Nonoffensive Defense
and the Transformation of US Defense Posture:
Is Nonoffensive Defense Compatible with Global
Power?
Project on Defense Alternatives
Carl Conetta
July 1995
The attempt to apply nonoffensive defense (NOD)
principles in a reformulation of US defense policy
raises some difficult and interesting issues--issues
relevant to the general effort to adapt NOD to post-Cold
War and non-European circumstances. These issues relate
to the superpower status of the United States, which has
since the 1950s viewed all the world's regions as within
its sphere of interest and influence. In its definition
of foreign and military policy objectives the United
States stands apart from those nations where NOD has
managed to sink some deep roots. NOD thinking has been
most influential in nations where the pre-existing
military policy consensus centered on a need to deter
and defend against large-scale border threats. Even the
pan-European renaissance of NOD thinking in the 1980s
concerned a regional confrontation that closely
resembled a simple national border confrontation writ
large. In these cases NOD has prescribed the defensive
restructuring of armed forces already having the
strategic objective of defending either a home border or
an alliance boundary contiguous with a home border.
Hence, the policy goal of NOD advocates in these
circumstances could be stated thus: to bring military
policy into unambiguous alignment with national
strategic policy. In the United States, by contrast, the
mainstream strategic policy consensus has centered for
more than four decades on open-ended global
objectives--the worldwide defense or expansion of
democracy and open markets, and the containment and
rollback of communism. Of course, many nations espouse
sweeping, ambitious goals, but few can realistically
pursue them in the military dimension--and in recent
years only one has been trying: the United States.
In the United States there is an acute tension, at
least at first contact, between the country's
pre-existing strategic inclination and NOD-inspired
platforms. Those in the United States who work within
the NOD paradigm are, therefore, drawn to either
challenge the nation's prevailing strategic consensus,
or to rethink the Euro-centric historical practice of
NOD, or both. Of course, the passing of the Cold War
order has changed fundamentally the context of NOD
efforts everywhere. Even when contemplating purely
national solutions, NOD thinkers are compelled to
considered the reality of and prospects for new
international configurations, arrangements, and
institutions. We can no longer assume the strategic
limits set by the Cold War. Not even in Europe, where
NOD originated, and certainly not in Eastern Europe,
will yesterday's models suffice1. The disintegration of the
Cold War order is pushing our thinking beyond
nation-state boundaries toward a contemplation of
security policy transformation on a world scale. The
examination of the US case can serve as a first
encounter with the limits and challenges of a global
process of defensive restructuring.
B. Applying NOD Concepts in a Revision
of US Military Policy
1. First Thoughts on Global Power
The question that serves as the title of this
paper--Is NOD compatible with global power?--may seem to
have an obvious answer: No. Inherent to global military
power is the ability to project armed forces over great
distances across state borders, which primae facie
seems to violate a central NOD tenet. Although 'global
military power' need not serve the type of objectives
pursued by, say, a Genghis Khan, Napoleon, or Hitler--it
does imply, at the least, exclusive prerogatives for the
nations that possess it. Whether a nation-state qua
global power assumes the role of imperialist, hegemon,
manager, or only arbitrator; whether it acts to
dominate, constrain, moderate, or only balance the
behaviour of other states, it will give rise in some
quarters to counter-balancing efforts. This implies that
the only stable and stabilizing form of global power is
that constituted globally on the basis of a substantial
global consensus and under the auspices of some global
cooperative security arrangement or agency.
From this perspective it appears that the divestiture
of superpower status should be the first and most
important plank of a NOD platform for any individual
nation qua superpower. The corresponding change
in military policy is simple and straight-forward: (i)
elimination of most power projection capabilities and
(ii) reduction in the size of national armed forces to
the level required to ensure national defense narrowly
defined. This guideline would probably entail reducing
US armed forces to less than one-third their Cold War
size. Within this directive, which excludes all but
strictly reactive-defensive goals, the standard NOD
guideline would apply: armed forces should be structured
to attain defensive goals by defensive means.
Practically, this rather literal approach would
initially narrow the field of application for NOD
concepts within superpower policy--the first order of
business being a process of subtraction or
dismemberment. Politically, this approach would make the
marginalization of NOD efforts within superpower states
a likely outcome--far more likely than within states
without superpower pretensions2.
2. Second Thoughts on Global Power
The lock-step logic of our first thoughts betray
their failure to take current geostrategic realities
into account. An attractive feature of the NOD paradigm
is that it permits individual nations to take steps that
simultaneously improve national security and
international stability without assuming any changes
on the part of other states. It is hard to
imagine, however, that the changes in US posture
ventilated in the previous section would not prove
remarkably destabilizing unless accompanied by
significant changes in the policy and behaviour of
many other states.
The postures of nations formally or informally allied
or cooperating with the United States presume US global
power. In regions where the United States has developed
a significant presence during the Cold War period,
adversarial armed forces have developed correspondingly.
Any unconditional withdrawal of US power would alter
regional balances dramatically. Of course, America's
regional allies could try to fill the gap created by US
withdrawal through a corresponding program of military
augmentation. Whether this would have a re-stabilizing
effect or not depends on how it is perceived on the
other side of regional political-military divides. And
we can safely assume that should America divest itself
of its global role its allies would not be alone in
feeling apprehensive. Some adversaries or potential
adversaries would also have second thoughts. This,
because superpowers act not only to support their
friends, but also to restrain them. The retraction of
Soviet global power provides a relevant lesson: the
weakening of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf during
the late-Gorbachev period probably contributed to Iraq's
1990 decision to invade Kuwait.
A better alternative to any precipitous or unilateral
change in US global posture would be a gradual,
multi-faceted, multi-lateral process of US withdrawal
and regional armed forces 're-balancing' and 'defensive
restructuring.' Such a process would not be easy to
negotiate or keep on track--especially difficult to
implement would be the provisions for 're-balancing,'
which would seek to ameliorate any gross regional power
asymmetries. At any rate, the essential point we are
arguing holds: without some complementary steps a US
global 'stand down' would have a destabilizing effect.
Hence, prescribing it would be irresponsible, unless
made contingent on a broader process of global
transformation. Within such a process, the defensive
reorientation of US global power--as distinct from a
simple retraction of US global power--would be
meaningful and necessary.
The final sections of this paper will review some
worthwhile proposals for the 'defensive reorientation'
of US global military policy and will suggest broader
measures of global transformation that are prerequisites
for the 'normalization' of America's role in the world.
First, however, we review some general issues and
propositions regarding NOD and global power relevant to
the US case and the global application of NOD generally.
C. NOD as a Design Principle for
Global System Transformation
1. The National Application of
NOD Is Not Enough
The implementation of nonoffensive defense on a
national basis or even multinational basis is not
sufficient to guarantee military stability in all cases
of interstate opposition. Some of the limitations of
national applications of NOD become clear when we
consider multi-lateral confrontations and confrontations
between nations or alliances of grossly asymmetrical
military potential. In shorthand we can refer to the
first of these scenarios as illustrating the n-nation
problem; the second illustrates the problem of gross
asymmetry.
First, let us consider these problems apart from the
issue of how a transition to nonoffensive defense might
affect them. The stability problems that arise in cases
where two adversarial states are seriously mismatched in
terms of military strength ---say, a theatre-level
imbalance of 5:1 or more--are self-evident. The n-state
problem is more complex: in any system of more
than two states, an independent effort by each state to
balance against all the others produces an endless
upward spiral of military competition and development.
Unlike the case of only two states in military
competition, the n-state case has no theoretical
equilibrium point.
Defensive restructuring can ameliorate both of these
problems. In some cases it can resolve them. Positive
effects result even when only one of the contestants in
an adversarial relationship chooses to restructure along
nonoffensive lines--and the benefit of increased
security accrues not only to the restructuring state,
but also to its adversary. Bi-lateral or multilateral
defensive restructuring substantially adds to the number
of potential cases resolved. NOD is beneficial because
it prescribes and enables non-symmetrical responses to
an adversary's military modernization efforts--that is,
a non-offensive and non-threatening response to
offensively-oriented modernization initiatives. Because
a well-conceived defensive-defense array can absorb more
of an adversary's offensive power than can an
offensive-defense array, the defensive-defense approach
has a levelling effect. Because it achieves this without
an expansion of offensive power or threat, it is also
stabilizing.
Unfortunately, the advantage of NOD is not such that it
can resolve all instances of the two problems under
consideration. The assertion that NOD cannot redress all
cases of serious bilateral imbalance when only the
weaker contestant restructures is noncontroversial: some
imbalances are simply too great to absorb. No amount of
defensive restructuring on the part of Estonia, for
instance, would give it a robust defense against a
determined Russian incursion3.
What about cases in which both or all powers choose to
defensively restructure their armed forces? In some of
these cases the problems mentioned above may persist at
a reduced level because no practical NOD model
completely eschews offensive power. Defensively-oriented
armed forces retain offensive capability at the tactical
level. This capability could be employed in
tactical-level cross-border attacks, although the
attempt would be very risky and inefficient.
Nonetheless, in situations where two nations of greatly
unequal capability face each other or where several
nations combine against a loner, defensive restructuring
may leave enough residual offensive capability to enable
successful aggression--especially if the goal of the
aggression is limited.
The fact that there are some limits to the stability
benefits that nations can gain through defensive
restructuring is certainly not a reason to forego NOD.
The relevant point is that regardless of defensive
restructuring, many nations may still need and seek
additional means of resolving the problems of n-state
configurations and gross military asymmetry. Three
solutions of varying value readily offer themselves:
First, nations can combine in counter-balancing
alliances or blocs. Of course, there is no guarantee
that a bipolar alliance system will achieve equilibrium.
When it does, it usually does so at the risk of tempting
regional or global holocaust. Nonetheless, equilibrium
is theoretically possible within such a system--although
it cannot be other than fragile unless based on NOD.
A second means of resolving the problems of n-state
configurations and gross asymmetry is the establishment
of a collective security arrangement whereby all nations
agree to combine against any aggressor. This arrangement
could be organized on either a regional or global basis.
However, the recent history of European policy toward
the wars in the former Yugoslav republics suggest that
efficacy requires political distance between the 'centre
of gravity' of any collective security arrangement and
particular sites of intervention. Otherwise, differences
in nation-state perceptions of interest regarding
particular conflicts critically impedes the functioning
of the system. The requirement for 'political distance'
can best be met by organizing on a global basis.
A third option is to constitute and support a global
agency to aid nations threatened with aggression. To be
effective such an agency must have at its disposal
sufficient means to 'tip the balance' to the advantage
of the defender in most conflict scenarios or, at least,
'even the balance.'
The three potential solutions appear in the order of
their desirability and in reverse order of their
practicability. A global agency with standing
capabilities is preferable because it would (i)
facilitate timely response, (ii) be more likely to treat
all cases equally, at least theoretically, and (iii)
serve to separate the conduct of any particular
operation from the rendering of national support to the
agency (which should occur on a routine basis). These
characteristics make for a credible and capable agent,
and thus enhance both deterrence and reassurance.
The political and practical problems of creating a
global defense force have been well catalogued and
endlessly recounted in recent discussions of the United
Nation's potential as a global military-security
institution. Especially daunting is the prospect of
fielding a global force sufficient to 'tip the balance'
in most of the world's likely conflict scenarios. By
some measures meeting this criteria could require a
contingency force of several hundred thousand personnel
and a support base at least 40 percent as large again.
A combination of the second and third option could
bring the requirements within reach while preserving
many of the benefits of having a global agent. The
requirements are further reduced if these steps are
considered as supplements to a global process of
defensive restructuring--in which global agents
and collective security arrangements would serve to
resolve residual imbalances. Thus, the combination of
three options--global defensive restructuring,
global/regional collective security arrangements, and a
small global defense force--constitutes a proximate,
stability-oriented solution to the problems of n-state
configurations and gross asymmetry.
2. Does Global Power Imply
'Offensive Power?'
The heart of global military capability is
long-distance power projection. As noted above, a
defining characteristic of national NOD models is the
structural limitation on cross-border military action.
Does the prescription for such limits put NOD at
variance with the concept of global military action? The
'first thoughts' section of this paper noted an apparent
incongruity. On closer examination the relationship
between NOD and the concept of global power proves to be
more complex.
The real point of NOD injunctions regarding the scope
of military action is the prevention of cross-border
offensives. Offensives on one's own territory--or more
accurately, counteroffensives--are permitted. How to
separate structurally the one capability from the other
defines the 'design problem' which uniquely occupies NOD
thinkers. Of course, defensive action on one's own
territory is noncontroversial, and such action includes
battlefield preparation, routine reconnaissance,
counter-mobility efforts, and the use of defensive fires
on a small-scale. Consideration of 'cross-border
defensive action' completes this matrix, although this
concept seems to lack a strong real-world referent, at
least at first glance. However, there is another
connotation that is both meaningful and important: the
cross-border projection of an armed force lacking the
capability for offensive action even on the tactical
level, with the aim of supporting a second party
threatened with aggression by a third.
Using the 'spider-in-its-web' NOD model for reference,
we can further specify this concept. The
'spider-in-its-web,' which is the most sophisticated and
practicable of current NOD designs, divides the defense
array into spider and web components4. Area-covering web units
serve to (i) locate and impede an invader and (ii)
support and provide cover for the friendly spider units,
which are the main repositories of tactical offensive
strength. The spiders serve to (i) disable, destroy, and
eject an intruder and (ii) protect web units in a pinch.
The synergy of the elements allows for a reliable,
efficient, and effective defense employing a relatively
small portion of offensive 'shock' units--in land
warfare, heavy armour and mechanized units. The
offensive capability of the spiders falls off
dramatically should they leave the protective
area-covering web; hence, the web serves to contain
offensive power.
The 'web' part of the system can be further divided
into relatively static and relatively mobile
subcomponents. The static subcomponents comprise the
nods of sensor, communication, and logistics systems as
well as some major field preparations--all deeply rooted
to home territory. The relatively more mobile component
of the web comprises relatively-light, dispersed,
area-covering forces: various mixes of light motorized
infantry, light mechanized infantry, light cavalry,
combat engineer, and artillery and missile units. These
are designed to articulate closely with the static
component.
In some iterations of the 'spider-in-its-web' model
provisions are made for centrally pooling some of the
tactically mobile subcomponents of the web and giving
these a capacity to rapidly deploy across the national
territory to 'thicken' local portions of the web as
needed. Their lightness makes rapid deployment of these
units practical. However, should they be isolated from
their logistics and communication support nets and from
cooperating spider units these elements would have
minimal offensive strength--even of a tactical variety;
they are designed to plug into, draw sustenance from,
and augment a broader system. This configuration of
operationally mobile military units reflects a design
concept that Lutz
Unterseher, author of the 'spider-in-its-web
concept,' describes as 'the separation of
operational/strategic mobility from tactical offensive
capability.'
There is nothing that necessarily limits the use of
these operationally mobile units to the web system in
the nation of their origin. They could be integrated
with another nation's web system as long as provisions
are made for cooperation and interoperability. Hence,
these units could serve as the heart of a
defensively-oriented, strategically-mobile rapid
deployment force--one that could be culled as needed
from national militaries or put permanently at the
disposal of a regional or global agency. Clearly,
intervention by such a force in a foreign conflict could
not occur without the consent of the host nation. And
once the force had deployed it would be dependent on the
host's web and spider units.
This vision of a defensively-oriented rapid deployment
force can serve a touchstone in the effort to refashion
US power projection capabilities--although the pace and
extent of conversion along these lines would depend on
developments partially outside US control. A subsequent
section of this paper examines an interim step for the
United States: the optimization of US intervention
capabilities for the mission of 'defensive support.'
3. Is There a Positive Role for
Offensive Power in a New World Order?
NOD thinkers usually confront this question when
considering a defender's need to disable and eject an
aggressor from home territory. Effective NOD models
incorporate a relatively small element of offensive
power for this purpose, as noted above, but they seek to
structurally contain or contextualize it, so as to
render it non-provocative. A more difficult discussion
involves the requirements of removing an invader who has
succeeded in overwhelming and displacing a defender's
military array. Of course, NOD designs strive to reduce
as much as possible the likelihood of this outcome, and
they are more successful in the effort than their
offensive-defense competitors5. Still, this cannot
completely foreclose the possibility of catastrophic
defeat--what might be called the 'Kuwait scenario.'6.
An entirely nonoffensive response to the 'Kuwait
scenario' might involve (i) diplomatic and nonmilitary
measures, such as quarantine and embargo, to force an
eventual return to the status quo ante bellum,
(ii) bolstered by a nonoffensive military shield to
limit the retaliatory options of the aggressor. To be
effective and convincing (in the sense of contributing
to both deterrence and reassurance) this option requires
improvements in the practice of quarantine and embargo.
As it stands, the Persian Gulf experience suggests that
in some cases it might take years to elicit the desired
behaviour by these means. Even less encouraging has been
the practice in the Balkan crisis, although in this case
the problem is largely political.
A variation on the concept of 'pooling' may permit an
interim solution that (i) relies on offensive power to
reverse acts of conquest but (ii) averts the
destabilizing effects of the current emphasis in
military policy on offense-capable armed forces.
Defensively-oriented nations could make arrangements to
pool and reconstitute some of their 'spider' and other
units in a fairly large offense-capable force. The
pooling of air power assets is an especially promising
way to selectively reconstitute some operationally
offensive power using national elements that do not
individually possess such a capability. However, such a
capability might require command and control,
communications, reconnaissance and surveillance, and
target acquisition systems of types that would not exist
in defensively-oriented militaries. Likewise regarding
land systems, the need for operationally mobile
communications and logistics nets constitutes a special
problem; so would the need for a very substantial
strategic lift capability. These would not otherwise
exist in defensively-oriented national military
arrays--and for good reason: they could give individual
nations some capacity to reconstitute offensive power on
a national basis. One solution would be to keep some of
these vital elements of an offensive power projection
force under the control of a global agency. Thus, this
agency would provide a core around which national
contributions could cluster to form a strategically
mobile force capable of wresting back captured territory
from an aggressor.
This discussion has so far assumed that a nation
abutting the victim of aggression would provide a
reception and assembly area for a global/multinational
'counter aggression' force. Not all cases will conform
to this assumption. In such cases, counter-aggressive
military action will hinge on a capacity to seize and
secure an enclave within the occupied nation to serve as
a landing and assembly site for the counter-aggression
force. Such capacity resides in airborne, amphibious
assault, and elite commando units and also depends
heavily on long-range air and naval forces. These types
of units and forces are the key to major offensive
action over great distances. Hence, the goals of
reassurance and stability requires that no single nation
or small group of nations monopolize these means or
possess them in great quantity: ideally, they should be
dispersed with some significant portion residing at the
global level7.
The previous discussion suggests some of the contours
of a global NOD system. Its principal elements are: (i)
most of the world's national armed forces restructured
along NOD lines, (ii) provisions for regional and
subregional cooperation among these nations based on
rapidly-deployable units designed solely for tactical
defensive action, (iii) provision for global defensive
military action based on the pooling of these units and
the addition of others residing on the global level, and
(iv) some provisions for global offensive action based
on an essential 'core' of units controlled by a global
agency supplemented by other essential units drawn from
individual nations (or, possibly, regional agencies).
This picture is meant to suggest the type and extent of
global military power that the goal of stability may
require in the near term, and it can serve as a
yardstick for judging possible transitional steps
between today's arrangements and future ones. The
picture does not, however, provide an exhaustive
inventory of the global and regional institutions and
arrangements the world needs to ensure stability.
Nonmilitary means, for example, are entirely excluded.
Indeed, not even all the necessary military elements
have been reviewed: naval power, for instance, is given
short shrift. Still, enough has been said to provide a
basis for assessing from the perspective of stability
requirements proposed changes in US military policy.
D. The Transformation of US Power
The following guidelines constitute the essential
elements of a post-Cold War program of security policy
transformation for the United States:
- Consistent with the goals of cooperative security,
the United States should:
- strive to pursue its military-security
objectives through cooperative, multinational
arrangements,
- strive to gradually increase the scope of
security cooperation and burden-sharing,
- support the evolution of effective, inclusive
global and regional security institutions and
regimes,
- favor gradually transferring the operational
responsibility for global security initiatives to
these bodies commensurate with their level of
development.
- In accord with a defensive-reorientation of military
policy, the United States should:
- restrict the exercise of its military power to
counter-aggressive action, narrowly defined, thus
precluding acts of preemption and coercive
'diplomacy,'
- develop and increasingly emphasize the use of
defensive means in counter-aggressive action,
- support a progressive, consensual tightening of
restrictions on strategic warfare--that is,
'nation-busting' strategies and weapons of all
sorts: nuclear, chemical, biological,
informational, and long-range precision
conventional,
- support through its alliance, military
assistance, and arms control polices a process of
global defensive restructuring--especially in
troubled regions--whereby national capacities for
cross-border offensive military operations would
be structurally constrained.
- In accord with the goal of reducing the role of
force in the settlement of international disputes the
United States should seek to:
- develop, improve, and increasingly emphasize
nonmilitary means of conflict containment and
resolution,
- seek to gradually shift the focus of global
security efforts from measures of post hoc
crisis response to measures of conflict
prevention, mediation, and arbitration.
- In accord with a principle of sufficiency the United
States should reduce the size of its armed forces and
their readiness levels commensurate with (i) the
post-Cold War decline in levels of threat and (ii) the
development of cooperative and nonmilitary means of
achieving its security objectives.
Several of these guidelines involve something other
than an application of NOD principles. They are
presented here as part of an integrated alternative
security program for the United States. In the case of
US policy change, progress toward defensive
reorientation and the normalization of America's role in
the world depends on progress in implementing other
planks of the program--if global stability is to be
maintained. Progress in the defensive restructuring of
US power projection capabilities is pegged, to some
extent, to progress in global defensive restructuring.
This is because, as noted in the previous section, the
efficacy of a purely defensive power projection force
depends on the presence of a well-developed NOD array in
the receiving or host nation. Likewise, the provisions
for transferring global responsibilities to cooperative
arrangements and agencies, which entails a substantial
remission in US global military power, presumes the
maturation of those arrangements and agencies.
In the next sections we will examine some options for
the near-term defensive reorientation of US
policy--specifically, policy on regional military
intervention and on arms transfers. Notably, the steps
we suggest in these sections do not have as
their perquisites substantial progress in a global
process of defensive restructuring or the existence of a
mature global military security agency. In most cases
the United States could undertake immediate reform along
the proposed lines without endangering either its own
security or that of its allies.
1. The Defensive Reorientation of
US Power Projection Plans and Capabilities
Much of current Pentagon force planning shares the
premise that the challenges of the post-Soviet era
require the United States to substantially improve on
the military capability demonstrated in the 1990 Gulf
War8. The
touchstone documents remain the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff's 1992 National Military Strategy and Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG) study, which together
define the themes that still dominate the defense policy
debate9.
Among these themes is the idea that the United States
needs the capability to conduct two major regional
conflicts (MRCs) anywhere in the world, each at a pace
much quicker than Operation Desert Storm (ODS), and
possibly without any but local allies.
The 1992 DPG posits the goal of prosecuting a
Southwest Asia war in 100 days--from deployment decision
to victory. In the DPG a war on the Korean
peninsula requires five months; overlapping wars on the
Korean and Arabian peninsulas require eight. Operation
Desert Storm, by contrast, required about six months
from mobilization to cease fire.
These studies and guidance documents project a vision
of future regional war-fighting that is very different
from the reality of Operation Desert Storm (ODS).
Whereas ODS had distinct defensive and offensive phases
separated by months, future intervention will compress
these phases into a seamless operation that moves as
quickly as possible from mobilization decision to
decisive victory. The documents treat the capacity for
this type of intervention as a baseline US
military requirement, suggesting that a week's delay in
deployment or an extra month spent in defensive
operations could have catastrophic consequences.
Ultimately, this view discounts America's freedom of
action in the post-Soviet era and understates its
profound strategic advantage over regional powers such
as Iraq. The rush to large-scale offensive action,
including early commencement of strategic air attacks on
an adversary's political-military and industrial
infrastructure, is intended to guarantee a short war.
Unfortunately, the great demands this approach places on
strategic lift and C3I capabilities may actually impede
initial defensive operations. Moreover, it will
certainly narrow the time window for diplomatic
intervention.
A more realistic, stability-oriented alternative would
seek to:
- Narrow the scope of potential large-scale US
action: There are only a few areas of the world
in which long-standing US commitments, potential
threats, and the needs of local allies might converge
to prompt an ODS-scale US intervention: Europe, the
Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia. US military planning
should prioritize these areas, pegging force planning
to the goal of correcting near-term shortfalls in
allied capabilities so as to strengthen deterrence and
ensure a robust defense, should deterrence fail. A
focus on supplementing allied capabilities in Europe,
Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf could be called
'Core Area Coalition Defence.' With regard to these
areas, US planning would assume a coalition effort
involving only local allies--although the United
States should also seek to expand the formal roster of
cooperating powers. Outside of these core areas, US
military interventions should occur only as part of a
broad, balanced multinational effort under the
auspices of global and/or regional agencies.
- Emphasize distinct defensive and offensive phases
in the conduct of counter-aggressive action:
Contrary to current planning, the US should retain and
further refine the concept of distinct defensive and
offensive phases in regional interventions separated
by a pause in operations, and it should focus force
planning on the requirements of rapidly deploying and
erecting a robust defensive shield. Not only
is this approach more affordable and realistic than
existing plans--thus contributing to the credibility
of the deterrent--it would reassure those nations
worried about misuses of US power--a group that
includes some of America's allies. An approach that
emphasizes an initial defensive phase in
counter-aggressive actions could serve to reinforce
diplomatic initiatives and give them more time to
work. It is also consistent with the use of sanctions
as a coercive instrument and alternative to offensive
military action. Of course, the approach does not
preclude an eventual transition to (counter)offensive
action. Flexibility is one of the attractive features
of this approach, setting it apart from the Pentagon's
plans for a rush to offensive operations. Among the
implications for force structure of this guideline and
the preceding one are (i) a greater emphasis than
currently planned on the land-based prepositioning of
war stocks, (ii) reductions in the number of
active-duty personnel, (iii) a greater emphasis on
reserve-component personnel, and (iv) a curtailment of
plans for strategic lift capability modernization and
augmentation.
- De-emphasize air attacks on strategic targets in
regional conflicts--especially industrial and
political leadership targets: The present USAF
emphasis on strategic attack in air war cannot be
justified on military grounds. Its overall effect is
destabilizing in several ways and it incurs political
and moral costs that outweigh any military benefit.
The United States should redefine the role of air
power as a defensive instrument, placing primary
emphasis on the missions of air defense, battlefield
interdiction, and close-air support. The official Gulf
War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) found the Gulf War
air campaign to be quite successful in destroying deep
targets of some types--for instance, command posts,
industrial facilities, logistics dumps, aircraft
shelters, and elements of the Iraqi air defense
system; it was much less successful in destroying
other categories of targets--for instance,
nuclear-chemical-biological (NBC) production and
storage facilities. In judging success, the GWAPS drew
a distinction between 'destruction of aim points' and
'military significance,' concluding that the real
battlefield effect of the strategic campaign was less
impressive than its tactical success might suggest.
Moreover, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
operations against some important targets--mobile SCUD
launchers and the Republican Guard, for instance--were
under-resourced because they did not conform
sufficiently to the USAF vision of air war10.
To question the immediate military significance of the
strategic campaign, however, is not to deny that it
had a profound effect on Iraqi society. After the war,
a team of investigators from the Harvard School of
Public Health estimated 70,000-90,000 postwar civilian
deaths, mostly children, due principally to the lack
of electricity for water purification and sewage
treatment. Even if this figure exaggerates reality by
a factor of ten, the outcome would still be of a type
and magnitude that can contribute to hatred and
instability for a generation. The vulnerability of
developing societies to precision-conventional
strategic attack contributes in many cases to the felt
need for countervailing capabilities. Unfortunately,
one likely candidate is weapons of mass destruction,
which are relatively cheap, easy to use, and
increasingly available. When we consider other lessons
of the air war, the potential for a dangerously
destabilizing dynamic becomes clear. First, the Gulf
War illustrates the difficulty of interdicting mobile
launchers or comprehensively destroying NBC production
and storage sites. Second, attacks on leadership and
C3I targets--which seek to isolate military from
political leaders, and central from field
commanders--can also increase the likelihood of
inadvertent NBC weapon use. Third, strategic attack
undertaken early in a campaign--as current doctrine
dictates--can weaken intra-war deterrence. Although
Iraq did not resort to NBC weapons in the Gulf War,
attacks on Baghdad and other cities left Iraq with
little reason to exercise restraint. Its efforts at
strategic retaliation included SCUD attacks on Israel,
the use of oil as an eco-weapon, and the mass
destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells. Thus, a continuing
emphasis on strategic air warfare could easily
contribute to an increased probability of NBC weapon
use in regional conflicts. Among the implications for
force structure and weapon mix of the guideline
proposed above are (i) a reduced requirement for
stealth aircraft, (ii) a reduced requirement for
long-range precision-attack missiles, (iii) a reduced
requirement for long-range medium fighter/bombers, and
(iv) a reduced requirement for 'deep looking' target
acquisition systems.
- Gradually redefine the mission of US power
projection forces to reflect a goal of 'defensive
support,' and restructure these forces accordingly.
Although the United States has a positive role to play
in ensuring regional stability, the end of East-West
superpower conflict means that regional allies can
confidently assume a bigger share of the burden of
their own national defense. Whereas today the US
virtually leads defense efforts in several regions,
tomorrow it can safely assume a supporting role. This
transformation of US capabilities should serve to ease
any concerns about US global objectives, reduce the
impetus for 'counter-balancing' behaviour on the part
of other states, and contribute to a spirit of
cooperation and equality among nations. The defensive
support mission requires (i) units capable of rapidly
reinforcing the defensive capability of nations
threatened by aggression and (ii) units that can supplement
the counterattack capability of those nations. The
United States could quickly bolster a nation's
defensive capabilities by deploying reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition assets; artillery
units (especially MLRS); equipment for rapid mine
emplacement; short and medium-range air defense units
(especially Patriot and Avenger); airmobile infantry
with a strong antitank component; close-air-support,
battlefield-interdiction, and interceptor aircraft;
and light infantry to provide security for combat
support units. To supplement the counterattack
capabilities of nations facing outside aggression, a
force comprising a mix of light, medium, and heavy
mechanized units should be used. Reasons of cost and
the need for rapid deployment argue against relying
solely on typical heavy manoeuvre units. The medium
units could be built around a mobile armoured antitank
gun system, antitank guided missile systems, and
laser-designating systems to guide artillery and
aircraft fire. Although lacking the self-contained
combat power of heavier units, these units would have
the advantage of strategic mobility and would be quite
effective as a supplementary force if adequately
supported by artillery and air power. The air force
component of a defensive-support force should comprise
close-air-support, battlefield interdiction, and
interceptor aircraft, and not longer-range
stealth fighter-bombers. The pace of the proposed
transformation of US power projection capabilities
depends on regional developments: for instance, the
relative strength of allies and the success of arms
and conflict reduction efforts. However, in two
regions of core concern to the United States--Europe
and Northeast Asia--significant steps toward
redefining America's mission are already possible11. Looking
further into the future, progress in a global process
of defensive restructuring will permit a more
comprehensive transformation of US power projection
capabilities along the lines explored earlier in this
paper.
2. Defensive Reorientation of
Military Assistance Programs
The experience of the past few years has dispelled
the hope that the Gulf War would catalyze effective
action to constrain the global arms trade--at least so
far as most types of conventional weapons are concerned.
Among the factors confounding such efforts are (i)
domestic economic incentives for the trade, (ii) the
difficulty of controlling a system comprising multiple,
motivated buyers and sellers, and (iii) the growth
potential of indigenous arms production. Also serious is
the fear that stopping the trade completely and abruptly
would not guarantee greater military stability; indeed,
it could reinforce existing imbalances and exacerbate
instability12
Many regional powers are dissatisfied with existing
strategic balances, and they see continued weapon
procurement as a means for redressing the perceived
asymmetries. Even if practicable, a total ban on
transfers would leave some nations feeling put at a
disadvantage. This could prompt new patterns of trade
and production or even new strategic alignments.
As the undisputed leading exporter of conventional
weaponry, the United States can and should play a
leading role in breaking the current impasse. It can
help resolve the range of problems outlined above by
supporting a defensive reorientation of the arms
trade--a regime among leading exporters that prohibits
or strictly limits the transfer of those weapon systems
most vital to offensive operations13.
Such a regime would require:
- cooperation among several of major exporting
countries (US, Russia, France, UK, China, and Germany)
in
- identifying two classes of weapons--offensively- and
defensively-oriented,
- prohibiting or sharply curtailing the trade in
offensively-oriented systems,
- permitting or subsidizing transfers of systems in
the defensive category,
- coordinating other military assistance efforts to
support the defensive restructuring of the armed
forces of recipient nations, and
- making access to transfers contingent on agreement
to abstain from procuring proscribed weapon types from
other sources, foreign or domestic.
If fully implemented such a regime would effect a
gradual defensive restructuring of armed forces
throughout its area of application. Stability would
improve as offensive military potentials atrophied and
defensive potentials increased. Enhanced military
stability would facilitate an improvement in interstate
relations and, thus, lay the groundwork for more
thorough measures of arms control and reduction. In
addition, this regime would replace a potentially
destabilizing competition among major exporters with
cooperation.
This approach has several practical advantages over
approaches that seek to abolish the arms trade in the
near-term. First, it would ease domestic economic
opposition to arms trade constraints. Second, it would
mitigate the concerns of both exporters and importers
about security and stability. Third, it would not
require agreement among all producers in order to
achieve a system-wide effect on the pattern of
transfers. Finally, it would affect not only imports but
also import substitution--that is, indigenous
production.
The selective weapons controls mandated by the treaty
on conventional forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), which are
meant to especially restrict capabilities for surprise
and large-scale attack, provide both a precedent and
reference point. Especially relevant to the prospects
for defensively reorienting the conventional arms trade
is the distinction suggested in the CFE mandate and
treaty between offense- and defense-oriented weapon mixes.
Although no weapon is purely 'offensive' or 'defensive,'
all have different values in offensive and defensive
roles--a fact that already plays a central role in
military planning. Using this distinction as a
guideline, planners can devise armed forces optimized
for defensive operations14.
A comprehensive process of defensive restructuring
requires more than just a change in weapon
mix--especially if the change is effected from outside
the region and in a piecemeal fashion. Doctrine,
training, operational plans, and force deployments
should be altered as well. For this reason, supportive
training and planning assistance should accompany a
defensive reorientation in arms transfers. Moreover, the
major powers could provide incentives for arms importers
to participate in other forms of qualitative arms
control on a bi- or multi-lateral basis. These could,
for instance, involve selective reductions in those
weapon categories most vital to surprise- or large-scale
offensive capabilities. The creation of
'offensive-weapon exclusion zones' along borders and
measures that increase military transparency would also
be important. Even without these additional measures,
however, a defensive reorientation of the arms trade
together with the aging of existing weapon stocks would
gradually effect defensive restructuring throughout a
region.
1. For a
presentation of recent innovations in NOD models for
Europe see Unterseher, Lutz: 'Military Stability and
European Security--Ten Years from Now', PDA Research
Monograph, no. 2 (November 1993); and idem, Carl
Conetta, et al.: Confidence-Building
Defense: A Comprehensive Approach to Security &
Stability in the New Era (Cambridge, USA:
Commonwealth Institute, 1994).
2. NOD advocates in
the United States operate within a strategic context and
associated policy consensus that is very different than
that prevailing, for instance, in Germany or Austria or
Sweden during the Cold War. Since the early-1950s
'global reach' has been the fundamental instrumental
goal guiding US armed forces development. Military
isolationism--defined as a singular or paramount focus
on the problem of defending national borders and
integrity--has not enjoyed a respected position within
US policy discourse since the mid-1950s. Today's
isolationists of the Buchananite Right are not really
isolationist at all, but narrow nationalist and
unilateralist; on the Left, military isolationism is
well represented, but it is not hegemonic. Its influence
is greatest among the nonparliamentary and 'pressure
group' left, which is very small and divided. Perhaps
even smaller in number, although not influence, are the
true military isolationists of the 'libertarian' or
anarchist Right. During the period 1967-1976 moves
toward military isolationism had some broad appeal,
reflected in the 1973 McGovern campaign slogan 'Come
Home America.' However, some of the same conditions that
gave rise to this sentiment prompted a more significant
return during the Reagan era to policies reminiscent of
both the brinkmanship of the Eisenhower-Dulles period
and the robust 'flexible response' activism of the early
Kennedy-MacNamara years. Indeed, conservatives
successively laid the blame for a decade of foreign
policy troubles--roughly from the 1968 Tet Offensive to
the 1979-1980 Hostage Crisis--on a lack of resolve in
international and military affairs. In sum, military
isolationism proved politically unsustainable--its
longer-term effect being to contribute to the
regeneration of its opposite. For a discussion of the US
Left's engagement with military policy see Knight,
Charles: 'The Left and the Military,' Dissent,
Volume 41, No. 4 (Fall 1994).
3. In such cases, it
still makes sense to restructure--first, because NOD is
the least provocative of available defence options;
second, because there are worthwhile goals short of a
robust defence: damage limitation, delay, and increasing
the price of aggression.
4. For a recent
iteration of this model see Unterseher, Lutz: 'Military
Stability and European Security--Ten Years from Now', Project
on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph, no. 2
(November 1993).
5. For comparative
assessments see Unterseher, Lutz, Carl Conetta, et
al., Confidence-Building Defense: A
Comprehensive Approach to Security & Stability in
the New Era, pp. 49-59; Milton Weiner:
'Distributed Area Defense,' paper prepared for a
conference on 'Enhancing NATO Conventional Defense in
Central Europe' (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1986);
and Hofman, Hans, Reiner Huber and Karl Steiger: 'On
Reactive Defence Options', Briefing, no. S-8403
(Munich: Bundeswehr University, November 1984).
6. It is worth noting,
however, that had Kuwait assumed a NOD posture during
the 1980s, it could have substantially increased the
price of conquest for Iraq and might have stalled Iraq's
initial success long enough for outside help to arrive.
For discussion of NOD model applicable to Kuwait and how
it's adoption might have affected the Persian Gulf
conflict see Conetta, Carl, Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher, 'Toward
Defensive Restructuring in the Middle East,' Bulletin
of Peace Proposals, June 1991; also published as PDA
Research Monograph, no. 1 (February 1991).
7. Another case that
may illustrate the need for some global offensive
capability is the 'Kampuchea scenario'--wherein a state
commits gross and persistent violations of human rights
on a mass scale and as a matter of policy. Of course,
intervention in this case raises special issues
concerning national sovereignty, which have blocked
formation of a general consensus on 'human rights
interventions.' These issues fall largely outside the
scope of this essay. Suffice to say that in the
foreseeable future political concerns will likely
restrict the practice of 'human rights intervention' to
cases in which the transgressions are uniquely egregious
and the transgressor is politically isolated. A firmer
stand than this would require the world's nation to have
much more confidence in cooperative security and the
rule of international law than exists today.
8. For an analysis of
post-Cold War US military planning see 'Rand's ''New
Calculus'' and the Impasse of US Defense Restructuring',
PDA Briefing Report, no. 4 (August 1993).
9. Christopher Bowie,
et al.: The New Calculus: Analysing Airpower's
Changing Role in Joint Theatre Campaigns (Santa
Monica: Rand, 1993); National Defense Research
Institute: Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future
Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the
Secretary of Defense (Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation, 1992); General Colin Powell: The
National Military Strategy of the United States
(Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992);
Secretary of Defense: Defense Planning Guidance
(Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1992); Joints
Chief of Staff: Mobility Requirements Study
(Washington DC, 1992).
10. For a discussion
of the air war and its implications see Alan Bloomgarden
and Carl Conetta: 'The Promise of Air Power and US
Modernization Trends After Operation Desert Storm', The
Hawk Journal, 1994; and 'After Desert Storm:
Rethinking US Defense Requirements', PDA Briefing
Report, no. 2 (July 1991).
11. For a discussion
of new era defense requirements in Europe, Northeast
Asia, and the Persian Gulf see 'Reasonable Force:
Adapting the US Army and Marine Corps to the New Era.
Part 1. Threat Environment and Force Size Requirement',
PDA Briefing Report, no. 3 (20 March 1992).
12. An
indiscriminate, across-the-board ban on arms transfers
would limit the scope and intensity of war, but not
necessarily its occurrence. As existing military
capabilities atrophied new types of military instability
could arise. Lower force-to-space ratios could leave
defences porous and, thus, more susceptible to rapid,
deep attack. Also, as national armed forces decreased in
size they would probably shed existing redundancies. But
small, homogenous armed forces are more vulnerable to
surprise assaults--even those conducted by similarly
sized opponents. To resolve these types of problems a
program of force restructuring must accompany
reductions.
13. For additional
discussion of this proposal see 'Restructuring America's
Arms Trade with the Middle East', PDA Briefing Memo,
no. 2 (November 1991); and Conetta, Carl, Charles Knight
and Lutz Unterseher: 'Toward Defensive
Restructuring in the Middle East,' Bulletin of
Peace Proposals, June 1991.
14. Generally
speaking, in environments suited to large-scale tank
operations, a defence-oriented military would be
somewhat 'lighter' on average than today's heavy
mechanized divisions and less capable of long-range
campaigns; it would rely more on artillery, anti-tank
weapons, and anti-armour mines than on main battle tanks
and infantry fighting vehicles; and its air power
component would emphasize air defence fighters and
anti-tank aircraft, rather than long-range multi-role
aircraft optimized for deep attack. See 'The US-Saudi
F-15E Sale and the Search for Stability in the Middle
East', PDA Briefing Memo, no. 5 (September
1992); and 'Restructuring America's Arms Trade with the
Middle East', PDA Briefing Memo, no. 2 (November
1991).
Citation: Carl Conetta, Transformation
of US Defense Posture: Is Nonoffensive Defense
Compatible with Global Power? Project on Defense
Alternatives. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth
Institute. Paper presented at The Global NOD Network
International Seminar Non-Offensive Defence in a
Global Perspective, Copenhagen, 4-5 February 1995.
https://comw.org/pda/nodglob.htm
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