2018 US Defense Strategy: All the World Our Battlefield

By Carl Conetta, 19 Jan 2018

It’s no surprise that, given the dominant role of military professionals in the Trump administration, DOD would craft an overweening “defense” strategy, guaranteed to pour fuel on the fires it perceives (and misperceives). In key respects it harkens back to the conceits of Dick Cheney’s 1992 Defense Guidance document, which have percolated just below the surface of Pentagon strategies ever since.

Some critical comments on the new strategy:

A central innovation is putting military contention with Russia and China at the center of US defense strategy: “The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition by… revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model…” Actually, neither Russia nor China base their foreign policy on crusades to alter the political-economic vision of other nations worldwide. However, both are more assertive than 10 years ago and their armed forces, more capable. But their military objectives have been limited in scope – partly aiming to push back against US and allied activity and advances over the past 20 years (albeit both of them transgressing intl law along the way).

The renewed centrality of the “rogue state” concept (applied explicitly to North Korea and Iran) is similarly consequential. It’s a framework that helps constrict the resort to normal diplomatic relations and means, while also sanctioning increased emphasis on coercion in dealing with these states who are judged to sit outside the law. And, of course, whether the US names nations as “revisionist powers” or “rogue states,” their central place in US military strategy creates an adversarial relationship as much as it simply recognizes one. US defense strategy is now avowedly about military confrontation with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Also noteworthy is increased focus of US military efforts on challenges in non-military domains: “Revisionist powers and rogue regimes are using corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxies, and the threat or use of military force to change facts on the ground.” The intention to escalate military ripostes to perceived non-military challenges is also evident in the new draft US nuclear posture, which implies possible nuclear responses to strategic cyber-assaults.

The strategy names the erosion of the “post-WWII international order” as a key concern. Of course, it sees the USA (and, specifically, US military power) as key in defending that order (and on a global scale). Naturally, the document elides the ways in which the USA has contributed to the weakening of that order and the abuse of it, through unilateral uses of force, military support for repressive governments, and expansion of exclusive military alliances. Indeed, the strategy downplays what should be the foundation stone of that order – the United Nations – substituting for it America’s network of regional alliances.

The strategy frets the erosion of America’s military edge, observing that “for decades the USA has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain is contested.” The sense of privilege apparent in this aspiration to employ forceful instruments everywhere unencumbered helps explain why others should challenge it. US military practice over the past 27 years has encouraged others to narrow the gap and helped legitimate their similar practices. America’s unusual margin of superiority – a singular consequence of Soviet collapse – was bound to recede as Russia recovered economically and the global balance of economic power shifted. Only a world order based on inclusive cooperation might have produced a different outcome. Today, nothing better represents unrealistic revisionist dreaming than does the Pentagon’s desire to regain uncontested superiority. It’s neither possible, nor necessary for US security.

The strategy reaffirms a set of hegemonic goals that are breathtaking in scope. It advances an imperative to “maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere” – a goal that implies that US security is contingent on America involving itself as a contestant in all the world’s regional power struggles. Let’s hope that other great powers don’t also see their security as contingent on hegemony. For the USA, the strategy says that this goal requires the Pentagon to (i) Expand Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships; (ii) Fortify the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance; (iii) Form enduring coalitions in the Middle East; (iv) Sustain advantages in the Western Hemisphere; (v) Support relationships to address significant terrorist threats in Africa. Is that all?

It’s not surprising that the strategy should rest on the hoary notion that “the surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.” This is boilerplate for Pentagon strategy docs – but also seriously ill-conceived. The “surest way” is not necessarily a realistic or achievable way; We could weaken or even bankrupt ourselves in the process of “being prepared” if our goals and commitments are unbounded. And is it really the “surest way”? Let’s restate the proposition: “The surest way to prevent war is to engage in open-ended arms races with all the potential competitors we can imagine worldwide.” This, I think, can only guarantee the opposite of what it intends.