roles, to protect “the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
state.”[see FT #7] This is not an
addition or deviation from pre-existing
policy.
These September
pronouncements were more than nebulous
threats. They posited a clear boundary marker
distinguishing where threats of strategic
significance might begin - ie. the newly
annexed territories. Importantly, this
reflected Moscow’s sense that its position in
the war had grown very precarious with the
line of contact receding eastward. Yet,
clearly, there is no “trip wire” encompassing
all four of the Ukrainian regions that Moscow
now claims as it own; This, because portions
of these areas were recovered by Ukraine
shortly after Putin declared annexation. But
not all occupied areas should be judged equal.
A serious challenge to Moscow’s control of
Crimea, for one, would stand apart.
Some US officials feel
that a determined Ukrainian effort to retake
Crimea, while practicable, might spark a
nuclear response.[48] Crimea has been held by
Russia for nearly nine years, it has a large
ethnic Russian majority, and its population
had voted strongly for the former
Russia-friendly Ukrainian president deposed in
the 2014 Maidan revolution, which prompted the
Russian seizure. All these factors contribute
to the tenacity of Moscow’s grip. Should Kyiv
recapture all of Kherson oblast and destroy
the Kerch Bridge connecting Crimea to Russia,
the Russian position would become exceedingly
precarious, increasing the likelihood that
Moscow would take desperate measures.
What about successful
challenges to Moscow’s position in the Donbas?
Especially sensitive would be the loss of
territory that Moscow has controlled since
2014. Such loss might incur a prohibitive
domestic political cost for Putin. Equally
significant would be any major Ukrainian
counter-offensive sweeping through the Donbas
toward the Russian border; This might be
viewed as a pending large-scale violation of
that border. Also, Putin knows full well that
his government is facing the prospect of
severe, permanent sanctions. At minimum, he
will want to retain some Ukrainian territory
in addition to Crimea to use as a bargaining
chip for sanctions relief. As Russian
conventional power is progressively proved to
fall short in guaranteeing these goals when
challenged by NATO-supported Ukrainian forces,
an assertion of strategic power grows in
importance.
Crossed Swords: US
Promises Catastrophic Consequences
US leaders initially
responded to Moscow’s new Sept-Oct round of
nuclear threat and innuendo with public vows
of decisive response and threats of
catastrophic consequences - although there was
no suggestion that America would respond
in-kind to a nuclear strike in Ukraine.[49]
President Biden on October 25 simply stated
that it would be “an incredibly serious
mistake” for Russia attack Ukraine with a
nuclear weapon.[50] Retired US Army General
and former CIA Director David Petraeus
suggested that, depending on the scale of any
Russian attack, a likely response might be
destruction of all Russian forces in Ukraine -
by conventional means.[51] EU foreign policy
chief Josep Borrell has likewise asserted that
should Moscow resort to nuclear weapons, the
West would annihilate its army.[52] Former
defense secretary and CIA director Leo Panetta
concurs. [53] (An exception was former Joint
Chiefs chairman Adm Mike Mullen, who served
2007-2011. Comparing Putin to "a cornered
animal," Mullen proposed that US-NATO leaders
"do everything we possibly can to try to get
to the table to resolve this thing.")[54]
On balance, Western
responses threatened to do to the Russian army
in a relatively rapid wholesale way what
Moscow sees already underway in a persisting
incremental fashion due to Western support.
This is problematic. If the latter incremental
approach to a critical challenge would elicit
a Russian nuclear response, so should the
former wholesale approach - and more so. In
other words, should Moscow exercise a nuclear
option in a limited way and Washington
threatens to respond massively with
conventional force then, if "extended
deterrence" holds, Russia would step up its
nuclear response. Are these credible
counter-threats? Whether yes or no, this big
power dialog illustrates the unstable ground
on which this conflict proceeds.
Where is the weak link
in this putative sequence of exchanges?
Examining each decision point in the sequence,
we might ask: What is immediately lost by the
actor who is “up at bat” should that actor
choose not to strike? The critical
weak link will be the first actor not facing
an assumed existential or near-existential
loss by failing to launch, but sure to risk
massive retaliation should they launch. That
is where most players would (or should) assume
the putative sequence will halt.
Oct-Nov 2022: A
Diplomatic Opening?
What most shaped the
interplay between US and Russian policy
pronouncements during October and November was
SIGINT - signal intelligence - on Russian
military leaders actually discussing the
prospects and options for using nuclear
weapons in Ukraine.[55] This gave greater
urgency to US-Russia talks on "risk reduction"
involving Biden's national-security adviser
Jake Sullivan and, on the Russian side,
Putin's foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov
and Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the
Russian Security Council.[56] Also, on October
21, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke
with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu
for the first time in five months.[57] What
followed was a distinct, albeit brief, change
in Russian rhetoric and US handling of the
crisis overall.
On October 26, Putin
proclaimed "no need" for using nuclear weapons
in Ukraine; He said, "There is no point in
that, neither political, nor military."[58]
This was not a complete disavowal of earlier
statements or Russian doctrine generally,
however; "Need" is conditional. The lack of it
today says nothing about the future. In part,
Putin's statement served as a rejoinder to US
threats of "catastrophic consequences." By
disavowing intent Moscow sought to avoid the
appearance of yielding to Washington's demands
should it decide not to exercise a nuclear
option. Still, Putin's statement helped
de-escalate the Sept-Oct standoff.
Subsequently,
On Nov
5, the United States urged Ukraine to show it
was open to negotiations with Russia;[59]
On Nov
8, the US State Department announced that the
USA and Russia would soon meet to discuss
resuming inspections under the New START
nuclear arms reduction treaty;[60]
On Nov
9, after Russia announced its intention to
withdraw from Kherson [61], Gen. Mark Milley,
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs, spoke of a
possible opportunity to negotiate an end to
the war should battle lines stabilize during
winter.[62]
On
November 14, US and Russian top intelligence
officials held a secret meeting in Turkey to
discuss Ukraine.[63]
Speaking before the
Economics Club of New York, Milley had advised
that "when there's an opportunity to
negotiate, when peace can be achieved, seize
it."[64] Recalling the grinding three-year
slaughter along the frozen Western front
during World War I, he advised the combatants
to "seize the moment" for negotiations, should
it arise. In his view, this moment would be
tied to a recognition that "military victory
is probably in the true sense of the word may
be not achievable through military means, and
therefore you need to turn to other means."
Although
controversial, Milley's assessment revealed
greater attention in US councils to the costs
of war, both real and potential. Pres. Biden
echoed Milley’s view in part, although seeming
to defer the decision on negotiations to
Ukraine, saying that over the winter "they're
going to both lick their wounds [and] decide
whether or not they're going to compromise...
It remains to be seen whether or not there'll
be a judgment made as to whether or not
Ukraine is prepared to compromise with
Russia."[65]
Washington’s increased
emphasis on diplomatic options also (and
perhaps mostly) reflected concern about the
resolve of key allies. At issue was not only
their attention to increased nuclear risks,
but also to the deleterious effect of energy
sanctions as the war entered the cold months.
(Based on historical data, The Economist’s
research unit estimated that Europe would
suffer 147,000 excess deaths this year -
assuming an average winter - due to the war’s
impact on energy prices.)[66]
Managing NATO Public
Opinion
Surveys of European
citizen opinion during the third quarter of
2022 fond substantial concern about the
possibility of war escalation and resort to
nuclear weapons.[67] The exchange of war
threats during late-Summer and early-Fall
certainly exacerbated these concerns. So did
overlapping US and NATO nuclear force
exercises in October, which might have been
postponed given rising tensions - but were
not.[68] In this regard, the November 8
announcement of US-Russia talks on resuming
strategic nuclear arms inspections probably
reduced some concerns.
For the most part, war
fears have not spurred majorities in Europe to
favor concessions to end the conflict.
Exceptions are Italy, Greece, and Hungary,
where pluralities support territorial
trade-offs [69] and where public opinion
opposes weapon transfers and/or continuing
sanctions.[70] Also, polls in both Hungary and
Romania show strong support for beginning
negotiations.[71] Popular opinion in Turkey
strongly favors neutrality and the government
is eager to see negotiations begin, wanting to
play a mediating role.[72] Also relevant,
Europe has experienced numerous and growing
protests about the surge in inflation, which
is partially linked to the war.[73]
Sentiment in the
Global South strongly favors a diplomatic
resolution of the crisis. Polls in Mexico,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, Indonesia,
Thailand, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa
show public opinion to be supportive of
compromise.[74] But this has little evident
impact on NATO’s consensus for “staying the
course.”
American public
support for providing Ukraine with arms and
aid remains strong (as measured in December
2022), despite slipping somewhat from earlier
highs.[75] However, surveying various polls
regarding US public concern about war
escalation:
■ 58%
of US respondents polled in October believe
that the USA is headed toward nuclear war.[76]
■ 65%
worried that the Ukraine war may escalate if
the USA provides weapons that could hit
Russia.
■ 39%
of US citizens (polled separately in October)
felt nuclear war was unlikely, 38% thought
“likely,” and 23% said they didn’t know - a
not reassuring balance of opinion.[77]
A Chicago Council poll
of US citizens in November 2022 found 47% of
respondents saying that Washington should urge
Kyiv to settle for peace as soon as possible
(up from 38% in July) while 48% supported
staying the course “for as long as it takes”
(down from 58% in July). [78]
In sum, while support
for aiding Ukraine remains relatively strong
in the USA and most European allied countries,
it is slipping. And that support weakens
further when considering the prospect of a
protracted war. Fears of a broader war and
possible use of nuclear weapons are strong
[79], and these probably feed support for
negotiations. Also undermining support for the
war especially in some European countries are
the war’s economic effects.
Policy Impact of
Late-2022 Missile Campaign
Several months of
substantial Russian battlefield setbacks,
culminating in the November loss of Kherson
and retreat to the eastern bank of Dnieper
River[80], helped spur speculation in the West
that cease-fire or peace negotiations might
soon be possible.[81] Also contributing to
this assessment were serious personnel loses
on both sides of the war, continuing fear of
nuclear weapon use and world war, global
economic distress, and the onset of winter.
Leadership in France, Germany, the UK, and the
USA hinted at a more moderate goal for a
Ukrainian cease-fire of rolling back the
Russian invasion to its February 2022 starting
point.[82]
However,
countervailing the prospect for fruitful
negotiations was the onset of a Russian
missile attack campaign targeting Ukrainian
energy infrastructure.
The Russian missile
campaign began in earnest on October 10 and
grew in ferocity after Moscow's loss of
Kherson on November 11. The onslaught involved
more than 600 missiles and hundreds of drones
fired between October 10 and December 29 - and
it continues today. Initially, Moscow claimed
the missile assault was in response to much
less numerous Ukrainian strikes inside Russia
and Crimea, notably one on October 8 that
damaged the Kerch bridge which links Crimea
and Russia.[83] However, fundamentally,
Moscow’s goal in the campaign has been to
regain initiative following battlefield
setbacks, derail Ukrainian force regeneration
and upgrade efforts, and compel negotiations
on favorable terms before Ukraine might mount
a new major offensive. However, as it
happened, the missile and drone exchanges
undercut the impetus for negotiations.
On December 1,
President Biden clarified that he was
“prepared to speak with Mr. Putin if in fact
there is an interest in him deciding he's
looking for a way to end the war.”[84]
However, what Biden meant was that,
"There's
one way for this war to end - the rational
way: Putin should pull out of Ukraine, number
one. But it appears he's not."
Not surprisingly,
Moscow rejected this frame, countering that
Kyiv and NATO had failed to address “the new
realities” of Moscow’s claim on four Ukrainian
oblasts. As for the Ukrainian position, among
the preconditions that Pres. Zelensky set for
negotiations was Russian withdrawal and the
restoration of Ukraine’s state borders with
Russia.[85] These preconditions are merely
restatements of the current maximal goals on
all sides. An initiative by a neutral
third-party to host unconditional
negotiations might surmount this
impasse, but there is no sufficiently
influential neutral power available. Some
likely candidates - France, Germany, Sweden -
have committed to the war. Nor do there appear
to be substantive secret negotiations underway
between Russia and Ukraine and/or US-NATO.
It’s instructive that French President Macron
was rebuked sharply by some NATO allies and
ignored by others when he merely suggested
that a future peace settlement also include
security guarantees for Russia.[86]
Ukraine’s
counter-strokes in the missile and drone
battle, although modest, have increased
Moscow’s assertion of a US-Russia proxy-war
(which is central to its thinking about
nuclear use). Notably, the December 5
Ukrainian attacks on Russian airbases hundreds
of miles inside Russia revealed a new accurate
“deep strike” capability.[87] The purpose of
the attack was to lessen Moscow’s sense of
advantage in the missile war, deny Russia a
sanctuary status, stir Russian public concern,
and bolster morale in Ukraine.
The December 5 attack
seems to have utilized an old but updated
system from the Soviet era: the Tu-141 Strizh,
which has a 620-mile range.[88] Had US tech
been added to improve accuracy? Did the strike
on Russian territory - 450 miles from Ukraine
and within 150 miles of Moscow - depend on the
US Navstar system?[89] Even answering these
questions in the negative will not resolve
Moscow’s claims of “proxy war.” From Moscow’s
viewpoint, the capacity of Ukraine to come
this far in the conflict has been entirely
dependent on US-NATO financial, material,
training, and operational support. This level
of support is nearly two-orders of magnitude
greater than that afforded the Afghan
Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghanistan war -
and the Mujahideen never attacked Soviet
soil.[90]
Immediately following
the December strikes, Putin revived his
warnings about nuclear war and a Russia-NATO
clash: “Such a threat is growing, it would be
wrong to hide it."[91] Notably, the Russian
Engels airbase, which was among those struck,
houses nuclear-capable bombers - a strategic
asset.[92] In accord with Russian doctrine,
attacks against these involve greater risk of
a nuclear response.
In a December 9
interview, NATO Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg recognized that the Russia-Ukraine
war could “become a full-fledged war that
spreads into a major war between NATO and
Russia"[93] - a worry often voiced by Russian
leaders. Some dissent regarding the attack
also flared among NATO members.[94] While
Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani
announced that Italy remained "against an
escalation of the conflict," Latvian FM Edgars
Rinkevics asserted that Kyiv should be allowed
"to use weapons to target missile sites or air
fields [in Russia] from where those operations
are being launched."[95] Although US National
Security spokesman John Kirby said that the
United States shared “concerns over potential
escalation," the US gave a passive “green
light” for Ukrainian attacks deep into Russia.
"It's their decision to make,” said Kirby,
although “we have not encouraged them to do
that."[96]
According to Sec. of
State Blinken, the "US neither encouraged nor
enabled Kyiv to strike inside Russia.”[97] A
US defense source explained to the UK Times
that, “We're not saying to Kyiv, ‘Don't strike
the Russians [in Russia or Crimea]'. We can't
tell them what to do. It's up to them how they
use their weapons.”[98] The only prohibition
that the source admitted was adherence to the
Geneva Conventions. But this substantially
understates US leverage and marks a departure
from earlier, more cautious policy. Have US
estimates of escalation risk changed? The
Time’s source explained:
“We're
still using the same escalatory calculations
but the fear of escalation has changed... It's
different now. This is because the calculus of
war has changed as a result of the suffering
and brutality the Ukrainians are being
subjected to by the Russians"
Former NATO commander
US Adm James Stavridis (ret) clarifies this
change:
“Having
watched the Ukrainians suffer for months...it
is increasingly hard to counsel them to simply
sit back and take what Putin wants to dish
out.”[99]
In other words, what
has changed is not the estimated risk of
escalation, but the impetus to run that
risk.
Washington has more
than sufficient leverage to limit Ukraine’s
operations, as it has done repeatedly by
refusing or apportioning some types of
munitions and weapons. However, Washington’s
profound involvement in the war also renders
it subject to moral hazard.[100] The USA has
built and sustained public and alliance
support for “staying the course” by
emphasizing the plight, courage, and stamina
of the Ukrainian people, as well as by
highlighting the depredations of Moscow. This
somewhat limits Washington’s freedom to
restrain Kyiv - especially given the late-2022
massive missile assault on Ukrainian
infrastructure. Still, it’s unlikely that the
deep attack went forward without Washington’s
sanction. Subsequent US statements about the
changed “calculus of war” seem more
argumentative than explanatory - perhaps with
the aim of motivating public and alliance
support for accepting additional risk.
Locating Moscow’s
Red Lines
How much risk did this
specific case incur? As an isolated incident
of limited scope with no obvious direct NATO
involvement, Moscow did not treat it as a
critical challenge to state stability. That
said, some of Moscow’s so-called “red lines”
were crossed. This was a deep attack into
Russia and an attack on a strategic asset. At
what point an accumulation of such incidents
might be viewed as constituting a critical
challenge is unclear. “Red lines” are not
“trip wires” but boundary markers (in US
practice as well as Russian). They delineate
danger zones, like a sign marking a minefield.
How many steps earn a decisive response is
unclear. State leaders fail to recognize this
at their peril.
What has been clear
throughout the first ten months of the war is
that Moscow’s threats of nuclear use and/or
world war were meant to dissuade US-NATO
involvement and dissuade support for the
Ukrainian war effort. By contrast, Moscow’s
missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure
sought, among other things, to deter a subset
of Ukrainian attacks, while also serving to
answer Kyiv’s battlefield successes and impede
preparations for future offensives. The fact
that nuclear threats have so far had a
dissuasive function targeting US-NATO, while
actual attacks employed conventional means
targeting Ukraine does not mean that careful
management of US-NATO support for Ukraine will
preclude nuclear use. Nuclear weapons are in
the picture only because Moscow anticipates a
critical (if not existential) challenge in the
future by Ukrainian forces already
substantially enabled by US-NATO.
Contemplating the
numerous threats and warnings advanced by
Moscow, Jeremy Shapiro - director of research
at the European Council on Foreign Relations -
avers:
"The
problem that the Russians have had in their
signaling is that their decision to escalate
likely revolves around the progress that the
Ukrainians make on the ground, not on any
discrete action (such as the provision of new
weapons systems) that the West might take. The
likelihood of escalation, in other words, has
stemmed from developments on the battlefield,
not from the crossing of some arbitrary red
line." [101]
On the same matter,
Michael Kofman - director of the Russia
Studies Program at CNA - offers a different
but complementary view:
“It's
worth noting that Russia hasn't used nuclear
weapons even after suffering significant
casualties and defeats in Ukraine, so the
criteria are clearly beyond such battlefield
losses.... [R]ather than a tactical defeat, it
may be tied to the loss of cohesion and
control over the forces in theater, leading to
a collapse of the military, or a significant
loss of territory within that context, such
that Russia is unable to recover it.”[102]
As Kofman (and
co-author Anya Fink) have pointed out
elsewhere,[103] Russian thinking on nuclear
use and signaling is carefully structured and
not conducive to cavalier employment or
gestures. So far, warnings have been an
attempt at deterrence by fear. It is
probably correct that a general collapse of
the battlefield effort is a necessary
condition of nuclear use - although more than
that is needed too: a decisive Ukrainian drive
on Crimea or toward the Russian border. In any
consequent decision about nuclear use, the
pivotal role of US-NATO in enabling this
advance will be a significant factor because
it helps define the conflict as a strategic
clash, not simply a local war - a clash in
which the apparent eclipse of Russian power is
impending.
Testing Moscow’s
“Red Line” in 2023
Moscow’s missile
campaign also helped motivate a new, year-end
$45 billion US aid package,[104] including the
promised delivery of Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM) guidance kits (which turn
unguided bombs into highly accurate ones) and
a Patriot air defense battery.[105] The
Patriot has greater range and maximum altitude
than Ukraine’s existing air defense assets as
well as some capability against ballistic
missiles.[106] While the Patriot battery and
other air defense systems in the arms transfer
pipeline will improve Ukraine’s capacity to
winnow Russian attacks, JDAM kits will add to
the nation’s precision-strike capability.
Ukraine’s
precision-strike capability, although limited,
is bolstered by NATO surveillance and
intelligence support. Its potential was
demonstrated in the January 1 attack on
Russian soldiers’ quarters in the Donestk
region. Cell phone use apparently revealed the
location which was then struck by US-supplied
HIMARS rockets, killing ~90 Russian
soldiers.[107] Ukraine is currently enhancing
its long-range missile strike capability, and
US Defense Secretary Austin has made clear
that Washington will not stand in the way of
this effort.[108]
President Biden has
also announced training for Ukrainian troops
in battalion-level maneuver operations.[109]
And, to enhance such operations, the USA,
Germany, the UK, Poland, and Canada will be
sending modern main battle tanks: M1A2 Abrams,
Leopard II, and Challenger[110]. Additionally,
the USA will be sending Bradley Infantry
Fighting Vehicles (IFV), Germany will send the
Marder IFV, and France will dispatch the
AMX-10RC.[111] (The AMX-10RC is a more lightly
armored wheeled vehicle but it brings a 105-mm
gun to the fight - a tank-killer.)
In sum, Ukraine has
started 2023 with increased defensive and
offensive capabilities pending. What Moscow
may experience in 2023 is a NATO-enabled force
able to blunt its missile assaults, conduct
deep strikes into Russia, push forward on the
ground to the Russian border, and contest for
control of Crimea. US-NATO policy seems
premised on the assumption that no step in
Ukraine’s advance will be sufficient to
trigger a cataclysmic Russian response.
Can We Discount
Moscow’s Nuclear Threats?
Various reasons to
discount the possibility of Russian nuclear
use have been advanced, although none are
truly reassuring.[112] To review them:
■ First,
Moscow’s doctrine on nuclear use specifies
that nuclear weapons will be employed against
conventional threats only if the latter put at
risk the survival of the Russian state.
However, as noted earlier, this seems to have
already been clarified to include action
against imminent threats to the “territorial
integrity” of Russia. What then is the
threshold for considering a threat to the
State to be existential? Clearly
something less than a march on Moscow in
progress. Speculation about Putin’s political
survival in the aftermath of a costly
catastrophic failure - and about Russia’s
political stability generally - may pertain to
this question. At any rate, it is already
known that the prospect of nuclear use is
under discussion within the Russian military.
■ Second,
Moscow is supposedly unwilling to risk a
negative reaction from those nations and
regions that have so far refused to condemn
and/or sanction it - notably China, India,
Turkey, and much of the Global South. But
there’s no reason to believe that all degrees,
forms, and circumstances of nuclear use would
earn daunting levels of disapprobation from
Russia-friendly governments. This is
especially true if Russia otherwise faces
profound and humiliating defeat, and if it
offers “good terms” for a cease-fire that are
refused. Also figuring into the response
calculus of non-aligned nations would be the
fact that many value Russian power as a
counterbalance to US power; They do not want
to see it decimated. Related to this, Russia’s
international influence is based partly on the
belief that it cannot and will not be cowed.
In other words, simply accepting a humiliating
defeat would also impose substantial
reputational costs.
■ Third,
Moscow will be confidently deterred from using
nuclear weapons by fear of US retaliation and
the risk of escalation to a general
Russia-NATO war. This proposition holds that
Moscow will realize that no matter how bad the
impending outcome of the current conflict may
seem, the resort to nuclear weapons in any way
or degree will only and surely make matters
worse for Russia. But the truth of this
proposition is far from self-evident. Indeed,
it departs from basic tenets of nuclear
strategy and extended deterrence as extolled
by both Russian and US military leaders and
thinkers. (Of course, beliefs about extended
deterrence and escalation control need not be
sensible in order to be generally influential;
Here the issue is what Russian strategic
leaders believe.) That said, the prospect of
retaliation and escalation is a sobering
concern - but it cuts both ways: Would the USA
be willing to risk Washington in a larger war
in order to shield Bakhmut? At any rate,
Moscow may seek options for nuclear use that
it feels fall below the threshold for sparking
general war between NATO and Russia.
■ A
fourth argument is that nuclear weapons would
not be sufficiently effective on Ukrainian
battlefields unless used in quantities that
would also put Russian troops at risk, cause
very substantial civilian casualties, and have
lasting radiological effects on Russian
occupied areas.[113] These are true
limitations that pertain generally to the use
of tactical nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, both
Russia and the United States maintain
stockpiles of these munitions as well as
operational concepts to guide their use.
Whether held for warfighting or deterrence, no
one who stockpiles these weapons
sufficiently believes that all who possess
them are convinced of their non-utility.[114]
At any rate, the drawbacks mentioned here
don’t address the most likely ways that Russia
could put nuclear weapons to use.
Moscow can try to
achieve a strategic effect through the use of
nuclear weapons in ways that incur minimal, if
any casualties or collateral damage. A warning
blast would suffice - as suggested by Anya
Fink, a research scientist at the Center for
Naval Analysis.[115] This might involve a
single tactical weapon in a deserted area or
an underground test of a larger weapon
(perhaps at the old Novaya Zemlya test site in
the Arctic Ocean). Ulrich Kühn of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace sketched a
similar scenario in 2018 involving a
no-casualty demonstration blast over the North
Sea meant to deter NATO action with regard to
a hypothetical Baltic conflict.[116] In any
such case, the point would be to signal that
the prospect of a qualitative leap in the
character of the war was at hand.
Although demonstration
blasts are consonant with Russian doctrine and
thinking [117], this prospective use of
nuclear weapons to influence the
Russia-Ukraine conflict is also discounted by
some:
“A
showcase detonation of a nuclear
warhead...will not scare off Kyiv. What it
will do is destroy any remnants of Russia’s
reputation as a signatory of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and deprive
Moscow of Turkey, India, and China’s amicable
neutrality.”[118]
It may be true that,
on balance, leadership in Kyiv will
not be daunted by a distant demonstration
blast. But that leadership is also painfully
aware that Ukraine’s present and future is
heavily dependent on the USA, NATO, and the
EU. A likely and achievable aim of Moscow’s
atomic demonstration would be to collapse the
European NATO consensus for war and impel a
process of negotiation. And it is questionable
that Moscow would worry more about its loss of
reputation as a member of the CTBT than about
the ongoing decimation of its military power,
the sure advance of NATO to its borders, and
its loss of reputation as a great power.
(Notably, the CTBT is not yet in force,
awaiting ratification by the USA, China,
India, Pakistan, Iran, and Israel. Also,
multiple arms control agreements have been
tossed aside during the past two decades and
North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests
between 2006 and 2017 resulting in an array of
sanctions comparable in some respects to those
already imposed and Russia.)[119]
Moscow might
alternatively collapse the NATO consensus for
staying the course by using a half-dozen
tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield
(with another few dozen held in ready
reserve.) In this case, it would not be the
limited tactical effect that would matter;
Instead, what would register is the strategic
shock accompanying any use of nuclear weapons.
But this alternative would come at much higher
cost and risk for Moscow; By contrast, a
demonstration blast would seem to signal a
modicum of restraint.
The arguments meant to
allay concerns about nuclear use seem
complacent given mounting tension between
nuclear weapon superpowers and an emerging
situation as ominous as the Cuban Missile
Crisis, or more so. Alexander Gabuev at the
Carnegie Endowment observes:
"Judging
by his statements and conduct, the Russian
leader appears to believe that the conflict he
started has existential stakes for his
country, his regime, and his rule, and that he
can't afford to lose... some people
understandably prefer to believe that under no
conditions would the Kremlin use nuclear
weapons in Ukraine, and that Russian nuclear
saber-rattling can be dismissed. This is, in
my view, a false assurance." [120]
Not all observers who
discount Putin's threats necessarily believe
that the probability of Russian nuclear use is
near zero, however. Some - a “fear itself”
cohort - seem principally focused on how the
fear of possible nuclear outcomes may
unnecessarily handicap very desirable military
support and action.[121] This attests to the
fact that other considerations can weigh into
thinking about the Ukraine situation. These
other factors include the expected degree of
damage should use occur, response options, the
prospects of escalation control, and the
expected payoff for holding firm. One enduring
strain of strategic thought East and West
contends that nuclear conflicts can be
meaningful won and that escalation can be
controlled and limited.[122] Putative payoffs
for holding firm in Ukraine could include the
recovery of all stolen territory, the
discouragement of future instances of nuclear
threat, and even the decimation of Russian
power. Each of these would be weighed against
prospective risks and costs.
The exigencies of big
power competition may help explain what
Russian-American journalist and Putin-critic
Masha Gessen finds incredulous about much of
the Western leadership and expert discussion
of Putin’s nuclear threats:
"The
more the Kremlin has signaled its readiness to
drop a nuclear bomb, the more the rest of the
world has sought a reason to believe that it
will not.... In recent weeks, as Moscow has
ramped up its warnings, it has become
conventional wisdom, or perhaps just good
form, to say that Putin isn't really going to
use nukes."[123]
As suggested earlier,
the US assessment of risk may be distorted by
the prospect for gain. Washington’s
willingness to stay the course may derive
from the same reality that makes the
risk of nuclear use substantial: the eclipse
of Russian power seems to be at hand.
Depending on where one sits, this may seem a
world historic opportunity worth the risk of
nuclear use.
At heart, many Western
observers simply fail to perceive the stakes
of the war as Moscow does, while presuming to
confidently predict Moscow’s behavior when
facing defeat. Former US ambassador to Ukraine
Steven Pifer reviews many of the reasons
commonly advanced to doubt Russian threats
that were reviewed above, especially focusing
on the severe reaction that Moscow would face
should it resort to nuclear weapons. And he
concludes:
“It
makes little sense for the Kremlin to run that
risk in a conflict that is not
existential. Russia can lose this war -
that is, the Ukrainian military could drive
the Russians out - and the Russian state will
survive. The Ukrainian army will not march on
Moscow.”[124][emphasis added]
But it is dangerously
presumptuous to think that Moscow would be
this sanguine when facing defeat on its border
and the likely advance of NATO. And it is
surely wrong to think that Moscow sees this
war simply as a limited regional conflict.
This conflict has evolved to become a
strategic showdown with the West, putting at
risk Russia’s regional power and global sway.
A thorough Russian defeat will permanently and
qualitatively constrict Moscow’s global
prerogatives, rendering its nuclear hand
empty.
Warning Signs of
Impending Nuclear Use [125]
Especially in the case
of a demonstration blast Moscow might see no
reason for extraordinary secrecy apart from
wanting to shorten Washington’s time for
preparing public opinion. In any case,
intelligence on nuclear activity leaked by
Washington and directed at citizens and allied
governments would probably not steel nerves -
unlike early warning of the February 2022
invasion. More likely, any mention at all of
impending nuclear activity would shake the
pro-war consensus, although war hawks might
probably press on. (No one knew better the
power of nuclear weapons or was less deterred
by it than Gen. Curtis LeMay, the commander of
the US Air Force during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, who advocated bombing Soviet positions
on Cuba and thought the alternative path
chosen by the Kennedy Administration to be
“almost as bad as the appeasement at
Munich.”)[126]
It might be easiest to
conceal preparations for a demonstration blast
until late in the preparatory process at
Novaya Zemlya because the site has been
recently active conducting sub-critical
nuclear tests. Preparations for using a
tactical weapon would be more obvious,
however, especially if battlefield use is
intended.
Non-strategic warheads
are kept separate from delivery systems and
the warheads would have to be moved some
distance in a secure fashion and then loaded
onto delivery systems. (There are 47 known
storage sites.)[127] Thousands of troops would
be involved in any significant transport of
nuclear weapons and launchers - although it
also is true that some warheads are routinely
moved for maintenance, making possible some
surreptitious movement.
The key determinant,
however, is that Moscow has no reason to
conceal such activity; The purpose of the
effort is signaling. In fact, it seems likely
that Moscow would embed any movement toward
nuclear use within a pre-announced strategic
nuclear exercise involving a general rise in
nuclear alert levels. Within this, a distant
blast might come with short warning, followed
immediately by a step down in alert
level, signaling no intent to further escalate
(while nonetheless remaining prepared to parry
retaliation.)
Conclusion
What is the likelihood
of Moscow employing nuclear weapons in the
course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict? We
could conclude “one-hundred percent” because
Moscow is already using them to stake their
threats and arrest the attention of NATO. But
this is not the type of use that is most
disconcerting. Amy Nelson and Alexander
Montgomery, writing for the Brookings
Institution, argue that attempting to decide a
probability of nuclear attack is a
fool’s enterprise, partly because all that can
be managed are subjective estimates that vary
widely.[128] Still, these may be based on
causal chains that are discernibly grounded to
varying degrees in relevant past conflict
experience and rely, more or less, on
falsifiable suppositions about human
leadership behavior.[129] Nelson and
Montgomery do allow that gross estimates may
be useful - especially if presented as
conditionals: higher likelihood if X, lower
likelihood if Y.
Policy-wise, Nelson
and Montgomery advance a game-theoretical
approach that focuses our attention on
devising ways to block the less desirable of
the possible outcomes of the clash with
Moscow. Essentially, they suggest investing in
making credible threats of “catastrophic
retaliation” to lower the likelihood of Moscow
going nuclear. So, this is an affirmation of
the approach adopted by the Biden
administration. However, it suffers several
short-comings:
First,
it strongly privileges “staying the course”
regardless of downside risks. It does so by
devaluing (or actually sidestepping) the
consequences of nuclear use. It professes to
address concerns about a nuclear clash by
advising Washington to do its best at
escalation dominance - which cannot at all
promise an escape from nuclear confrontation.
(It is a game of competitive brinkmanship:
“chicken.”) Such threats may not prove as
credible as hoped because they discount
Moscow’s option of reciprocal escalation - and
both sides know this. An alternative approach
might seek to directly mitigate the inducement
for going nuclear rather than (or in addition
to) raising its cost. This would entail some
greater restraint and some new opening for
negotiation.
Second,
the strategy of threatening Moscow with an
even more bitter defeat does not effectively
address the most likely options for nuclear
use: a demonstration test-blast or simply a
dramatic increase in strategic nuclear
readiness. Both aim to spur fear and collapse
the Western consensus for war without giving
cause for direct retaliation. Meeting this
gambit with reciprocal increased readiness on
the western side would only go to serve
Moscow’s purpose: panic. And this would be a
“worthy panic” because hair-trigger standoffs
are inherently unstable, conducive to
inadvertent action. Therein resides the
greatest danger of strategic nuclear conflict.
As Nelson and
Montgomery assert, no precise estimate of the
likelihood of nuclear use is possible. What
can be usefully attempted, however, are broad
estimates of how various developments on the
ground might move the “gauge” of probability.
One prospective causal
chain leading to nuclear use begins with
NATO-empowered Ukrainian forces resuming their
successful advance:
As Ukrainian forces
approach the Russian border, increasingly
strike Russian territory with missiles and
drones, and challenge Russian possession of
Crimea, it is very likely that Moscow will
perceive a critical challenge to its national
security, political stability, and status as a
world power. Unless US-NATO leaders decide to
advance negotiations at this juncture (or
before), Moscow may signal dramatic
escalation. This is especially true if its
battlefield forces seem to be in disarray.
Russian escalation
could involve putting their strategic forces
on high alert and possibly beginning to deploy
some tactical nuclear units in an ostentatious
fashion.[130] This would prompt a nuclear
crisis or emergency. A dramatic additional
step might be a nuclear warning blast over or
under Russian territory. With or without this
dramatic additional step, Washington will
similarly raise the alert level of nuclear and
conventional forces. These developments would
represent a crisis more severe than the 1962
Cuban missile standoff; This, because a
nuclear standoff today would occur in the
context of a very deadly ongoing war occurring
directly on the border of a nuclear weapon
superpower.
A more destructive
intentional use of a tactical nuclear weapon
or weapons - involving mass casualties and
material damage - is also possible. The
drawbacks summarized earlier (in section on
discounting nuclear threats) weigh against
this type of attack (ie. intentional fatal
use), but cannot preclude it. Also possible is
mistaken, accidental, or rogue use of nuclear
weapons. Experience (and common sense) suggest
that this last category of use is more likely
when tensions are greatly elevated.[131]
How to weigh these
various dangers of nuclear use? Consistent
with our review of current dynamics, past
practice, and doctrine, we conclude that,
■ It
is likely that in response to a comprehensive
Ukrainian breakthrough Moscow will move its
strategic forces to "threat of war" alert
level and begin to deploy elements of
battlefield nuclear units.
■ Regarding the
additional or complimentary step of a nuclear
warning blast in Russian territory: It is fair
to say that it is unlikely, but it would be
unwise to bet high odds against this
eventuality in
the context of a collapsing Russian effort.
■ The use of even a
limited number of tactical nuclear weapons
near or against the leading edge of Ukrainian
units would remain very unlikely in any
context. Still, it would be irresponsible to
simply ignore this possibility. Protection of
Ukrainian units against radiological effects
is essential and should begin immediately.
■ Regarding
mistaken, accidental, or rogue use of nuclear
weapons under hair-trigger conditions in the
course of high-intensity conventional war:
Although no analytically rigorous calculation
of probability is possible, it is judicious to
postulate (or assume) a likelihood of
unintentional or rogue use; This, in order to
guide policy and defensive preparations. A
probability in the range of 1/30 is (i) not
implausible in light of past experience in
hair-trigger nuclear standoffs [see ft. #131]
and (ii) minimally restrained in light of
downside risk. This is not meant as a hard and
fast estimate, but rather an injunction to
“act as if” in light of downside risk.
■ The probability of
escalation to a direct Russia-NATO conflict
will remain low, although the eventuality
cannot be reliably excluded given current war
objectives on all sides and the trajectory of
Russia-US threats and counter-threats.
Russian nuclear use in Ukraine, either
intentional or unintentional, may invite
direct US intervention; Washington has pledged
as much. And a US-NATO attack of any sort on
Russia or Russian forces would substantially
increase the likelihood of a nuclear response.
The experience of the
Cuban Missile Crisis remains relevant to
wisely managing the current confrontation.
Reflecting on the crisis 26 years after the
fact, US President Kennedy's
national security advisor McGeorge Bundy
estimated that the standoff had involved a
1/100 risk of nuclear war; Kennedy had thought
the chances of general war were much higher -
between 1/3 and 1/2.[132] The gap between
these two would seem irresolvable, but Bundy
finessed it by taking consequences into
account, writing that "In this apocalyptic
matter the risk can be very small indeed and
still much too large for comfort."
Although the
probability of a big power nuclear clash of
any magnitude over Ukraine remains low, it would be
irrational and irresponsible to act as though
we can roll the nuclear dice and never come up
"snake eyes."[133] Foremost
in today’s policy planning should be Bundy's
observation that even a very limited nuclear
exchange "would be a disaster beyond
history."[134]
Addendum: US War
Messaging: “Stay the Course”
US messaging regarding
the possible use of nuclear weapons in this
conflict has been varied, reflecting the
changing balance among several goals. The
goals include supporting Ukraine’s defense,
pressing forward with the war until Russia has
been driven back and significantly punished,
dissuading Russia's possible resort to nuclear
weapons, managing the war’s escalation
potential, and sustaining allied government
and public support for the war effort.
Dissuasion of Russian
action has had two components: the issuance of
counter-threats and occasional ventilation of
diplomatic openings regarding the war and
other security concerns (such as START). These
statements additionally function to reassure
allied governments and publics that the USA
and NATO are managing nuclear and world war
risks. Also serving reassurance are routine US
official assertions that, while US security
leaders are watching Russian nuclear activity
closely and taking Russian warnings about
nuclear weapons seriously, Russian nuclear use
is "very unlikely." This lends support to
"staying the course" in Ukraine by sounding
neither cavalier nor alarmed about nuclear
risks; It avers that the risk is seen,
measured, and managed.
Attention to Russian
violence and the plight, courage, and
successful defensive action of the Ukrainian
people has produced strong popular sympathy
for Ukraine, especially among NATO and allied
publics. However, translating this into
sustained support for a protracted war despite
the war’s broader deleterious effects requires
something more than sympathetic coverage of
Ukraine’s plight. Sympathy for this plight
could just as easily favor a quick diplomatic
resolution. So might attention to war costs
beyond Ukraine affecting regional and global
food scarcity, fuel shortages, and economic
activity.[135] In this context of global
humanitarian distress, the allied consensus on
“staying the course” is disciplined by the
insistence of top US and NATO leaders that
they will follow Ukraine's lead in deciding
when and what to negotiate - a "high-road"
stance.
Punitively, the USA
and NATO will not dictate to Kyiv. Much of the
deference to Kyiv's leadership is
performative, however. Had it entailed ongoing
unreserved support "for as long as it takes,"
it would expose the allies to serious moral
hazard. In fact, Kyiv has had to consistently
plead for additional support and bolder
action, relying on moral suasion and shaming.
Nonetheless, US-NATO have apportioned military
assistance in accord with their perceived
strategic self-interest, view on overall
regional security, and estimated risk of
prompting a larger Russia-NATO conflict. The
same is true for diplomatic efforts. At times,
one or more allies have discouraged Ukraine's
pursuit of talks; At other times, openness to
talks has been encouraged.[136] When and if
US-NATO supports Kyiv's determination to "stay
the course" of war and defer negotiations, it
is because US-NATO leaders themselves support
staying the course and deferring negotiations
- or so their behavior indicates.
END NOTES
1. Anna Clara Arndt
and Dr Liviu Horovitz, Nuclear rhetoric and
escalation management in Russia’s war
against Ukraine: A Chronology (Berlin: German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, 03 Sep
2022); “Putin loyalist dials up
nuclear rhetoric as NATO partners push
for more weapons for Ukraine,” CNN, 19 Jan 2023; “Russian State Duma Head Joins
Officials Warning Of Nuclear Retaliation
In Ukraine,” RFE/RL, 22 Jan 2023.
2. Gustav Gressel, "Signal and noise: What
Russia's nuclear threat means for Europe," European Council on Foreign
Relations, 2 Mar 2022.
3. Cuban
Missile Crisis
■ National
Security Archive, Cuban
Missile Crisis at 60, accessed 01 Jan 2023
■ Avalon Project, The
Cuban Missile Crisis, Yale Lillian Goldman
Library, accessed 01 Jan 2023.
4. Moscow's
perception of NATO as threatening should not
be surprising much less incomprehensible.
NATO was created in opposition to Moscow and
served as the military counter-balance to
the Soviet alliance for 40+ years. NATO
expansion was both an instance and cause of
the shared failure to integrate Russia with
the post-Cold War European order. Regarding
the structural character of NATO, as analyst
Edward Luttwak has pointed out:
"NATO is not a security-talking
shop but a veritable military force,
complete with a hierarchy of operational war
headquarters, intelligence and planning
staffs, a joint surveillance force of AWACS
aircraft, an air defense network with radar
from Norway to Turkey and elaborate logistic
facilities... In other words, NATO is a
fighting force, temporarily at peace."
Edward N. Luttwak, oped, "A
Look at Expanding NATO,” Washington
Post, 06 Jul 1997.
Since the end of the
Cold War, NATO or its leading members have
conducted multiple regime-change efforts
using both non-military and military, covert
and open means. For Russia (or any nation),
the close proximity of a powerful strategic
competitor would constitute a potential
"threat in being." At minimum, close
proximity would give the alliance greater
leverage over Moscow. To compensate for
NATO's eventual spread to Ukraine, Russia
would have to substantially increase
surveillance and defenses along a ~2300-km
border. It would still be vulnerable to
increased cross-border surveillance,
espionage, and covert action. And, of
course, there's no easy way to compensate
for the loss of 1,000-km of defensive depth.
Recognizing these
realities in no way justifies Moscow's
recent actions or its behavior in general.
Recognition only serves to illuminate the
predictable paths of Russian policy.
5. National
Security Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: The
White House, Oct 2022).
6. National Security
Archive, The
Underwater Cuban Missile Crisis at 60, George Washington
University, accessed 01 Jan 2023.
7. Center for Naval
Analysis, translation, Foundations
of State Policy of the Russian
Federation in the Area of Nuclear
Deterrence, June 2020.
8. US Dept of
Defense, 2022
National Defense Strategy, incorporating the
Nuclear Posture Review and the Missile
Defense Review (Washington DC:
2022).
9. ibid
10. The cohort of US
allies include at least 48 states - namely,
other NATO members and major non-NATO
allies. "Friends" is a vague term but could
include, for instance, other members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council and select members
of the Partnership for Peace not already
encompassed by other categories. US Dept of
State, “Major
Non-NATO Ally Status,” 20 Jan 2021.
11. “‘No
other option’: Excerpts of Putin’s
speech declaring war,” Al Jazeera,
24 Feb 2022.
12. Russian Nuclear Forces Combat Alert
■ "Russian
strategic deterrence forces go on
enhanced combat alert - top brass," Tass, 28 Feb 2022.
■ “Here’s
what ‘high combat alert’ for Russia’s
nuclear forces means,” Washington
Post, 28 Feb 2022.
Dmitry
Stefanovich of the Primakov Institute of
World Economy and International Relations in
Moscow also speculated that the alert was
"primarily about increasing the readiness of
automated battle management systems to
ensure the delivery of retaliatory launches
under any scenario." Pavel Podvig of the
United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research similarly speculated that the
Russian "nuclear command and control system
received what is known as a preliminary
command."
■ Dmitry Stefanovich,
"About that special [osobyy]
mode of combat readiness of the
deterrence forces," @KomissarWhipla, 28 Feb 2022.
■ Pavel Podvig "What is this "special mode of
combat duty of the deterrence forces?" @russianforces, 27 Feb 2022.
13. “Russia's Lavrov: A third
world war would be nuclear, destructive,” Aljazeera,
02 March 2022.
14. “Biden:
Direct conflict between NATO and Russia
would be ‘World War III',” The Hill,
11 Mar 2022.
15. “Biden:
‘For God's sake, this man cannot remain
in power’,” The Mercury
News (AP), 26
Mar 2022.
16. “Biden
contradicts aides and reaffirms his call
for Putin's overthrow, NY Post,
28 Mar 2022.
17. “Russia
Lists Justifications to Use Nuclear
Weapons as Ukraine War Drags On,” Newsweek,
26
March 2022.
18. "Putin's
spokesman Dmitry Peskov on Ukraine and
the West: ‘Don't push us into the
corner'," PBS News,
28
Mar
2022.
19. “Russia
Insists It Won't Use Nuclear Weapons in
Ukraine,” Newsweek,
19 Apr 2022.
20. “On
Ukraine visit, Blinken, Austin pledge
return of U.S. diplomats, more security
aid,” Reuters,
25 April 2022.
21. “Pentagon
chief says US wants to see Russia
‘weakened',” The Hill,
25 Apr 2022.
22. “Russia's
Lavrov: Do not underestimate threat of
nuclear war,” Reuters,
25 Apr 2022.
23. “Angry
Putin wields energy, nuclear threats
against West,” Washington
Times, 27 Apr 2022.
24. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Understanding
Putin's Nuclear Decision-Making,” War on the Rocks, 22 Mar
2022.
25.
"Is
the US now officially engaged in a proxy
war with Russia in Ukraine? It depends
who you ask; Part of problem is lack of
agreed definition,” Independent, 09
May 2022. Also: Lt Colonel Amos C. Fox,
Ukraine
and Proxy War: Improving Ontological
Shortcomings in Military Thinking,
Association of the United States Army, 16
Aug 2022.
26. “White
House Rejects Rep. Seth Moulton's
Characterization of a ‘Proxy War’ With
Russia,” The Intercept,
10 May 2022. Also: US
Dept of State Secretary Antony J.
Blinken with Stephen Colbert, interview, 19 May
2022.
27. "US Is
in a Proxy War With Russia: Panetta," Bloomberg
Politics, 17
Mar 2022.
28. Russia-Ukraine War as
US-Russia “Proxy War”
■ Hal
Brands, "Russia
Is Right: The US Is Waging a Proxy War
in Ukraine," Washington
Post, 10 May 2022.
■ Andrew
Buncombe, "It's
time to stop pretending what's happening
in Ukraine is anything other than a US
proxy war," Independent,
22 Dec 2022.
■ Ted
Galen Carpenter, The
NATO vs. Russia Proxy War in Ukraine
Could Become a Real War, Cato Institute, 12
Oct 2022
■ Robert
Farley, "What
Exactly Is a Proxy War?" 1945.com,
26 Jun 2022.
■ Geraint
Hughes, "Is
the war in Ukraine a proxy conflict?" King's College
London, 12 Oct 2022.
■ Olivier
Knox, "Why
Ukraine isn't a ‘proxy war' (yet?)," Washington
Post, 03 May 2022.
■ Anatol
Lieven, "The
horrible dangers of pushing a US proxy
war in Ukraine," Responsible
Statecraft, 27 Apr 2022.
29. For example, leading up to
Russia's retreat across the Dnieper, its
standing on the west bank had been
deteriorating for weeks. Why? "The arrival
of Western weapons - US-made HIMARS
artillery systems and M777 howitzers,
French-made Caesar howitzers, German-made
Panzerhaubitze self-propelled artillery,
among others - gave Ukraine the ability to
hit Russian targets further behind the front
lines from a safer distance." “Bad
News Politically, Shrewd Move
Militarily? What Russia's Kherson
Retreat Means - And What It Doesn't,” RFE/RL, 10
Nov 2022.
Also see:
■ Mary
Glantz, How
Ukraine's Counteroffensives Managed to
Break the War's Stalemate Monday (Washington DC: USIP,
19 Sep 2022).
■ Louis-Alexandre
Berg and Andrew Radin,
“The
Ukrainian Military Has Defied
Expectations. Here Is How US Security
Aid Contributed,” Rand
Blog, 29 Mar 2022.
30. Global Financial Aid to
Ukraine
■ “Aid
to Ukraine Explained in Six Charts,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 18 Nov
2022.
■ “Infographic:
Who provides the most aid to Ukraine?” Aljazeera,
9
Dec 2022.
■ “US
Security Assistance to Ukraine Breaks
All Precedents,” Stimson Center,
20 Oct 2022.
■ “Ukraine
Support Tracker, A Database of Military,
Financial and Humanitarian Aid to
Ukraine,” Institute for
World Economy, 20
Nov 2022.
31. Arms Transfers to Ukraine
■ “Arms
Transfers to Ukraine,” Forum on the Arms
Trade, Jan 2023.
■ “List
of foreign aid to Ukraine during the
Russo-Ukrainian War,” Wikipedia,
Jan 2023.
■ “US,
NATO countries announce massive weapons
package for Ukraine,” NPR, 20 Jan 2023.
■ “Putin
Has A Problem: NATO Is Sending Artillery
and Tanks to Ukraine,” 1945,
16 April 2022.
32. Training the Ukrainian
Military
■ “The
Secret of Ukraine's Military Success:
Years of NATO Training,” Wall Street
Journal, 13 Apr 2022.
■ “DOD
Leaders Say Training Ukrainian Forces Is
Paying Dividends,” DOD News,
4 May 2022.
■ “The
US army base training Ukrainian fighters,” BBC,
8 July 2022.
■ “British
special forces ‘are training local
troops in Ukraine'," The Times,
15
April 2022.
■ “Ukrainian
soldiers training in UK to use British
armoured vehicles,” The Guardian,
21 April 2022.
■ “Mozart
Group: The Western Ex-military Personnel
Training Ukrainian Recruits,” The Guardian,
5 Aug 2022.
33. NATO C3I and RSTA support to
Ukraine
■ “NATO
surveillance plane watches Russia's
activity in Ukraine,” CBC News,
19 Oct 2022.
■ "AWACS:
NATO's 'eyes in the sky'," NATO Newsroom,
03 Mar 2022.
■ “How
US military aids Ukraine with
information, not just weaponry,” CS Monitor,
3
June 2022.
■ “Intel
Sharing Between US and Ukraine
‘Revolutionary' Says DIA Director,” USNI News,
18
Mar 2022.
■ “How
one US intelligence agency is supporting
Ukraine,” C4ISRNET,
25
Apr 2002.
■ “This
Is The Armada Of Spy Planes Tracking
Russia's Forces Surrounding Ukraine,” Warzone,
18 Feb 2022.
■ “US Air Force E-8 JSTARS Radar
Jet Flies Rare Sortie Directly Over
Eastern Ukraine,” Warzone, 28 Dec 2021
■ “The
role NATO ISR aircraft are playing in
monitoring the war in Ukraine,” Key.Aero, June
2022.
■ “Commando
network coordinates flow of weapons and
intelligence in Ukraine,” NYT, 26
Jan 2022.
■ “The
Role of United States ISR in Ukraine,” Overt Defense,
9 June 2022.
34. “The
US has a big new goal in Ukraine: Weaken
Russia,” Washington
Post, 26 Apr 2022. Also: “US
war aims shift in Ukraine — and bring
additional risks,”
NPR, 27 Apr 2022.
35. “Biden
adviser embraces effort to weaken Russia
and make example of Putin,”
Washington Examiner, 22 July 2022.
36. Avril Haines, Director of
National Intelligence, testimony, United States
Senate Hearing on Worldwide Threats,
Washington DC,
10 May 2022.
37. "Russian
military leaders' talk of nuclear attack
rattles US calculus," Washington
Post, 02 Nov 2022.
38. "'Only
one option': Pro-Russian commander urges
nuclear war with NATO as Ukraine regains
ground," AlterNet.com,
14 Dec 2022.
39. “Patient
and Confident, Putin Shifts Out of
Wartime Crisis Mode,” NYT, 30
June 2022
40. “Sergei
Shoigu spoke at the opening of the X
Moscow Conference on International
Security,” VPK
website (translation, VPK = Russian Military
Industrial Company),
17 Aug 2022.
41. “Kremlin
Official Reveals What It Would Take for
Russia to Use Nuclear Weapons,” The Daily
Beast, 22
Aug 2022.
42. "Russian nuclear employment
could be preceded by attempts at
legitimizing such action. Russian
descriptions of the conflict, Western
sanctions, or Western actions perceived as
constituting existential threats to Russia
would be concerning. This is, doctrinally,
the threshold at which Russia would consider
a nuclear response.” Kristin Ven Bruusgaard,
“Understanding
Putin's Nuclear Decision-Making, War on the Rocks, 22 Mar
2022.
43. “Rapid loss of territory in
Ukraine reveals spent Russian military,” Washington Post, 13 Sept
2022. Also: Seth G. Jones , Jared Thompson ,
and Riley McCabe, “Mapping Ukraine's Military
Advances, September,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 22 Sep 2022.
44. Address by Vladimir Putin,
President of the Russian Federation,
Kremlin, Moscow, 21 Sep 2022.
45. “Medvedev raises spectre of
Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine,” Reuters,
27 Sep 2022.
46. “Russia's
Medvedev: new regions can be defended
with strategic nuclear weapons,” Reuters,
22 Sep 2022.
47. “Signing
of treaties on accession of Donetsk and
Lugansk people's republics and
Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia,” The Kremlin,
Moscow, 30 Sep 2022.
48. “A
Biden admin official recently told
members of Congress that Ukraine has the
military capability to take back Crimea,” NBC,
16 Dec 2022.
49. “US
Warns Russia of ‘Catastrophic
Consequences' if It Uses Nuclear Weapons," NYT,
25 Sep 2022.
50. “Biden
Warns Russia Using Nuke Is 'Serious
Mistake' Amid 'Dirty Bomb' Rumors,” Newsweek,
51. “Petraeus:
US would destroy Russia's troops if
Putin uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine,” Guardian, 02
Oct 2022.
52. “Russian
army will be ‘annihilated' if Putin
nukes Ukraine: Borrell,” AFP, 13
Oct 2022.
53. Leon Panetta, “If
Putin Uses Nukes in Ukraine, the U.S.
Must Respond with Military Force,” Politico,
12 Oct 2022.
54. “White
House NSC Coordinator for Strategic
Communications John Kirby and Adm. Mike
Mullen,” interview, ABC
News, 9 Oct 2022.
5. “Russian
military leaders' talk of nuclear attack
rattles US calculus,” Washington
Post, 2 Nov 2022.
56. “Senior
White House Official Involved in
Undisclosed Talks With Top Putin Aides,” Wall Street
Journal, 07 Nov 2022.
57. “US,
Russian defense chiefs hold first talks
in months,” Washington
Post, 21 Oct 2022.
58. “Putin
says ‘no need’ for using nuclear weapons
in Ukraine,” PBS, 27
Oct 2022.
59. “US
privately asks Ukraine to show it's open
to negotiate with Russia,” Washington
Post, 05 Nov 2022.
Also: “US
says Zelenskiy risks allies' ‘Ukraine
fatigue' if he rejects Russia talks –
report,” The Guardian,
06 Nov 2022.
60. “US to
hold first talks under nuclear treaty
since Ukraine war - State Dept,” Reuters, 08
Nov 2022.
61. “Exclusive:
Russia needs time to pull back from
Kherson, fighting to slow in winter -
Kyiv," Reuters,
10 Nov 2022. Also: “Bad
News Politically, Shrewd Move
Militarily? What Russia's Kherson
Retreat Means -- And What It Doesn't,” 10 Nov 2022.
62. “Russia
and Ukraine each likely suffered 100,000
troops killed or wounded, top US general
says,” CNN, 10
Nov 2022.
63. “CIA
director meets Russian counterpart as US
denies secret peace talks,” The Guardian,
14
Nov 2022. Also: "CIA
boss talks nuclear weapons and prisoners
with Putin's spy chief," Reuters, 14
Nov 2022.
64. “Milley
on war: ‘When there’s an opportunity to
negotiate, when peace can be achieved,
seize it. Seize the moment.’” Economic Club of
New York, 9 Nov 2022.
65. "Biden:
After Kherson both sides will ‘lick
their wounds’ and decide about
compromise,” White House
Briefing (November 9, 2022).
66. “Russia
is using energy as a weapon. How deadly
will it be?” The Economist,
26 Nov 2022
67. “Public
Opinion on the war in Ukraine,” EU
Directorate-General for Communication, Public Opinion
Monitoring Unit, 24 Nov 2022.
68. “Russia
Conduct Simultaneous Nuclear Exercises,” Arms Control
Today,
NATO, Nov 2022.
69. “Globalism
2022 Support for countering Russia - All
markets,” YouGov/Cambridge,
2022.
70. "Public
Opinion on the war in Ukraine,” EU
Directorate-General for Communication,
Public Opinion Monitoriung Unit, 27
Oct 2022.
71. “Public
opinion on the war in Ukraine,” EU
Directorate-General for Communication,
Public Opinion Monitoriung Unit, 8 December
2022.
72. “Why
Turkish Citizens Blame the United States
for Ukraine War,” Project on Middle
East Democracy,
10 May 2022. Also: “Turkey
is friendly with both Russia and
Ukraine. Now it wants them to talk peace,” NPR, 16
Nov 2022.
73. European Economic Concerns
and Strife Related to War
■ “As
Ukraine War Hits Pocketbooks, European
Discontent Grows,” VOA, 17
Nov 2022.
■ “Tens
of Thousands Protest in Prague Against
Czech Government, EU and NATO,” Reuters, 3
Sep 2022.
■ “‘I've
given up on all my dreams': Dread in
Germany deepens over war in Ukraine,” LA Times,
03 Oct 2022.
74. “Globalism
2022 - Support for countering Russia -
All markets,” YouGov/Cambridge,
2022.
75.“Growing
US Divide on How Long to Support Ukraine,” Chicago Council on
Global Affairs, 05 Dec 2022.
76. “Americans'
nuclear fears surge to highest levels
since Cold War,”
The Hill, 14 Oct 2022. Also: “Three
in four Americans say US should support
Ukraine despite Russian threats,
Reuters/Ipsos poll shows, Reuters, 05
Oct 2022.
77. “Economist/YouGov
Poll - US Adult Citizens,”
16-18 Oct 2022.
78. “Growing
US Divide on How Long to Support Ukraine,” Chicago Council on
Global Affairs, 05 Dec
2022.
79. “Fears
in Europe grow over Putin nuke threats,” The Hill, 06
Oct 2022.
80. “Kherson
biggest Russian loss since withdrawal
from outside Kyiv,” BBC News,
11
Nov 2022.
81.“Ukraine
Retakes Kherson, US Looks to Diplomacy
Before Winter Slows Momentum; American
arms are flowing, but officials in
Washington question how much territory
either side can win,” Wall Street
Journal,
13 Nov 2022.
82. “US
Goal in Ukraine: Drive Russians Back to
Pre-Invasion Lines, Blinken Says,” Wall Street
Journal 6
Dec 2022.
83. “Five
reasons why the Crimean bridge explosion
is significant,” The Hill,
09
Oct 2022.
84. “Biden
says he has no plans to contact Putin,
prepared to talk about ending Ukraine
war,” Reuters, 1
Dec 2022. 85. “Zelenskyy
open to talks with Russia — on Ukraine's
terms,” AP, 8 Nov
2022.
86. “Macron
says new security architecture should
give guarantees for Russia,” Reuters,
03 Dec 2022. Also: “Ukraine,
Baltics rebuke Macron for suggesting
‘security guarantees' for Russia,” CNBC,
4 Dec 2022.
87. “Explosions
rock 2 military airbases deep inside
Russia,” NBC News,
05 Dec 2022.
88. “How A
Soviet-Era Reconnaissance UAS Became A
Cruise Missile,” Aviation Week, 15 Dec
2022. Also: “Ukraine
used home-modified drones to strike
Russian bases,” Politico,
07 Dec 2022.
89. “Drones
that attacked Russian airstrips were
guided by US' GPS system - Russian UN
envoy,” TASS, 9
Dec 2022.
90. Estimates of combined US,
Saudi, and Chinese aid to the mujahideen
range between $6–12 billion over an 13 year
period. This might equate to $25 billion in
2021 USD - or less than $2 billion per year.
The Kiel Institute "Ukraine Support Tracker"
records about $120 billion in aid as of 20
Nov 2022. See:
■ Ukraine
Support Tracker.
■ Steve
Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of
the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from
the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.
(New York: Penguin Group, 2005.)
■ C.J. Dick, Mujahideen
Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, Conflict Studies Research Center
(Camberley, Surrey UK: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Jan
2002)
91. “The threat of nuclear war is
rising, says Vladimir Putin,” MSN, 8 Dec 2022.
92. “How A
Soviet-Era Reconnaissance UAS Became A
Cruise Missile,” Aviation Week,
15
Dec 2022.
93. NATO
chief fears Ukraine war could become a
wider conflict, AP News,
9 Dec 2022.
94. Brazen
strikes deep inside Russia complicate
support from US, allies for Ukraine,” Washington
Times, 7 Dec 2022.
95. “Strikes
in Russia leave Ukraine allies uneasy at
Putin reply,” Stars and
Stripes (Bloomberg News), 8 Dec
2022.
96. ibid
97. “US
did not encourage or enable Kyiv to
strike within Russia, Blinken says,” Washington
Post, 7 Dec 2022. Also: "’US
neither encouraged nor enabled Kyiv to
strike inside Russia’ - Blinken,” BBC, 7 Dec
2022.
98. “Pentagon
gives Ukraine green light for drone
strikes inside Russia,” UK Times,
09
Dec 2022
99. James Stavridis,
“Putin
Won't Use a Nuke. Chemical Weapons,
Maybe,” Bloomberg,
July 20 2022
100. C. Anthony Pfaff, "Proxy
war or not, Ukraine shows why moral
hazards matter," New
Atlanticist, 09 Jun 2022. Also:
Michael Vlahos, "America's
Perilous Choice in Ukraine: How Proxy
War Accelerates Great Power Decline," Institute for
Peace & Diplomacy, 17 Oct 2022.
101. Jeremy Shapiro,
“We
Are On a Path to Nuclear War,” War on the
Rocks, 12 Oct 2022.
102. “Nuclear
Experts On Chances Of Russia Using
Atomic Weapons In Ukraine,” The War Zone,
30
Sep 2022.
103. Michael Kofman and Anya
Loukianova Fink, “Escalation
Management and Nuclear Employment in
Russian Military Strategy,” War on the
Rocks, 19 Sep 2022. Also: Kofman,
Fink, Edmonds, Russian
Strategy for Escalation Management:
Evolution of Key Concepts (Arlington Virginia:
CNA, Apr 2020).
104. “US
approves $45 billion aid package for
Ukraine,” France 24,
23
Dec 2022.
105. “Biden
Gives Ukraine Patriot System, JDAMs, as
Zelenskyy Visits US,” Air &
Space Magazine (21 Dec 2022). Also:
■ “US to
Supply Ukraine with Kits to Make 'Dumb'
Bombs 'Smart',” Wall Street
Journal, 21 Dec 2022.
■ “What
Joint Direct Attack Munitions Could Do
For Ukraine,” Warzone,
15 Dec 2022.
106. “Patriot
to Ukraine: What Does It Mean?” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 16 Dec
2022. Also: “Patriot
missiles to Ukraine: US regaining
escalation dominance?” Airforce
Technology, 22
Dec 2022.
107. “Russia
says 89 troops were killed in New Year's
attack, blames use of mobile phones,” Reuters, 4
Jan 2023.
108. “US
not preventing Ukraine from developing
long-range strike capabilities Pentagon,” Jerusalem Post
(Reuters), 6
Dec 2022. Also: “Ukroboronprom
tells about new drones for Ukrainian
armed forces,” The New Voice
of Ukraine,
12 Dec 2022.
109. US Dept of Defense, “US
Plans Combined Arms Training for
Ukrainian Soldiers,” DOD News,
15 Dec 2022.
110. “Factbox:
Tanks for Ukraine: who is lining up to
send them?” Reuters,
25 Jan 2023. Also: “The
Ukrainian Army Could Form Three New
Heavy Brigades With All These Tanks And
Fighting Vehicles It’s Getting,” Forbes, 17
Jan 2023.
111. “Ukraine
Gets ‘Tank Killers',” New York Times,
06
Jan 2023.
112. Viewpoint: Russia Will Not Use
Nuclear Weapons
■ George
Mitrovich, “Why
Hasn't Putin Gone Nuclear in Ukraine?” The National
Interest, 17 Nov 2022.
■ “Russia's
Nuclear Weapons Rhetoric. US officials
say they do not believe that Russia has
decided to detonate a tactical device,
but concerns are rising,” NYT, 2
Nov 2022.
■ "Nuclear
war in Ukraine not likely," The Well, 27
Oct 2022.
■ "Putin
'Very Unlikely' to Use Nuclear Weapons:
Retired US General," Newsweek, 26
Oct 2022.
■ "Russia's
nuclear arsenal is huge, but will Putin
use it?" NPR,
17 Oct 2022.
■ “Will
Putin Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?
Local Experts Explain,” NBC Boston,
12
Oct 2022.
■ "Interview
with Paul Bracken: Could Russia Really Go
Nuclear?"Yale Insights, 11
Oct 2022.
■ William
Alberque, “Russia
is unlikely to use nuclear weapons in
Ukraine,” IISS Analysis,
10 Oct 2022.
■ “In
Ukraine Conflict, Nuclear Escalation Is
Possible, But Not Likely, Expert Says,” Texas A&M
Today, 13
April
2022.
■ Olga
Oliker, “Putin's
Nuclear Bluff,” Foreign
Affairs, 11 Mar 2022.
■ J.
Andrés Gannon, “If
Russia Goes Nuclear: Three Scenarios for
the Ukraine War,” Council on Foreign
Relations, 9 Nov 2022.
■ The
War Zone, “Nuclear
Experts On Chances Of Russia Using
Atomic Weapons In Ukraine,” 30 Sep 2022.
113. Hans M.
Kristensen & Matt Korda,
“Tactical
nuclear weapons,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, 30 Aug 2019.
114. Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic
Nuclear Weapons, US Congressional
Research Service,
Washington DC, 07 March 2022.
Also: William A. Chambers, John K. Warden,
Caroline R. Milne, and James A. Blackwell, An
Assessment of the U.S.-Russia
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Balance,
Institute for Defense Analysis, Jan 2021.
115. “Russia's
nuclear arsenal is huge, but will Putin
use it?“ NPR,
17 Oct 2022.
116. Ulrich Kühn,
Preventing
Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO
Playbook (Washington DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
28 March 2018).
117. Kofman and Fink,
“Escalation
Management and Nuclear Employment in
Russian Military Strategy,” War on the Rocks, 19
Sep 2022. Also: Kofman, Fink, Edmonds, Russian
Strategy for Escalation Management:
Evolution of Key Concepts (Arlington Virginia:
CNA, Apr 2020).
118.“Strategic
Procrastination: What’s Russia’s Game
With Nuclear Signaling?,” Carnegie
Politika, 10 Nov 2022.
119. “Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),” Nuclear Threat
Initiative, accessed 18 Dec 2022.
120. Alexander
Gabuev, “The
Atlantic Putin's Doomsday Scenario” The Atlantic
(11 Nov 2022).
121. Anne Applebaum,
“Fear
of Nuclear War Has Warped the West’s
Ukraine Strategy,” The Atlantic,
(07 Nov 2022). Also:
■ Daniel
Bilak, “The
West must urgently overcome its fear of
provoking Putin,” Atlantic
Council blog, 25 Nov 2022.
■ Dan
Reiter, “Don’t Panic About Putin,” Foreign
Affairs (7 Nov 2022)
122. John K. Warden, Limited
Nuclear War: The 21st Century Challenge
for the United States,
Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 4,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Center for Global Security Research, July
2018.
123. Masha Gessen, “Why
Vladimir Putin Would Use Nuclear Weapons
in Ukraine,” The New
Yorker, 01 Nov 2022.
124. Steven Pifer, “Would
Putin Roll the Nuclear Dice?” Time, 18
Oct 2022.
125. Uri Friedman “Will
Putin Use Nuclear Weapons? Watch These
Indicators,” The Atlantic,
15 Oct 2022. Also:
■ William
Alberque, “Russia
is unlikely to use nuclear weapons in
Ukraine,” IISS Analysis,
10 Oct 2022.
■ “How
America Watches for a Nuclear Strike,” NYT, 5
April 2022.
126. "This
is Almost as Bad as the Appeasement at
Munich," transcript and
recording, The Fourteenth Day,
accessed 10 Jan 2023.
127. “Where
the weapons are - Nuclear weapon storage
facilities in Russia,” Russian
Strategic Nuclear Forces, 24 August
2017.
128. Amy Nelson and
Alexander Montgomery, "How
not to estimate the likelihood of
nuclear war," Brookings
Institution, 19 Oct 2022.
129. Martin E.
Hellman, "Probabilistic
Risk Assessment" in James Scouras,
ed, On Assessing the Risk of Nuclear War
(Laurel, MD: John Hopkins Applied Physics
Laboratory, 2021).
130. To indicate a higher state
of Russian strategic force readiness “land-
and rail-based mobile missile systems can be
dispersed, missile-armed submarines in port
can be sent out to sea, and bombers can be
loaded with nuclear weapons. Measures to
enhance the stability of command and control
systems may include the activation of
reserve command centers and reserve
communication channels and the deployment of
mobile relay stations for the transmission
of commands to submarines and bombers.” Of
course, half-steps along these paths would
also be obvious and would understandable
stir great concern. Pavel Podvig ed, Russian
Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge MA: MIT
Press, 01 Nov 2001); Chapter 2, "The
Structure and Operations of Strategic
Nuclear Forces Russian Strategic Nuclear
Forces".
131. There have been
dozens of nuclear weapon-related accidents
since the 1945 as well as a handful of
publicly-known incidents of mistaken
near-use due to faulty perception of attack.
A high percentage of these false warnings
occured during conflict crises - in 1956
during the Suez Crisis, 1973 during the
Arab-Israeli October War, and most
critically during the Cuban Missile Crisis
when a Soviet submarine nearly launched a
nuclear torpedo, US radar operators
separately mistakenly reported to the US air
defense command that a missile attack was
underway, and a US F-102 fighter armed only
with nuclear air-to-air missiles rushed to
protect a U-2 that had wandered into Soviet
air space. It should not be surprising that
mistaken perceptions or rash action cluster
around crisis periods.
■ “Close
Calls with Nuclear Weapons,” Union of Concerned
Scientists, 15 Jan 2015.
■ Jason
M. Weaver, “One
in a Million, Given the Accident:
Assuring Nuclear Weapon Safety,”
US Department of Energy, Office of
Scientific and Technical Information, 25
August 2015.
■ “Broken
Arrows: Nuclear Weapons Accidents,” Atomic Archive,
accessed, 30 Dec 2022.
■ Patricia
Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas
and Sasan Aghlani, Too
Close for Comfort: Cases of Near
Nuclear
Use and Options for Policy, Chatham House Report,
April 2014.
132. McGeorge Bundy, Danger
and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in
the First Fifty Years (New York:
Random House, 1988); Graham Allison, "The
Cuban Missile Crisis at 60: Six Timeless
Lessons for Arms Control," Arms Control
Today, October 2022.
133. A roll of two
dice in which both turn up only one pip is
"snake eyes" - a losing roll. Its
probability of occurrence is 1/36.
134. McGeorge Bundy,
"To
Cap the Volcano," Foreign
Affairs 48, no. 1 (October 1969).
135. Global Impact of
Russia-Ukraine War
■ “War
in Ukraine sparks fertilizer crisis that
may impact the future of global food
production,” The World -
WGBH, 05 Jan 2023.
■ “How
Russia’s War on Ukraine Is Worsening
Global Starvation,” NYT, 02
Jan 2023.
■ “Putin's
'energy weapon' will kill more in Europe
this winter than have died in Ukraine
war,” The Telegraph
(UK), 26 Nov 2022.
■ “OECD
Says War In Ukraine To Have Greater
Impact On Global Economy Than Expected,” RFE/RL, 26
Sep 2022.
■ Assem
Abu Hatab, “Africa’s
Food Security under the Shadow of the
Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” Review of
Southern Africa Vol. 44 No. 1 (29 Aug
2022).
■ “Global
cost-of-living crisis catalyzed by war
in Ukraine sending tens of millions into
poverty,” UN Development
Programme, 7 July 2022.
136. Allied influence on
Ukrainian talks
■ “US
says Zelenskiy risks allies' ‘Ukraine
fatigue' if he rejects Russia talks –
report,” The Guardian,
06 Nov 2022.
■ "Possibility
of talks between Zelenskyy and Putin
came to a halt after Johnson's visit -
UP sources," Ukrainska
Pravda, 05 May 2022.
■ “NATO
says Ukraine to decide on peace deal
with Russia - within limits,” Washington
Post, 05 April 2022.
■ “Mixed
signals from Ukraine’s president and his
aides leave West confused about his
endgame,”
Washington Post,
18 March 2022.
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