Arms Control

Beyond pleasant lunches – How independent research and new ideas played a role in ending the Cold War: A retrospective on the years 1987-1989

by Charles Knight, 05 July 2026.  First published as a guest post at Van Jackson‘s Un-Diplomatic, ➪ full-text of PDA version: PDF

Gorbachev & Shevardnadze

This retrospective focuses on the work of one researcher/thinker from West Germany, Lutz Unterseher.  It follows the migration from West to East of his thinking and writing (and that of a network he organized) to Mikhail Gorbachev’s key foreign policy advisers.  Once there, this work likely played a role in shaping the particulars of one of the Soviet leader’s most consequential foreign policy decisions.

The story is told less for its historical value than for its value to all who work on the construction of new ideas.

  • In what circumstances do new ideas get noticed and made use of by powerful persons and institutions?
  • What types and levels of idea development are most likely to gain the attention of national leaders who tend to be relentlessly pragmatic?
  • What did the author of this retrospective learn while writing this article?

Korea versus Korea: Conventional Military Balance and the Path to Disarmament

by Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher, Lit Verlag, Munster, Germany, April 2020.

➪ full book PDF 

Chapter: “A Path to Reductions of Conventional Forces on the Korean Peninsula” by Charles Knight.

➪ read full English text:  PDF    or   ➪ Korean auto-translation (DeepL)

korea vs korea cover

Varied incremental steps that embody and signal the accumulating commitment to a minimally acceptable common political future for Korea are key to this process. Progressive reduction of cross-border invasion threats through mutual confidence building force restructuring will constitute a virtuous circle of reinforcement for a changed relationship. [Through the] accumulation of the sunk costs of iterative reciprocity North and South Korea will arrive at a point where the demonstrated commitment to smaller restructured military postures is sufficient to allow rapid progress toward a stable level and disposition of arms compatible with a new peaceful political relationship.   ~ Knight

Die Konfrontation auf der Halbinsel, mit offensivir Oreintierung und Bereitschaft zur Praemption, impliziert Stabilitatsrisiken. Diese werden noch erhoht durch Entwicklung und Einfuhrung prazier ballistischer Raketen, welche die Illusion nahren, den Gegner im Konfilktfall ‘enthaupten’ zu konnen.   ~ Unterseher

North Korea’s Conventional Military Forces: Relative Strength and Options

by Lutz Unterseher, PDA Guest Publication, April 2019.
➪ PDF

This paper by German military analyst Lutz Unterseher first assesses the relative conventional military power and potential of North and South Korea, then suggests a number of military restructuring steps the U.S. and South Korea can take to reassure North Korea of its security in the context of denuclearization. Unterseher calls for “…a genuine structural change, shifting the capabilities of the [allied] forces in the direction of a stable, non-provocative defense.”

If we can assume that the drive to generate unconventional [nuclear] instruments of deterrence is a response to the lack of options in the conventional realm, it would make sense to come up with policy recommendations aiming to lessen northern concerns.

DPRK Soldiers Patrol the Yalu

DPRK soldiers patrol the Yalu River shore. Image by WZ Still WZ from Pixabay.

Pleasant Lunches: Western Track-Two Influence on Gorbachev’s Conventional Forces Initiative of 1988

by Lutz Unterseher, PDA Guest Publication, August 2018. ➪ PDF

Secretary-General Gorbachev’s astounding and pivotal speech to the UN General Assembly in December of 1988 announced substantial reductions and defensive restructuring of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe.

Lutz Unterseher, living at that time in Bonn, West Germany, was a leading developer of the concepts of the confidence-building restructuring of armed forces intended to reduce East-West military tensions and improve crisis stability. There is no doubt that some of these concepts were influential with Soviet officials in Gorbachev’s closest circles. This article is Lutz Unterseher’s recollection of some of his most consequential interactions with Soviet analysts and diplomats in the several years before Gorbachev’s announcement of the force reductions and restructuring.

Noted: What North Korea wants in nuclear arms negotiations

by Charles Knight. This was a comment to an article by Duyeon Kim, “How to tell if North Korea is serious about denuclearization,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 October 2018, midway between the Singapore Summit and the Hanoi Summit.  ➪ HTML

Kim meets with Trump

… productive negotiations must take account of North Korea’s de-facto status as a nuclear weapon state and its core security interests.

What to Look For in the Pyongyang Inter-Korean Summit

by Charles Knight, The Diplomat, 14 September 2018.  HTML

“Denuclearization, if it occurs, is a long-term project. It will not happen in the case of Korea unless there are very substantial reductions and redeployments of conventional weaponry and military units on the peninsula.
“Just think of North Korea’s long-time substitute for nuclear weapons — its thousands of artillery pieces dug in and aimed toward Seoul. And these days South Korea has hundreds of conventionally-armed rockets aimed at key facilities in the North. All of this has to change, in a step-by-step reciprocal and verified process as trust builds. This is the hard part of making peace. It takes time and persistent will.”

Pyongyang monument

Image by Peter Anta from Pixabay.

The Inter-Korean Summit Declaration of April 27, 2018: a review in detail

by Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives, 01 May 2018. ➪ PDF

prayers for peaceThe April 27, 2018 Inter-Korean Summit was a visibly cordial event. At its conclusion, North and South Korea released a Declaration of Peace, Prosperity, and Unification. This paper reviews a selection of key sections and phrases in ‘The Declaration’ with attention to understanding their implications for the goal declared by both parties of ending ‘division and confrontation’ on the peninsula and for addressing the overhanging issue of denuclearization. Notably, both parties strongly assert their rights as Koreans to take leadership in this task.

What Will Success at the Inter-Korean Summit Look Like?

HTML by Anastasia O. Barannikova, English edits by Charles Knight, The Diplomat, 24 April 2018.
 

“Much will depend on U.S. readiness to negotiate and its willingness to adapt to the changing international conditions in northeast Asia. With an improvement of U.S.-North Korea relations, tensions in the region will not disappear, but instability will be more manageable and there will be less risk of a war engulfing Korea and beyond.”

A Russian Perspective On Korean Denuclearization

an interview with Anastasia O. Barannikova by Charles Knight, Lobe Log, 18 March 2018. HTML

“In the past periods of temporary normalization of relations, the two Koreas separately and jointly tried to promote denuclearization initiatives. Many people across the globe have mistakenly thought about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as only pertaining to nuclear disarmament of North Korea. But what about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea [withdrawn in 1991], the inclusion of nuclear weapons in joint exercises, and the nuclear umbrella guarantee extended to South Korea by the U.S. ever since the Korean War? A nation that enjoys (or suffers from) such nuclear-umbrella guarantees does not qualify as “non-nuclear.” From this perspective, South Korea has long been nuclear, and it was the U.S. that first made the Korean peninsula nuclear.”

Reality Check on North Korea. How can the U.S. stop this march to war with North Korea? Open our eyes.

➪ see full post:  PDF   HTML

by Charles Knight, U.S.News & World Report, 20 February 2018.

“North Korea is most likely to agree to verifiable arms limitations if there is a credible path for them to significantly improve their national security, end sanctions and achieve international political normalcy, including ultimately diplomatic recognition from the U.S.
“This is a rare moment in international relations when the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea have a common interest in limiting the further development of North Korea’s nuclear force. Every reasonable avenue should be explored for making common cause to prevent war while also achieving a realistic degree of limitations on North Korea’s nuclear and missile arms.”

8 Key findings regarding the Korea nuclear arms crisis from recent discussions with experts in China, Russia and Korea

by Charles Knight, Center for International Policy, 02 February 2018. ➪ read full post  PDF

Most interlocutors thought that there is almost no chance that the presently stringent sanctions can force the DPRK to agree to disarm. The Chinese and the Russians generally believe that the maximal concession that sanctions can win from the DPRK is an agreement to freeze their warhead and missile development — particularly inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development — in return for some combination of confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and progress toward political normalization. The North Koreans will not give up the nuclear weapons they already have… at least not until there is permanent peace on the peninsula and the US is no longer understood to be an enemy.

Obama Getting Ready to Reduce Nukes: A Step in the Right Direction

➪ HTML by Charles Knight, Huffington Post, 28 February 2013. As the deployed force gets smaller it makes sense to reduce the complexity of the force structure. There is nothing magic about the triad created at the height of the Cold War. PDA has argued for moving to a dyad made up of submarines and land-based ICBMs. Ending the strategic nuclear role of bombers would reduce the requirement for (and the cost of) the new bomber currently in development and also allow the remaining bomber fleet to more effectively focus on a conventional role.

Ideas, Homework, and Message – a testament to Randall Forsberg’s contribution to disarmament

by Charles Knight, Common Dreams, 14 January 2008.  ➪ HTML

Randall “Randy” Watson Forsberg was best known as the creator of the proposal for a Nuclear Freeze, an idea that blossomed into a movement in the early 1980s. In today’s political culture, she would be thought of as a great messenger.  What made Forsberg’s message powerful is its foundation in rigorous research and analysis.

Arms Control in an Age of Strategic and Military Revolution

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) by Carl Conetta, Presentation to Einstein Forum, Berlin, 15 November 2005. Changes in the nature of warfare, military technology, and the global strategic environment pose new challenges for arms control. The article critically examines new forms of strategic warfare, cyberwar, so-called “precision” conventional warfare, and less lethal weaponry.

Disarming Iraq: What Did the UN Missions Accomplish?

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) by Carl Conetta. PDA Briefing Memo #27, 25 April 2003. A review of the evidence finds that while UN disarmament missions contributed substantially to disarming Iraq and increasing confidence, they also left substantial residual uncertainties. However, the disarmament missions served to tightly constrain Iraq’s WMD capability and undercut its effectiveness and standard military deterrence would have acted to keep this residual threat in check.

Inspecting Iraq: A Record of the First 40 Days

(HTML version) compiled by the Project on Defense Alternatives, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 04 January 2003. With war and peace hanging in the balance, what evidence of prohibited weapons have UN inspectors found in Iraq? This compendium of press reports provides a thorough review of the UNMOVIC inspections through 4 January 2003.

First Strike Guidelines: the case of Iraq

(HTML version) by Charles Knight, PDA Briefing Memo #25, 16 September 2002 (revised and updated 10 March 2003, postscript added 01 March 2004). Assesses how the case of Iraq measures up within a set of guidelines for preemptive counterproliferation developed by the director of the Air Force Counterproliferation Center. Includes extensive notes with links to material relevant to making an informed decision about war. The original 16 September 2002 edition is available in a PDF version and a HTML version.

Asia Pacific Tilts to West: Limit Offensive Weaponry, Boost Arms Control

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, commentary originally published in Defense News, 31 March – 06 April 1997.
➪ HTML

Examines the pattern of military spending in the Asia Pacific region since the Cold War and makes recommendations for U.S. policy. Based on data and analysis from Post-Cold War US Military Expenditure in the Context of World Spending Trends.

Fundamental Design Principles of Confidence-Building Defense

by Carl Conetta and Lutz Unterseher, 1994.  ➪PDF

A selection of slides as prepared for seminars held in Holland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Belarus in 1994. These were used in presentations and included in the seminar briefing book, Confidence-Building Defense: a comprehensive approach to security and stability in the new era.

The seminars were organized and co-sponsored by the Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS) and the Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA).

The principles of Confidence Building Defense remain relevant to the aspirations and strategic interests of nations that have suffered mutual enmity and military standoff and now seek to create the conditions for lasting peace and to reduce the size of their militaries while advancing their essential national security.

Confidence Building Defense

Defensive Restructuring of Ground Forces in Europe – workshop report

rapporteur, Carl Conetta. A workshop co-sponsored by the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies and the RAND Corporation featuring a presentation by Lutz Unterseher, a response by Barry Posen, and participant discussion, Washington, DC, 17 January 1989. ➪ PDF

In his presentation Unterseher warned that unless conventional arms reductions in Europe are combined with defensive reductions, they could actually undermine rather than improve stability by increasing both sides’ vulnerability to surprise attack. Posen agreed but judged that any significant shift toward a SAS-type alternative is not now feasible.  Instead, a step-by-step process of bilateral reductions and restructuring might work.

Joint US-Soviet Seminar on Conventional Arms Reductions in Europe

➪ full-text PDF

by Carl Conetta, Conference Report, in Defense and Disarmament Alternatives, the newsletter of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), January 1989.

Jonathan Dean in MoscowReport on the September 1988 conference, co-hosted by the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), of  Soviet and US arms control and military policy specialists. The report summarizes the exchange regarding problems and prospects for conventional force reductions in Europe.

These meetings happened a little less than two months before President Gorbachev’s historic announcement at the UN in December of 1988 of substantial unilateral reductions and defensive restructuring of Soviet troops in eastern Europe – one of the most significant policy shifts in the process of ending the European Cold War. This international conference likely had more import than most.