And So Now… It’s War?

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, 21 Feb 2022

The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed.

Movement toward resolution begins with recognizing that all sides, all stakeholders share fault for the current crisis. And no side has told the whole truth of it.

Without question, Russian intervention in Ukraine’s civil conflict violates international law. Although Russia has the right to defend itself from attack, this proviso does not apply in the current situation. The annexation of Crimea was illegal, as is Russian intervention in the Donbass. This is indisputable.

Also indisputable is the civil nature of the conflict between Kyiv and the Donbass rebels. Russian intervention on the rebel’s side does not change this. Similarly, the 2014 Euromaidan revolution and regime change has real, indigenous roots – despite the role of Western powers in encouraging it and supporting it politically and financially. This external interference tarnishes but does not de-legitimize the uprising. US and allied interference probably contravened the UN Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States (1965). But the interference was not strictly illegal. And such interference happens all the time. Also, the Ukraine regime change was not a “coup” as some contend – except in the sense that many revolutions end in coup-like transfers of power. The story does not end here, however.

What should also be clear is that the Euromaidan revolution (or regime change) did not represent the whole of the country, which was divided linguistically, politically, and geographically. Moreover, the new regime attempted to revise language laws in ways prejudicial to ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, who constitute almost 1/3 of Ukraine’s population. Finally, the role of extreme ethnic-Ukrainian nationalists in the new order was and is indisputable. Although small in number, they have had an outsized influence on policy and action regarding ethnic Russians and the Donbass conflict. Put simply, the Euromaidan revolution and the new regime are not “pure as the driven snow.”

All things considered, it is not surprising that anti-Euromaidan protests sprang up in the east soon after the Feb 2014 regime change. The eastern oblasts is where ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and electoral supporters of the deposed president were concentrated. With Moscow’s encouragement, the eastern protests evolved by April 2014 into the self-styled Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics”. Almost immediately, acting Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov launched an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) against the eastern rebels. What should have happened was negotiation.

Kyiv’s operation made halting progress for awhile, but the front stabilized after a summer flood of Russian equipment and Russian “volunteers.” (Total rebel strength has been approximately 40,000 fighters plus up to 6,000 Russians.) In April 2018, Kyiv redefined the conflict as one between Ukraine and Russia, essentially rejecting the indigenous roots of the eastern rebellion and claiming the fight to be wholly international in character.

In the 12-15 months following the April onset of the civil conflict 11,000 Ukrainians were killed in fighting. This death toll represents more than 80% of the total 13,000 killed between 2014 and 2021. The very substantial reduction in carnage after mid-2015 was due to the so-called Minsk agreements and the control regime that followed.

As noted above, there were two recent points when positive leadership might have turned the region away from the path of disaster. The first was on February 21, 2014, when negotiations led by European Union mediators and the foreign ministers of Poland, France, Germany succeeded in bringing both opposition leaders and President Yanukovych to sign the “21 February Agreement” (formally “Agreement on Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine“).

Among its provisions, the 21 February Agreement included restoration of the 2004 constitution (which weakened the power of the presidency), formation of a government of national unity, early elections, a new Election Commission and reformed election laws, a block on declaring a state of emergency, and amnesty for the Euromaidan protestors. However, the deal was abruptly cast aside by Euromaidan activists, being vocally opposed by street-level leaders and some nationalist groups (including Right Sector). Subsequently, President Yanukovych fled the country, many of his government and parliamentary supporters recused themselves (to put it mildly), and the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) quickly reshuffled itself. The revised body almost immediately voted to abolish language policies that had given Russian and other minority languages official status in some areas. This was a serious misstep, only blocked a few days later by Ukraine’s acting president,  Oleksandr Turchynov.

The second opportunity to avert disaster was the signing of the Minsk II Protocol in Feb 2015, which pledges autonomy for the rebel areas and also requires the “withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine” and the “disarmament of all illegal groups.” Its provisions were soon affirmed and reinforced by UN Security Council Resolution 2202 (The Resolution here also appends the provisions confirmed by the Security Council).

As already noted, the protocol’s cease-fire provisions had the effect of very substantially reducing violence. For this reason, it continues to earn verbal praise from all-sides, even while some stall or seek to exit other provisions of the agreement. Unfortunately, over the course of six years, there has been little progress fulfilling the political aspects of the agreement. And now the rebel forces seem to be intent on exiting the deal’s cease-fire provisions. (Moscow and the rebel leaders insist that Ukrainian government forces started the recent escalation, but such a provocation seems unlikely given the massive Russian force arrayed along Ukraine’s borders ready to strike.)

Current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has sought to rewrite the agreement since early last year. The critical provisions now refused by Kyiv are those granting rebel areas a significant degree of autonomy; This is the reason the rebels fight. And, as it turns out, none of the western sponsors of the agreement (France and Germany), nor the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that oversaw it, nor those western nations sitting on the UN Security Council (which had affirmed it), seem willing to push hard for the agreement’s full implementation. These powers certainly have the leverage needed to ensure implementation. Of course, this reality has not been lost on Moscow, which sees key provisions of the agreement hanging in abeyance while Kyiv stumps for fast-tracking NATO membership and Ukraine receives arms and training from the USA and other NATO countries.

What has changed since 2014 is the willingness of the USA and some other NATO countries to tempt war in order to undo those aspects of Minsk II that might inhibit the full and uncompromised incorporation of Ukraine into western institutions and the US/NATO sphere. Zelenskyy appreciates this and is acting accordingly. Both he and the Biden administration hope that Moscow will back down in the face of Washington’s threats. Apart from this, Ukrainian state and military leaders may hope to gain increasing support from the west, even if NATO membership remains a distant prospect.

What Zelenskyy may not appreciate is that the United States can gain strategically even if Russia further occupies Ukraine in whole or part. Such a move would cost Russia dearly, revive NATO, increase European dependence on American military power, and gain broader adherence to the foreign policy framework that Washington currently advances: “strategic competition” or “great power competition.” Of course, this would be cold comfort for a devastated, occupied Ukraine.

For its part, Moscow’s willingness to tempt war over Ukraine has been clear ever since it annexed Crimea. It lost out to the USA in the contest to shape Ukraine’s governance, purportedly worries about the fate of Ukraine’s Russian communities, and resists the loss of both economic and military connections. But central to its concern has been the 25-year march of NATO toward its borders. The absorption of Ukraine would be the culminating point of NATO expansion. It would give the alliance a 1400 mile border with Russia.

Washington insists that NATO poses no threat to Russia, even should it press up against its borders. But such assertions are themselves disquieting. They evince a not credible ignorance of the inherent nature of military power and alliances, the long and continuing history of tense US-Russia relations, the permeability of borders to all sorts of unwanted influences, and the proclivity of several NATO alliance members for regime change efforts.

While Moscow insists that the USA and NATO take its security interests into account, Washington says there is no room in a “rule-based” world order for considerations of Realpolitik. True, there is nothing in international law, formal or customary, that flatly prohibits the expansion of military alliances. Of course, this view underrates the persistence of power politics in the practice of nations, including America’s. There is wisdom and usefulness in taking a Realist reading of conflict situations and their broader ramifications.

Practically, what does the United States hope to gain by pushing NATO up to Russia’s borders when the effort risks sparking conflict between nuclear great powers and is certain to deepen and perpetuate East-West contention? Consider: It may be that stability, cooperation, and the rule of law all depend on reaching some sort of underlying condominium among great powers with regard to their core security interests.

Fortunately, the second opportunity to avert disaster mentioned above has not yet been foreclosed – and it accords with the “rule of law.” In the recent exchange of US-Russia security proposals a minimum Russian requirement is evident. While Russia has raised a broad variety of security concerns and demands, its Feb 17 statement emphasizes the importance of Minsk II implementation to de-escalating the Ukraine standoff. And implementation of the agreement in accord with UN Security Council Resolution 2202 (2015) would in no sense upset the rule of law. Quite the contrary. But the pivotal question may be less legalistic than practical:

Is it harder to live with autonomy for the Ukrainian rebel areas than it is to face regional war?