Build-Down:

US Armed Forces Retrenchment
in the Context of Modernization

Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #8 Carl Conetta, Charles Knight and Alan Bloomgarden May 1994

This Publication Available in Print $8.00

1. Introduction

America's armed forces are today engaged in a process of transformation more profound than any in the past 40 years. And yet the national debate on the significance and wisdom of this process proceeds without a sufficient awareness of the most fundamental issue: How will the post-Cold War transition affect our nation's real aggregate military capability? Instead, the debate has fixated on partial and superficial measures of change -- such as the percentage reduction in military personnel (about 30 percent), in active division headquarters (about 45 percent), in Air Force tactical fighter wings (about 44 percent), and in Navy "battle force" ships (about 42 percent.)

Most of the common measures of armed forces strength are too general to give a meaningful sense of the current transition. In the case of the Army, for instance, measuring change in terms of combat maneuver brigades (which constitute divisions or operate independently) rather than in terms of divisions suggests a reduction of 33 percent, not 45 percent. Common measures also fail to convey any sense of the qualitative transformation of the armed forces. In the case of the Navy, for instance, understanding the real change in combat capability requires at minimum some attention to changes in the age of the fleet and in its aggregate tonnage, not to mention the fleet's growing proportion of advanced "Aegis" class destroyers and cruisers. Trying to evaluate changes in military capability without attention to qualitative factors is comparable to analyzing fluctuations in the level of annual defense expenditure without taking into account inflation (or deflation). It is important to recognize that the current process of change is not just one of force reduction. Substantial modernization efforts are underway or planned as well, although for most of the services these focus much less today on procurement of new platforms than during the period 1978-1993. (In the next 15 years DOD currently plans to procure approximately 2500 new fighting platforms; more than 20,000 were purchased in the previous 15 years.)

Much of planned modernization involves (1) completing and fully integrating new target acquisition, battle management, and electronic warfare systems developed during the past decade, (2) upgrades to existing platforms that will increase the precision and range of their fires as well as their capability to fight at night and in bad weather, and (3) developing and integrating a new generation of precision munitions. The likely import of these initiatives is difficult to quantify. The integration of J-STARS aircraft, the upgrading of Army armored vehicles (including digitalization), and the addition of longer-range and more accurate tactical missiles to the Army arsenal may not appear as significant as the past decade's purchase of an entirely new fleet of tanks and fighting vehicles, but the impact on the battlefield may be nearly as great. The same is true with regard to the impact on air interdiction capabilities of the integration of J-STARS, the completion of night-fighting and precision-attack upgrades to existing aircraft, and the addition of new precision weapons.

The significance of current modernization derives in part from the fact that it "rounds off" and enhances a 15-year process of comprehensive modernization -- a process only partially complete at the time of the Gulf War. Current and planned modernization also benefits greatly from the "reality check" provided by the Gulf War and from the procurement of fighting systems during the 1980s that were designed expressly to accept regular modular (or "drop-in, add-on") upgrades.

In light of current and planned modernization efforts it is a mistake to describe the current process of armed forces transition as a "draw-down." The process is one of "build-down," involving the trimming away of the older, less capable portions of America's armed forces while multiplying the capabilities of the force that remains. This report provides an overview of the build-down process and an initial evaluation of how it will affect our nation's conventional combat capability. The report:

• Employs measures of US military force structure that are more indicativeof real combat capability than are measures such as Army divisions or numbers of ships in the Navy,



• Provides some measures of how ongoing and planned US modernization efforts will add to national military capability even as the gross numbers of troops, divisions, air wings, and ships decline, and



• Measures modernization plans against the experience of the Gulf War, thus providing a better indication of their significance in a post-Cold War context.

Our analysis strongly supports the conclusion that the change in US military capability will be far less substantial than implied by plans to reduce active troop levels 30 percent. Indeed, when planned reductions are viewed in the context of both (1) weapon and platform modernization programs (as we do in this report) and (2) planned improvements to over-arching command, control, communication, and intelligence systems (which this report does not cover in detail), it seems likely that America's aggregate conventional military capability at the end of FY 2000 will be comparable to that in 1990 -- provided that force readiness is maintained.

Although this report adopts 1990 as a baseline year against which it measures change, this approach cannot determine how much military capability the United States actually requires in the new era. Several more steps are needed to put the national discussion of defense requirements on a firm footing: (1) a qualitative assessment of the capabilities of both new era allies and likely adversaries, (2) a determination of how America's stakes in distant conflicts have changed with the end of the Cold War, and (3) an examination of options for novel and more cooperative means of resolving global security problems. These issues are beyond the scope of the present report, although others in this series have addressed or will address them.¹

2. US Armed Forces Personnel: Reduction and Redistribution

Table 1 summarizes how the BUR will change the number and distribution of active and selected reserve military personnel. Several aspects of the planned changes stand out:

• Although the number of active military personnel is slated to fall about 30 percent from 1990 levels, the reduction in the total force -- comprising active and selected reserve troops -- is only 26.5 percent.



• Despite the outstanding performance of most types of reservists during the Gulf War and the savings that could be realized through a much greater reliance on the reserve components, the proportion of selected reservists in the total force will increase only slightly from the 1990 baseline -- 35.5 to 38.4 percent.



• Post-Gulf War speculation about a shift away from ground power toward air power finds little correlation in the planned redistribution of military personnel among the services. The proportion of US active-duty personnel in the Air Force will rise only slightly from about 26 percent to 26.8 percent. Looking at both active and selected reserve personnel, the Air Force allotment rises a bit more -- from 23 percent to 24.6 percent.



• Contrary to expectation the BUR increases the proportion of ground forces -- US Army and Marine Corps -- in the all-service active-duty mix, from 45.8 percent in 1990 to 46 percent. A slight increase is also evident when we look at the Total Force: USA and USMC active and selected reserve personnel will increase from 54.2 percent of the all-service total to 54.5 percent.



• Most significant is the BUR's increased emphasis on the US Marine Corps. Indeed, the slight increase in emphasis on ground forces does not benefit the Army at all -- both its active and reserve components will have a smaller share of US military personnel in the future. The USMC active and reserve components, by contrast, will grow proportionately as part of the US armed forces and as part of US ground forces.



• Especially notable is the increased emphasis on Marine Corps active troops relative to the Army's active component. In 1990 USMC active troops constituted 20.7 percent of all active ground force personnel; when the BUR restructuring process is completed the USMC will incorporate 26 percent of all US active component ground troops. While in the past the active USMC was 26 percent as large as the active Army, in the future it will be 35 percent as large.

The increased emphasis on the USMC seems inconsistent with the BUR's emphasis on Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) involving adversaries with large, heavy- mechanized ground forces. And, although the perceived need for more rapid deployment capability lends primae facie support to the shift in emphasis, a look at the Gulf War experience calls this support into doubt as well. Army airborne units were the first to deploy. Although Marine Corps deployments caught up and then kept pace with Army deployments through mid-September 1990, the Army's deployment had surpassed that of the Corps by the end of the month. The inescapable fact is that after the deployment of three or so brigades, the USMC is not much more rapidly deployable than USA seaborne units. The defining characteristic of the USMC is its specialization for amphibious warfare -- from which its capability for rapid deployment derives. If the Corps as a whole is to be redefined as America's foremost rapid deployment ground force, substantial new lift capability must be added. Additional armor is needed as well. However, this new lift could as easily go to the Army (where the armor already exists) -- unless, of course, the real need is for more amphibious warfare capability. Only such a need (which was not apparent in the Gulf War) could justify the BUR's tilt toward the USMC.

In light of the profound transformation in America's security environment, it is surprising how little the BUR aims to change the overall allocation of personnel among the services and service components. Except for a greater emphasis on the USMC and on the USAF reserve components, the distribution of personnel among the services in the post-Cold War period will closely resemble that during the final years of the Cold War. Indeed, more variation is evident in the Cold War peacetime periods 1955-1964 and 1976-1988 than in the BUR's plans for the future.

3. US Ground Force Units and Weapons

Table 2 summarizes the planned change in the number of US ground force units (Army and Marine Corps). Unit strength for the Army is given in terms of both divisions and combat maneuver brigades (which constitute divisions or fight independently). For the USMC, strength is given in terms of both divisions and combat maneuver battalions (which are one step down from brigades/regiments in the organizational hierarchy). Depicting structural change in terms of units subordinate to divisions allows a more accurate assessment of change in fighting strength.

• Although the planned change in active US Army divisions suggests a 44 percent reduction in strength, the planned reduction in subordinate combat maneuver brigades shows only a 37 percent cut. This is more in line with the planned 34 percent reduction in Army active-duty personnel.
• Although the BUR suggests a reduction in Army reserve component division "flags" as great as 50 percent, the planned cut in reserve combat brigades is only 30 percent. This cut is substantially greater than that planned for reserve personnel. The difference reflects the fact that reservists perform many combat support and service support functions for the active component.
• The BUR proposes reducing the Army total force as measured in combat maneuver brigades by 33.6 percent. As shown in Table 1 the cut in Army Total Force personnel is only 28.5 percent. This finding is consistent with either an increase in combat unit readiness or a relative increase in levels of combat support (for instance, helicopter units) or service support.
• Attention to the planned change in numbers of USMC combat maneuver battalions -- infantry, armor, amphibious assault -- helps correct the false impression of zero reduction in strength given by numbers of USMC divisions. The USMC will reduce its roster of active maneuver battalions 12.5 percent. USMC reserve battalions will fall by 7 percent. This correlates fairly closely with planned reductions in personnel. The Corps' Total Force reduction will be 11 percent.

Tables 3 and 4 summarize key elements of the current ground force modernization program and compare the planned future inventory of select systems with the Gulf War deployments. In each case the "Future Available Arsenal" column records the total post-FY2000 inventory for the system in question (and, in some cases, for each model of the system) assuming that currently planned modernization programs go forward. Using the Gulf War as a baseline, these tables give a good first-order impression of important qualitative enhancements planned for ground forces, which in turn provides the necessary context for understanding the significance of force structure reductions.

3.1 The Abrams, Bradley, and Multiple Rocket Launcher System (MLRS)

The M1 Abrams tank modernization program aims to upgrade as many as 1200 basic M1s to M1A2 status. (In addition, a small number of M1A2 have been built since the Gulf War.) Because the final program goal is not yet set, the "future inventory" column shows a minimum-maximum range for numbers of M1s and M1A2s.

• Table 3 shows that the planned Abrams inventory will be substantially more modern than the fleet that fought in the Gulf War. During Operation Desert Storm (ODS) the Army and Marine Corps had at their disposal 2376 tanks that were M1A1 class or better. However, 528 of the deployed M1A1s served as a stored theater reserve; only 1848 constituted the fighting force. The future inventory of comparable or better tanks available to the USA and USMC will be at least 2.7 times larger than the ODS force even if the M1 modernization program stops after upgrading only 210 M1s.



• The "cutting edge" tanks of the Gulf War were the 654 M1A1s equipped with heavy (depleted uranium) armor. At least 2300 tanks comparable to these heavy-armor M1A1s or even better (i.e., M1A2s) will be available in the future -- again assuming an early end to the upgrade program. This number is sufficient to equip 7 heavy divisions. If the Army proceeds with modernizing 1200 M1s, US ground forces will have enough cutting edge tanks to equip 10 heavy divisions.



• M1A2s were not yet available during the Gulf War. At least 272 will be available in the future (as part of the "cutting edge" force mentioned above). If the Army wins assent to continuing Abrams upgrades, 1245 M1A2s will become available. The M1A2 incorporates a number of improvements -- most notably the integrated "vehicle electronics" system -- that together set it apart from previous models by half a "generation." Due to improved navigation, situation awareness, target acquisition, and fire control, officials of the Tank Automotive Command contend that the M1A2 will have twice the battle efficiency of the A1 in defensive mode and 50 percent more capability in an offensive mode. Nonetheless, the M1A1 (HA)s far outperformed the best of Iraqi tanks in the Gulf War.



• A similar degree of modernization will occur in the Army's fleet of M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. During ODS 2200 Bradleys were deployed to Southwest Asia -- although 418 of these (the "A0" models) served mostly as reserves. In the future, three times as many Bradleys will be available to the Army. Counting only those Bradleys that are more advanced than the "A0" model, existing stocks and planned upgrades will make available 2.6 times as many advanced Bradleys as served in the Gulf.



• More significant, current modernization plans will put at the Army's disposal 3000 "A2 ODS" and "A3" model Bradleys, which are more advanced than any that fought in the Gulf War. Like the M1A2, the M2/3-A3 represents a half-generation advance over older Bradleys. (The Army's hopes to field 1602 of these models).



• The US Army deployed 189 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) for the Gulf War. More than three times as many will be available for use in the future inventory. Only 18 of the MLRS units deployed in ODS were initially capable of firing ATACMS missiles and another 9 conversion kits were on hand. At least 10 times as many MLRS units will be ATACMS-capable in the future.

3.2 Armed helicopters: Cobra, Kiowa Warrior, Apache, and Comanche

Table 4 presents a similar analysis of the future (post-FY1999) armed combat helicopter inventories of the US Army and Marine Corps. In this case the projected future inventory includes new procurement, upgrades, and older models that can serve past 2005. (However, current plans are to retire some helicopters before their useful life is over.)

• Whereas the Army and Marine Corps deployed approximately 513 armed helicopters for the Gulf War, at least 2.5 times as many of these should be available in the future inventory even if no Comanches enter the force until after 2010.



• If Comanche begins to enter the force during 2005-2010, as planned, the inventory of armed helicopters will be 2.8 to 4 times larger than the force deployed for ODS.



• Even without the Comanche approximately 1200 of the future available armed helicopters would be superior in capability to their precursors that fought in the Gulf War. Indeed, the backbone of the planned attack helicopter fleet -- the AH-64C and AH-64D Apaches -- is shown in some Army analyses to be 7.5 times more effective and 16 times more effective, respectively, than the AH-64As that fought in the Gulf War.²

• If planned modernization programs go forward the Army will have at its disposal by the period 2010-2012 approximately 1600 upgraded Apaches and new Comanches (assuming a 25-year service life for the Apaches). This fleet would be almost 3.5 times larger than the Army's deployment of armed helicopters for ODS, and the average capability of the individual helicopters constituting this fleet would be far greater than that of the mix of Cobras, Kiowa Warriors, and Apaches that fought in the Gulf War.

4. The Future of US Air Power: USAF, USN, and USMC

4.1 The planned reductions
Table 5 reviews planned changes in combat air power structure and inventories for all services. For greater accuracy the table calculates change in terms of wings, squadrons, and the Primary Authorized Aircraft (PAA) associated with these units. The table calls attention to several features of the BUR's plans for air power:

• Most notable is the all-service reported total reduction goal for fighter and attack wings, squadrons, and PAA aircraft. The planned reduction in wings is 36.4 percent (from 55 to 35), in squadrons 45.4 percent (from 218 to 119), and in PAA fighter attack aircraft 40 percent (from 3766 to approximately 2252.) Of these measures, the changes in squadrons and PAA aircraft are most meaningful.



• Regarding bombers with a conventional role the BUR suggests an increase of more than 200 percent -- from an effective PAA of 68 in 1990 to one of 154.³ Adding bombers to the tactical combat aircraft totals mitigates somewhat the change in all-service fleet size: down 37 percent from 3834 PAA in 1990 to 2406 PAA.



• A comparison of active and reserve components reveals that the reserves are hit harder, suffering a 53 percent reduction in squadrons. Active component squadrons are cut 42.4 percent. The relative emphasis on cutting reserves component air units is remarkable given their high readiness standards and cost-effectiveness.



• The USAF fleet of fighters and attack aircraft suffers the greatest percentage cuts -- 44.5 percent in PAA aircraft (active and reserve) versus the USN/USMC average reduction of 30.7 percent.

Does the USAF take the biggest cut of all? If accepted at face value, the announced reduction plan for USAF combat squadrons and PAA suggests a significant relative redistribution of air power among the services. Whereas in 1990 the USAF controlled 55 percent of tactical combat squadrons and 69 percent of fighter and attack PAA, the BUR projects a future in which the USAF will control only 50 percent of squadrons and 64 percent of PAA. However, the BUR's presentation on USAF tactical air force reductions should be approached with caution, for several reasons:

• First, although the USAF squadron and PAA numbers offered in DOD's annual report seem to further specify the BUR goal of reducing to 20 tactical fighter wing equivalents, they actually only repeat it. The USAF and DOD have simply equated each wing with three squadrons and each squadron with 24 primary authorized aircraft. However, historically, the number of USAF squadrons per wing has varied. So has the number of PAA per squadron. In addition, some squadrons have existed outside wings. (By comparison, USN and USMC air power planning does not treat squadron and PAA numbers as statistical derivatives of wing numbers.) It is possible that the USAF may further specify its plans in the future, revealing squadron and PAA numbers that are more than simple multiples of wing numbers.



• Second, the USAF today maintains approximately 190 A-10/OA-10s outside of tactical fighter wings in eight Forward Air Control (FAC) squadrons. These aircraft once counted as tactical fighters, but they do not in the BUR's accounting. Four, five, or more of the FAC squadrons may remain after force reductions are complete. These aircraft will retain considerable combat capability and should not be viewed as simple equivalents of the OV-10s they will replace. Adding these squadrons and planes back into the fighter and attack totals would mitigate the apparent severity of the cuts, easing the reduction in USAF tactical fighter PAA to about 40 percent -- but still leaving the USAF short of its former predominance. For a fuller picture of the Air Force's future conventional force we can add conventional bombers into its combat air totals as well, which indicates a total reduction in fighter, attack, and bomber PAA of 36 percent.



• Finally, the BUR's proposed reduction in USAF active and reserve PAA aircraft (whether calculated as 44.5, 40, or 36 percent) does not correlate with the proposed USAF personnel cut of only 21 percent. (See Table 1.)

The planned reduction in USAF personnel does not correlate with the announced cut in Tactical Fighter Wings. USAF personnel can be roughly divided into strategic and tactical/mobility forces, on the one side, and various support functions on the other (such as medical support, training, communications, and base maintenance). Recently, these two categories have each included about 50 percent of USAF personnel. Within the first category, personnel are further distributed approximately 35 percent to strategic functions, 50 percent to tactical, and 15 percent to mobility. Both strategic and tactical force structures are slated for substantial cuts. The only way to reconcile the planned structure cuts in these areas with an overall USAF personnel cut of only 21 percent is to assume that the support side of the equation (medical, training, etc.) suffers cuts that are proportionately much smaller than on the warfighting side. However, this does not make sense from the perspective of warfighting needs or institutional dynamics. Either the USAF 20 wing force will involve more squadrons and aircraft than the Air Force's statistical extrapolation shows or the service is trading-in teeth for tail.

4.2 Future tactical combat aircraft procurement needs

The PAA totals for 1990 and the future reported in Table 5 do not translate directly into aircraft procurement requirements. Using historical and alternative coefficients Table 6 illustrates how PAA numbers translate into Total Inventory numbers.

The total inventory adds Backup Authorized Aircraft (BAA) to the PAA totals. BAA aircraft, which have been historically associated with PAA aircraft on a one-for- three basis, provide a margin that ensures that squadrons can remain at full fighting strength even when some aircraft are undergoing diagnostics, repairs, or upgrades. BAAs also serve as immediate replacements for aircraft destroyed in war or peacetime exercises. In addition, the total inventory category includes front-line aircraft in storage (which can provide permanent replacements for PAA aircraft) and front-line aircraft types used for training but possibly available for a warfighting role. These aircraft are recorded in the column marked "additional."

The historical coefficients for translating PAA numbers into Total Inventory numbers have varied significantly from service to service, although Table 6 assumes, as is common, that the PAA-BAA ratio is three to one. For 1990 the more inclusive ratio of PAA-Total Inventory derives from inventory numbers reported by the services for front-line attack and fighter aircraft. The actual coefficients in 1990 were 1.58 for the USAF and 1.515 for the USN and USMC (combined).

The future requirement for "A" and "F" (attack and fighter) planes as reported in the BUR and 1994 Report of the Secretary of Defense is 1440 PAA for the USAF and approximately 812 PAA for the USN and USMC. Applying the standard Cold War coefficient, these PAA numbers would translate into total inventory requirements of approximately 2276 fighter and attack aircraft for the USAF and 1232 for the USN and USMC: an all-service total inventory of 3508. Approximately 750 of the aircraft in this estimated total inventory would provide backups for PAA. The remaining 506 aircraft fall into the "additional" category. Four hundred of these -- equivalent to 18 percent of PAA -- might serve as a war stock. The remaining 106 might serve as combat-capable trainers or in other minor roles.

A front-line combat aircraft war stock equivalent to 18 percent of PAA seems quite modest when viewed in the historical context of a NATO-WTO conflict scenario. Even given the larger air forces of America and its NATO allies during the high tide of the Cold War, ten days of war across the European "central front" could have consumed this percentage of allied PAA. However, looking forward into the new era, 18 percent of 2252 PAA would provide the United States with a war stock equivalent to more than seven times the total coalition aircraft losses in the Gulf War. In this light, a smaller margin is reasonable. Ten percent of currently planned PAA, for instance, would equal four times the total coalition losses in the Gulf War.

The final section of Table 6 adopts a "new-era standard" for converting PAA numbers into total inventory requirements. This standard assumes a ratio of one backup aircraft for every three PAA, an additional 10 percent of PAA as a war stock, and another 5 percent of PAA for training and other purposes. Given this standard, the BUR's projections for future PAA would translate to total attack and fighter inventories of approximately 2136 for the USAF and 1204 for the USN and USMC.

4.3 Past and planned tactical combat aircraft procurement

Table 7 surveys America's possible future inventory of attack and fighter aircraft based on (1) procurement during the period 1980-1994 and current procurement plans and (2) reported service procurement plans for the next two decades. Aircraft procured in the years 1980-1994 -- few of which entered service until 1982 -- are relevant because the oldest of these aircraft will not exhaust their useful service life until 2007 (assuming a service life of 25 years).

Future tactical combat aircraft procurement falls roughly into two categories: (1) those aircraft that will enter one of America's air forces or achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) before 2003 and (2) those that will not likely achieve IOC or begin to enter the service inventories until after 2010. In order to provide a basis for comparison Table 7 also reports the total US attack and fighter aircraft deployed for ODS.

• In the period 1980-1994 the United States acquired approximately 2773 attack and fighter aircraft for the USAF and 1500 for the USN and USMC. Of these, less than 250 of the USAF aircraft and 150 of the USN and USMC aircraft have been lost in war or through accidents. Hence, the USAF should have in active or "usable" stored status 2523 of these aircraft, while the Navy and Marine Corps should have 1350.



• The services currently hope to win assent to procurement of 1587 new fighter and attack aircraft that will begin to enter service inventories between now and 2003. The services also hope to procure as many as 2775 additional planes that will not begin to enter service inventories until after 2010.

How do current tactical aircraft procurement plans compare with the PAA requirements as set forth in the BUR? This is a difficult question to answer for several reasons: First, as illustrated in Table 6, PAA numbers do not translate easily into total inventory requirements. Different assumptions about what constitutes an acceptable war stock produce different estimates of the total requirement. Second, early retirement of existing aircraft can produce the false appearance of a shortfall. Third, the plans for new (i.e., post-FY1994) procurement stretch over a long period -- more than 20 years -- and schedules for production and goals for IOC are very slippery.

A better approach to assessing current plans is to ask how well the recently procured fleet of aircraft (including those not yet produced or in service) meets US requirements through 2007 -- when the oldest of these aircraft will reach the 25-years-of-service mark. As noted above, this stock includes 2523 USAF and 1350 USN/USMC "A" and "F" aircraft.

Table 8 compares this stock with the PAA and total inventory requirements as set forth in Table 6. In translating PAA requirements into total inventory requirements it uses both the "Cold War" and "new era" standards, also as set forth in Table 6. (These standards reflect different assumptions about how large a war stock the United States requires in the new era.) In establishing requirements the table also adds replacement aircraft for those lost through peacetime accidents, based on historical loss rates (approximately 1.34 percent of PAA per year.)

The implication of this analysis is that the USAF could meet its entire numerical requirement for fighter and attack aircraft through 2007 with aircraft procured in the period 1980-1994. Beyond these aircraft -- some of which will not enter the force until FY96 -- the USAF need add no new "A" and "F" planes until 2007. For the USN & USMC, the addition of 12 planes to the stock of attack and fighter aircraft already acquired in 1980-1994 would meet their numerical requirements through 2007 -- even assuming "Cold War standards" for translating total PAA into total inventory.

Fulfilling the BUR requirement for attack and fighter aircraft through FY2007 with stocks procured during the period FY1980-FY1994 would mean consuming all or most of the service life of these aircraft (assuming that 25 years is the limit of their service lives). The downside of this approach is that the average age of US air fleets will rise to about 19 years for the USAF (17 years for the active component) and 18 years for the combined USN and USMC fleets by 2007. These averages would be far greater than in any previous period.

However, historical standards of average air fleet age may have little relevance for the future, for several reasons. First, the air frames of the 1980s and 1990s were built to last longer than those of previous decades. As pointed out by former USAF Chief of Staff General Michael Dugan, "Modern combat aircraft last longer than their predecessors.... Those introduced in the 1970s [will last] about 20 years; and those from the 1980s and 1990s will last longer."⁴ Second, modular or "drop in" modernization upgrades are easier, more extensive, and more effective than ever before. Third, improvements in the over-arching C3I "system of systems" and in precision munitions and delivery systems can partially compensate for having older air frames. (Notably, F-111Fs were the work horses of the laser- bombing fleet in the Gulf War despite their average age of 19 years.)

Another common argument against fully consuming existing air assets involves the "bow wave" problem: if existing aircraft are retained until the end of their service lives, then future acquisition will replicate the "boom-bust" pattern of the 1970s and 1980s, with production "bunching up" in one half of a 25-year production cycle. This pattern is disruptive for industry and it adds to procurement costs. In other words, fully efficient consumption today seems incompatible with fully efficient production. One solution -- currently in favor -- is to retire and replace large numbers of aircraft early, thus flattening the future bow wave. However, this trades one inefficiency for another.

A better approach might seek an optimal combination of (1) modest new additions in the period 2004-2007, (2) the reconditioning or remanufacturing of some aircraft today in order to extend their service lives, and (3) consolidation of service procurement programs and industry production facilities. The early addition of 200 aircraft and the reconditioning of 200 more would substantially extend future production activity. Consolidation of both procurement and production could mitigate the worst effects of any remaining bow wave.

The least expensive option would be a further reduction in the size of planned combat air fleets -- if acceptable from the perspective of security requirements. Cutting one or two more tactical fighter wings and two USN air wings would permit the early retirement of 300 older aircraft. This would improve the average age of the remaining fleet. A blending of this option and the program outlined above could achieve both substantial savings and a virtual elimination of the bow wave.

Subtracting one or two USAF wings and two USN air wings from the BUR goals would imply a reduction in PAA of perhaps 200 planes, leaving about 2050 "A" and "F" aircraft (PAA). The real test of adequacy involves the so-called "two-war" requirement. Even in the case of having to fight two MRCs the United States would not send all of its air assets to war. A strategic reserve would be retained and some aircraft would remain forward deployed in other theaters. Assuming that only 1900 attack and fighter aircraft plus 154 bombers (2054 aircraft total) are available for the two wars, can these be reasonably expected to do twice the job of the 1317 such aircraft that deployed for Desert Storm? The answer hinges on two issues: the extent of qualitative improvements in the force and how America chooses to employ air power in future conflicts.

A central theme of this report is that simple "bean counts" of platforms, units, or personnel numbers do not tell much about combat capability. The next section of this report reviews the modernization program for air-delivered precision munitions. Improvements in C3I, navigation, and target acquisition systems are hard to quantify -- but they will be extensive. In the Gulf War J-STARS aircraft and reconnaissance drones played an important role in multiplying air power efficiency and responsiveness, even though reliance on these systems was far short of what is planned for the future.

The increase in the proportion of night-fighters and precision-attack aircraft gives a better indication of the coming boost in air fleet capability. Only 22 percent of the ground attack aircraft deployed in ODS (and an even smaller proportion of the 1990 total inventory) had advanced night-fighting capability. By the end of the decade more than 50 percent of America's "A" and "F" planes will have such capability. Less than 15 percent of ODS ground attack combat aircraft -- approximately 150 planes -- conducted the vast majority of medium-altitude precision attacks. By the end of the decade more than 600 fighter and attack aircraft will be able to deliver PGMs from altitudes above 12,000 feet -- and the number of these aircraft will continue to rise next decade. Within the next ten years numerous heavy bombers are also slated to join the ranks of precision-attack aircraft. In the Gulf War, the large majority of attack sorties (and, thus, demand for attack aircraft) did not involve precision bombing. Although precision weapons are not necessary, suitable, or cost-effective for some attack missions, there is room for a further substitution of precision attack for non-precision attack -- and any substantial substitution will significantly reduce the demand for attack aircraft.

Finally, the United States can and will better integrate its combat air fleets -- USAF, USN, and USMC -- resulting in more efficient utilization. During the Gulf War, the Joint Force Air Component Commander underutilized USMC and, especially, USN aircraft. The USAF aircraft constituted 60 percent of America's ground- attack inventory in the Gulf, but conducted 68 percent of all US attack sorties and delivered 88 percent of all US precision munitions.⁵ A fuller integration and utilization of all air assets is a relatively low-cost option for significantly increasing total air power effectiveness.

The second issue relevant to America's capability to conduct two overlapping air wars with a smaller air fleet is how the wars are fought. The most demanding approach would be to attempt to conduct two overlapping comprehensive offensive air campaigns, each at a pace comparable to or greater than that achieved in ODS. Less demanding would be two air campaigns fought in synchronized defensive and offensive phases.

During the Persian Gulf conflict Secretary of Defense Cheney concluded that a robust defensive shield was in place before even 40 percent of America's eventual air deployment was complete. By this standard, a future capacity to distribute 1900 fighter, attack, and bomber aircraft between two theaters of war should be sufficient to guarantee an offensive campaign in one theater and a defensive campaign in the other. The United States could also choose to fight the offensive phases, when the time came, at a more deliberate pace than that set in ODS, thus reducing the demand for aircraft.⁶ Some analysts might consider this type of strategic innovation an abandonment of the "two MRC" requirement, but it is not. Instead, it is an abandonment of the requirement to conduct two early, very rapid, and near-simultaneous offensive air campaigns. This limitation is reasonable given that the United States will rarely, if ever, face a two MRC contingency.

5. Land Attack Missiles and Air-delivered Precision Munitions

Table 9 reviews key elements of America's future available arsenal of land-attack missiles and air-delivered precision munitions, and it compares this arsenal with an inventory of similar weapons employed in the Gulf War. The calculation of the nation's future arsenal includes weapons procured during the period 1980-1994 and currently planned procurement for the fiscal years after 1994.

• The currently available stock of MLRS missiles is more than 50 times larger than the total used in ODS. Likewise, the current stock of ATACMs is 50 times larger than the ODS-employed total. Current procurement plans will increase this stock further. Considered together with the fact that America's current and future inventory of regular MLRS launchers and ATACMS-capable MLRS launchers will be much larger than the totals deployed for Desert Storm, the future size of the Army's land-attack missile arsenal suggests a much greater capability than demonstrated in ODS.



• A greater reliance on ATACMS missiles and current efforts to increase the range of both these weapons and standard MLRS missiles will give the Army a future capability that has no real parallel in the Gulf War. Greater range implies not only a capacity to attack new categories of targets in much greater depth, but also a greater capacity for cooperation among MLRS units, which in operational terms effectively multiplies the number of these units. Moreover, the procurement of Brilliant Anti-Tank (BAT) and other precision submunitions for use with ATACMS and MLRS missiles will boost their lethality nearly as much as the Air Force's employment of precision-guided bombs has boosted the lethality of its aircraft.

Turning to air- and sea-launched missiles and bombs, future capabilities are best understood by dividing the systems into three categories: longer-range (ALCM, SLCM, and TSSAM), mid-range (SLAM and AGM-130), and shorter range (guided-bombs, glide-bombs, and Mavericks).

• Navy procurement of conventional land-attack SLCMs in the period 1980- 1994 and as planned for the future will give it an arsenal 10 times larger than the stock used during the Gulf War. Planned upgrades to these missiles will increase their accuracy and flexibility -- as will the employment of precision submunitions and terminal guidance.



• The Air Force may have used most of its stock of conventional ALCMs during the Gulf War -- the total number of conventional models so far procured is difficult to determine. At any rate, the planned TSSAM missile may assume many of the conventional roles once slated for the ALCM. The current USAF procurement goal for this missile would give it an arsenal more than 100 times as large as the stock of ALCMs used in the Gulf War.



• All told, the existing and currently planned arsenal of ALCMs, SLCMs, and TSSAM will together give the services almost 30 times as many longer-range precision-attack missiles than employed during the Gulf War.



• Mid-range precision missiles, which include the SLAM and the new AGM-130, played a smaller role in the Gulf War; indeed, only seven were used. Past and planned procurement will give the USN and USAF a stock of mid-range precision missile several hundred times larger than the total used in ODS.

Shorter-range precision weapons include older laser-guided and glide bombs and several new systems: the Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW), the Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW), and the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). Although they involve a different attack profile, Mavericks are also best assigned to this category because of range and because they share target types with the other, smaller members of this category. Regarding both Mavericks and laser-guided bombs, Table 9 does not capture procurement before 1980, which is substantial. However, systems procured prior to 1980 tend to be substantially less advanced than those used in the Gulf War and are less amenable to upgrades than are later models.

• Today America's air forces have in stock more than 36,000 weapons in the category we define as shorter-range precision-guided. About 15,000 of these types of weapons were used during the Gulf War.



• If current modernization and upgrade programs go forward as planned America's future arsenal of shorter-range air-delivered precision weapons will include 120,000 weapons -- an arsenal 8 times larger than the stock used in ODS. (If procurement of JDAM is cut short at 40,000 units, however, the arsenal will be only 6 times as large as the ODS stock.)



• Apart from sheer numbers of shorter-range precision weapons, current modernization plans will also add important new capabilities. These include moderate standoff capability, all-weather precision attack capability, and multiple-target precision or area attack capabilities.



• The largest share of new weapons will be JDAMs, and these have important limitations. Except for the relatively few JDAMs to be equipped with terminal precision seekers (500-1000) this weapon is significantly less accurate than laser-guided bombs (10-15 meters for JDAM versus 3-5 meters for LGBs) Thus, the standard models should not be considered as simple substitutes for LGBs except in bad weather or where the quality of air defenses make delivery of LGBs, which require loiter time, too risky. However, JDAMs can profitably substitute for dumb bombs in many circumstances. In general, basic JDAMs should be viewed as a complement to LGBs and other weapons with terminal precision guidance.

As currently planned America's future arsenal of precision weapons holds remarkable (and, so far, largely overlooked) implications. The planned stock of precision land-attack missiles (ATACMs) and air-delivered munitions will be 6.5 to 8 times larger than the stock used in Desert Storm, and more capable per average weapon as well. This calculation excludes standard MLRS missiles as non- precision weapons and excludes the planned buy of BATs because these are submunitions. This arsenal would, for instance, permit the United States to employ twice as many precision munitions (perhaps with three or more times the impact) in future MRCs than in the Gulf War, and do so three or four times before exhausting supply. And, as noted, this does not take into account heavier use of standard MLRS missiles or the host of other upgraded precision weapons deliverable by helicopter and ground vehicles. Several implications stand out:

• Reliance on large numbers of dumb munitions could be reduced dramatically, and with this



• Numbers of delivery platforms could be reduced while the effective intensity of attack (level of destruction per day) is increased.



• The reduction in platforms and weapon numbers (and tonnage) will substantially ease the logistic and power projection challenge posed by MRCs.

6. The Navy's Future Fleet: More than Meets the Eye

Table 10 presents an overview of the planned change in the principal combat elements of the Navy active-component fleet. The table presents both numbers of ships and aggregate tonnage -- the latter measure being one very rough indicator of strength. Assessing a fleet in terms of total number of ships alone is comparable to assessing an army in terms of "combat units" without making a distinction among divisions, independent brigades, and independent battalions. Clearly, it is significant if a "50 unit" army comprises mostly divisions or mostly independent brigades (which are less than one-third as large as divisions and less varied in their capabilities.) Attention to change in a fleet's aggregate tonnage can detect discrimination in the choice of the types and sizes of units to retire. (The average age of ships in the fleet is another rough indicator of capability. Table 11 includes this measure in examining the change in the Navy's fleet of major surface combatants.)

• BUR mandated reductions in the Navy fleet will reduce the central elements of combat power -- attack submarines, aircraft carriers, and major surface combatants by 42 percent in number but only 29 percent in aggregate tonnage. (Line 4) The latter figure is a truer indicator of change in strength -- and it correlates better with the 32.4 percent reduction in Navy personnel recorded in Table 1.



• When the ships of the amphibious warfare fleet are also taken into account, the difference between change in numbers of ships and tonnage appears even more stark: a 39.6 percent cut in ships versus a 23 percent reduction in tonnage. (Line 7)



• Where change in numbers of ship and aggregate tonnage seem to correlate best is in the category "Major Surface Combatants" (Line 3), which constitutes approximately 50 percent of the combat fleet. For this category the planned change amounts to a 43.6 reduction in numbers of ship and a 40.5 percent reduction in aggregate tonnage. Line 8 analyzes the change in the total fleet discounting the effect of changes in Major Surface Combatants. It shows that the planned reduction in submarines, aircraft carriers, and amphibious ships measured in aggregate tonnage is only 14.3 percent (despite a reduction in fleet size of 35 percent).

Table 10 reveals that the planned reduction in Major Surface Combatants (MSCs) is especially significant in the Navy's overall restructuring scheme. Table 11 takes a closer look at this category, which in 1990 included battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and patrol boats. Although the BUR gives a range 116-110 ships for the future inventory of MSCs, the table assumes the smaller of these goals.

• The total number of Major Surface Combatants will fall by 43.6 percent from 195 ships to 110 (Line 6) during the period 1990-2005. However, the reduction is concentrated in the battleship category, which includes the largest and oldest ships, and the Frigate and Patrol Boat categories, which include the smallest. As a result, the change in fleet weight and age composition does not reinforce the first impression of dramatically reduced fleet strength.



• Overall MSC fleet weight falls by 40.3 percent (Line 8), but the change in fleet weight discounting the four battleships (Line 8a) is only 28.4 percent. Looking at the weight change in ships other than battleships, the individual members of the fleet will be 25 percent heavier on average in 2005 than in 1990. Not only will the average weight of ships in the fleet rise, but weight will be more evenly distributed throughout the fleet because the cuts focus on both the largest and smallest ships.

• The average age of the ships in the fleet improves by 22 percent. (Line 9). This is not only because the oldest ships are usually retired first, but also because 53 new ships are added in the period 1990-2005. (Line 11)



• Line 10 shows the age of the fleet by weight -- so that the age of larger ships counts more than that of smaller. Just as the average age of the fleet measured ship-by-ship enhances our understanding of the reduction in fleet size, average age by weight helps us appreciate the real significance of the planned reduction in fleet weight. And the fact that the improvement in weighted average age (-33%) is greater than the improvement in simple average age (-22%) tells us that the "youth" of the future fleet will not be concentrated on the small end of the ship spectrum. This is important because both size and youth can serve as rough indicators of capability.



• A better indicator of improvement in capability is the growth in numbers of Aegis-, Tomahawk-, and Vertical Launch System (VLS)-equipped ships.(Lines 6a, b, c)



• The Aegis cruisers and destroyers are the first true "information age" ships, and they will constitute almost 75 percent of the fleet in 2005 (compared with 7 percent in 1990). The increase in the numbers of Aegis ships will be more than five-fold.



• The Tomahawk cruise missile is the Navy's premier land-attack weapon. Only 17 percent of the surface fleet could employ the weapon in 1990; 66 percent will be Tomahawk-capable by 1999. The Navy will arm more than twice as many surface ships with Tomahawks in 1999 than in 1990.



• The Vertical Launch System increases the flexibility and responsiveness of a variety of anti-air, anti-ship, and land- attack missiles. Less than 9 percent of the fleet was VLS-equipped in 1990; 66 percent will be VLS equipped by 1999. There will be a four-fold increase in the number of Vertical Launch System ships. (The combined approximate maximum fleet load of VLS cells and Tomahawk missiles will rise from 1,900+ in 1990 to 7,200+ in 2005.)



• As the Navy relies more on missile power in the future, it will rely less on the power of guns. Line 7 indicates a 53 percent reduction in the total number of guns for the category Major Surface Combatants (some types of guns are mounted on ships outside this category as well.) Discounting battleships the reduction in MSC guns is 40 percent. Along with the increase in average weight of ships, however, will be an increase in ammunition stores. Nevertheless, the reduction in "gun-based" firepower is a special concern for the Marine Corps, who depend on Navy guns for fire support. (For this reason the Navy is thinking about deploying a version of the ATACMS on some ships.)

A final feature of the Navy's build-down program for surface combatants depicted in Table 11 is the retirement of many ships with less than 30 years of service -- a conservative but common estimate of service life. Because the table assumes a fleet of only 110 surface combatants while DOD and the Navy may choose to retain as many as 116, it could slightly overstate early retirement. Nonetheless, the general features of the phenomenon of "retiring early and building new while reducing fleet size" does not depend on the fate of six ships.

• Even while adding 38 new ships in the 1990-1999 period the Navy will retire as many as 60 ships before their effective service life is complete (Line 12a.) (Table 11 refers only to the active-component fleet. However, ships transferred from the active to reserve component are not considered "retired." The table assumes that the reserve fleet will comprise 16 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates.)



• In the period 1999-2005 the Navy will retire additional ships early -- as many as 15 ships, while it adds 15 new ships to its fleet.



• In 2005, 25-31 ships retired by the Navy in the period 1990-2005 will still be younger than 30 years. (The precise number depends on the final goal for fleet size.) If 35 years is adopted as the standard for MSC service life, another 30 ships (mostly frigates) would qualify as "early retirees" -- even as late as 2005.

Acknowledgements: PDA would like to thank Sean Meyer and Steve Lily-Weber for their assistance in the preparation of this memo, and Keith Patton whose expert knowledge of naval systems and attention to detail greatly facilitated this effort.

Notes

1. Relevant material available from the Project on Defense Alternatives include: Carl Conetta, "Mismatch: The 'Bottom Up Review' and America's Security Requirements in the New Era," testimony before the US House Committee on Armed Services, 10 March 1994; "Rand's New Calculus and the Impasse of US Defense Restructuring," PDA Briefing Report 4 (August 1993); "World Order and American Power: Toward a US Security Policy for the New Era," PDA Briefing Memo 7 (April 1993); and, Reasonable Force: Adapting the US Army and Marine Corps to the New Era, PDA Briefing Report 3 (20 March 1992).

2. Glenn W Goodman, Jr., "Army Aviation's Stellar Plans Hamstrung by Budget Shortfalls," Armed Forces Journal International (April 1993) page 37.

3. Estimates of the PAA for conventional bombers vary greatly because many bombers can serve in either a conventional or nuclear role. We choose 68 as the number of PAA bombers in 1990 because these many served in the Gulf War.

4. General Michael Dugan, "Operational Experience and Future Applications of Air Power," RUSI Journal (August 1992) pp. 35-38.

5. Eliot Cohen, Draft Summary of the Gulf War Air Power Study, chapter 7, pp. 15-18.

6. The Gulf War Air Power Survey calls into question aspects of the current emphasis on strategic-level offensive action. For some categories of targets -- oil refining and electric power generation facilities, for instance -- the operational significance of comprehensive attacks in a short war (i.e., one measured in weeks or months, not years) seems minimal. In a two-war pinch the United States could and would profitably divert some of the strategic effort to defensive ends. See Eliot Cohen, Draft Summary of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, chapter 3, pages 9-32.

Citation: Carl Conetta, Charles Knight and Alan Bloomgarden, Build-Down: US Armed Forces Retrenchment in the Context of Modernization, Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #8. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, May 1994.
http://www.comw.org/pda/bmemo8.htm

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