Reset Defense Blog

Western brinkmanship in Ukraine depends on denying there is a brink. That’s a mistake.

Carl Conetta, 31 May 2023

How to assess the risk that Moscow will use nuclear weapons to rescue some part of its “special military operation” in Ukraine? Look to nuclear capability, operational effectiveness, the value of the asset or position Moscow hopes to protect, the likely retaliation it will face or price it will pay for nuclear use, and its ability to defer that price or parry retaliation.

There is no doubt that Russia has the capability to conduct a limited nuclear attack on Ukraine while retaining thousands of additional nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, to parry retaliation by third parties. This is a common (albeit delusional) “limited nuclear war” script entertained by both the USA and Russia for decades.[1]

Although a limited nuclear battlefield attack would not knock Ukraine out of the war – even in prospect – the goal of such an attack might be to prompt Brussels and Washington to seek a ceasefire out of fear of a broader war. Moscow’s wager would be that this is a more likely Western response than escalation. Moscow would also be betting specifically that the West would not risk the destruction of Washington, Berlin, or Paris in order to punish an attack on a Ukrainian field army. But would Moscow roll these dice?

For what it is worth, Russian nuclear doctrine provides considerable leeway for the use of nuclear weapons.[2] This helps shape the expectations of and planning by state and military security managers. In Russian doctrine, as in Western, there are provisions to “extend” the use of nuclear weapons to circumstances other than meeting a nuclear attack.[3] Over the past year and more, Russian leaders have pointed to Russian doctrine allowing nuclear use to blunt conventional attacks that challenge “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state,” put “the existence of the state under threat,” or attack state or military assets essential to nuclear retaliatory capacity.[4]

The threshold for several of these guidelines is unclear. How close and how fast can a NATO-supported Ukrainian offensive come to the Russian border before possibly triggering a response? Also, notably, Russia has laid claim to five Ukrainian oblasts as its own. Does the Russian nuclear umbrella cover these?

Russian doctrine also allows the use of nuclear weapons simply to limit the escalation of military conflict and help ensure its “cessation on conditions acceptable to the Russian Federation.” This seems to allow using nuclear weapons in some presumably “extreme” circumstance to prevent catastrophic battlefield defeat, regardless of where it happens. (The United States also extends its “nuclear umbrella” to additionally address places and circumstances beyond nuclear attack on the homeland.)[5]

The real question deciding the credibility of Russian threats concerns Moscow’s cost-benefit calculus should it face decisive defeat in Ukraine. What are the repercussions for Moscow’s regional and global sway of accepting a decisive defeat in Ukraine and allowing the likely advance of NATO (after decades of sternly inveighing against expansion)? How do these losses compare with the likely costs and risks of nuclear use?

Is there a nuclear brink?

Some observers flatly dismiss the likelihood of Moscow escalating to the nuclear level, arguing that its stakes in the Ukraine war are not great enough to warrant the likely retaliation and certain global censure that would follow. For instance, Steven Pifer, a former US ambassador to Ukraine, writes:[6]

“It makes little sense for the Kremlin to run that risk in a conflict that is not existential. Russia can lose this war—that is, the Ukrainian military could drive the Russians out—and the Russian state will survive. The Ukrainian army will not march on Moscow.”

It is dangerous, however, for Westerners to presume to define for Moscow what it sees as an existential threat to the Russian state. Consistent Russian policy statements, investment, and action all suggest that Moscow views the nation’s critical interests to substantially exceed the mere survival of the state, writ small.

Pifer’s statement might be read as more motivational than predictive, aiming to shape allied opinion – reassure it – and convince Moscow that Westerners intend to “stay the course.” In this way, the statement might itself be an act of brinkmanship, evincing a stout willingness to risk an adverse outcome.

That said, it would be a grave error to underestimate or understate Russia’s strategic stakes in the war as it and they have evolved. Moscow accepting a dramatic defeat on its border (and presumably acquiescing to the eventual advance of NATO) would signal the eclipse of Russian global power. This expectation is shared by top US leadership.[7] Such a development would likely presage not only the wider advance of NATO – to Moldova and Georgia, for instance – but also the enervation of Moscow’s alliances and the eventual destabilization or realignment of its state partners. Russia’s political, economic, and military leadership would most likely view this chain of eventualities as undermining essential prerequisites of national power, security, and wealth. Thus the pressure to meet a dramatic challenge with dramatic action is considerable.[8]

Nonetheless, in a recent study, we too concluded that Putin would not likely execute a deadly nuclear attack in response to a decisive Ukrainian military advance.[9]

Moscow’s most likely nuclear option

We assess the likelihood of deadly nuclear use to be low not simply because the tactical effect of battlefield nuclear weapons would be unsatisfactory, nor simply because retaliation and censure would follow any such attack. The pivotal reason is that Moscow has a practicable lower-risk alternative option for compelling a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement short of Russia’s total defeat.

In the event of a decisive Ukrainian drive toward the Russian border or Crimea, Moscow could move to raise the war readiness of its strategic and tactical nuclear forces to a crisis level, while “reassuring” the West that this move is purely precautionary. The immediate aim would be to provoke a Russia-USA nuclear face-off short of war. Less likely but also possible would be a test explosion of a Russian nuclear weapon over Russian territory. (Nuclear demonstration shots accord with Russian doctrine.)

US-NATO would predictably respond to a real and evident spike in Russian nuclear readiness with a comparable increase in nuclear readiness, resulting in a stand-off. This stand-off would be more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis because it would be rooted in a very bloody ongoing war on the border of Russia that involves a third party – Ukraine – not entirely under NATO control.[10]  Moscow’s aim would be to collapse the NATO consensus for war – a quite plausible outcome, especially in light of French, German, Italian, Greek, and Hungarian sentiment.

A Russian feint toward nuclear use is still remarkably dangerous, of course. As we wrote previously, it is “crisis instability that poses the greatest danger of nuclear cataclysm.”[11] Any hair-trigger standoff increases the likelihood of rash, mistaken, or accidental nuclear use. During the Cuban crisis there were several close calls. And there have been others in other crises.[12]

We are closer today to a nuclear clash than at any time in the past 60 years. And we will grow closer still if, or when, the two nuclear weapon superpowers raise their war readiness levels. Some US leadership statements about war goals indicate that US brinkmanship is partially driven by the prospect of a dramatic reduction in Russian power and the possible demise of Vladimir Putin.[13] These prospects may also feed misplaced warnings about the dangers of diplomacy and problematic assertions about what Moscow may or may not consider an existential challenge. Both instances of nuclear danger denial may serve and evince brinkmanship.

As noted, Russia and the West have previously managed a confrontation similar in relevant respects to the current one – the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis[14] – which can help illuminate the options and arguments we entertain today

JFK, McGeorge Bundy, and General Curtis LeMay

Reflecting on the crisis 26 years after the fact, US Pres. Kennedy’s national security advisor McGeorge Bundy estimated that the 1962 standoff had involved a 1/100 risk of nuclear war.[15] But how worrisome are those odds, if true? Trying to weigh the likely cost of nuclear war, Bundy thought (at least in retrospect) that the risk was too high to push forward with a more aggressive response to the Soviet placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba. Bundy wrote “In this apocalyptic matter the risk can be very small indeed and still much too large for comfort.”[16]

In the event, Pres. Kennedy decided to blockade the further transfer of Soviet missiles and seek a diplomatic solution – horse-trading, as it turned out – to remove the assets already in place. In this, he rejected the proposal to bomb Cuba put forward by the head of the US Air Force, General Curtis LeMay. Kennedy was worried that the Soviets would retaliate for a strike on Cuba with action in Berlin or elsewhere, and the two nations would climb the escalation ladder. LeMay dismissed this concern by saying that wherever the Soviets might act the USA could best them, and so they would be deterred or defeated. LeMay told Kennedy that the President’s alternative – which resolved the crisis with a single US fatality (U-2 pilot Maj. Rudy Anderson) – was “almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.”[17]

This debate still resonates today – Kennedy vs LeMay – but one reality has been papered over, and the occluded variable is essential to setting a wise limit on brinkmanship. As McGeorge Bundy observed, a pivotal consideration in managing nuclear standoffs is (or should be) that even a very limited strategic nuclear exchange “would be a disaster beyond history.”[18] If the threat is even marginally credible, then caution is due and diplomacy wise.

Notes

1. Amy F. Woolf, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” US Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 07 Mar 2022.  Also see: William A. Chambers, John K. Warden, Caroline R. Milne, and James A. Blackwell, “An Assessment of the US-Russia Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Balance,” Institute for Defense Analysis, Jan 2021.

2. Michael Kofman and Anya Loukianova Fink, “Escalation Management and Nuclear Employment in Russian Military Strategy,” War on the Rocks, 19 Sep 2022. Also see:  Kofman, Fink, and Jeffrey Edmonds, Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts (Arlington Virginia: CNA, Apr 2020).

3. Extended nuclear deterrence

• Michael J. Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence,” RAND Corp Perspective, 2018.
• Shannon Bugos, “Russia Releases Nuclear Deterrence Policy” Arms Control Today (July/August 2020).
• Valeriy Akimenko, “Russia and strategic non-nuclear deterrence,” Chatham House briefing, 29 Jul 2021.
• “Extend deterrence,” Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72, Curtis LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, USAF, 18 Dec 2020.

4. Center for Naval Analysis, translation, “Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence,” June 2020.

5. US nuclear doctrine similarly allows globe-spanning nuclear use to protect US assets, critical interests, allies, and partners from a variety of devastating attacks – not just nuclear. However, US policy does importantly limit nuclear action to use only against other nuclear weapon states, non-members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and those NPT member states that Washington may view as in violation of their treaty obligations.

• US Dept of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, Incorporating the Nuclear Posture Review and the Missile Defense Review (Washington DC: 2022).
• “Extend deterrence,” Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72, Curtis LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, USAF, 18 Dec 2020.

6. Steven Pifer, “Would Putin Roll the Nuclear Dice?” Time, 18 Oct 2022

7. US Officials foresee the eclipse of Russian power

• DNI Haines, “Opening Statement” on the “2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” DNI, 04 Apr 2023.
• “Russia-Ukraine war: Putin has already lost ‘strategically, operationally and tactically’, says US general,” The Guardian, 14 Feb 2023.
• “Russia Suffers ‘Catastrophic Strategic Disaster’ in Ukraine,” DOD News, 09 Nov 2022

8. Russian voices urging use of nuclear weapons

• “Russian Radio Host Pressures Putin to Change View of Nuclear Weapon,” Reuters, 10 May 2023.
• “Kadyrov says Russia should use low-yield nuclear weapon,” CNBC, 1 Oct 2022.
• “‘Only one option’: Pro-Russian commander urges nuclear war with NATO as Ukraine regains ground,” AlterNet.com, 14 Dec 2022.

9. Carl Conetta, “Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy,” Project on Defense Alternatives Policy Report, 02 Feb 2023.

10. National Security Archive, “Cuban Missile Crisis at 60,” accessed 01 Jan 2023. Also see: Avalon Project, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” Yale Lillian Goldman Library, accessed 01 Jan 2023.

11. op cit, Conetta, “Tempting Armageddon.” Subsection: “Crisis Instability: The Certain Danger”

12. There have been dozens of nuclear weapon-related accidents since the 1945 as well as a handful of publicly-known incidents of mistaken near-use due to faulty perception of attack. A high percentage of these false warnings occurred during conflict crises – in 1956 during the Suez Crisis, 1973 during the Arab-Israeli October War, and most critically during the Cuban Missile Crisis when a Soviet submarine nearly launched a nuclear torpedo, US radar operators separately mistakenly reported to the US air defense command that a missile attack was underway, and a US F-102 fighter armed only with nuclear air-to-air missiles rushed to protect a U-2 that had wandered into Soviet air space. It should not be surprising that mistaken perceptions or rash action cluster around crisis periods.

Patricia Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas, and Sasan Aghlani, “Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy,” Chatham House Report, April 2014.

13. US objectives

• “Biden adviser embraces effort to weaken Russia and make example of Putin,” Washington Examiner, 22 July 2022.
• “US war aims shift in Ukraine – and bring additional risks,” NPR, 27 Apr 2022.
• “The US has a big new goal in Ukraine: Weaken Russia,” Washington Post, 26 Apr 2022.
• “Pentagon chief says US wants to see Russia ‘weakened’,” The Hill, 25 Apr 2022.
• “Biden contradicts aides and reaffirms his call for Putin’s overthrow, NY Post, 28 Mar 2022.
• “Biden: ‘For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power’,” The Mercury News (AP), 26 Mar 2022.

14. See ft. 10

15. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988); Graham Allison, “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 60: Six Timeless Lessons for Arms Control,” Arms Control Today (October 2022).

16. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988) p 461

17. Gen. Curtis LeMay, “This is Almost as Bad as the Appeasement at Munich,” transcript and recording, “The Fourteenth Day,” accessed 10 Jan 2023.

18. McGeorge Bundy, “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Affairs 48, no. 1 (October 1969).

 

Some say that turning to diplomacy in the face of nuclear threats will prompt a rash of nuclear proliferation and coercion. They’re wrong.

Carl Conetta, 30 May 2023

Moscow’s repeated warnings about possible world war and nuclear conflict in response to Western support for Ukraine’s fighting forces have elicited calls in the West to resist “nuclear blackmail.”[1] Some observers go further to claim that moderating Western policy in light of nuclear dangers would actually increase the likelihood of nuclear war, if not now then in the future.[2] Prof Timothy Snyder (Yale University) advances the argument succinctly. He writes:

“All of you who are saying that we have to give in to [Russian] nuclear blackmail are making nuclear war more likely. Please stop. When you give in to it, you empower dictators to do it again, encourage worldwide nuclear proliferation, and make nuclear war much, much more likely.”[3]

The stratagem of this argument is to turn concern about nuclear war against itself; To see the concern itself as the problem. This is wrong headed. There are a variety of effective and sensible ways to inhibit nuclear weapons proliferation, but categorically daring nuclear threats made by nuclear weapon superpowers fighting wars on their borders is not one of them.

What to do in light of nuclear threats depends on assessments of threat capability, threat credibility, the value of what is at risk, and capacities for retaliation on all sides. Based on these factors, we might figure a rough likelihood of nuclear use, which weighs against any potential conventional gain or loss. How to respond admits a wide range of options, not just a binary choice between capitulation and absolute victory.

About the Russia-Ukraine war one thing is sure: Regardless of outcome at this point, it hardly stands as a positive advertisement for aggression or for Russian power generally.

Now, turning to the specific problem of nuclear-weapon proliferation:

The principle impetus for non-nuclear nations to pursue nuclear weapons is contention with existing nuclear weapon states or with adversaries who possess overwhelming conventional military superiority. These concerns seem sufficient to outweigh any doubts about the efficacy of nuclear deterrent threats. Reinforcing the pursuit of these weapons is the fact that both Washington and Moscow have long embraced and advocated strategies of extended nuclear deterrence – which amount in part to using nuclear threats to putatively stem non-nuclear ones.[4]

Thankfully, it’s a steep climb to nuclear weapon capability – dangerous, costly, and technically challenging. The most reliable way to inhibit the transfer of proscribed material and technology is close cooperation among all major nuclear-weapon states in non- and counter-proliferation efforts. In this light, it is worrisome that relations among the nuclear-weapon superpowers have become so badly frayed.

“Nuclear Blackmail”

The term “nuclear blackmail” has often been employed to introduce the idea of using nuclear weapons in coercive bargaining.[5] It allows a quick study because common blackmail is a well-known and understood form of coercion.  In 2021, there were more than 12,000 US cases of blackmail and extortion recorded in the FBI crime database.[6] It is frequent because the number of potential perpetrators is enormous and the cost of entry into the practice is low. Indeed, most humans have probably already engaged in some coercive bargaining – and quite specifically, blackmail – by the time they reach adulthood. However, despite the utility of using the term “blackmail” to describe “nuclear coercion,” it can also confound policy-making if done without qualification.

The ease of entry into the practice of common blackmail sets it apart from nuclear coercion because, as noted above, the cost of entry into the club of nuclear-weapon states is very high. Also distinct is the relative ease by which a common blackmailer might remain anonymous and, thus, less vulnerable to interdiction or retaliation. Nation states, by contrast, cannot hide in the shadows when leveling nuclear threats. While common “blackmail” is a relatively low-cost, low-visibility, low-risk endeavor, nuclear coercion is none of the these things. Although the dynamics of bargaining are similar for all forms of coercion, the limits and frequency of various types is not. As always, analogy cannot substitute for analysis. And in the case of nuclear threats, the “blackmail” analogy limits our ability to manage them; It does this by distorting the risk calculus, by exaggerating the downside risk of negotiated settlement.

No matter how the Russia-Ukraine war resolves, the resolution will not alter the factors that limit capacities for nuclear acquisition and coercion. More pointedly, moderation of Ukrainian and US-NATO objectives in the war for the sake of reducing nuclear risks would not prompt a rash of proliferation. Nor will it prompt an epidemic of nuclear coercion. Visibility, counter-proliferation efforts, and the high cost of acquiring, holding, and using nuclear weapons will always weigh against proliferation. Capability, the credibility of one’s motivation, and vulnerability to retaliation will always serve as limiting factors to nuclear coercion. And nations that perceive an existential threat will always seek more powerful means of defense or alliance with those possessing it.

Notes

1. A selection of Russian nuclear threats related to the Ukraine war

• “Putin reminds everyone that Ukraine joining NATO could lead to nuclear war,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11 Feb 2022.
• “Russia ready to defend itself with any weapon, including nuclear – Medvedev,” Tass, 22 Feb 2022.
• “‘No other option’: Excerpts of Putin’s speech declaring war,” Al Jazeera, 24 Feb 2022.
• “Putin waves nuclear sword in confrontation with the West,” AP, 25 Feb 2022.
• “Russian strategic deterrence forces go on enhanced combat alert – top brass,” Tass, 28 Feb 2022.
• “Russia’s Lavrov: A third world war would be nuclear, destructive,” Al Jazeera, 02 March 2022.
• “Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov on Ukraine and the West: ‘Don’t push us into the corner’,” PBS News, 28 Mar 2022.
• “Russia’s Lavrov: Do not underestimate threat of nuclear war,” Reuters, 25 Apr 2022.
• “Angry Putin wields energy, nuclear threats against West,” Washington Times, 27 Apr 2022.
• “Russia’s Medvedev: new regions can be defended with strategic nuclear weapons,” Reuters, 22 Sep 2022.
• “Medvedev raises spectre of Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine,” Reuters, 27 Sep 2022.
• “Russian military leaders’ talk of nuclear attack rattles US calculus,” Washington Post, 02 Nov 2022.
• “The threat of nuclear war is rising, says Vladimir Putin,” MSN, 8 Dec 2022.
• “‘Only one option’: Pro-Russian commander urges nuclear war with NATO as Ukraine regains ground,”AlterNet.com, 14 Dec 2022.
• “Putin loyalist dials up nuclear rhetoric as NATO partners push for more weapons for Ukraine,” CNN, 19 Jan 2023.
• “Russian State Duma Head Joins Officials Warning Of Nuclear Retaliation In Ukraine,” RFE/RL, 22 Jan 2023.
• “Russia signs deal to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus,” AP, 25 May 2023.
• “Russia’s Medvedev Threatens Ukraine With Pre-Emptive Nuclear Strike,” Newsweek, 26 May 2023.

2. Max Boot, “Giving in to Putin’s nuclear blackmail would be a geopolitical disaster,” Washington Post, 11 Oct 2022. Also see: Andriy Zagorodnyuk, “Bowing to Putin’s nuclear blackmail will make nuclear war more likely,” The Atlantic Council blog, 18 Oct 2022.

3. Timothy Snyder, “All of you who are saying that we have to give in to nuclear blackmail are making nuclear war more likely,” Twitter, 14 Oct 2022.

4. On Extended Deterrence

• Michael J. Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence” (PDF), RAND Corp Perspective, 2018.
• Shannon Bugos, “Russia Releases Nuclear Deterrence Policy,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2020.
• Valeriy Akimenko, “Russia and strategic non-nuclear deterrence,” Chatham House briefing, 29 Jul 2021.
• “Extend deterrence” (PDF), Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72, Curtis LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, USAF, 18 Dec 2020.

5. On Blackmail and “Nuclear Blackmail”

• Daniel Ellsberg , “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail,” RAND Paper, RAND Corporation, 1968. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P3883.html
• Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), Chap 1, “The Diplomacy of Violence.”
• Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1 July 1987)

6. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Crime Data Explorer,” accessed: 27 May 2023.

by Charles Knight, March 2023.

The present status of the war in Ukraine begs the question of whether anything like “decisive” warfare will occur this year?

Or will this war continue (since the summer of 2022) to uncannily mimic the often static battles of the Western Front during WWI?

In other words, will the war remain mired in mutual slaughter?

Presently, according to the many popular press narratives, the Russian winter offensive is concluding, and we await the spring and summer offensive by Ukraine.

It should be noted that there is no reason to believe that national leaders will follow popular press narratives. Offensives are risky business, and commanders often change their minds daily, especially regarding the critical factor of timing.

The Russians could try diverting the concentration of Ukraine forces readying for an offensive by opening their own offensive push at a place of their choosing. Or the Ukrainians could suddenly withdraw their troops from the threatened (and largely destroyed) town of Bakhmut while beginning one or more major offensives in Luhansk, Kherson, or Zaporizhzia.

There are many possibilities.  There are many paths to military success or failure.

None of this is predictable.  The generals are certainly not going to tell us about their plans.

Meanwhile, the war is not only terribly costly to Ukraine and Russia but much of the world pays through global economic disruption.

In poorer areas of the world, misery has surely increased because of the war.  There are growing signs that the world is growing weary.  An Economist report has found “…an emerging disconnect between wealthy Western economies and the Global South.”

The following is a Postscript (March 2004) to the report (September 2002) of a detailed exercise I undertook to apply the preemptive counter-proliferation guidelines developed by Dr. Barry R. Schneider, director of the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, to the case of Iraq. 

The 2003 Iraq War can be described as a preventive counter-proliferation war.  Schneider’s guidelines are for a preemptive war.  A preventive war is several steps closer to a war of aggression than a preemptive war — it is almost certain that any nation that is the target of a preventive war will view it as a war of aggression.  If the Kremlin were inclined to use this terminology, it would call its present war in Ukraine preventive, while Ukraine certainly understands it to be a war of aggression.  Therefore, we should expect the guidelines for a preventive war to be more stringent than those for a preemptive war. 

I completed and published the exercise findings in September 2002, six months before the invasion of Iraq.   

~ Charles Knight, 19 March 2023

by Carl Conetta, appearing 07 Mar 2023 in Aviation Week. Link to original oped: HTML

Russian threats of nuclear use have grown increasingly serious as Ukrainian forces, buttressed by Western support, have pressed forward against the Russian front lines in Ukraine. In his Feb. 21 address to the Russian Federal Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly claimed “an existential threat,” citing U.S. officials’ talk of seeking Russia’s strategic defeat. Putin also suspended participation in the New START arms control treaty and directed the military to prepare to resume nuclear testing, asserting that Washington was doing the same. This may reveal his next move.

Along its present course, the Ukraine conflict likely will culminate in a U.S.-Russia standoff more serious than the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Washington contends that Putin’s nuclear threats ring hollow and that U.S. counter-threats are a sufficient deterrent. This is a grave miscalculation. Washington misconstrues Moscow’s perspective in several ways that obscure the risk of nuclear use.

First, Moscow sees the current conflict as a strategic showdown with the West that has profound implications for Russia’s global sway. Washington sees this as well, but contends that Moscow is caught in a corner without practicable exit options. This is wrong.

Second, as Moscow sees it, the advance of NATO-enabled Ukrainian forces presages the advance of NATO itself. For 30 years, Moscow has called the eastward expansion of NATO a critical security concern. For just as long, NATO leaders have denied it. What matters, however, is whether Moscow is sincere in fearing the leverage that NATO might gain by sitting forces on Russia’s long border with Ukraine.

Third, many Western observers suggest that Moscow will not risk the U.S. retaliation that a resort to nuclear weapons would bring—as though Moscow has no option for counter-retaliation. Putin reasonably might wonder: Is Washington ready to sacrifice Boston for, say, the Ukrainian 92nd Mechanized Brigade? For that matter, how much risk are the NATO allies willing to assume? Their commitment to “staying the course” in Ukraine is the target of Putin’s threats.

The outcome of the Ukraine war will profoundly affect Russia’s stature and influence as a global power. It also will affect the nation’s internal stability. The conflict asks: Can Russia win even a local war against an adversary supported by the West? Does Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal count for much in the contest of powers? In this light, the conflict should count at minimum as a “near-existential” crisis for Moscow—“check,” if not quite “checkmate.”

Facing conventional defeat, Moscow would have a variety of nuclear options. The least likely of these is garnering the most attention in the West: an attack on Ukrainian forces using so-called “tactical” nuclear systems. Such weapons would not be effective enough to blunt a major Ukrainian offensive unless used in numbers that would also put Russian troops and areas at risk. Moreover, such action would earn global reprobation and invite direct U.S. intervention—Washington has pledged as much. Putin still has other, more likely options.

In the case of a decisive Ukrainian drive on the Russian border or Crimea, Moscow could signal dramatic escalation by putting its strategic nuclear forces on high alert and deploying some tactical nuclear units in an ostentatious fashion. The aim would be to break the Western consensus for war and prompt a cease-fire and negotiations. An additional step, although unlikely, would be a nuclear “warning blast” over or under Russian territory. Warning shots are entirely consonant with Russian nuclear doctrine. An underground test of a strategic weapon in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would suffice, and it would accord with Putin’s recent statement. This would be an attempt at extended deterrence by intimidation, which also would involve any obvious increases in nuclear force readiness.

In the case of a marked rise in Russian nuclear activity, Washington would necessarily raise the alert level of U.S. nuclear forces. The result would be a confrontation more dangerous than the 1962 Cuban missile standoff—more dangerous due to the context of the Russia-Ukraine war.

An early, deadly use of nuclear weapons remains very unlikely. Realistically, it is crisis instability that poses the greatest danger of nuclear cataclysm. Any situation that prompts a bilateral resort to peak levels of nuclear readiness—a hair-trigger standoff—greatly increases the likelihood of accidental or mistaken nuclear use.

The experience of the Cuban missile crisis remains relevant to managing the current confrontation wisely. Reflecting on the crisis, McGeorge Bundy, who was President John F. Kennedy’s national security advisor during it, estimated that the crisis had involved a rather modest one-in-100 risk of nuclear war. Nonetheless, Bundy observed: “In this apocalyptic matter, the risk can be very small indeed and still much too large for comfort.” Foremost in Washington’s planning about the Ukraine conflict should be Bundy’s observation that even a very limited nuclear exchange “would be a disaster beyond history.”

Carl Conetta is a researcher at the Project on Defense Alternatives and author of Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use Is Misconstrued in Western Policy.

Charles Knight, 17 October 2022

A society must assume that it is stable, but the artist must know, and he must let us know, that there is nothing stable under heaven.

~ James Baldwin, 1962

The comforting narrative of a dependable and stable nuclear deterrence between the US and Russia has been thrown into disarray by the War in Ukraine. This narrative, propagated widely in the years following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, held that both the Super Powers fully appreciated that they could not “win” a nuclear battle and, therefore, would avoid direct conventional warfare, which might then quickly escalate into nuclear war. In a necessary corollary, it was thought that Russia and the US would make every effort to avoid a conventional war in Europe. Why? Because there are so many paths to escalation to nuclear war in Europe. Elsewhere in the world, US and Russian interests were more diffuse and, therefore, not so vital.

Recently Political Scientist Matt Fuhrmann posted on Twitter (@mcfuhrmann 10/10/22) a chart of “Cases of Attempted Nuclear Coercion 1946-2016.” It is from his and Todd Sechser’s 2017 book, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, p. 128.  Fuhrmann’s Tweet begins: “Wondering how Putin’s nuclear threats over Ukraine compare to other nuclear crises?”

In their book, Fuhrmann and Sechser list 19 cases of attempted nuclear coercion over 75 years. I use the Fuhrmann/Sechser assembly of instances of attempted nuclear coercion as a starting data point to examine what the Ukraine War might mean for the notion of a stable (mutual) nuclear deterrent between two major nuclear powers.

The Construction of a “Stable Nuclear Deterrent”

I ask the question,   Is the nuclear deterrent aspect of the US/Russian relationship presently stable in any meaningfully reliable way?

Theoretically, for an effective and stable mutual nuclear deterrent, a credible capability must exist to respond to a nuclear attack with an overwhelming retaliatory attack. However, this was not the case for the Soviet Union until the end of the 1950s or the beginning of the 1960s. This meant that the US had about fifteen years following WWII in which it had relatively unrestrained nuclear options and could attempt nuclear coercion or compellence of adversaries without risking devastating retaliation by the target country.

The Cuban Missile Crisis marks the time when the US came to grips (for both the professional military leaders and the public) with the reality of mutually assured destruction … and thus, there was the need to invent a notion of a stable nuclear deterrent. Not that the nuclear arms race ceased after the Cuban Missile Crisis. It continued until the end of the Cold War (and has recently resumed.)

Nor did the US or the Soviet Union refrain entirely from attempting nuclear coercion. But Fuhrmann and Sechser only cite the 1969 threat by the US during the Vietnam War and the complicated multi-party threats during the 1973 Yom Kippur War as instances of attempted nuclear coercion in wars in which both the US and the Soviet Union were intensely interested parties. These should be counted as instances in which threats to use nuclear weapons locally could have escalated into a nuclear war between the great powers.

What did change after the Cuban Missile Crisis is that only a minority in the US leadership ranks believed there was a realistic chance to return to the heady days in the 1950s when it was possible to believe in the efficacy of nuclear compellence targeted at a near-peer nuclear power.

 

What does the history of attempted nuclear coercion tell us about the situation in Ukraine?

In this article, I discount all the instances in the Fuhrmann/Sechser list before 1960, leaving 13 cases over the 56 years from 1960 to 2016.

From those, I further remove those that do not pertain principally to conflict between the US and the Soviet Union/Russia. We then have left just 3 cases: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Vietnam War in 1969, and the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Of these three, only the Cuban Missile Crisis qualifies as a direct big-power strategic confrontation. In Vietnam and the Middle East, the US and the Soviet Union were engaged as supporters of different sides in a local conflict. It is thought that these are the sort of conflicts in which the big powers are not likely to risk all by using nuclear weaponry.

In the run-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, each side in that dangerous strategic confrontation had deployed medium-range strategic missiles to the territories of their allies in the close vicinity (Turkey and Cuba) of their adversary. As a result, both felt that the other nuclear power had critically threatened vital strategic interests.

Leaders on both sides in that crisis had to maintain an intense rational focus to arrive at a compromise settlement that would avoid nuclear war. Yet, despite their demonstrated rationality, there were several unexpected developments during the crisis not under the leadership’s control and which could have led to disaster. (See, for instance, Michael Dobbs, “I’ve Studied 13 Days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This Is What I See When I Look at Putin,” New York Times, 5 October 2022.)

In some important ways, the Ukraine War presents a greater nuclear risk than the Cuban Missile Crisis. Therefore, it demands even more careful rationality and restraint by Russia and the US.

By making threats to use all means at his disposal to protect the existential interests of Russia and its territorial integrity, Putin is using nuclear coercion to limit his adversary’s options in the war. However, as with most other instances of nuclear coercion, this is a highly risky tactic and inherently unstable. (See Steven Pifer, “Pushing back against Putin’s threat of nuclear use in Ukraine,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 10 October 2022, for how Putin has attempted to limit and restrain US/NATO support for Ukraine by repeated reference to his military nuclear options.)

Several things make the Ukraine War nuclearly fraught:

1. Putin has annexed several Ukrainian oblasts, effectively making them into vital Russian territorial interests to defend from the NATO-backed challenge. He has effectively created a situation that fits the criteria in Russian military doctrine for using nuclear weaponry. I assume he knows what he was doing in this regard. His views on the role of nuclear forces in defending Russian territory are clear.
2. The very success to date of the Ukrainian defense increases the perceived “need” for Moscow to reach for high-risk military options.
3. This is a war in Europe, precisely the sort of conflict that the Soviet Union and the US learned to avoid after the Cuban Missile Crisis. We are lucky that the Soviet Union and the US learned that lesson. It helped us to survive the Cold War. Unfortunately, with the launch of the Ukraine War, that wise restraint has been destroyed. There are so many ways wars in Europe can go wrong:  too many nations very near each other that have nuclear weapons  — most all with complex histories and cross-cutting webs of interests. With human emotions added into the mix, any war in Europe can easily and quickly escalate into irrational levels and types of violence.

 

What NATO and the US Must Do to Avoid Escalation to Nuclear War?

Some things can be done by the US or NATO nations to reduce the probability that Putin will order the use of nuclear weapons:

1. The US and NATO must make sure Putin and other Russian leaders know that there are realistic “exit ramps” from their war effort. Likewise, the Kremlin must know there are options to end this war that avoid oblivion.
2. As Kennedy smartly pursued talks behind the scenes with the Soviets during the Cuban Missile Crisis, so must Washington pursue similar discussions with the Russians now. Domestic political pressures will necessitate that these talks be secret. They may not produce serious negotiations soon, but they serve to maintain a relationship and take psychological pressure off the Kremlin leaders that might otherwise incline them to use nuclear weaponry.
3. It is essential to make clear to the Kremlin a willingness to lift specific categories of economic sanctions when a negotiated war settlement is achieved.
4. The US has shown some wise restraint in the qualitative aspects of its substantial military support of Ukraine. This support has included not only ordnance and some sophisticated equipment but also superb battlefield intelligence. Nevertheless, the US must continue to ensure that no US service people become directly engaged in the fighting or are in harm’s way on the ground, sea, and air in the vicinity of the war. Deaths of US soldiers in this war could result in intense domestic pressure on Washington to retaliate against Russia, risking rapid escalation.
5. The US must resist suggestions that it supplies Ukraine with longer-range weaponry which could hit targets deep inside Russia. Moreover, Washington must restrain impulses to involve its military forces in the air or naval interdiction of Russian military platforms.

To return to the central question about the stability of nuclear deterrence in Europe between Russia and the US/NATO, it should be clear that any remaining mutual deterrence is presently highly fragile. It lacks a stable platform of shared strategic understanding.

And to the extent that we would rely on human rationality as a factor in deterrence, we must realize that rationality only goes so far. Indeed, presently, a very short way. Reflect for a moment on the recent history of big-power leadership. The US just went through four years with Donald Trump as commander-in-chief. It should be clear by now that neither was he inclined toward disciplined rationality nor did he have the most basic understanding of the limited “usefulness” of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, he did not demonstrate any interest in learning about such.

Putin’s degree of commitment to and capacity for rationality in his leadership of Russia remains unknown. His recent decisions about Ukraine do not give one confidence in that regard. Joe Biden is an old Cold Warrior, and no doubt learned a few things about what was safe to do and what wasn’t. However, he is famous for impulsive statements in public. We must hope he is more deliberate and careful in the war room.

Nonetheless, the historical record of national leadership informs us that we can not rely on rationality to carry the day, especially in the pressure cooker of war. Presently the world is utterly vulnerable to any failure of Biden or Putin to stop short of direct warfare between their respective military forces! The paths on which that failure could happen multiply the longer the war continues.

The US/NATO war effort in Ukraine must remain deliberately limited. Beyond that, we must resist the usual war fevers (beset with visions of victory over evil) that take nations toward total war.

The short answer is “no” – but there is more to the issue than that. A closer look at the road to war also illuminates paths to a negotiated end.

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, 09 June 2022

In early May, Politico reported Pope Francis suggesting that “NATO may have caused” the Russian invasion.[1] What the Pope actually said was more cautious and useful in understanding the road to this war. As clarified by Religion News Service, the Pope had suggested that:

“NATO barking at Russia’s doors” may have raised alarms in the Kremlin about the Western European alliance’s intentions in Ukraine. “I can’t say if (Russia’s) anger was provoked,” he continued, “but facilitated, maybe yes.”[2]

Neither NATO nor US policy caused the Ukraine war. The invasion was Moscow’s unforced choice. But that doesn’t settle the issue of provocation. Although neither provocation nor “facilitation” amount to “cause,” such dynamics might have played a role in moving us toward this war. And knowing what role US or NATO policy may have played in bringing the world to this juncture can help illuminate ways to end the conflict (short of prosecuting it to its bitter end – however long that might take and at whatever cost it might entail).[3]

Ivo Daalder, a long-time national security manager for Democratic presidential administrations,[4] rejects outright the idea that NATO expansion had anything at all to do with the February 2022 invasion. He asserts that

“Moscow’s unprovoked aggression is proof that its long-standing complaint about NATO moving too close to its borders was little more than a convenient excuse for its revisionist aims.” [5]

This dismisses the NATO expansion complaint too cavalierly. The author might as well have asserted that because NATO expansion is not provocative, Moscow was not provoked. This argument assumes its conclusion. It doesn’t settle questions about provocation, it elides them.

Does the invasion of Ukraine reflect “revisionist aims” in whole or part? Moscow certainly has sought to inhibit or block Ukraine’s approach to NATO, which became a Ukrainian constitutional imperative in 2019.[6] Restoring Ukraine to the status of a neutral buffer state counts as a revisionist aim, although this instance of revisionism directly reflects concerns about NATO expansion. It’s not a counter-point.

The comparative roles of NATO expansion and independent “revisionist aims” in effecting Moscow’s aggression is a pivotal issue. It bears on the prospect of negotiating an end to this war any time soon. Are we in fact witnessing a first or major step in a dedicated Russian effort to re-establish an empire in the post-Soviet space and overturn Europe’s post-Cold War order by force or coercion?[7] Such ambitions would seem almost Hitler-ite or Napoleonic in character. If so, it might require a protracted war and total strategic defeat to quell Moscow’s will to conquest, regardless of how costly such a war might be. Conversely, if Russian actions have been significantly shaped by an accumulation of more specific issues, incidents, and complaints then the room for productive negotiation is greater.

Although efforts toward a negotiated settlement are presently stalled, this could soon change should a costly stalemate take hold, as seems likely. Also, the regional and global costs of the conflict are mounting, and this will increase pressure for a diplomatic resolution.[8] Already some European NATO members are working independently to advance diplomatic solutions. [9]

Options for compromise have already been ventilated. Earlier in the war, Kyiv had proposed some measures, including formal neutrality, a return to the status quo 2014, and a 15-year pause in deciding the disposition of Crimea and the Donbas.[10] (On 23 May 2022, Henry Kissinger proposed that Ukraine simply cede the same territory to Russia and be done with it; The proposal mostly sparked strong objections in Ukraine and in the West.)[11] Presently, Pres. Zelensky seems to disfavor negotiations, but also recognizes that these are essential to war termination.[12] He must certainly understand that should Moscow face failure in the east, it will impose even greater, more far reaching destruction on all of Ukraine.

For its part, Moscow had suggested horizontal negotiations in mid-December 2021 when it advanced a series of proposals to revise Russia-NATO security arrangements.[13] Although these were too grand, one-sided, and late in the game to win a serious hearing, they suggested the possibility of pursuing broader Russia-NATO negotiations to facilitate compromise on Ukraine. Even portions of the Minsk agreements could be modified and revisited. (Minsk I, for instance, suggests the prospect of a post-war demilitarized “security zone” extending on both sides of the Russia-Ukraine border monitored by the OSCE.)[14]

Some NATO members are presently pursuing more ambitious war goals having less to do with simply defending Ukraine than with punishing Russia and imposing a strategic defeat on it.[15] Some may have already acted to constrain Kyiv’s efforts toward a negotiated ceasefire.[16]

US Sec of Defense Austin has clarified that America’s ultimate goal is to weaken Russia “to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”[17] It’s hard to imagine what Sec Austin has in mind given that Russia has 900,000 active military personnel and 4,500 ready nuclear warheads, and that the case at hand involves an attack on a contiguous nation rather than some distant target such as Iraq or Syria. Any broad assent in the West to this audacious and risky goal depends on the characterization of Russia as a constitutionally expansionist power, posed to possibly sweep to the Atlantic. Weighing against this interpretation would be any conditional circumstances particular to this conflict that helped shape its occurrence and that might be addressed to truncate it.

Putin’s “grand ambition”

Putin’s ambitions are supposed to be revealed in the long July 2021 article written under his name, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.”[18] This offers a biased re-imagining of the historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine.[19] Essentially, it concludes that the citizens of both belong to a broader community that has been torn asunder politically by treachery and error. And he argues that, due to historical and cultural ties, “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia.” This seems an exceptionally covetous conclusion, even an imperial one[20]. But his policy prescriptions are more modest. He observes:

“Some part of a people…can become aware of itself as a separate nation… How should we treat that? There is only one answer: with respect!” [21]

Still, he asserts that seceding groups have an unquestioned right only to that which they originally brought to the union. “All other territorial acquisitions are subject to discussion, negotiations.” The relevant referent here is Crimea. (Of course, the appropriate time for negotiating the disposition of Crimea was 30-years ago).[22]

The article extends Moscow’s interests to Donbas as well. Putin writes that he increasingly believes that “Kiev simply does not need Donbas.” His reasoning is that Kyiv has refused to proceed with the Minsk accord which promised the only way to peacefully restore the area to Ukraine. Here Putin is being sarcastic. Of course, Kyiv seeks to re-integrate the rebel areas – but only on its own terms, not the rebels’.

With regard to both Crimea and Donbas, the article also re-asserts a Russian responsibility to protect the rights of ethnic Russian communities.[23] This issue is especially salient for Moscow because it reflects on the legitimacy of a state espousing a nationalist ideology. Indeed, the article principally stands as an appeal to Russian nationalism, including that allegedly felt by Ukraine’s ethnic Russian community. All of the article’s historical bias is bent to this purpose – a rationalization to build support for the war.[24] On the positive side, however, it also suggests a strict limit to Moscow’s European ambitions.

Moscow’s threat to Ukraine is over-determined

Obviously there’s more to the Russian invasion and occupation than simply an effort to preempt NATO membership, although it certainly does that. The seizure of Crimea, for one, is partly motivated by other critical security concerns due to the basing there of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.[25]

Russian basing rights were challenged in 2008 when following the “Orange Revolution” (2004) the Ukrainian government under Pres. Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) declared that Russia’s lease would not be renewed once it expired in 2017. The next president, Viktor Yanukovych, reversed that decision after taking office in 2010.[26] He negotiated a new agreement extending the lease to 2042 in exchange for lower gas prices. (Notably, the presence of a Russian base on Ukrainian territory would have precluded NATO membership.)[27] The decision would probably have been abrogated after Yanukovych was deposed in 2014 and the new Maidan government began to look decisively West.

In March 2022, Russian Col. Gen. Sergei Rudskoi, deputy head of the General Staff, argued that Donbas was key to the entire 2021 invasion. He said that all of Ukraine was targeted (rather than just Donbas) to prevent Kyiv from continuously threatening Donbass.[28] But this is not credible. The Russian operation far exceeded in risk and cost both the requirement and the value of securing Donbas. More likely the aims were to ensure that Ukraine would remain a reliable Russia-NATO buffer of 1000+ km and to keep at least some of Ukraine in Moscow’s orbit given the close economic relationship between Russia and (especially) Ukraine’s east.

In sum, Moscow’s threat to post-Maidan Ukraine was over-determined, partly due to the extent and nature of the change that occurred in 2014 – the ouster of a democratically-elected pro-Russian leader by a western-supported protest movement. Moscow’s threat to Ukraine is exceptional, however. Apart from Ukraine, Moscow’s unilateral Eurasian military interventions over the past 30 years have not much expanded its writ.[29] The Kremlin did gain and still retains virtual control over small slices of Moldova and Georgia (begun as putative peace operations but now sustained supposedly as a matter of protecting ethnic rights.) On balance, however, and measured over 30 years, Russia is a conservative regional hegemon invested in stasis not revisionism. And central to its military activity along its perimeter have been security concerns. [30]

The Issue of “Provocation”

Did US/NATO policy provoke the Russian attack on Ukraine? If by “provoke” one means “cause” as in a chemical reaction, then the answer is “no.” But the actions of one state that affect another can cause sentiments – alarm, fear, suspicion, outrage, disaffection – among the other’s political authorities that shape their perceptions and predispose them to belligerent responses.

Violent responses are allowed by international law in very few and select circumstances, notably: self-defense against armed attack. Russia’s actions in Ukraine fall far short of this standard. And the notion of “preventive attack” – action to preclude a possible future attack – has no standing in international law, although some (including the United States) have advanced this rationale for war.[31]

While most types of provocative actions do not justify an offensive response, all types make them more likely. Even lawful actions bearing on the security of other states can raise the probability of a belligerent response, lawful or not. And the cascading consequences for the global community of a subsequent war may outweigh the immediate issues at stake. Thus, wise leadership would be careful about reducing or crowding the critical security concerns of other powerful nations, especially nuclear ones.[32] Failing to do so is irresponsible – and perhaps fatally so. At minimum, efforts at mitigation or compensatory steps are required. Sometimes peace, stability, and prosperity are best served by seeking alternative approaches.

Two questions can help assess the possible role of Western policy in the slide toward this war. And both may illuminate a road out – short of fighting to the bitter end. First, does NATO expansion in any sense “threaten” Russia? And second, apart from NATO’s 30-year march eastward, what does Moscow see as more immediate provocations – that is, Why act now?

The NATO “threat”

NATO’s eastward expansion “threatens” Russia in the same general sense that the 1962 Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba “threatened” the USA. Although the missile deployment didn’t itself constitute an act of violence, nor even announce an intent to do violence, it did involve an immediate and objective decrement in US security by complicating the nation’s strategic calculus.[33] Security managers and analysts often use the word “threat” in this way, meaning an act or development that increases vulnerability to possible acts of violence or coercion. Such “threats”can be said to be potential, indirect, or incipient. (Notably, security managers typically use “threat” in this way to refer to the vulnerabilities of their own homelands or “interests” exclusively.)[34]

Washington and Moscow have had a long history of contentious relations, never fully repaired. Indeed, NATO was born in opposition to Moscow. It outlasted Soviet collapse, growing from 16 members to 30, incorporating most former members of the Soviets’ “Warsaw Treaty Organization” as well as several former republics of the Soviet Union itself. This Cold War and post-Cold War history is the substrate of present Russian state manger sentiments, perceptions, and assessments.[35]

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO or its leading members have conducted multiple regime-change operations using both non-military and military, covert and open means in Europe and elsewhere.[36] In this light, there is no national leader on earth now or in history who wouldn’t be concerned should a comparable contending military power set-up “shop” next door, especially if done as the nth step in a military “march” of decades.

The close presence of a powerful adversary or strategic competitor constitutes a potential “threat in being,” even though this doesn’t rationalize a violent response.[37]. To compensate in the present case, Russia would have to substantially increase surveillance and defenses along a ~2300-km border. It also would have to attempt compensating for the loss of 1,000-km of defensive depth. Even still, it would be vulnerable to increased cross-border surveillance, espionage, and covert action.

Given that the two sides of the Russia-US/NATO divide hold about 15,000 nuclear weapons between them, it’s wise to keep them separated while developing cooperative means to help ensure the safety of non-aligned buffer states. Ukraine puts 1,000 kilometers between NATO and Russia along its 2,300 kilometer border with Russia. That separation has been a good thing for Europe and the world, although Ukraine has lacked sufficient security guarantees.

Moscow’s complaint

Moscow has been consistently warning and complaining about NATO expansion since Yeltsin’s time [38], having perceived multiple vows that it would not occur [39]. Those complaints grew more urgent in 2004 when former Soviet republics Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were incorporated. But their borders with Russia extend only 500 kilometers. They are sandwiched between Russian Kaliningrad and Belarus, and connected to NATO via Poland by a narrow corridor of 100 kilometers. The Baltic states have more reason for concern in this case than does Russia.

The next initiative drawing Moscow’s ire was the declaration at NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia and Ukraine would one day join NATO. Putin, speaking at the summit, immediately warned against admitting Ukraine and moving NATO’s military infrastructure closer to the Russian border.[40] He had offered similar complaints the year before at the 2007 Munich Conference.[41]

By contrast with the summer 2021 article, these presentations focused mostly on security issues – not only NATO expansion, but also NATO’s eastward troop deployments, the collapse of negotiations on adapting the CFE Treaty to new conditions, the unilateral declaration of Kosovo independence, the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, and America’s increased practice of military intervention. (At the time, the United States had 180,000 troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.)[42] Of course, not long after the 2008 NATO summit, Russia and Georgia went to war with the latter hopelessly outgunned.

In his presentations, Putin’s suggestion of “debts owed Moscow” continued to undergird his appeals for reciprocity. But in this case the putative “debts” relate to Moscow’s “tear down” of the Berlin Wall, its 1989 unilateral reduction of conventional forces in Europe, the release of the east and central European captive nations, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself.  Outside Moscow these moves were not viewed as “gifts” but as forced choices. Nonetheless, Gorbachev and Yeltsin had risked and won internal disputes on the hope of achieving a common European home.

The long contest over Ukraine

Russia and US/NATO have seriously contended for influence over Ukraine since the early 2000s,[43] but the 2014 Maidan revolution and regime change in Kyiv was a turning point. The Maidan mass movement, supported by the West and representing Western-leaning segments of Ukrainian society, deposed pro-Russia Pres. Viktor Yanukovych, who had won office in a 2010 election (declared fair by OSCE observers).[44] A Feb 2014 peace settlement brokered by the EU between the government and opposition leaders was summarily cast aside on the insistence of Ukrainian Right Sector leaders and some grassroots fighting groups in Kyiv.[45] Weeks later, Moscow seized Crimea.

Moscow rationalized its 2014 seizure of Crimea partially on the basis of a new draft Ukrainian language law limiting the official use of Russian language (later rescinded)[46], the presence of extreme Ukrainian nationalists in the new government [47], and the fact that Crimea’s population was two-thirds ethnic Russian. (The peninsula also heavily favored the deposed President Yanukovych, and a 2014 Pew Center poll found a slim majority favoring the right of regions to secede.)[48] As suggested earlier, Moscow’s principal motivation may have been its strong security interest in maintaining the Black Sea Fleet there.

Earlier in the Maidan revolution, US political support for it had been graphically communicated by photos of Assistant US Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and US Amb Geoffrey Pyatt socializing with the protestors and handing out sandwiches to them.[49] Also, a leaked phone conversation between Nuland and Pyatt revealed them planning to push for the selection of Arseniy Yatsenyuk as next Ukrainian Prime Minister – a position he did attain.[50] As for the EU, the USA was contemptuous of its efforts – or as Nuland put it to Pyatt, “Fuck the EU.” Reasonable people can disagree about what these actions prove about US influence on the events leading to the Feb 2014 revolution, but it is indisputable that such actions would feed suspicions and fears of an improper US role. (Notably, US political and financial support for pro-Western revolutions in Ukraine and elsewhere do not violate international law although they may contravene the non-binding 1981 UN General Assembly “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States.”)[51]

Donbas and the Minsk protocol

Separatist sentiment in Ukraine’s east grew rapidly in response to the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych, who had strong majority support there, and the rise to power of ethnic-Ukrainian nationalists.[52] When anti-Maidan rebels in the east (who were supported by Moscow) seized portions of the Donbas area in March and April 2014 [53], Kyiv quickly launched an “anti-terrorist” campaign against them.[54] Compromise should have been possible, but from a different perspective, the legitimacy of one rebellion could be viewed as inversely related to the legitimacy of the other. Post-Maidan Kyiv was strongly disinclined to tip its hat in any way to the Donbas rebels.

The Kyiv offensive slowly ground down the rebels until mid-August 2014 when Russian artillery, equipment, and “volunteers” more substantially joined the fight.[55] (Ukraine’s security service estimated rebel strength as 40,000 fighters plus 6,000 Russians.)[56]

Nearly 10,000 Ukrainians died in the first two years of the Donbass fighting (as well as perhaps 400-500 Russians, according to the US State Department).[57] Those first two years of the Donbass fight claimed 75% of the total fatalities through to 2022. The bloodshed slowed from a flood to trickle due to the 2015 Minsk II agreement, mediated by France, Germany, and the OSCE.[58] Average annual fatalities during 2016-2022 were only 10% as great as during 2014-2015.

The agreement provided for a ceasefire; It also entailed granting the rebel areas autonomy within Ukraine. However, while the cease-fire was significantly effective over the next six years, saving thousands of lives, the agreement was never fulfilled. Essential constitutional change never occurred. And autonomy was never implemented.[59]

This was partly due to stiff opposition from ultra-nationalist groups, whose militias had also been vital to the fight in the east. Their fight extended to Kyiv as well. A deadly anti-Minsk II protest by these groups in Sep 2015 involved a grenade assault that left three Ukrainian soldiers dead. (This led Prime Minister Yatsenyuk to say the rightists were “worse” than the eastern separatists.)[60]  But the Rada’s governing majority also would not abide by the sequencing of steps set out in the agreement [61] that would have had Donbas elections occur before Kyiv had regained control of the border. The United States among other NATO and EU nations gave vocal support to the Minsk II process, but none applied their ample leverage to compel closure. Their general support for Ukraine vs Russia had put them in a position of moral hazard.

Ukraine’s ultra-nationalist parties and militias have an outsized influence over Ukrainian policy despite their weak electoral showing (seldom as high as ten percent). This is due to their very active memberships (probably exceeding 50,000) and their reliance on mass protest and direct action – sometimes violent.[62]

Relevant to the eastern conflict, their strength was made evident in early 2017 when they blockaded east-west trade routes. During the first few years of the eastern standoff, the rebel and western areas continued a degree of commerce. However, within weeks of the vigilante blockade’s start, government opposition to it melted away and an official blockade was implemented.[63] One predictable result was that the rebel areas integrated more closely with the Russian economy.

Beyond Minsk, Toward NATO

In early 2018, the Ukrainian parliament passed a controversial bill prioritizing the full reintegration of the rebel areas, now defined simply as territory temporarily occupied by Russia as an aggressor state.[64] This supplanted the notion of the struggle as an internal conflict. Soon after, Ukraine replaced the four-year Anti-Terrorism Operation (ATO), which had been led by the state’s security forces, with a Joint Forces Operation (JFO) led by the regular military.[65] On the face of it, these efforts were incompatible with the Minsk agreement. Finally, in early 2021, the Zelensky government openly called for revising the agreement as well as the negotiating body, adding the USA, Canada, and the UK to existing members Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine.[66] In effect, this was an abrogation of the Minsk agreement and process, although Kyiv said not.

While Minsk II hung in abeyance, the USA and other NATO members began and then redoubled their arming and training of the Ukranian military.[67] NATO and Ukrainian troops also conducted numerous joint exercises both inside Ukraine and elsewhere.[68] As each year passed, Ukraine’s capacity to retake Donbas by force increased.

As for the post-Maidan government’s NATO aspirations: Kyiv had abandoned neutrality and declared for NATO as early as Dec 2014.)[69] In early 2019, it passed a constitutional amendment formally committing the country to becoming a member of both NATO and the European Union.[70]

In 2018, NATO had granted Ukraine official aspiring member status.[71] Finally, in June 2020, it recognized Ukraine as an Enhanced Opportunities Partner.[72]

The view from Moscow

From Moscow’s perspective the progression of events and their meanings would have been clear. An extra-constitutional change of Ukraine’s government in 2014, conspicuously supported by the USA and other Western powers, deposed a democratically-elected Russia-friendly president who was also strongly favored in Ukraine’s east. For Moscow, this could only have redefined the nature of contention over Ukraine.

The change also posed a multifaceted security challenge for Russia involving the disposition of its Black Sea Fleet and the expansion of an exclusionary and competitive military alliance to its borders. When portions of Ukraine’s eastern oblasts rebelled against the change, the Maidan government attempted to forcefully suppress them. Multiple opportunities to achieve compromise in the Ukraine disputes were cast aside (2014 EU sponsored agreement) or held in abeyance (Minsk II) while the country muscled up, deepened its NATO partnership, increased NATO presence, and crept steadily closer to official membership.

None of the above justifies Russia’s illegal actions but it should be clear how these developments might prompt sentiments, perceptions, and assessments that made an aggressive Russian response more likely. Notably, it is not NATO expansion alone that had this effect, but expansion together with the other developments summarized above.

The above analysis reveals multiple opportunities and options for avoiding war by giving some credence to Moscow’s concerns, even though there was no legal compulsion to do so. The draft US-Russia security agreements that Moscow advanced in mid-December 2021 also provided some last-minute opportunity to avert war. Although these served more as a litmus to rationalize war, a positive US response could have forestalled that outcome. None was forthcoming, however.[73]

Principles and Prospects

Moscow frames its case against ongoing NATO expansion in terms of a principle of “indivisible security,” which was most recently set out in the 1999 OSCE Charter for European Security.[74] For Moscow, the relevant guideline is “States will not strengthen their security at the expense of other States.”[75] By its reading, both NATO and its prospective members are aiming to improve their security in ways that diminishes Moscow’s. There is no objective measure by which to determine this, however – and no formal means for adjudicating it. Resolution depends on strategic empathy.

For its part, the United States has repeatedly asserted NATO’s so-called “open door” policy as a reason for standing firm regarding Ukraine’s candidacy. Nonetheless, NATO’s charter and practice reveal several relevant conditions that might shut the door on some aspirants. Notably, aspiring members need first to resolve ongoing conflicts, and their joining the alliance should bring greater security to the whole (and presumably not greater security challenges).[76] Regardless of talk about inviolable principles, no one should doubt that the United States together with other leading members could close the door should they decide that doing so best serves their security, alliance functionality, and/or regional stability.[77] Article 10 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty is clearly conditional – and not solely with reference to the character and strength of aspiring members.[78] So why act as though the USA and other NATO members have no choice?

Kyiv has based its plea for defensive support on “the sovereign equality of nations” – a principle enshrined in the UN charter and foundational to all international law.[79] There’s no question that Russia’s assault on Ukraine is a grave violation of its sovereignty. How to productively address this is the present challenge. What if restoration of the status quo ante bellum (pre-2014) is judged unattainable? Or, what if the costs of attaining it are judged too steep – considering not only battlefield costs, but also global costs in multiple registers?

As noted above, various options for compromise have already been ventilated. All would involve a concession to power, however – which is presently the price of stabilization. But as part of any compromise package, Russia could be made to pay substantial reparations (by whatever name) to Ukraine, which would help dissuade future Russian aggression. And embedding compromise on the war within some new and broader Russia-NATO security arrangement could incentivize adherence. Indeed, opening a dialog on an improved European security architecture would encourage Moscow to abandon maximalist aims regarding Ukraine.

Diplomatic progress toward ending the war requires a recognition that Russia’s security concerns have been at least partially legitimate, even though its invasion of Ukraine is not. As NATO leader, the United States is best positioned to encourage and initiate effective East-West dialog on the war and broader security issues. This is not likely to occur, however, because US leaders seem strongly committed to the ultimate aim of “weakening” Russia. Realistically, initiative for compromise will have to be independent, coming first from the UN, EU, OSCE, or all three.

NOTES

1. “Pope says NATO may have caused Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” Politico, 03 May 2022.

2.“Pope Francis says NATO, ‘barking at Russia’s door,’ shares blame for Ukraine,” Religion News Service, 03 May 2022.

3. Weighing NATO expansion

• “NATO and the Road Not Taken,” Boston Review, 16 Mar 2022.
• “Was NATO Enlargement a Mistake?” Foreign Affairs (19 Apr 2022)

4. Daalder served on President Clinton’s National Security Council. He also served the Obama administration as US Permanent Representative to NATO from May 2009 to July 2013.

5. Ivo Daalder, “Let Ukraine In,” The Atlantic, Apr 2022.

6. “Ukraine President Signs Constitutional Amendment On NATO, EU Membership,”
RFE/RL, 19 Feb 2019.

7. Elias Götz, “Russia, the West, and the Ukraine crisis: three contending perspectives,” Contemporary Politics Vol. 22, No. 3 (2016)

8. Regional and global costs of the Russia-Ukraine war

• “War in Ukraine: Twelve disruptions changing the world,” McKinsey & Company, 9 May 2022
• “Ukraine war to cause biggest price shock in 50 years – World Bank,” BBC, 26 Apr 2022.
• “Ukraine’s Reconstruction To Require Sums ‘Beyond Imagination,’ Says EIB Head,” Eurasia Review, 24 Apr 2022.
• “From soaring food prices to social unrest, the fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war could be immense,” CNBC, 21 Apr 2022.
• “Crisis in Ukraine could slash global trade growth by half in 2022: WTO,” Business Standard, 01 Apr 2022.
• “Ukraine War to Compound Hunger, Poverty in Africa, Experts Say,” VOA, 19 Mar 2022.

9. “Europe’s leaders fall out of key on Ukraine. Germany, France and Italy are making overtures to Moscow,” Politico.eu, 16 May 2022.

10. Kyiv proposed compromises

• “Zelensky floats possible Putin compromises,” Axios, 22 Mar 2022.
• “Ukraine is willing to compromise on Donbass to end war: Zelensky,” NY Post, 27 Mar 2022.

11. Kissinger Davos speech and proposal

• “Kissinger: These are the main geopolitical challenges facing the world right now,” full text, World Economic Forum, 23 May 2022.
• “The War in Ukraine Can Be Over If the US Wants It,” New York Magazine Intelligencer, 1 June 2022.
• Daniel R. DePetris, “Does Henry Kissinger Have a Point on Ukraine?” Newsweek, 27 May 2022.

12. Kyiv takes firmer stance

• “With Ukraine Taking Firmer Stance, Peace Talks Grind to a Halt,” NYT, 17 May 2022.
• “Ukraine peace deal: Kyiv rules out ceding land to Russia,” BBC, 22 May 2022.

13. Moscow security proposals

The two Russian documents proposed (among other things) that:
– NATO expansion end,
– NATO and Russia rollback their European military deployments to the status quo 27 May 1997,
– Neither side deploy land-based intermediate- or short-range missiles in areas that put them in reach of the other’s territory,
– NATO conduct no exercise in Ukraine and none in the other states of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, or Central Asia,
– Both sides agree to limit the size of their military exercises,
– Neither the USA nor Russia will operate heavy bombers or surface warship in areas from which they can attack the other party,
– Neither the USA nor Russia will deploy nuclear weapons outside their own territory, and
– Neither will conduct nuclear weapons training of personnel from non-nuclear countries.

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees (Moscow: 17 Dec 2021).
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Moscow: 17 Dec 2021).
• “Russia’s draft agreements with NATO and the United States: Intended for rejection?” Brookings Institution, 21 Dec 2021.

14. Peace Agreements Database, Minsk I (Minsk Protocol), University of Edinburgh, 09 May 2014.

15. US/NATO war goals

• “Western allies ramp up rhetoric against Russia, want ‘defeat’ of Moscow,” Politico.eu, 20 May 2022.
• “The Utter Necessity of a Russian Defeat,” The Hill, 20 May 2022.
• “The War Won’t End Until Putin Loses,” The Atlantic, 23 May 2022.

16. Western dissent over Kyiv peace proposals

• “NATO says Ukraine to decide on peace deal with Russia — within limits,” Washington Post, 05 Apr 2022
• Paul Pillar, “The Coming Dissent Over Ukraine’s Peace Terms,” National Interest, 05 Apr 2022.

17. “Pentagon chief’s Russia remarks show shift in US’s declared aims in Ukraine,” Guardian, 25 Apr 2022.

18. Vladimir Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” (Moscow: The Kremlin, 12 Jul 2021)

19. Putin’s revision of Russia-Ukrain history

• “Fact-checking Putin’s claims that Ukraine and Russia are ‘one people’,” U.Rochester Newscenter, 03 Mar 2022.
• “Putin’s one-sided history of Ukraine’s relationship with Russia,” Politifact, 23 Feb 2022.

20. “Putin’s new Ukraine essay reveals imperial ambitions,” Atlantic Council Ukraine Alert, 15 Jul 2021.

21. Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” op cit.

22. “Analysis: Why Russia’s Crimea move fails legal test,” BBC, 07 Mar 2014.

23. “Putin Pledges To Protect All Ethnic Russians Anywhere. So, Where Are They?” RFE/RL, 10 Apr 2014.

24. “Contextualizing Putin’s ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’,” Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2 Aug 2021.

25. Crimea background

• “Analysts: Black Sea port in Ukraine still key to Russia’s naval interests,” Stars & Stripes, 03 Mar 2014.
• “Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?” Wilson Center, 22 Mar 2014

26. “Ukraine extends lease for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet,” The Guardian, 21Apr 2010.

27. “Russia’s Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol beyond,” Diploweb – La Revue Geopolitique, 23 May 2010.

28. “Russian Military Official Shifts Rhetoric, Says Army Now Focusing On ‘Liberation’ Of Eastern Ukrainian Regions,” RFE/RL, 25 Mar 2022.

29. Russia’s Military Interventions (Santa Monica CA: RAND. 2021)

30. Alexander Thalis,  “Threat or Threatened? Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of NATO Expansion,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, 03 May 2018.

31. On “preventative war”

• “Iraq War lesson. ‘preventative wars’ are illegal wars, period,” Responsible Statecraft, 18 Mar 2022.
• “Beating Them To the Prewar,” New York Times, 28 Sep 2002.
• Mary Ellen O’Connell, “The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense,” American Society of International Law, Aug 2002.

32. Russian nuclear use?

The probability of Moscow resorting to nuclear weapons remains very low because the likely consequences of such action is widely seen as catastrophic for all sides. However, the character of the war as an increasingly Russia-NATO proxy conflict and its proximity to Moscow increases the likelihood of desperate action should Russian failure loom. This is a conflict that Putin cannot afford to lose strategically or politically. So, should Russia face a categorical defeat in the field, the likelihood of intentional nuclear use will rise – and probably to a degree greater than that during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Even in this case it will remain low, although higher readiness levels and signalling on both sides will increase the likelihood of accidental use.

• “Putin could use nuclear weapon if he felt war being lost – US intelligence chief,” Guardian, 10 May 2022.
• “Russia Insists It Won’t Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine,” Newsweek, 19 Apr 2022.
• “CIA Chief Says Threat Russia Could Use Nuclear Weapons Is Something US Cannot ‘Take Lightly’,” RFE/RL, 15 Apr 2022.
• Lawrence Korb, “Why the War in Ukraine Poses a Greater Nuclear Risk than the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Just Security, 12 Apr 2022.
• “‘Battlefield nukes’ in Ukraine? A low but complex threat,” CSM, 11 Apr 2022.
• “Would Russia Use a Tactical Nuclear Weapon in Ukraine?” Modern War Institute, 16 Mar 2022.
• “Putin Orders Russian Nuclear Weapons on Higher Alert,” Arms Control Association, Mar 2022)

33. “The Soviet Union could not right the nuclear imbalance by deploying new ICBMs on its own soil. In order to meet the threat it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had very few options. Moving existing nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American targets was one.” Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999), pp. 94–95.

At the time, the USA had 203 ICBMs able to reach anywhere in the Soviet Union. The Soviets by contrast had 36 ICBMs able to hit anywhere in the USA. The planned Cuban deployment when finished would have comprised more than 80 intermediate- and medium-range missiles sitting just 90-miles off the US coast and thus able to function as proxy ICBMs. Also available would have been 90 shorter range nuclear missiles for defense of the island.

• “Last Nuclear Weapons Left Cuba in December 1962,” National Security Archive, 11 Dec 2013.
• “The Cuban Missile Crisis: A nuclear order of battle.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (20 Oct 2012)
• “What Was at Stake in 1962?” Foreign Policy (10 Jul 2012).

34. “The Geopolitics of Empathy,” Foreign Policy (27 Jun 2021).

35. Why Moscow fears NATO

• “The sources of Russia’s fear of NATO,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies (Apr 2018)
• Assessing Russian Reactions to US and NATO Posture Enhancements (Santa Monica CA: RAND 2017)

36. US practice of regime-change

• Template Revolutions: Marketing US Regime Change in Eastern Europe, Westminister Papers, 2017
• “American Covert Regime Change Operations: From the Cold War to the War on Terror,” Journal of International Affairs (23 Jul 2018)
• “The USA tried to change other countries’ governments 72 times during the Cold,” Washington Post. 23 Dec 2016.
• “Mapped: The 7 Governments the USA Has Overthrown,” Foreign Policy (20 Aug 2013)
• “Regime Change Doesn’t Work,” Boston Review (26 Jun 2012).

37. see ft. 31.

38. Moscow’s complaints about NATO expansion

• “Ukraine war follows decades of warnings that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe could provoke Russia,” The Conversation (28 Feb 2022).
• Peter Beinart, “Biden’s CIA Director Doesn’t Believe Biden’s Story about Ukraine,” peterbeinart.substack.com (07 Feb 2022).
• “NATO Expansion – The Budapest Blow Up 1994,” National Security Archive, 24 Nov 2021.

39. NATO Expansion: “What Gorbachev Heard,” National Security Archive, 12 Dec 2017.

40. Full text available in PISM, Documents Talk: NATO-RUSSIA Relations after the Cold War, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 08 Dec 2020.

Also see: “Putin warns NATO over expansion,” Guardian, 04 Apr 2008.

41. “Transcript: Putin Speech and the Following Discussion at the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy,”  Johnson’s Russia List, 27 Mar 2014.

42. Congressional Research Service, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11″ (Washington DC: CRS, 08 Dec 2014)

43. US-Russia contention over Ukraine

• Short critical assessment of US efforts before and leading up to the original 2004 Ukrainian “Orange Revolution”: “US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev,” Guardian, 25 Nov 2004.
• Critical assessment of recent Russian efforts to shape political developments in Ukraine: “The logic of competitive influence-seeking: Russia, Ukraine, and the conflict in Donbas,” Post-Soviet Affairs Vol. 34, No.4 (2018)

44. “Yanukovych set to become president as observers say Ukraine election was fair,” Guardian, 08 Feb 2010.

45. EU 2014 peace deal discarded

• “Ukraine Has Deal, but Both Russia and Protesters Appear Wary,” NYT, 22 Feb 2014.
• “Ukraine opposition signs crisis deal, but streets resist,” NY Post, 21 Feb 2014.
• “Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine – full text,” Guardian, 21 Feb 2014.

46 “Ukraine passes language law, irritating president-elect and Russia, Reuters, 25 Apr 2019.

47. “In Ukraine, nationalists gain influence – and scrutiny, Reuters, 07 Mar 2014.

48. Crimea voting trends and popular opinion

• “Percentage of Ukraine’s Population (by region) that voted for Tymoshenko or Yanukovych in the 2010 Presidential Election,” Central Election Commission Ukraine, Brookings Institution, 21 May 2015.
• “Despite Concerns about Governance, Ukrainians Want to Remain One Country,” Pew Research Center, 08 May 2014.

49. US officials supporting Maidan protestors

• “Russia cries foul over Western embrace of Ukraine’s demonstrators,” CSM, 13 Dec 2013.
• “Top US official visits protesters in Kiev as Obama administration ups pressure on Ukraine president Yanukovich,” CBS News, 11 Dec 2013.

50. “Ukraine crisis: Transcript of leaked Nuland-Pyatt call,” BBC, 07 Feb 2014.

51. UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, 09 Dec 1981.

52. Separatist sentiment in Ukraine’s east

• “The Origins of Separatism: Popular Grievances in Donetsk and Luhansk,” Ponars Eurasia, 15 Oct 2015.
• “In Ukraine, nationalists gain influence – and scrutiny,” Reuters, 07 Mar 2014.
• “Percentage of Ukraine’s Population (by region) that voted for Tymoshenko or Yanukovych in the 2010 Presidential Election,” Central Election Commission Ukraine, Brookings Institution, 21 May 2015.

53. Donbas anti-Maidan rebels

• “A new, pro-Russia ‘Maidan’ in Ukraine’s east?” CSM, 08 Apr 2014.
• “Pro-Russian Protesters in Eastern Ukraine Seize Weapons,” VOA, 06 Apr 2014.
• “Pro-Russia protesters occupy regional government in Ukraine’s Donetsk,” Reuters, 03 Mar 2014.

54. Kyiv takes military action against Donbas rebels

• “Ukraine says Donetsk ‘anti-terror operation’ under way,” BBC, 16 Apr 2014.
• “Kiev government to deploy troops in Ukraine’s east,” AP, 13 Apr 2014.

55. Russian 2014 intervention

• “Ukrainian army closes in on Donetsk as rebel fighters call on Russia for help,” Guardian, 03 Aug 2014.
• “Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion on a New Front,” NYT, 28 Aug 2014.

56. “Security Service of Ukraine: Today 6,000 Russian military personnel and 40,000 militants fight in Donbas,” Ukraine Media Crisis Center, 15 Mar 2015.

57. Death toll during Ukraine civil conflict

• “Death Toll in Ukraine Conflict Hits 9,160, UN Says,” NYT, 03 Mar 2016.
• “US says about 500 Russian soldiers killed in eastern Ukraine,” Anadolu Agency News Broadcasting System (Turkey), 10 Mar 2015.

58. Minsk II agreement

• “Factbox: Minsk agreement on Ukraine,” Reuters, 12 Feb 2015.
• “Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements,” UN Peacemaker, 19 Feb 2015.

59. “Ukraine unlikely to advance Minsk II despite talks,” Economist Intelligence Unit, 11 Jan 2022.

60. Far-right deadly revolt against Minsk agreement

• “Death Toll Rises To Three From Grenade Attack Near Ukrainian Parliament,” RFE/RL, 01 Sep 2015.
• “Far-Right Riot at Ukraine’s Parliament,” Institute for the Study of War, 01 Sep 2015.

61. “Ukraine parliament offers special status for rebel east, Russia criticizes,” Reuters, 17 Mar 2015.

Note: The 2015 special status law was provisional and, contrary to the Minsk agreement, it was not to come into effect until Donetsk and Luhansk held elections under Ukrainian law.

62. Outsize influence of Ukrainian extreme nationalists

• “Nationalist Radicalization Trends in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine,” Ponars Eurasia, May 2018.
• “Commentary: Ukraine’s neo-Nazi problem,” Reuters, 19 Mar 2018.
• “In Ukraine, Ultra-nationalist Militia Strikes Fear In Some Quarters,” RFE/RL, 30 Jan 2018.

63. Blockade of rebel areas

• “Cut Off: What Does the Economic Blockade of the Separatist Territories Mean for Ukraine?” Focus Ukraine, Wilson Center, 9 Jan 2018.
• “Ukraine orders blockade on rebel-held east,” Deutsche Welle, 15 Mar 2017.
• “In Ukraine, blockade threatens to force issue at heart of civil war,” CSM, 28 Feb 2017.
• “Donbas Blockade Exposes Political Fault Lines in Ukraine, Eurasia Daily Monitor 14:24 (24 Feb 2017).

64. Donbas Reintegration Law

• “Ukraine Moves To Restore Control Over Separatist-Held Areas, “ RFE/RL, 18 Jan 2018.
• “Donbas Reintegration Law: What Impact on the Minsk Agreements?” Strike, 09 Mar 2018.

65. Kyiv’s new military policy on Donbas

• “Ukraine’s New Military Engagement in the Donbas,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe, 03 May 2018.
• “Ukraine Declares ‘Anti-Terrorist Operation in the Donbas’ Officially Over: What Does That Mean?” RUSI, 16 May 2018.
• “Old war, new rules: what comes next as ATO ends and a new operation starts in Donbas?” Ukraine Crisis Media Center, 04 May 2018.
• “What Does Ukraine’s New Military Approach Toward the Donbas Mean?”  Atlantic Council, 15 May 2018.

66. Ukraine seeks to revise Minsk agreement and process

• “President of Ukraine calls for revamp of peace process to end Donbas war,” President of Ukraine Official Website, 26 April 2021.
• “Zelensky offers to involve U.S., UK, Canada in Normandy talks,” UNIAN (Ukrainian Independent Information Agency), 26 Apr 2021.

67. NATO Security Assistance to Ukraine: Arms and Training

• Congressional Research Service, US Security Assistance to Ukraine (Washington DC: CRS, 29 Apr 2022)
• “Lethal Weapons to Ukraine: A Primer,” Atlantic Council, 26 Jan 2018.
• “The Secret of Ukraine’s Military Success: Years of NATO Training,” WSJ, 3 Apr 2022.
• “As the Russian threat grew, US intelligence ties to Ukraine deepened,” Yahoo News, 02 Feb 2022.
• “CIA-trained Ukrainian paramilitaries may take central role if Russia invades,” Yahoo News, 13 Jan 2022.
• “Mission Ukraine: US Army Leads Multinational Training Group to Counter Russian Threat,” Association of the United States Army, 19 May 2020.
• “Ukrainian Special Forces Getting Western Help, Training,” SOFREP, 08 Mar 2019.
• “In Ukraine, the US Trains an Army in the West to Fight in the East,” Defense One, 05 Oct 2017.
• “US, allies give Ukrainians a boost in building modern army,” Stars & Stripes, 06 Jul 2017.
• “The USA and Ukraine have started military training exercises despite Russian objections,” Insider, 20 Apr 2015.

68. Joint Exercises

• “Ukraine holds military drills with US forces, NATO allies,” Reuters, 20 Sep 2021.
• “The US-Ukraine Sea Breeze naval exercises, explained,” Washington Post, 02 Jul 2021.
• “Military from 5 NATO states to take part in Ukrainian-British drills,” Kyiv Post, 04 Apr 2021.
• “US Air Force’s huge exercise in Ukraine fuels growing partnership and that country’s NATO ambitions,” Air Force Times, 13 Nov 2018.
• “Ukraine-NATO Joint Military Exercises Begin In Lviv Region,” RFE/RL, 03 Sep 2018.
• “US and NATO troops begin Ukraine military exercise,” BBC, 15 Sep 2014.

69. “Ukraine Votes To Abandon Neutrality, Set Sights On NATO,” RFE/RL, 23 Dec 2014.

70. “Ukraine President Signs Constitutional Amendment On NATO, EU Membership,” RFE/RL, 19 feb 2022.

71. “NATO officially gives Ukraine aspiring member status; membership action plan is next ambition,” Euromaidan Press, 10 Mar 2018.

72. “NATO recognises Ukraine as Enhanced Opportunities Partner,” NATO News, 12 Jun 2020.

73. US rejects Russian security proposals

• “US refuses to budge on Ukraine in response to Russian demands,” LA Times, 26 Jan 2022.
• “Putin accuses US, allies of ignoring Russian security needs,” AP, 1 Feb 2022.

74. “The Indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic Security,” presentation by OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, 18th Partnership for Peace Research Seminar, Vienna Diplomatic Academy, 4 Feb 2010.

75. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Charter for European Security,” Istanbul Document 1999 (Vienna, Austria: OSCE, 1999)

76. NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement (Brussels: NATO, 03 Sep 1995)

77. NATO’s “Open Door”

• “Article X is conditional. New members can join NATO only if their membership would enhance regional security.” Michael O’Hanlon and Stephen Van Evera, “There is no NATO open-door policy,” The Hill, 27 Jan 2022.
• Amb. James Dobbins, “Should NATO Close Its Doors?” RAND Blog, 02 Feb 2022.
• Daniel DePetris, “NATO should shut the door, but not because Russia said so,” Defense News, 19 Jan 2022.

78. NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty (Brussels, 4 Apr 1949)

79. See Article 2(1). United Nations Charter (New York: UN, 26 Jun 1945)

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, updated 03 Apr 2022

Within days of the Russian invasion, it became clear that Moscow’s effort to seize Ukraine had stumbled badly. The Russian military had expected a quick win, but found itself facing a hard slog instead. But why? And how to measure the conflict now?

The “whys” are multiple and intersecting:

• First, the operation reflected an exceptionally ambitious goal: complete seizure and “demilitarization” of the largest European country apart from Russia itself. The operational plan supporting this goal was complex, dividing the effort along several axes. It aimed to overtax and section Ukraine’s defenses, isolate the capital, and envelop Ukraine’s main force in the east. But a plan this grand and complex tempts collapse.
• Second, the size and complexity of the operation required a deep draw on Russia’s military. The invading force could not be limited to Moscow’s best and most experienced units. And many of the selected units seemed incapable of managing the fog and friction of war.
• Third, the Russian military came expecting to fight the weak force it had faced and badly mauled in 2014 and 2015. It planned, organized, and provisioned accordingly. Moscow also expected the Ukrainian populace to be as divided now as it was in 2010. One result was that Russian units initially moved forward in small, light units, hoping to seize the prize with minimal combat and destruction. But both assumptions about Ukraine proved wrong. And as the Russian advance slowed and stalled, logistical problems set in.

Ukraine had begun a process of military reform and revitalization following establishment of the Minsk II cease fire in 2015. The cease fire mostly held for seven years during which time several NATO countries afforded Ukraine increasing levels of military assistance – material, training, and intelligence support. The country’s special operations forces gained special attention. Ukraine’s progress in military reform has been modest, but sufficient to enable it to exploit the weaknesses in Russia’s initial assault, attacking its vulnerable supply lines, relying on portable anti-armor weapons and small unit tactics to ambush armored vehicle, and fighting pitched battles in urban settings as the war progressed.

Within a week of invading, the Russian military was struggling to revise its approach. Earlier errors impeded any quick reorganization and resupply, but Russia has progressively transitioned to a heavier, more balanced mode of warfare, with greater reliance on artillery and siege tactics. Paradoxically, as Russian artillery and air attack now bear down, Ukraine may suffer the most from its relative early success in stalling Russian forces. That is, success called forth the current onslaught, which was always implicit in the lopsided Russia-Ukraine balance of forces.

The contest over measuring gains and losses

How do the two sides compare in terms of personnel and equipment losses? That’s a matter of dispute, of course. These seemingly objective measures are subject to a rather intensive propaganda war, as both sides try to shape the opinion and morale of both fighters and publics, their own and their opponents’.

In fact, the information war is not two sided – Russia vs Ukraine – but multi-sided. The types and degree of risk that US and European governments are willing to bear, and the types and extent of support they are willing to offer Ukraine are influenced by public perception of the war and its progress, which in turn is subject to shaping. And this helps explain the wide divergence in estimates of loss.

What’s at issue is not simply an accurate accounting of the war’s costs, but policy choices – such as declaration of a “no fly” zone or cross-border flights of substitute fighter aircraft – that might tempt a much broader and more destructive conflict. Where the trigger for escalation sits is a policy decision. This post looks at some of the information dynamics that are shaping such decisions.

Personnel losses

Consider that on March 15 official Ukrainian sources claimed that more than 13,500 Russians had been killed. By contrast, Moscow has claimed 1,500 fatalities on March 25. The Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), an independent monitoring group based in Russia, estimated Russia’s military dead as ~700 as of early March based on their investigations, but also speculated that a complete number might fall between 1,000 and 2,000.

During the week of March 6, one US official put the number of Russian fatalities as high as 6,000, but thought the number could be closer to 3,500. Also that week in testimony before members of the US House of Representatives, the director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency said the best estimate of Russian fatalities was between 2,000 and 4,000, although he also admitted low confidence in the estimate “because it relied on both intelligence sources and ‘open source’ information.” Clearly these US estimates of Russian fatalities range widely. One certainty, however, is that none comport with the estimates offered by either Moscow or Kyiv.

On March 13, President Zelensky claimed that the Ukrainian military had suffered around 1,300 fatalities. Earlier in March Russia estimated that its military operation had killed 2,870 Ukrainian troops. US officials have estimated that between 2,000 and 4,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed.

Confirmed civilian fatalities as of April 3 have been less: 1,413 dead, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. However, the UN office also asserts that the number is surely an under count. (And with Russia having commenced heavier urban assaults in mid-March, the number might climb rapidly.)

Russian equipment losses

Turning to Russian equipment losses: In a March 15 report, the Ukrainian military claimed to have destroyed 81 Russian fixed-wing aircraft and 95 helicopters. It also claimed to have captured or destroyed 404 tanks and 1,279 armored personnel vehicles. Reports verified via online photographs tell a different story.

Independently documented Russian equipment losses amount to only half the number claimed four days earlier by the Ukrainian military for armored combat vehicles and only one-fourth the claimed aircraft losses. As of April 2, independent researchers logged the following Russian military losses:

• 179 tanks destroyed. Another 209 otherwise damaged, abandoned or captured;
• 365 fighting vehicles, APCs*, and MRAP** vehicles destroyed. Another 370 otherwise removed from Russian service;
• 16 aircraft destroyed, 1 damaged; 15 of these were combat aircraft;
• 33 helicopters destroyed, 5 otherwise out of commission.

[*Armored Personnel Carriers, ** MRAP: Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle]

How reliable are these figures? All claims derive from readily available photographic evidence exhaustively linked on the report’s website, which is commendable. The researchers claim efforts to ensure that the photographs are current, related to the Ukraine conflict, and correctly assigned to the appropriate party. And the photos can be reverse searched to aid in their verification.

Under-counting is more likely than over-counting. Although thousands of citizens and soldiers are deluging social media with photo documentation of the war, it’s likely that some disabled or abandoned Russian equipment has not been recorded due to the lingering presence of Russian troops. Also, Russian troops may have carted some away.

A summary of the combat vehicle and aircraft assets that Russia and Belarus brought to the theater can help put estimated losses in context:

• 1800-2000 tanks by various estimates (links are below)
• Up to 8000 other armored combat vehicles (links are below)
• 300-500 combat aircraft at hand by varying estimates

The source of these baseline estimates are western military and intelligence agencies, diplomatic institutions, security policy centers, and trade and other media. Based on these sources, final ground equipment totals were extrapolated from the Pentagon assessed presence of 117 Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) as well as other unit types and higher levels of organization.

Viewing the observed losses in light of these figures suggests a Russian armored vehicle loss rate of 11.2% over five weeks. Armored vehicles (including tanks) actually destroyed in combat or otherwise destroyed had constituted about 5.4% of the total deployed. (The rest of those counted as “lost” were simply disabled, captured, or abandoned.)

Russian combat aircraft losses were somewhat less. They have been within the 3-4 percent range. which corresponds with the sense that Russian air power has been underutilized.

It’s difficult to estimate ground combat activity based on such losses, which include armored vehicles destroyed, disabled, abandoned, and captured. We know that the Russian effort has been plagued by severe logistical problems involving equipment repair and the provision of food and fuel. This might prompt soldiers to not only abandon equipment – which is occurring, in fact – but also to disable or destroy it to prevent its appropriation by Ukrainian forces. (The United States armed forces often did the same when leaving behind equipment in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

What might Russian material losses say about personnel attrition?

Even taken as an approximate accounting, 11% of Russian armored vehicles equipment destroyed, disabled, or otherwise lost within a period of five weeks is a great deal. Equipment losses do not necessarily correlate with personnel losses, however. Ukrainian operations prioritized the destruction of vehicles by remote action or ambush using portable missiles. Nor were all the losses the result of combat. As noted above, some portion of the 5.4% of vehicles actually destroyed were destroyed by Russian personnel as they abandoned them to prevent their appropriation by Ukrainian units.

In light of the level and type of equipment loss, an associated 10% Russian casualty rate would be considerable. Routinely, a third of casualties are fatalities. This might suggest about 3,500 Russian fatalities and 6,500 injured. This assumes that 100,000 troops were deployed forward in 100+ Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) and other formations with the remainder in support or reserve.

The estimated number of Russian combat casualties is more-or-less consistent with Ukrainian claims of as many as 1,000 POWs – again assuming that Ukrainian units mostly depleted adversary units, rather than enveloping them. (On March 12, the Ukrainian armed forces claimed to be holding 500-600 Russian POWs. President Zelensky was later reported to claim “almost” 1,000 POWs.)

For historical context, units suffering logistics, morale, or leadership problems can disintegrate if they suddenly suffer as little as 15% serious casualties.  In the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Iraqi ground units, disintegrated after suffering as little as 2.5% fatalities. And this would generate large amounts of destroyed, disabled, abandoned, and captured equipment.

Ukrainian equipment losses

Drawing on the same source for a verified accounting of Ukrainian equipment losses shows, as of 20 March:

• 33 tanks destroyed, 53 otherwise abandoned or captured;
• 64 armored fighting vehicles and APCs destroyed. 103 otherwise abandoned or captured;
• 11 aircraft destroyed; 10 of these are combat aircraft. 1 other aircraft destroyed.

As in the case of counting Russian losses, an undercount is more likely than an over count, both because lost equipment may lie in Russian controlled areas and because Ukrainian photographers and web masters may self-censor.

As best can be determined from other sources, the prewar Ukrainian arsenal included:

• ~850 usable tanks of varying age and capability
• ~2,400 infantry fighting vehicles and APCs
• ~80 combat aircraft – presumably not all of these are usable

Based on these estimates, the war has consumed about eight percent of Ukraine’s available tanks and other armored combat vehicles. This rate is 70% as high as that calculated for Russian forces, which is not so much less. The percentage of Ukrainian aircraft losses has been significantly greater – 12% compared with 3-4 % on the Russian side. Also, keep in mind that the percentage of Ukrainian aircraft holdings that are actually functional is uncertain. One recent report asserts that Ukraine now holds only 56 functional fighter aircraft. This and combat attrition may explain Kyiv’s insistent requests for replacement aircraft.

Conclusion

Unsurprisingly, Moscow and Kyiv are far apart in their estimation of own and other losses. This testifies to the information or propaganda aspects of the current conflict. Independent sources of equipment losses show the two sides much closer in their levels of attrition than most media coverage would suggest. And this implies lower levels of personnel attrition. Interestingly, the levels of verifiable equipment loss are within the range of US official estimates for Russian personnel losses.

Ukrainian resistance is more intense than Moscow anticipated, but Russia’s principal problems are logistical and the impact of logistical shortcomings on morale. Although Russia’s home-based material stores are great, its forces are operating at the end of ever longer and more vulnerable supply lines. By contrast, Ukrainian forces are heavily dependent on uncertain outside support, but when its units are forced back they fall back on their supply lines.

The utter dependence of Ukraine on outside support drives its investment in the propaganda war, whose target is the West. By contrast, Russia’s propaganda efforts are oriented toward maintaining troop morale and Russian public support.

The key conclusion of our analysis is that, contrary to the propaganda messaging of the two sides, both would seem able to sustain combat for a considerable time longer. And this implies unrelenting destruction in Ukraine, with ever mounting civilian losses. While this might argue for increased emphasis on war containment and diplomatic efforts, the most evocative messaging on the western side emphasizes Russian miscalculation and fumbling, Ukraine’s adept resistance, and the promise of war termination via increased investment in the war.

 

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, 21 Feb 2022

The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed.

Movement toward resolution begins with recognizing that all sides, all stakeholders share fault for the current crisis. And no side has told the whole truth of it.

Without question, Russian intervention in Ukraine’s civil conflict violates international law. Although Russia has the right to defend itself from attack, this proviso does not apply in the current situation. The annexation of Crimea was illegal, as is Russian intervention in the Donbass. This is indisputable.

Also indisputable is the civil nature of the conflict between Kyiv and the Donbass rebels. Russian intervention on the rebel’s side does not change this. Similarly, the 2014 Euromaidan revolution and regime change has real, indigenous roots – despite the role of Western powers in encouraging it and supporting it politically and financially. This external interference tarnishes but does not de-legitimize the uprising. US and allied interference probably contravened the UN Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States (1965). But the interference was not strictly illegal. And such interference happens all the time. Also, the Ukraine regime change was not a “coup” as some contend – except in the sense that many revolutions end in coup-like transfers of power. The story does not end here, however.

What should also be clear is that the Euromaidan revolution (or regime change) did not represent the whole of the country, which was divided linguistically, politically, and geographically. Moreover, the new regime attempted to revise language laws in ways prejudicial to ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, who constitute almost 1/3 of Ukraine’s population. Finally, the role of extreme ethnic-Ukrainian nationalists in the new order was and is indisputable. Although small in number, they have had an outsized influence on policy and action regarding ethnic Russians and the Donbass conflict. Put simply, the Euromaidan revolution and the new regime are not “pure as the driven snow.”

All things considered, it is not surprising that anti-Euromaidan protests sprang up in the east soon after the Feb 2014 regime change. The eastern oblasts is where ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and electoral supporters of the deposed president were concentrated. With Moscow’s encouragement, the eastern protests evolved by April 2014 into the self-styled Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics”. Almost immediately, acting Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov launched an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) against the eastern rebels. What should have happened was negotiation.

Kyiv’s operation made halting progress for awhile, but the front stabilized after a summer flood of Russian equipment and Russian “volunteers.” (Total rebel strength has been approximately 40,000 fighters plus up to 6,000 Russians.) In April 2018, Kyiv redefined the conflict as one between Ukraine and Russia, essentially rejecting the indigenous roots of the eastern rebellion and claiming the fight to be wholly international in character.

In the 12-15 months following the April onset of the civil conflict 11,000 Ukrainians were killed in fighting. This death toll represents more than 80% of the total 13,000 killed between 2014 and 2021. The very substantial reduction in carnage after mid-2015 was due to the so-called Minsk agreements and the control regime that followed.

As noted above, there were two recent points when positive leadership might have turned the region away from the path of disaster. The first was on February 21, 2014, when negotiations led by European Union mediators and the foreign ministers of Poland, France, Germany succeeded in bringing both opposition leaders and President Yanukovych to sign the “21 February Agreement” (formally “Agreement on Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine“).

Among its provisions, the 21 February Agreement included restoration of the 2004 constitution (which weakened the power of the presidency), formation of a government of national unity, early elections, a new Election Commission and reformed election laws, a block on declaring a state of emergency, and amnesty for the Euromaidan protestors. However, the deal was abruptly cast aside by Euromaidan activists, being vocally opposed by street-level leaders and some nationalist groups (including Right Sector). Subsequently, President Yanukovych fled the country, many of his government and parliamentary supporters recused themselves (to put it mildly), and the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) quickly reshuffled itself. The revised body almost immediately voted to abolish language policies that had given Russian and other minority languages official status in some areas. This was a serious misstep, only blocked a few days later by Ukraine’s acting president,  Oleksandr Turchynov.

The second opportunity to avert disaster was the signing of the Minsk II Protocol in Feb 2015, which pledges autonomy for the rebel areas and also requires the “withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine” and the “disarmament of all illegal groups.” Its provisions were soon affirmed and reinforced by UN Security Council Resolution 2202 (The Resolution here also appends the provisions confirmed by the Security Council).

As already noted, the protocol’s cease-fire provisions had the effect of very substantially reducing violence. For this reason, it continues to earn verbal praise from all-sides, even while some stall or seek to exit other provisions of the agreement. Unfortunately, over the course of six years, there has been little progress fulfilling the political aspects of the agreement. And now the rebel forces seem to be intent on exiting the deal’s cease-fire provisions. (Moscow and the rebel leaders insist that Ukrainian government forces started the recent escalation, but such a provocation seems unlikely given the massive Russian force arrayed along Ukraine’s borders ready to strike.)

Current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has sought to rewrite the agreement since early last year. The critical provisions now refused by Kyiv are those granting rebel areas a significant degree of autonomy; This is the reason the rebels fight. And, as it turns out, none of the western sponsors of the agreement (France and Germany), nor the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that oversaw it, nor those western nations sitting on the UN Security Council (which had affirmed it), seem willing to push hard for the agreement’s full implementation. These powers certainly have the leverage needed to ensure implementation. Of course, this reality has not been lost on Moscow, which sees key provisions of the agreement hanging in abeyance while Kyiv stumps for fast-tracking NATO membership and Ukraine receives arms and training from the USA and other NATO countries.

What has changed since 2014 is the willingness of the USA and some other NATO countries to tempt war in order to undo those aspects of Minsk II that might inhibit the full and uncompromised incorporation of Ukraine into western institutions and the US/NATO sphere. Zelenskyy appreciates this and is acting accordingly. Both he and the Biden administration hope that Moscow will back down in the face of Washington’s threats. Apart from this, Ukrainian state and military leaders may hope to gain increasing support from the west, even if NATO membership remains a distant prospect.

What Zelenskyy may not appreciate is that the United States can gain strategically even if Russia further occupies Ukraine in whole or part. Such a move would cost Russia dearly, revive NATO, increase European dependence on American military power, and gain broader adherence to the foreign policy framework that Washington currently advances: “strategic competition” or “great power competition.” Of course, this would be cold comfort for a devastated, occupied Ukraine.

For its part, Moscow’s willingness to tempt war over Ukraine has been clear ever since it annexed Crimea. It lost out to the USA in the contest to shape Ukraine’s governance, purportedly worries about the fate of Ukraine’s Russian communities, and resists the loss of both economic and military connections. But central to its concern has been the 25-year march of NATO toward its borders. The absorption of Ukraine would be the culminating point of NATO expansion. It would give the alliance a 1400 mile border with Russia.

Washington insists that NATO poses no threat to Russia, even should it press up against its borders. But such assertions are themselves disquieting. They evince a not credible ignorance of the inherent nature of military power and alliances, the long and continuing history of tense US-Russia relations, the permeability of borders to all sorts of unwanted influences, and the proclivity of several NATO alliance members for regime change efforts.

While Moscow insists that the USA and NATO take its security interests into account, Washington says there is no room in a “rule-based” world order for considerations of Realpolitik. True, there is nothing in international law, formal or customary, that flatly prohibits the expansion of military alliances. Of course, this view underrates the persistence of power politics in the practice of nations, including America’s. There is wisdom and usefulness in taking a Realist reading of conflict situations and their broader ramifications.

Practically, what does the United States hope to gain by pushing NATO up to Russia’s borders when the effort risks sparking conflict between nuclear great powers and is certain to deepen and perpetuate East-West contention? Consider: It may be that stability, cooperation, and the rule of law all depend on reaching some sort of underlying condominium among great powers with regard to their core security interests.

Fortunately, the second opportunity to avert disaster mentioned above has not yet been foreclosed – and it accords with the “rule of law.” In the recent exchange of US-Russia security proposals a minimum Russian requirement is evident. While Russia has raised a broad variety of security concerns and demands, its Feb 17 statement emphasizes the importance of Minsk II implementation to de-escalating the Ukraine standoff. And implementation of the agreement in accord with UN Security Council Resolution 2202 (2015) would in no sense upset the rule of law. Quite the contrary. But the pivotal question may be less legalistic than practical:

Is it harder to live with autonomy for the Ukrainian rebel areas than it is to face regional war?

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, 14 Feb 2022

Summary: Moscow will act when and if it declares that the West has escalated contention rather than responding positively to its entreaties – principally those regarding NATO expansion and implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Recent, new US/NATO troop deployments and weapon transfers to Ukraine may already count as relevant escalation. Russian forces surrounding Ukraine stand at an exceptionally high level of readiness and significantly exceed the scale of previous deployments. Nonetheless, a full-scale invasion aiming to seize the whole of Ukraine is highly unlikely. Indeed, Russian action may involve no more than large-scale conveyance of weapons and munitions to the rebel areas, possibly along with an influx of “volunteers.” Several other options ranging between these two are discussed below.

Given the forecasts, premonitions, and warnings emanating from Washington regarding a prospective Russian invasion of Ukraine, one would think it a foregone conclusion. And maybe, it is – even though seizing the country and subjugating its 44 million people would be an unparalleled nightmare for Moscow. And that’s true regardless of threatened sanctions. (By comparison, the 2014 seizure of Crimea was easy; It is small region (pop. 2.4 million) that had been positively inclined toward Russia and was already hosting thousands of Russian military personnel on the eve of annexation.)

Has Washington been hoping to deter a Russian invasion by forecasting it, threatening punishment, bolstering Ukraine’s weapon stocks, and redoubling the type of European military deployments about which Moscow incessantly complains? A curious feature of the recent NATO military preparations and enhancements is that, while sure to irritate Moscow, they fall far short of what might deter invasion. Perhaps these, like Washington’s warnings and prognostications, are meant mostly to rally NATO and burnish the image of American leadership. Another distinctive feature of US pronouncements is that they comprise mostly threats and little in the way of positive inducements. In some respects, America’s framing of the crisis cannot fail: If Russia invades, then America is proved insightful; If it does not invade, then America can claim effective deterrence. And yet, there are options for Moscow to spoil both expectations.

The road to current options

Weighing what Moscow might do now or soon requires a look back at the recent evolution of the crisis. Russia’s attempted intimidation of Ukraine by massing troops on its border has occurred frequently since Jan 2015, always linked to (i) Ukrainian action concerning the eastern rebels or Ukraine’s Russian-speaking citizens, (ii) Ukranian steps toward NATO, or (iii) weapon deliveries from the USA or NATO.

Since early 2020, Russian military pressure has been linked to the lack of progress toward fully implementing the Minsk II agreement, President Zelenskyy’s desire to revise provisions of the accord regarding autonomy for rebel areas, his pronounced campaigning for NATO membership, NATO’s June 2020 grant to Ukraine of “enhanced opportunities partner” status, the transfer of lethal weapons from NATO countries (beginning in 2017), and joint Ukraine-NATO training and exercises. From Moscow’s perspective, the likelihood of full Minsk II implementation is progressively diminishing, while Ukraine’s approach to NATO advances, and its capacity to retake the eastern rebel areas improves. This argues against patience, especially given the failure of western capitals to incentivize Ukrainian acceptance of key Minsk II provisions.

Upping the ante

In Dec 2021, Moscow seemed to broaden the scope of prospective negotiations by offering a draft “Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation” regarding security guarantees. This document outlined rather ambitious proposals to mutually limit behavior that Moscow perceived as undermining the core security interests of the signatories, especially itself. These included ending the eastward expansion of NATO and, indeed, denying ascension to any former member state of the USSR (presumably meaning Georgia). The treaty would also forbid deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territory, and forbid the dispatch of heavy bombers, warships, or missiles to areas outside national territory from which they can attack the other’s home territory.

The document seems to be more a public enumeration of security complaints than a practical foundation for near-term negotiations. It’s too ambitious. However, while it does not mention the ongoing dispute regarding Ukraine’s civil conflict, it may have been meant to put that dispute into the context of Russia’s overall and long-standing security complaints. In this context, a western push to fully and soon implement the Minsk II agreement would seem a modest concession to Moscow’s concerns. Now, in the opinion of many western leaders and commentators, grants of autonomy for the rebel areas would also scuttle Ukraine’s hopes for NATO membership – as Moscow desires. But such an exclusion is speculative and proffered mostly as additional argumentation against granting the eastern rebel zones true autonomy. (A number of NATO members have nettlesome regions, population segments, political tendencies, or even state leaders.)

In any event, neither the USA nor NATO have responded favorably to Moscow’s avowed security interests on either the large or small scale. The US rejoinder to Moscow’s draft treaty (inclds English translation) did offer renewed dialog on some issues and the possibility of negotiating some relevant arms control agreements and confidence building measures. However, the response deferred such discussion to a Russia-NATO format, thus delaying it, and also asserted that negotiations should occur within the framework of 1990s East-West agreements and forums that Moscow now considers long-surpassed and rendered moot by Western actions over the past two decades.

With regard to NATO enlargement, the US document simply reiterates disingenuous cant about NATO’s “open door.” Additionally, the United States offered its own list of complaints to be discussed, covering inter alia Russian troop presence in Crimea, Moldava, and Georgia. This is fair enough, but the document’s closing sentence undercuts the prospect for negotiation: “It is the position of the United States government that progress can only be achieved on these issues in an environment of de-escalation with respect to Russia’s threatening actions towards Ukraine.” In other words, you stand down and then we can discuss your concerns and ours.

This offers Moscow no easy or respectable exit from the current standoff, no “golden bridge” out. The United States is offering Moscow the sole option of empty-handed and humiliating retreat. This is all that Washington thinks Moscow deserves. Of course, at this point, Moscow might find useful America’s very public presentation of “an offer they cannot accept.” How might this be viewed outside US-allied capitals (and even within some)? Might it inadvertently afford Moscow some greater political freedom to take direct action? The same might be true of perspectives on Ukranian President Zelenskyy’s hardline insistence on vacating the Minsk II promise of true autonomy for the rebel regions. (The agreement continues to enjoy strong declaratory support on all sides because it dramatically reduced the carnage of Ukraine’s civil conflict – most died prior to Minsk agreement – in the first years of the fighting.)

Moscow’s Options for Action

As stated at the outset, there’s no good reason for Moscow to seek or attempt the conquest of all Ukraine. The least demanding option suggested above would involve the transfer of very substantial amounts of armament to the rebel areas, possibly together with additional Russian “volunteers.” This would undergird a “porcupine defense”.

Most of the Russian units currently arrayed along Ukraine’s borders might then gradually withdraw, leaving behind some rapid intervention forces and a considerable number of artillery, air defense, and reconnaissance assets to buttress rebel defenses, if need be. This degree of intervention might come as a considerable relief to those led for months to expect a massive invasion – thus weakening western support for severe sanctions. Indeed, subsequent efforts to stymy the Nord Stream 2 pipeline might fracture NATO.

Complimentary Russian political steps might include a formal pledge to help defend the rebel areas against military offensives. Not likely would be recognition of these areas as independent states, as was the case with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Such might foreclose their reintegration with Ukraine, which Moscow prefers (although the rebel leadership might not).

A more ambitious and less likely objective would be to help recover areas lost by the rebels since 2015 or even to extend control to the whole of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. (The lost areas are depicted in the map “Ukraine and Separatist Statelets,” which also shows the full extent of the related Oblasts). This larger area might prove more defensible because it would be less vulnerable to flank attack. The resulting rebel “republics” would face the rest of Ukraine on only one side. But this assumes that the rebel forces could confidently hold this expanse without a long-term large-scale influx and stationing of Russian troops (which would support the narrative of “Russian occupation.”) Obviously, this larger-scale option for Russian action would be much more demanding and costly for Moscow’s forces, and it would likely prompt US-promised sanctions.

The farthest plausible limit of Russian advance would aim to occupy all of those areas of Ukraine that have a higher concentration of ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and citizens who voted for the former president Viktor Yanukovych (who was deposed by the Euromaidan revolutionaries). (See maps below) This is not to assume that Russian invaders would be welcome in these areas, only that Moscow might hope to face less resistance there. And why might Moscow attempt such a risky gambit? To substantially increase its defensive depth – an objective that speaks directly to concerns about the advance of NATO.

Map ⇓ indicates the geographic distribution of native Russian-language speakers

Map ⇓ indicates distribution of support in the 2010 election for Viktor Yanukovych, the president deposed by the Euromaidan revolutionaries in 2014.

 

 

War? Only If We Want It

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, 26 Jan 2022.

Anatol Lieven offers a way out of the current impasse in Ukraine: The Most Dangerous Problem in the World. Essentially, he reviews the 2015 Minsk II agreement, how implementation might have averted the current crisis, and the roadblocks to its implementation. But it remains relevant and it points to an exit from the crisis. Drawing on Lieven’s analysis, here is my view and prescription:

The current crisis began with disagreement on how to proceed with the Minsk II Protocol. The issue was the sequencing of its steps and how this affected reversibility. Of course, the 2018 adoption by the Ukrainian parliament of a law on “Ensuring Ukraine’s State Sovereignty over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions” didn’t help. It sidestepped the Minsk agreement, redefined the conflict as one purely between Ukraine and Russia, and it privileged a military solution. More than sidestepping the agreement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has sought to exit and revise the hard won agreement since late 2019 – and, more recently, in April 2021. And why?

The “problem” generally was that the Protocol lends some legitimacy to both sides.  Quarrelsome, perhaps, to both sides, but a modicum of mutual respect and the practice of quid pro quo is the essence of diplomacy. (So, the “problem” is actually the formula for a solution – that is, diplomacy.) Now, practically or politically the problem is the Ukrainian parliament’s refusal to go forward with a change to the constitution allowing autonomy for the Donbass region – at least, not until after Kiev has regained control of the region and of the border with Russia. However, on the Russian and rebel side, this approach makes the promised autonomy too easily reversible. Tuesday’s vote can undo Monday’s.

How to move forward? The first step is for benefactors on all sides to motivate progress. The United States, EU, and Russia should initiate a joint effort making all aid to Kiev and to the eastern rebels contingent on near-term compliance with Minsk II.

Some provisions of Minsk II are easily reversible, others less so. Begin with the easily reversible provisions which at least can serve as confidence-building measures. Pivotal among these is a change to the Ukrainian constitution allowing for the autonomy of the Donbass region within a federated Ukraine. While this could be quickly undone, the involvement of outside sponsors should give some confidence that the measure will not be reversed unless other elements of the Protocol are violated. The next steps would be to demilitarize the Donbass and supplant both Russian and Ukrainian troops with a large contingent of European peacekeepers. These also would gain control of the region’s borders. Subsequently, local elections could be held under the supervision of outside monitors.

Here’s the hitch:

Allowing for true Donbass autonomy within a future federated Ukraine accepts that the 2014 regime-change did not represent a large portion of the country and that the way forward grants both sides legitimacy. It might also imply, although not necessarily, that the international community accepts that if the division of the country resulted from outside intervention, the intervention came from *both* east and west. Finally, this solution might preclude NATO membership for Ukraine – and not because Moscow would object. Also, a stable solution would probably necessitate some sort of EU-Russia accommodation on economic relations with Ukraine. Overall, the result could advance cooperation between east and west rather than war, hot or cold.

by Charles Knight, originally published by the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, 22 December 2021.

 

While visiting Australia in mid-December, South Korean President Moon Jae-in announced that North Korea, China, South Korea, and the United States have agreed on an end-of-war declaration at the “fundamental and principle levels”. Since 1953, when an armistice ended large-scale combat on the Korean Peninsula, the parties to that war have not signed a peace treaty. Instead, they have prepared for war as though it could or should resume at a moment’s notice.

Moon first proposed the ‘end-of-war declaration’ in a speech before the UN in 2019. He renewed that call before that same body this past September, inviting diplomats from the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea to meet, negotiate, and sign a declaration. He also called for including China in a four-party declaration. The ‘end-of-war’ notion is formulated as an alternative to a formal peace treaty that remains politically out of reach, especially after the failure of the Hanoi Summit in 2019. As such, President Moon hoped that 3- or 4-party talks might lead to a renewal of negotiations regarding the broader issues of peninsular peace.

In his Canberra remarks, Moon pointed out that “we are not able to sit down for a negotiation on declarations,” because of Pyongyang’s insistence that the U.S. and South Korea “end hostile policies” before any talks could proceed. As the Deputy Director of the Publicity and Information Department of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party Kim Yo-jong stated in September, the first step is to “ensure mutual respect toward one another and abandon prejudiced views, harshly hostile policies and unfair double standards toward the other side.” Of course, this conditionality lacks specificity. Yet, judging from previous North Korean negotiating positions, Pyongyang is likely signaling that moving to meaningful negotiations will require the U.S. to provide offers of sanctions relief and reduce its military presence and joint exercises in the South.

The United States, for its part, still insists on the unilateral nuclear disarmament of North Korea. Numerous issues of mutual interest to Pyongyang and Seoul are considered secondary and contingent on nuclear disarmament. Given that North Korea is now a (minor) nuclear power that considers nuclear weaponry essential to its strategic posture, Washington’s position is equivalent to a refusal to negotiate from Pyongyang’s perspective. Until quite recently, the Biden administration’s behavior suggested it had adopted the Obama administration’s notion of “strategic patience,” a stance that amounts to taking no actual diplomatic initiatives. Recently, this has changed—with the U.S. now signaling that it is ready to talk, take a “step-by-step” approach, and honor the framework agreed upon in the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement made by Kim and Trump.

A step-by-step process will mean give and take. Moreover, it implies that the U.S. might ultimately have to settle for some tempering of the North’s nuclear arsenal rather than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID) it was originally seeking. Not that Washington is ready to acknowledge this publicly. In fact, the recent G7 meeting statement reasserted the CVID standard.

Washington might argue that its affirmation of CVID is justified given that the Singapore Statement includes a provision which declares: “Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Nevertheless, the formulation “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is a subject of contention, because North Korea and the United States interpret its meaning differently.

By reaffirming the Singapore Joint Statement as a basis for negotiations, however, the U.S. hints that it is prepared to negotiate with the North on the precise meaning of “Peninsula Denuclearization”. For instance, might the U.S. eventually agree to stop flying dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) bombers over the peninsula?

Meanwhile, the U.S. Treasury Department recently announced new ‘human rights’ sanctions, blacklisting North Korea’s Central Public Prosecutors Office, a former Minister of Social Security, and the new Minister of People’s Armed Forces. Whatever value these sanctions might have in their particulars, they certainly send a mixed message to North Korea about prioritizing peace and disarmament negotiations.

Things change, however, and the situation in Korea is not stable. For several years, both North and South Korea have been in a short-to-medium range missile arms race, developing and testing missiles carrying greater payloads over longer distances. As Sangsoo Lee of the Stockholm Korea Center observes: “What we are witnessing today on the Korean Peninsula is the same kind of action-reaction dynamic that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War—a destabilizing and expensive arms race.” This rings true, as, despite Moon’s desires for peninsular peace, he has not as of yet demonstrated the political will to reign in ROK’s military establishment.

In 2018 Pyongyang decided, at the urging of Russia and China, to induce negotiations with the U.S. by initiating a moratorium on testing new ICBMs and nuclear warheads. However, as time goes by, Chairman Kim faces increasing pressure from his military to end this moratorium. Pressure is unlikely to subside, for Military planners in the North are aware that the U.S. has been preparing its Air Force and Navy for conventional preemptive operations to prevent the successful wartime use of North Korean nuclear weapons. Pyongyang also understands that the deterrent value of its partially-developed
nuclear arsenal diminishes over time absent ongoing improvements, which require periodic testing. Therefore, if serious negotiations do not begin soon, one could expect the DPRK to end its testing restraint.

While many in Washington are content with a strategy of waiting patiently for sanctions to force Pyongyang’s capitulation, this approach overlooks how existentially critical nuclear weaponry has become in North Korea’s strategic calculus. Without an adequate national security alternative, Pyongyang will most likely choose to suffer indefinitely under the economic pain of sanctions, however severe.

President Moon has consistently sought a path toward peace with North Korea. Achievements in this regard include facilitating several intra-Korean summits and the three meetings between Trump and Kim. Economic opening to North Korea has been at the core of Moon’s program, but Washington’s sanctions regime has blocked most initiatives. The end-of-war declaration, agreed to “in principle” by four major stakeholder nations, may well be the last significant peace initiative of his term. Yet, even if it goes no further than the symbolic agreement announced in Canberra, Moon, as a practical politician, likely consoles himself with a secondary objective of burnishing his political party’s reputation for pursuing peace during the run-up to the next election.

The impasse in Korea raises profound questions about the U.S.-South Korea alliance. What is an alliance’s value for peace and security if a faraway great power effectively vetoes peace initiatives by a middle power dealing with a potential war situation in its immediate neighborhood? Of course, some will argue this to be simply the latest example of Thucydides’ Melian dilemma: “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” But this simple formulation never captures the full complexity or mutability of the real world. It did not do so for the Athenians, nor the Melians, and neither does it for us today.

Alliances cannot and do not last forever. To endure from one era to another, they must adapt and change. If Washington returns to old habits of leveraging its hegemonic will to control affairs on the Korean Peninsula, it may reap the unintended consequence of hastening the end of the alliance. After all, South Korea is much stronger economically and militarily than it was a few decades ago. It has earned substantial agency in its Northeast Asian geostrategic maneuvers, and it demands certain strategic autonomy independent from Washington. The U.S. would be wise to recognize this and accommodate Seoul. A relationship of partners will be more productive than the archaic patron-client one that actively shuns South Korean interest. And such strategic recalibration would come with the added benefit of helping end America’s longest war.

Can the United States escape the vortex of its 20-year war?

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, 09 Sept 2021

15 August 2021- in short order, a 20-year $1.2 trillion US effort at nation-building evaporated, disintegrated, went up in smoke. And while unreconstructed interventionists pummel President Biden for surrendering Afghanistan, the truth is that we never had it. What we held instead was a hollow construct of our own imagination and creation – a client pseudo-state. And when it was finally and fully tested, it (for the most part) threw down its arms and ran away.

In a sense, the sudden collapse of Kabul’s government and security services provides the surest litmus test of America’s 20-year enterprise in Afghanistan. It tells us that coercive nation-building by a foreign power – indeed, an alien power – is an impossible mission. Outsiders lack the knowledge, indigenous roots, legitimacy, and degree of interest to succeed against local resistance. Their very presence is provocative, especially given differences of language, religion, and culture. It’s as likely to spur resistance as it is to quell it. At the same time, such interventions risk becoming intractable given domestic political dynamics and Washington’s fixation on preserving its superpower reputation, its claim to being the “indispensable power”.

America’s interventionists have had only one answer to the persistence of failure: Stay the Course (with minor adjustments and occasional troop surges). They commonly aver that “Will” is the ingredient lacking in US adventures abroad. Public support or tolerance for this view steadily declined after the completion of the Obama troop surge in 2012; By April 2021 less than one-quarter of Americans would affirm it. However, the deadly mid-August disorder at the Kabul airport has given interventionists a fresh opportunity to assail withdrawal, if only obliquely.

While most Americans have come to accept the need and wisdom of withdrawal, the bloody mess at the airport casts a shadow over its practical implementation. US hawks and interventionists mobilized this impression to challenge the goal of withdrawal itself and to rally opinion to support interventionism – presumably by smarter means. Ostensibly the criticisms concerned the manner of withdrawal, not the fact of it. However, during August, the one type of complaint morphed seamlessly into the other, with interventionists decrying the “abandonment” of the Kabul regime, blaming the collapse of Kabul’s forces on the USA, demanding that American forces secure Kabul province, and ultimately insisting that Biden renege again on a withdrawal pledge and keep troops in Afghanistan until “every American is brought home.”

In recent complaints, there was no proposed new course that credibly promised to deliver the type of Afghanistan that Washington’s nation-builders had sought. And there was little recognition or expressed concern that the proposed action – defer withdrawal – would have involved returning to war with the Taliban. There’s not even much attention to the fact that the Taliban had recently been helping to protect US forces, safely escorting US nationals to the airport, and fighting off ISIS. This degree of cooperation was limited and conditional, but also essential. It should not have been summarily dismissed – especially given that Kabul’s military, such that it was, offered no alternative.

The Biden administration did err seriously in failing to fully appreciate what little progress had been made over 20 years toward building a functional Afghan government and military. How much progress was there? Next to nothing lasting or reliable. Failing to see this is an astonishing omission, but the omission has been endemic among US security policy officials. And it has kept the USA stuck in an impossible mission for 20 years. To be fair, the Biden administration appreciated the short-fall more than most officials, although not nearly enough – hence, the airport fiasco.

Did America’s covey of intelligence agencies “see it coming,” as some critics assert. No. Not usefully. The intelligence estimates that were supposed to guide the withdrawal repeatedly proved to be “an hour late and a dollar short” – that is, not usefully accurate, timely, or detailed:

• In mid-2020, the intelligence consensus had been that the Taliban might triumph within two or three years.
• By 27 April 2021, when President Biden announced the prospective withdrawal date, the intelligence estimate had been revised to 18 months – which, actually, was not much different than the 2020 estimate in terms of the possible end date. Rather reassuring, it would seem, but wrong.
• By 23 June, a possible collapse date was further revised to be as close as 6 months away. US retrograde operations had somehow lost a year of leeway over a period of just 2 months. Still, the projected horizon was still far enough away to allow smooth completion of the planned evacuation. Had it been correct. But it too was wrong.
• A mid-July estimate argued that despite Taliban gains, “the capital is not at imminent risk of a takeover, thanks in part to the threat of US airstrikes.”
• In early August, DOD disseminated a new, foreshortened estimate of possible Taliban victory: 90 days.
• Soon after – around Aug 12 – less than a week before the regime’s collapse – a new intelligence assessment concluded that the Taliban could isolate Kabul within the next 30-to-60 days. Still, room enough to complete withdrawal – but wrong.

Only in late June 2021 did intelligence services begin seeing a possible collapse before the end of the year. And at no point did intelligence services see a potential collapse before mid-September. Rather than aid the administration, this cluster of mistaken estimates may have contributed to the administration’s faulty calculus.

Still, outside the intelligence establishment, there were sufficient sources indicating that the Afghanistan effort was rotten at the core – a patient perpetually on life-support. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) saw it, the federal government separately recorded it, the news media widely reported it, and various non-governmental organizations chronicled it. The sorry condition of the effort might also have been gleaned from President Ghani’s January 2018 assessment that the Afghan National Army would not last more than six months without US support and that the Afghan government would also collapse. Thirty months hence, nothing had changed to improve this situation. In fact, Ghani‘s assessment has been shown to be overly optimistic.

The administration’s endgame plan envisioned the Kabul regime minimally securing Kabul Province while holding much of the center and northeast of the country long enough for an orderly US troop withdrawal to occur. Civilian evacuations would continue after the troops’ departure. The long-term survival of the regime was thought to be problematic, but not hopeless. And the Biden administration intended to continue supporting Kabul’s military effort with funds, training, equipment, force planning, munitions, logistics, and intelligence. Direct US military action would occur from “over the horizon,” but only to blunt explicit terrorist threats.

This administration’s program was not much different than how both the Obama and Trump administrations had come to see a possible future end game and post-deployment relationship. What should be the centerpiece of discussion now is that all these expectations stretching back a decade and more were delusional. In that light, Biden’s misjudgments about the near-term reliability of the Kabul regime were just a lesser instance of those guiding US policy for 20 years. This shows the danger of narrowing critical attention to the airport debacle: It produces no caution against the impossible missions, the torrent of hubristic error that culminates in last acts such as this one. Of course, for some critics, preserving the interventionist prerogative takes precedence.

Did Biden’s decision to proceed with withdrawal actually contribute to the collapse of the Kabul government and military, as some critics say? Yes, certainly – how could it not? America’s “Afghanistan” was a client-state, a desperate dependency. A fiction. The USA was its paymaster and superpower partner in war. Once fully tested on its own, it quickly crumbled. That should not be surprising – although much of Washington has acted as blind to this reality for years or tried to suppress it. As the collapse actually unfolded, each local loss or setback suffered by the Afghan National Security Forces added to the momentum of collapse (calling to mind the effect of the German blitzkrieg on the French military in 1940). The rapid desertion of soldiers and politicians from their posts was the impetus for the Kabul airport chaos. But the essential precondition for chaos and collapse was the inherent decrepitude of this foreign-imposed state. Yes, by his action, Biden pulled the curtain back on this fragile corrupted entity. It was weaker than he or the intelligence establishment or most US state managers had expected.

Diplomacy as War by Other Means

Having lost the war, the United States and its allies are now coordinating to win the peace by other coercive means: stopping aid, reviving and stiffening sanctions, blocking recognition, freezing financial assets, and denying the Taliban government access to the global commons. Of course, a wide range of covert means is also available.

The leaders of the G7 countries have warned the Taliban not to revert to the strict Islamic form of government that they ran when they last held power. And the G7 has asserted “that the Taliban will be held accountable for their actions on preventing terrorism, on human rights, in particular, those of women, girls and minorities, and on pursuing an inclusive political settlement in Afghanistan.”

While compromise on some of the G7 demands seems possible, those regarding the form and composition of the Taliban government are unlikely to find any acceptance. The Western alliance straight-out dictating the contours of an Islamic government is a non-starter, to stay the least. The Taliban will not soon or easily surrender the commanding position or core principles for which 50,000 of its members died. While punitive measures might compel a degree of shaky compliance in some areas, the greater effect of tightening the screws on Afghanistan will be instability, hostility, realignment, and missed opportunities for cooperation – in other words, more pain and loss on all sides. The cost-benefit ratio for this campaign of punitive diplomacy is not encouraging, but other dynamics can drive the confrontational approach, nonetheless.

Sanctions, as an assertion of power after losing a war, may speak to the domestic politics and public opinion of the losing states. Punitive measures may also aim to restore some of the reputational heft lost by the United States due to the Afghan war outcome, saying in effect: our destructive power does not end at the edge of the battlefield. Some argue that the reputational fallout of such losses doesn’t matter. That’s wrong, judging from the geopolitics of the immediate post-Vietnam War years. There is a reputational price to pay for imprudent and/or unnecessary military adventures, although the United States obviously recovered its hegemonic prerogatives within 15 years of North Vietnam’s victory.

Finally, the temptation to enact severe sanctions and other punitive measures after a war loss may be intentionally aimed to destabilize Taliban rule and help feed resistance, perhaps reviving war on a proxy basis. In this example, punition would not simply serve as a tool of coercion; It would be meant to actually achieve destabilization and perhaps collapse.

Regardless of motive, the punitive approach undermines rather than enhances regional and national stability. And it feeds contention rather than cooperation. It continues to view Afghanistan and the surrounding region principally through the lens of 9/11 and America’s 20-year war. It literally revives that war and continues it by other means. And it minimizes the regional reality of new actors, new challenges, and new opportunities. A different approach might build on the precedent of selective US-Taliban cooperation achieved over the last two years – transactional for sure, but real nonetheless.

Stabilize Afghanistan: Make Peace with the Taliban Now

As an alternative to pursuing a peremptory approach to the Taliban, Washington should immediately establish a civil, diplomatic modus. It should pursue a non-coercive transactional relationship. This seemingly audacious turn in policy offers the only realistic prospect for moving soon toward a more stable country and region, which will be achieved together or not at all.

A more cooperative relationship might quickly begin to address and advance a variety of important goals:

■ Ensure the return home of all foreign nationals who care to depart Afghanistan as well as releasing all Afghans with travel authorization from another country (as the Taliban have pledged).
■ Preventing or interdicting the export of terrorist influence and activity. Especially, work jointly against ISIS-K.
■ Containing or reducing other transnational criminal activity, especially the drug and arms trades.
■ The development of regional confidence and security-building mechanisms, such as conflict resolution and arms control protocols.
■ The advance of equitable, sustainable economic development.

Other important subjects of cooperation that might begin soon include migration control, environmental protection, and transnational health concerns.

Full and formal normalization of relations will take time, but many aspects of normalization (affecting, for instance, trade and aid) should go forward quickly on a provisional basis. This should have a stabilizing effect on the country and advance cooperation in all spheres.

As suggested above, any attempt to compel Taliban adherence to outside political and social ideals and practices will prove very contentious. But more can be accomplished within a context of cooperative relations than without. And, of course, in the final resort, no nation is compelled to trade with or aid others whose policies it considers abhorrent. (WTO rules give leeway for trade sanctions on a number of non-economic pretexts.) The prospect of limited restrictions argued explicitly on the basis of adhering to one’s own national laws may be a way of favoring change without giving the impression of a united front against the Taliban or an opening shot in a “clash of civilizations.” Neither of these stances would be productive, although possibly gratifying to some.

 

When will US troops leave Afghanistan? Why the uncertainty?
And how the logistics of withdrawal has little to do with it.

Carl Conetta, 19 June 2021 – PDF version here

(Note: Reference numbers in text link directly to relevant documents)

The date for US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan is subject to change once again. (1)  The Feb 2020 agreement between the USA and the Taliban had originally set May 1, 2021 as the deadline for ending US ground presence.(2) However, on April 17 President Biden announced his intention to breach the agreement by setting a new date almost 6 months in the future: September 11.(3)  Now, the NYT reports that more than a dozen officials in the USA, Afghanistan, and Europe are confirming a possible new departure date in mid-July 2021.(4)  Given the opportunity to deny the leaks, Pentagon Press Spokesman John Kirby instead demurred, saying, “I’m not going to speculate about what the exact time frame is going to end up being.” (5)

In US discussion of these changes, the logistics of withdrawal have been emphasized as initially requiring the delay and then, unexpectedly, allowing some mitigation of it.(6) According to the Times, upon supposedly beginning withdrawal in April “military officials quickly realized that they could be out by early to mid-July.”(7) But these explanations for the delay and then its partial retraction fall short, as this post will show.

First, previous troop drawdowns in Afghanistan (and elsewhere) strongly imply that the task could have been completed by May 1, if there had  been a will to do so.(8)  (see Appendix 1: The Logistics Dodge, below )

Second, arguing that ignorance of conditions on the ground led to overestimating the time needed for withdrawal begs credulity. Active planning for the move has been underway for more than a year.(9) (10) So has the process of withdrawal. Already 10,000 troops had withdrawn by early 2021 (counting from January of 2020).(11) The task facing the new administration was not a new one, nor was the ground unknown.

An alternative (or complimentary) explanation for breaching the US-Taliban agreement is that it gave Washington more time to pursue some of its unfinished business concerning Afghanistan’s future. In this, the lingering troop presence would serve as a type of leverage. As a Reuters reporter found, “Some U.S. officials and many experts fear that if US-led international forces depart before a peace deal is reached, Afghanistan could plunge into a new civil war, giving al Qaeda a new sanctuary.”(12) Motivating and managing that prospective peace deal was part of Washington’s unfinished agenda.

Clearly, the ~10,000 US troops and contractors serving in Afghanistan could not counter-balance the Taliban, but they could stiffen Kabul’s forces and resolve, hold NATO’s attention and concern, add to the effectiveness of US air power, keep access points open, and anchor the possibility of a revived US ground presence. Put simply, they could represent the fact that the ground game isn’t over until it’s over. And that’s the foundation of the leverage those troops provide.

The USA has been using the time it’s gained not only to ease the pace of withdrawal, but also to improve Afghan defenses, polish plans and preparations for “fighting from afar,” and pursue dramatic new political initiatives aiming to lock the Taliban into a cease-fire, peace settlement, and nation-building plan substantially defined by the USA. (See Appendix 2. Unfinished Business: Shaping Afghanistan’s Future, below.) An illustrative goal briefed to Afghan President Ghani and Chairman Abdullah by US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad was “a revised 90-day Reduction-in Violence…intended to prevent a Spring Offensive by the Taliban.”(13)

Biden’s decision to breach the agreement was a high-risk gamble. This was partly because the existing Taliban cease-fire on US forces was associated with the 2020 US-Taliban deal – now breached. That cease-fire allowed the United States more than a year without a combat casualty – a sharp drop from previous years.(14) Should the cease-fire break down and US forces suffer fatalities under Taliban attack, near-term withdrawal could become politically impossible. However, with the prospect of US withdrawal still dangling in the near future, Biden gambled that the Taliban would hold their fire and wait.

For Every Action…

The Taliban responded to Biden’s contravention by threatening a return to unrestricted attacks on US troops.(15) But Biden had already issued a preemptive threat on April 14 when he warned that, should the Taliban lift the cease-fire linked to the deal and resume attacks on US troops, the latter would respond with “all the tools at (their) disposal.”(16) The Taliban reiterated their threats as the May 1 deadline passes.(17) And US Army General Austin Scott Miller, commander of the NATO Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, repeated Biden’s.(18)

In this exchange the potential for an escalation spiral is obvious. And should fighting once again flare, it would not admit an easy or quick resolution. Even apart from the friction generated by the breach, any delay in withdrawing troops from the Afghan imbroglio presents an opportunity for renewed conflict, which could easily add years to US ground troop combat in a conflict several US presidents had hoped to end or curb.

Taliban offensive action surged after May 1, (19) although little or none of it was intentionally directed at US forces. When attacks did seem to target US troops or their positions, US forces struck back ferociously.(20) Generally, the role of US air power in supporting Kabul’s forces against the Taliban grew along with the fighting.(21) And with the increasing extent and intensity of fighting,(22) Washington increasingly worried about what NYT’s informants called a “nightmare scenario”: The eventuality of a US combat-related death in Afghanistan.(23) That occurrence might reconfigure US policy on withdrawal and would certainly be politically disruptive at home. The NYT informants connected these concerns to the administration’s consideration of a mid-July exit.

Blinken’s diplomatic and government-shaping program made little progress during the period April to June even though it was arguably the main reason for extending America’s ground force presence beyond the agreed May deadline. Obviously, Blinken’s cease-fire proposal did not take hold. Also failing to gain traction (at least initially) were efforts to draw the Taliban into an Istanbul-based international meeting that might formulate an Afghan settlement with features favored by Washington. (See Appendix 2. Unfinished Business: Shaping Afghanistan’s Future)

Throughout April, the Taliban steadfastly refused to participate in any meetings that addressed substantive settlement issues before foreign troops left Afghan soil. This prompted Turkey, Pakistan, and the Kabul government to issue joint statements accusing the Taliban of failing in its responsibility to seek an inclusive negotiated settlement. Not wishing to be portrayed internationally as a spoiler, the Taliban responded in early May with a counter-offer: It would participate in the US arranged meetings if the United States would agree to a July exit date. Reportedly, the USA and Taliban subsequently conferred over the option. More recently, as rumors of a possible July exit circulated, the Taliban agreed in principle to participate in the US proposed meeting, although the terms of the meeting are still under discussion. (For more detail see Appendix 2)

Indicative of the remaining distance between the two parties and the emphasis the Taliban place on indigenous authority is their response to the Biden proposal to have a NATO country – presumably Turkey – assume responsibility for keeping the Kabul International Airport open and secure.(24) The Taliban’s response was categorical:

“Every inch of Afghan soil, its airports and security of foreign embassies and diplomatic offices is the responsibility of the Afghans, consequently no one should hold out hope of keeping military or security presence in our country.”(25)

In a net assessment, Biden’s gambit has involved more risk than gain. The Taliban have continued their rapid advance, refused to renew a cease-fire with Kabul, and so-far rebuffed efforts to draw them into substantive settlement negotiations prior to the withdrawal of foreign troops.  This outcome should not be surprising. It corresponds to Afghanistan’s internal balance of power and to the limit on what outside players can accomplish by means of force and funding. The commitment of outside powers, now twenty years along, has substantially receded in recent years, as is obvious to all the contestants

In the United States, public support for withdrawal now stands above 2:1, not surprisingly.(26) What has twenty-years, $2 trillion, and as many as 6,000 US military and contractor lives gained? A dysfunctional kleptocratic warlord state that cannot stand on its own against ill-equipped insurgents. (27)

Without substantial permanent foreign military support the Kabul government will soon crumble and a Taliban coalition will become the predominant political force in Afghanistan. (28) (29) (30) Appreciating this, the Taliban will not be co-opted by Washington’s recent raft of peace and governance meetings and proposals. Why cannot Washington see this? Why pursue a policy that risks prolonging the war and US ground force intervention with little hope of gain?

Hubris, voluntarism, institutional interests, and partisan politics all play a role in shaping Washington’s appreciation of strategic realities and in limiting the range of options thought feasible. The recent debate over withdrawal shows that, contrary to the evidence of 20 years, confidence in progress if not victory remains alive in some corners.(31) (32) Given this, building a leadership coalition supportive of a given policy can require compromise on specifics. Thus, past efforts to reduce deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq have come wrapped paradoxically in troop surges or “one last shot,” often extending rather than ending commitments. Paradoxical action is often the price of “consensus.” (33)

Today, in Afghanistan, “mission accomplished” turns out not to have meant exiting ASAP. Nor did it exclude a sudden surge of new policy initiatives, anchored by military presence and action. This suggests that the administration was divided among itself. Certainly, the broader Democratic Party leadership was divided on the wisdom of straight-forward “withdrawal.” (34) (35) And some key military leaders made no secret of their disapproval while nonetheless retaining their positions.(36)

What remains to be seen is how the principal players respond to each other’s initiatives during this tense interregnum between ground combat and withdrawal. To be sure, every day the USA prolongs its ground presence involves new opportunities for US troops to be killed. Every day presents an opportunity to re-enter a cycle of violence, making it more difficult to exit. Similarly, every new US plan, every new or renewed commitment is an anchor, a snare, increasing America’s political investment in advancing its vision(s) of Afghanistan’s future. And when we take into consideration air power, special operations raids, military aid, diplomatic support, and financial assistance, it’s clear that US withdrawal from this conflict, in any full sense, is not on the horizon.

Appendix 1: The Logistics Dodge

Among the broad public the most persuasive reason to delay the long-awaited, majority-supported troop withdrawal involves safety and logistical limits. However, taking historical precedent into account, neither of these concerns makes much sense given the size of the US and allied contingent: about 17,000 troops and contractors. Relatively speaking, the United States has managed much greater logistical challenges in a more timely fashion in the recent past – including in Afghanistan: (37) (38)

Without doubt there are a variety of tough transportation problems in the current Afghanistan case – such as the rugged terrain and poor transportation net.(39) Some of the challenges have been exaggerated, however. For instance, the number of sites hosting US personnel numbered in the hundreds some few years ago, but only dozens more recently.(40) More relevant than enumerating the types of obstacle possibly facing Afghanistan withdrawal is weighing this case against other US withdrawal efforts. How do different cases and experiences stack up?

The 1990-1991 Gulf War offers one standard for judging the challenge now facing America in Afghanistan.(41) Operation Desert Storm (ODS) involved more than 500,000 US troops “in theater”. This posed a redeployment challenge orders of magnitude greater than what Washington today faces in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, following the ODS cease-fire, troops were exiting the war zone at rates up to 5,000 personnel per day. Assets took longer, of course. All told, redeployment of people and materiel from the theater took 10 month.

Applied to the present Afghanistan case, this standard might suggest that withdrawal could be accomplished in less than a few weeks! That calculation is faulty, of course. The relationship between the two cases – the Gulf and Afghanistan wars – is not linear.(42) The Gulf states offer an exceptional infrastructure and environment for deployment and redeployment. In the case of Afghanistan, countervailing factors include an especially poor transportation network, limited airport capacity, lack of nearby seaports, severe weather, mountainous terrain, and possible harassing attacks by violent actors.(43) On the other hand, facilitating the current effort is that planning has been already underway for a year.(44) (45) Also expeditious was the consolidation of US personnel and assets in fewer, more secure locations, which similarly had been underway for a year.

Another – and perhaps more relevant – standard was set during the 2013-2015 US military drawdown in Afghanistan.(46) (47) This followed the 2009 Obama surge. In the space of two years, 60,000 troops were redeployed. The lion’s share of their equipment was removed, destroyed, or transferred to the Afghan Armed Forces.(48) And, unlike today, that was a period of active combat. Indeed, during 2013 and 2014, over 120 US soldiers were killed in action.(49)

Looking forward from February 2021, in light of the above, could the United States have withdrawn all its troops and assets by May 1. Personnel, yes; Assets, probably not. Despite almost a year of specific planning, the delay in execution had precluded it. However, while the administration might reasonably argue that logistical challenges impose some delay in full withdrawal, the planned five months exceeds what’s reasonable. Supporting this conclusion is not only the example of the 1990-1991 Gulf War (adjusted for size), but the adjusted examples of the Vietnam War, the 1983 Grenada intervention, the 1999 Kosovo War, and the multiple surges and recessions in US troop levels during both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars to date.(50) (These comparisons assume the need to evacuate a total of ~20,000 US and allied troops, civilian government personnel, and contractors from Afghanistan.)

The Taliban would certainly have negotiated a short delay in America’s exit. Indeed, some sources report they are now in the process of belatedly negotiating a possible July 2021 exit date.(51) Looking back to April, the key to having effectively met the terms of the 2020 agreement would have been negotiating a short delay, declaring an end to the operation on May 1, making substantial withdrawals within weeks of April 14, and completing withdrawal by mid-June. That’s a practicable option that would not have risked disrupting the process of disengagement and withdrawal.

Appendix 2. Unfinished Business: Shaping Afghanistan’s Future

In early March 2021 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken summarized ambitious new US proposals for Afghanistan’s near future in letters (52) and documents (53) shared with Afghanistan’s President Ghani and Chairman Abdullah. (54) (55) These documents outline in some detail (i) a possible roadmap to a permanent cease-fire, (ii) the structure of a temporary unity government, (iii) the principles of a new constitution, and (iv) a future permanent government structure.(56) In essence, they constituted a “shake-and-bake” peace settlement confected in Washington DC and reflecting its ongoing vision for Afghanistan. There’s little doubt that this eleventh-hour effort to gain substantial influence over the Kabul-Taliban negotiations would shape the Taliban’s reaction (57) to Biden’s eleventh-hour breach of the 2020 US-Taliban “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan.”(58)

For the immediate future the United States had prepared “a revised 90-day Reduction-in Violence, which is intended to prevent a Spring Offensive by the Taliban.”(59) Blinken also asked the UN to convene a meeting of representatives from Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India, and the United States to discuss a joint approach to shaping a new order in Afghanistan.(60) Similarly, the USA has pushed to accelerate settlement negotiations between the Kabul and the Taliban. To this end, the UN, USA, Turkey, and Qatar proposed a session to be held April 24 in Istanbul, but this had to be postponed due to the Taliban’s refusal to attend such summits until foreign troops leave the country, as promised. (61) (62)

The Taliban see these machinations as an effort to overturn the 2020 agreement, strengthen the political and military position of Kabul, and revive some elements of earlier Western nation-building plans. Washington had hoped to significantly advance this program before the end of the revised troop withdrawal schedule. Should the Kabul government and a varied assembly of world powers coalesce around Blinken’s proposals, international pressure on the Taliban might intensify. But there is no good reason to believe that this imperious approach would succeed now anymore than before. It could, however, prolong the conflict and America’s involvement in it.

* “The Fog at the End or the Tunnel” is a paraphrase of “Light at the End of the Tunnel,” which was a statement commonly used by US government officials during the Vietnam War era to argue that the end of the war or a turning point in the war was coming into sight, even if not immediately obvious.

 

by Charles Knight, 31 January 2021.

During the last decade, we entered a new strategic era that will have large and lasting effects on the international and domestic policy and position of the United States.

An emergent sign of this new era was Russia’s decision in 2015 to intervene in the Syrian civil war in support of the Damascus government. This deployment was the first significant “out of area” military intervention by Russia since the demise of the Soviet Union.

While many Western commentators characterize Russian actions in Ukraine and Syria as ‘resurgent aggression,’ a more accurate assessment is that Kremlin leadership seeks to halt that country’s long post-Soviet decline in global influence by addressing perceived national security deficits. In Ukraine, Russia has sought to shore up its flanks against NATO expansion in its near-abroad. Russian forces have also deployed to protect Mediterranean and Middle East interests represented by its long-time Syrian ally and, in particular, the naval base at Tartus and, fifty kilometers to the north, the new tactical air base at Latakia.

Although Russia has been militarily assertive in words and deeds, the most significant and dangerous strategic developments involve China. The reason for this is quite straightforward: Russia is presently a relatively weak state and will likely be a declining power for years to come. On the other hand, China is a rising economic and military power (although its military strength lags its economic advance by a considerable measure.) China has demonstrated renewed national confidence and pride rising in the face of seventy years of dominating presence by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, effectively reaching right up to China’s coasts.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Image by David Mark from Pixabay

China has been building out its territorial claims in the South China Sea. The U.S. Pacific forces have responded with repeated displays (by air and by sea) of disrespect for China’s sovereign claims. These demonstrations of U.S. power have ratcheted up tensions with China without in any way resolving the issue of the underlying competing sovereign claims.

Five years ago, the talk in American news and opinion media was of “a new Cold War with Russia.” Today, our media offers “a new Cold War with China.”

It would be a mistake to think that cold wars are something that happens to us – like a coronavirus spreading from Wuhan to Europe and from Europe to Seattle and then New York. Rather, a cold war is best understood as an ideological construct with a clear intent: to mobilize American and allied nations for an extended “struggle” with a designated enemy.

The first Cold War (1947-1989) was costly for the world, diverting one or two percent of global economic activity to military capabilities particular to that conflict. For the U.S. the Cold War consumed a much higher percentage of GDP than the global average.  U.S. defense spending rose to nearly 15% of GDP during the Korean War and averaged between 5 and 7% of GDP in non-war years. Overall, the Cold War cost American’s about 4% of their GDP.

On a global scale, the first Cold War was nothing like an uneasy peace. During its course, more than 30 million people died in some thirty-five wars. Although these conflicts were peripheral to the presumed central front in Europe, many were encouraged and provisioned by the main protagonists.

The U.S. government rallied a significant portion of several generations’ creative energies to the Cold War cause. Too often, our government and compliant media spun inaccurate and exaggerated stories of enemy prowess and intent, producing widespread fear. During the Cold War’s 40+ years, fears of the enemy took a profound psychic toll on all involved, especially children.

We can do much better than remain passive during the construction of an encore. There is a choice.

Graham Allison, former director of the Belfer Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School, has written:

“If leaders in the United States and China let structural factors drive these two great nations to war, they will not be able to hide behind a cloak of inevitability. Those who don’t learn from past successes and failures to find a better way forward will have no one to blame but themselves.”

It will not be an easy task to create a structure for peaceful relations with China. We must privilege cooperation, always seeking to identify common security interests. This task will require imagination, persistence, and focused attention.

Alternatively, a cold war framework for our relations with China will result in $300 to 500 billion additional annual U.S. security expenditures. It will divert Americans’ energies and resources away from many important social, economic, and environmental goals. The U.S. will defer many domestic investments.

Nations wise enough to opt-out of a cold war with China will emerge as winners, while those that sign on to the struggle will likely reap decline and perhaps the whirlwind of war.

~~

[ Adapted from an earlier version of this cautionary tale published in the Huffington Post, February 2016.]

 

by Carl Conetta, 3 December 2020

Commentary on “Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan: Washington Perspectives on a US-Taliban Agreement” – A US Institute of Peace panel w/ Michèle Flournoy and Stephen Hadley, February 18, 2020

In this Feb 2020 panel on the US-Taliban agreement, prospective Biden SecDef Michèle Flournoy emphasizes the “phased, conditional” nature of the negotiated US troop withdrawal, while herself suggesting some conditions that would essentially preserve the nation-building goals long advanced by the United States. And she avers that she “would certainly not advocate a NATO or US departure short of a political settlement being in place. That would be a disaster for everyone.”(46:03)

However, Flournoy’s conditions, including implementation of a finalized intra-Afghan peace agreement, significantly exceed those conditions set out in the Feb 2020 US-Taliban Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan.  In other words, her putative support for the agreement is nothing of the sort. What’s more, her enhanced conditions might actually serve as poison pills. Her co-panelist, Stephen Hadley (who served as GW Bush’s National Security Advisor 2005-2009) concurs in advancing new conditions. He argues that the Taliban need to accept the current Afghanistan constitution and state institutions.

None of this over-reach is surprising, given that both Hadley and Flournoy helped shape the policies that kept this war burning during their successive tenures, 2005-2012. The USA has long demanded that the Taliban simply fold itself into the political order crafted by the US occupation. But none (or not much) of this figures in the current US-Taliban agreement – which is why the Taliban are playing ball and we are moving toward ending US involvement in this conflict.

What does the hard-fought, long-sought agreement actually say? In order to trigger the full withdrawal of US and coalition forces by May 2021, the agreement only requires that (i) cease-fires are in place, (ii) the Taliban work to suppress Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups within their areas of control, and (iii) intra-Afghan negotiations on the country’s political future get underway. The agreement does not make withdrawal contingent on completion of an intra-Afghan agreement.

Both Flournoy and Hadley repeatedly stress that actually sealing a final an intra-Afghan settlement will require a long, hard slog. That may be correct – but also irrelevant to the US-Taliban agreement and US troop withdrawal, as long as the Taliban enact the conditions listed above. Apparently that’s not how either Hadley or Flournoy see it.

According to Flournoy and Hadley, what should happen if no final intra-Afghan settlement is reached? “What is Plan B?” – as one perspicacious audience member asked. Hadley says that Plan B is to make Plan A work – a weak joke that inadvertently reveals why the USA has been stuck in Afghanistan for 19 years: No Plan B except to surge Plan A. Flournoy, by contrast, picked up the gauntlet and inadvertently revealed why we’re likely to remain there indefintely: “Plan B is [to] revert to where we are now and try to convince the Taliban and their supporters… to be more serious about moving forward.” Plan B is to replay Plan A. (Flournoy’s support for the 2009-2012 troop surge in Afghanistan is a point of contention with Biden, who opposed the surge. The surge more than doubled US troop presence. It nearly tripled annual US troop fatalities.)

Apart from demanding a final political settlement, which is more than the current withdrawal agreement requires, Flournoy also puts the onus of progress solely on the Taliban. This grants Kabul considerable freedom to demand more from the final settlement than conditions on the ground and the Kabul-Taliban power balance would imply. Kabul can simply refuse to move forward to a final settlement on any basis other than its preferred one. What would happen then? Presumably Flournoy’s “Plan B” – a reversion “to where we are now” – would occur. And to be clear, “where we are now” is US military presence, operations, and support. Put simply, “where we are now” is war.

The Flournoy-Hadley position seems to be that Washington either wins considerably more than what the US-Taliban agreement promises or it “stay the course” – a course now 19-years old. This view may lead the United States deeper into a position of “moral hazard” because Kabul is certainly listening and hoping to keep US dollars and troops fully engaged.  The US presence, yes or no, may become Kabul’s choice if all it takes is for President Ashraf Ghani or the Afghan National Assembly to stonewall the intra-Afghan negotiations.

The unspoken truth is that the Kabul government, its institutions and security forces, its basic functionality, are nowhere without US power and support. Of course, no US policymaker wants, intends, or foresees “staying the course” forever. None expect or desire an endless series of resets, surges, or “do-overs.” But US policy regarding its costly regime-change, nation-building, and regional reform efforts is immured by denial and delusion about what can be accomplished by forceful US intervention. In their discussion of the Afghan prospect, Flournoy and Hadley seem unaware and unaffected by the numerous reports of Afghan government dysfunction, reconstruction failures, and security force depredations.

Similarly, Hadley makes the remarkable claim that (circa early 2020) Afghan security forces were “in the lead” combating the Taliban. Well, apart from the fact that they are losing, they remain wholly dependent on US intelligence, logistical support, and air power. Indeed, US fixed-wing aircraft dispensed more munitions in the 2018-2019 period than in the previous five years. And, until recently, there were approximately 25,000 US and allied troops in the country. Additionally, the United States employed 25,000 contractors. And US financial and material aid to Afghanistan has in recent years exceeded 25% of the nation’s GDP. This does not suggest a government that can stand on its own. It does not suggest that reliable stability is within reach, given just a wee bit of additional US intervention.

If the next administration hopes to end this seemingly endless conflict and bring US troops home, it needs to face facts about the character of the Kabul government, the balance of power on the ground, and the limits of outside intervention. These realities should be abundantly clear by now, albeit hard to swallow.

In light of current painful realities, Washington should council Kabul to seek a compromise settlement that it can have some hope of defending on its own. Beyond this, the coalition can increase Kabul’s leverage by offering diplomatic support and pledges of substantial reconstruction aid. Pakistan and the Gulf States might use similar means to moderate the Taliban’s position. Ruled out, however, should be any extension of US troop presence or other applications of US military power to decide Afghanistan’s future.

US expectations of Afghanistan’s future also need a strong dose of realism. America’s long and costly Vietnam intervention is instructive. In 1968, 13 years and 30,000 US deaths after President Eisenhower launched significant US military involvement, peace talks began. Five years and 30,000 US deaths later, the Paris Peace Accords were signed. A little more than two years after that, the US allied government in the south was overrun by Northern and Viet Minh forces. This much might have been expected given the balance of power and the dysfunction of the South Vietnamese government, which had been largely a creature of US power. Now, what about Afghanistan?

It is more likely than not that the Taliban will come to be the dominant actor in Afghanistan’s future. To this eventuality, outside states should be ready to adapt. Should the Taliban gain predominant sway, this need not and will not imply a replay of the period 1996-2001. The Taliban will grow their influence and moderate it by finding allies among players in the current governing order. There were in the past, are now, and will be in the future areas and opportunities for US-Taliban cooperation – such as stemming ISIS and limiting the drug trade.

What will be most difficult for the Biden administration is to face and admit the error of the Afghanistan regime-change, counter-insurgency, and nation-building efforts. As demonstrated by the USIP panel, there is a powerful temptation to deny past missteps and instead “stay the course.” And this temptation is especially strong among the architects of this foreign policy disaster.

• AP. “Rebuilding Afghanistan has a high human cost, US agency says,” 11 Feb 2020.
• American Conservative. “That’s Classified!’ See How Afghanistan War Lies Are Made,” 11 Feb 2020.
• CRS. The Washington Post’s “Afghanistan Papers” and US Policy, 28 Jan 2020. (PDF)
• Washington Times. “‘Into the arms’ of the Taliban: Inspector general says US ties with corrupt Afghan warlords backfired.” 15 Jan 2020.
• WaPo. “The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War,” 09 Dec 2019.
• The Hill. “Documents show US leaders misled public on progress in Afghanistan War,” 09 Dec 2019.
• The Guardian. “Afghanistan papers detail US dysfunction: ‘We did not know what we were doing’,” 14 Dec 2019.
• Suzanne Fiederlein, et al. The Human and Financial Costs of Explosive Remnants of War in Afghanistan.  Providence RI: Cost of War Project, Watson Institute, 19 Sep 2019. (PDF)
• NYT. “CIA’s Afghan Forces Leave a Trail of Abuse and Anger,” 31 Dec 2018.
• US News. “Watchdog Says US Strategy in Afghanistan Shows Little Result,” 21 May 2018.
• Stars & Stripes. “IG: Pentagon cannot properly account for $3.1 billion provided to Afghan security forces,” 26 Mar 2018.
• NBC. “Inspector general accuses Pentagon of censoring Afghanistan data,” 30 Jan 2018.
• Newsweek. “Arming the Enemy in Afghanistan,” 18 May 2015.
• Mother Jones. “The US Has Given Over 465,000 Small Arms to Afghanistan; Where the Hell Are They?”, 28 Jul 2014.

• The Balance. “Afghanistan War Cost, Timeline, and Economic Impact; The Ongoing Costs of the Afghanistan War,” 22 Oct 2020.
• US Department of Defense. Section 1090 Reports: Estimated Cost to Each US Taxpayer of Each of the Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Washington DC: 11 Sept 2020.
• Federation of American Scientists. Dept of Defense Reports on the Cost of War, 2016-2019. Washington DC: 16 Jan 2020.
• US Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 Wars. Providence RI: Cost of War Project, Watson Institute, 13 Nov 2019. (PDF)

* [Title of this post derives from the Roman historian Tacitus’ quotation of Calgacus, a Caledonian (Pictland) chieftain, who said of the Roman conquest of his realm: “They make a desolation [or ‘desert’] and call it peace.” The title also borrows from the title of Studs Terkel’s The Good War: An Oral History of WW II.]

By Carl Conetta, 7 Nov 2017; updated 25 Oct 2020

Expanded excerpt from “Disappearing the Dead: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Idea of a ‘New Warfare,’ 18 February 2004 (pdf).

Even given perfect intelligence and accuracy, most guided weapons in the 500- to 2000-lb range are sufficiently powerful to routinely cause some degree of collateral damage. This, because they carry hundreds of pounds of enhanced high-explosives wrapped in hundreds of pounds of steel – an obvious point, but one that has been too often occluded or overlooked.

A 2,000-lb bomb typically contains 945 pounds of tritonal, a TNT derivative that is about 20 percent more powerful than TNT. By comparison, the bomb that destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995, comprised approximately 5,000 pounds of ammonia nitrate mixed with fuel oil — the equivalent of nearly 4,000 pounds of TNT. The portable devices used by suicide bombers typically weigh between 10 and 35 pounds; these can carry a punch equivalent to 40 pounds of TNT if a plastic explosive (C-4) is used.

Most everything will be severely damaged, injured, destroyed, or killed within 20 meters of a 500-lb bomb blast and 35 meters of a 2000-lb blast. This lethal radius can be partly mitigated by detonation inside a large, compartmentalized building – however, as a Rand study points out: “While structures surely have some shielding effect, building collapse and spalling are secondary yet major causes of injury.” (pdf)

Averaged across different types of surfaces, a 2000-lb bomb will carve a crater 50 feet across and 16 feet deep; a 500-lb bomb will carve one 25 feet across and 8.5 feet deep. The probability of incapacitating injury to unprotected troops within 100 meters of a 2000-lb bomb blast in the open is 83 percent; for those between 100 and 200 meters it is 55 percent. (pdf)

Safe distances for unprotected troops are approximately 1,000 meters for 2000-lb bombs and 500 meters for 500-lb ones. Even protected troops are not entirely safe within 240 meters of a 2,000-lb bomb or 220 meters of a 500-lb bomb. [For sources and more information on blast effects see the note at bottom.]

It is considered bold for a combat controller to bring down a strike within 800 meters of his/her position, and the 2001 Afghan strike that killed eight coalition troops and injured Hamid Karzai and 20 others is attributed to a JDAM hit within 100 meters of their position.  Commenting on the Karzai incident Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem of the Joint Staff rightly described the 2000-lb JDAM as a “devastating weapon”, adding that, “As a pilot, when I would drop a 2,000-lb weapon, I wanted at least 4,000 feet of separation from that weapon when it went off.” This distance would put an aircraft just beyond the reach of shrapnel and flying debris.

The brute destructive power of these weapons is not ancillary to the recent success of so-called precision attack, but central to it. A critical threshold in the development of US capabilities was passed when improvements in accuracy and precision helped insure that 50% or more of the weapons dropped would hit close enough to their targets so that the latter would be encompassed by the weapon’s destructive footprint. Of course, the area of deadly destruction is not small, but large – more than a acre for 2000-lb bomb. And this big footprint is pivotal to the success of “precision weapons.” An appropriate analogy is not a sharpshooter’s rifle shot, but a well-aimed double-barreled scatter gun firing a hail of slugs. In a sense, “precision” depends on which end of the weapon’s trajectory one sits.

Also relevant to the impact of “precision warfare” is the sheer number of bombs used since 2001: more than 70,000 in Afghanistan and more than 150,000 in Iraq and Syria (US munitions only). (See note at bottom for sources of bombing totals.)

It is certainly true that improvements in the accuracy and precision of air-dropped munitions has greatly reduced the numbers of aircraft and weapons required to destroy targets. Compared to bombing efforts during the Vietnam war era, it might take only 1/8 as many aircraft and 2% as many weapons to destroy a target today. A corollary of this is a capacity to significantly reduce the extent of death and destruction collateral to a bombing run. But capacity doesn’t necessarily determine actual outcomes, measured broadly. Several other variables weigh in:

(1) Does improved targeting lower the threshold for going to war and, thus, increase the frequency of wars and aggregate war fatalities?

(2) Does improved targeting encourage attacks on targets that carry a greater inherent or baseline risk of substantial collateral death and destruction? That is, do advanced air forces spend down “improved safety” by attacking less safe targets? And,

(3) Does improved targeting better enable attackers to comprehensively collapse an enemy nation’s government and critical infrastructure, producing fatal chaos on a wide scale.

The answer to all three queries is “yes” – and this upends the mystique of so-called “precision warfare.” America’s post-9/11 wars have not been low casualty events. To address the questions posed above in turn:

(1) Since the end of the Cold War, the USA has conduced air campaigns, some protracted, in a dozen nations – all outside the context of superpower contention, none involving existential threats, and most with only tenuous, remote, or indirect connection (if any) to attacks on US assets. Counter-terrorism efforts, once the province of discrete Special Operations units, have become a major employer of guided bombs in large quantities.

(2) Hubris, complex environments, and the fog of war have led to numerous, deadly “precision strikes” on wrong targets including attacks in residential neighborhoods, city centers, crowded towns, and government complexes resulting in many hundreds of civilian dead. Also mistakenly hit were mosques, hospital complexes, refugee encampments, farm workers, wedding parties, and even a neutral foreign embassy – this latter with potential strategic consequences. None of these strikes might have been attempted except for undue confidence in the promise of “precision warfare.”

(3) By any measure, US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan relied more on guided-weapons than ever before, quickly disintegrating governments in both places. And yet the product of these rapid victories was humanitarian crisis and chronic chaos. The same is true for operations in Libya, which have fed conflict across the Sahel. Indeed, with the partial exception of the mid-1990s intervention in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, none of America’s post-Cold War military operations produced conditions of reliable stability or security. As for the cost in lives of the war and chaos unleashed by “precision” victory: 160,000 dead in Afghanistan and 300,000 dead in Iraq – and still counting. This is the standard by which precision warfare should be judged.

Sources on blast effects and safe distances:

• FM 3-09.31 Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander (Fort Sill, OK: US Army Field Artillery School, 1 Oct 2003), “Appendix D: CAS Capabilities and Limitations”
• Close Air Support Newsletter No. 98-13 (Fort Leavenworth KS: US Army Combined Arms Center Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1998), “Appendix B: NTC CAS ROE”
• Vernon Loeb, “An Unlikely Super-Warrior Emerges in Afghan War; U.S. Combat Controllers Guide Bombers to Precision Targets,” Washington Post, 19 May 2002
• David Wood, “New Workhorse of US Military: A Bomb With Devastating Effects,” Newhouse News Service, 12 March 2003.

On blast effects also see:

• Explosive Weapon Effects Overview (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Feb 2017)
• Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: Technical considerations relevant to their use and effects (West Perth, Australia: Armament Research Services, May 2016)
• Areas of Harm: Understanding explosive weapons with wide area effects (London: Article 36; Utrecht: PAX, 2016)

US Bombing Data, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria – 2001-2020:

•  “Air Power Summaries,” US Air Forces Central, HQ, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina (accessed 25 Oct 2020)
• Combined Forces Air Component Commander, 2007-2010 Airpower Statistics (Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina: USAFCENT Public Affairs Directorate, 30 Aug 2010)
• Anthony H. Cordesman, US Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2007 (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 Dec 2007). PDF
• Operation Iraqi Freedom – By The Numbers (Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina: USCENTAF Assessment and Analysis Division, 30 Apr 2003)
• Carl Conetta, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties,” Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #13 (Cambridge MA: 24 Jan 2002)

By Carl Conetta, 19 Jan 2018

• JCS Chair Gen James Mattis, Summary of the US National Defense Strategy (Washington DC: US DOD, 2018) (pdf)
• USNI News, “Mattis Unveils New ‘Lethal’ National Defense Strategy Focused on Great Power Competition,” 19 Jan 2018.

It’s no surprise that, given the dominant role of military professionals in the Trump administration, DOD would craft an overweening “defense” strategy, guaranteed to pour fuel on the fires it perceives (and misperceives). In key respects it harkens back to the conceits of Dick Cheney’s 1992 Defense Guidance document, which have percolated just below the surface of Pentagon strategies ever since.

Some critical comments on the new strategy:

A central innovation is putting military contention with Russia and China at the center of US defense strategy: “The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition by… revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model…” Actually, neither Russia nor China base their foreign policy on crusades to alter the political-economic vision of other nations worldwide. However, both are more assertive than 10 years ago and their armed forces, more capable. But their military objectives have been limited in scope – partly aiming to push back against US and allied activity and advances over the past 20 years (albeit both of them transgressing intl law along the way).

The renewed centrality of the “rogue state” concept (applied explicitly to North Korea and Iran) is similarly consequential. It’s a framework that helps constrict the resort to normal diplomatic relations and means, while also sanctioning increased emphasis on coercion in dealing with these states who are judged to sit outside the law. And, of course, whether the US names nations as “revisionist powers” or “rogue states,” their central place in US military strategy creates an adversarial relationship as much as it simply recognizes one. US defense strategy is now avowedly about military confrontation with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Also noteworthy is increased focus of US military efforts on challenges in non-military domains: “Revisionist powers and rogue regimes are using corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxies, and the threat or use of military force to change facts on the ground.” The intention to escalate military ripostes to perceived non-military challenges is also evident in the new draft US nuclear posture, which implies possible nuclear responses to strategic cyber-assaults.

The strategy names the erosion of the “post-WWII international order” as a key concern. Of course, it sees the USA (and, specifically, US military power) as key in defending that order (and on a global scale). Naturally, the document elides the ways in which the USA has contributed to the weakening of that order and the abuse of it, through unilateral uses of force, military support for repressive governments, and expansion of exclusive military alliances. Indeed, the strategy downplays what should be the foundation stone of that order – the United Nations – substituting for it America’s network of regional alliances.

The strategy frets the erosion of America’s military edge, observing that “for decades the USA has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain is contested.” The sense of privilege apparent in this aspiration to employ forceful instruments everywhere unencumbered helps explain why others should challenge it. US military practice over the past 27 years has encouraged others to narrow the gap and helped legitimate their similar practices. America’s unusual margin of superiority – a singular consequence of Soviet collapse – was bound to recede as Russia recovered economically and the global balance of economic power shifted. Only a world order based on inclusive cooperation might have produced a different outcome. Today, nothing better represents unrealistic revisionist dreaming than does the Pentagon’s desire to regain uncontested superiority. It’s neither possible, nor necessary for US security.

The strategy reaffirms a set of hegemonic goals that are breathtaking in scope. It advances an imperative to “maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere” – a goal that implies that US security is contingent on America involving itself as a contestant in all the world’s regional power struggles. Let’s hope that other great powers don’t also see their security as contingent on hegemony. For the USA, the strategy says that this goal requires the Pentagon to (i) Expand Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships; (ii) Fortify the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance; (iii) Form enduring coalitions in the Middle East; (iv) Sustain advantages in the Western Hemisphere; (v) Support relationships to address significant terrorist threats in Africa. Is that all?

It’s not surprising that the strategy should rest on the hoary notion that “the surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.” This is boilerplate for Pentagon strategy docs – but also seriously ill-conceived. The “surest way” is not necessarily a realistic or achievable way; We could weaken or even bankrupt ourselves in the process of “being prepared” if our goals and commitments are unbounded. And is it really the “surest way”? Let’s restate the proposition: “The surest way to prevent war is to engage in open-ended arms races with all the potential competitors we can imagine worldwide.” This, I think, can only guarantee the opposite of what it intends.

by Carl Conetta, 1 July 2017

Although Duterte had a reputation as an effective (if crude) mayor of Davos, he began his 2016 campaign with no strong political base outside his home island of Mindanao. He lacked the support of either a major political party or a substantial chunk of the Philippine oligarchy (outside Mindanao, at least). His electoral coalition was a hodge-podge of smaller, mostly conservative-nationalist formations but also religious groups and some leftists.

His own party, the Philippine Democratic Party, had a history of strong anti-Marcos activism and nationalism, having been the platform for Cory Aquino’s election in 1986, but having since dwindled to a small regional formation. Duterte gained some broader left-wing support based on his relationship with the former leader of Philippines Communist Party, his self-description as a socialist (which he is not), his ‘common man’ image, and his pledge to seek peace with communist and Moro insurgents.

So how did he win? Image, issues, and social media were key. Those three ingredients plus a bump from social movements and a Filipino majority disenchanted with recent ruling parties won him the election.

The Duterte campaign relied on social media to build a “coalition of the aggrieved” by hammering at a range of salient issues: crime, drug use, urban congestion, underdeveloped infrastructure, exploitation of contract workers, the dominance of urban over agricultural areas, and the domination of ‘imperial” Manila/Luzon over other cites and islands. This occurred in a context where years of economic growth had delivered nothing to the poor and little to the middle-classes, also a context in which crime was rampant and infrastructure dilapidated despite economic growth.

Against the elite and well-spoken reformism of previous parties, Duterte campaigned as a ‘doer,’ a law and order candidate, a son of the poor, and a nationalist (in a political context where nationalism had a leftist anti-colonial appeal).

Once he won, legislators poured into his party. Some social movements had more-or-less supported him, and he rewarded them by giving four cabinet portfolios to leftists. But his economic program? It’s strictly neo-liberal with social programs added. He aims to create a more friendly business environment for both domestic and foreign capital, while also promising to direct more government spending to urban and rural infrastructure, education, healthcare, social protection, and job training.

Bibliography:
• Mong Palatino, “Is the Philippines’ Duterte Really a Leftist?”, The Diplomat, 02 May 2017.
• Malcolm Cook and Lorraine Salazar1, “The Differences Duterte Relied Upon to Win” (pdf), ISEAS Perspective (Singapore: Yusof Ishak Institute, 22 Jun 2016).
• Julio C. Teehankee, “Duterte’s Resurgent Nationalism in the Philippines: A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis,”  The Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs (1 Dec 2016).
• Pierre Rousset, “The left currents in the Philippines and the Duterte presidency” (Eurioe Solidaire Sans Frontieres, 25 Sep 2016).

By Carl Conetta, 21 Dec 2015

The current [2015] war hysterics began years ago, 2011 – soon after Congress turned to cap discretionary spending. Successive Pentagon leaders began warning that rolling back the DoD budget to the level of 2008 or 2009 (inflation adjusted) would have devastating, even catastrophic effects on the US military. It would make America weaker and inhibit our ability to respond to threats (SecDef Hagel), hasten instability in Asia and put “the nation at greater risk of coercion” (JCS Chair Gen. Dempsey), and even invite aggression (SecDef Panetta). Various leaders, democratic and republican, began seeing Hitler reincarnated in the form of Putin, Assad, or both. In ISIS they saw an apocalyptic threat “unlike anything we’ve seen” (Hagel). And many worried aloud about a new American isolationism. (For sources, see A Short Tour of Pentagon Hysterics.)

From every direction, the warnings came. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper: “In almost 50 years in intelligence, I don’t remember when we’ve had a more diverse array of threats and crisis situations around the world to deal with.” Others concurred: The global security environment is “more dangerous than it has ever been” (Gen. Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs), it’s “the most uncertain I’ve seen in my thirty-six years of service” (Gen. Odierno, Army Chief of Staff), there’s “greater turmoil than at any time in my lifetime” (Sen. John McCain).

No wonder Americans are worried. Well, ISIS is real enough as is the Syrian civil war, Russian actions in Ukraine, and Chinese assertiveness in the South China Seas. But are they exceptional and indicative of a world gone wild? (Here, I argue that what’s exceptional today are domestic partisan political dynamics.)

The crises represented today as unprecedented are anything but. The emergence and spread of ISIS and Boko Haram, for instance, recall the Taliban both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It also recalls the Iraqi insurgency and communal slaughter of 2004-2009. And the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah (1985). The foreign fighter phenomenon is not new, nor is the practice of militant groups seeking to affiliate with their more successful analogs. It’s true that ISIS uniquely stages its atrocities for maximum media exposure. But this does not make them qualitatively more threatening then were their Iraqi precursors (both Sunni and Shia) or the Taliban or Al Qaeda (which, after all, struck hard at America several times). The terrorist attacks in Paris were horrific, but they mirror attacks in Europe during the 2000’s: the 2005 London bombing and the 2004 Madrid train bombing (which together claimed 243 lives and injured 2,750).

Perspective is also due in weighing the Syrian civil war, the wars in Sub-Saharan Africa, and recent Russian and Chinese behavior. The Syrian conflict replays Iraq, Afghanistan, Algeria (1992-99), Chechnya (1991-2009), Lebanon (1975-90), Somalia (1988-present), Sri Lanka (1983-2009), Sudan (2003-09), Tajikistan (1992-96), the former Yugoslavia (1992-1999), and Yemen (1994-present). Today’s civil wars in East, West, and Central Africa recall the much worse conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s. Overall, conflict deaths are down from the 1965-1998 period. And, although conflict deaths have jagged somewhat upwards in recent years, this is mostly due to conflict in one place: Syria

Recent Russian and Chinese actions of concern also have their near equivalents in the not distant past: Russia in Georgia (2008), China and the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, and recurrent Taiwan Straits crises. The rise (or resurgence) of Russia and China are not new. They’ve been underway for 17 years.

Any argument for the especially dire state of the world today must also take into account the cyclical crises involving North Korea, India-Pakistan, and Israel that dot the past 20 years. Of course, none of today’s interstate wars compare with those of the 1980s.

Two concluding points: 1. The 1990-2010 period of US unipolar dominance is now ending, as it was bound to end; it was exceptional. This is hard for official Washington to countenance. 2. While hawks and the defense establishment always argue that US restraint leads to global instability, they are blind to the possibility that US military activism contributes to instability that reverberates for years to come. In fact, we are today living in the backwash of our post-9/11 wars.