Carl Conetta, 26 Sept 2024
Speaking to the Security Council on Sept 25, 2024, Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin asserted that “Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state… supported by a nuclear power should be treated as their joint attack.” What’s the implication of this?
Putin’s proposition simply raises the threat potential that he attributes to the Ukraine war. Asserting a critical linkage to a nuclear state supposedly increases the existential valence of the war. Of course, he has called it a “proxy war” before, but now he’s emphasizing that the involvement of a nuclear-weapon state lowers the threshold for nuclear use...in some new ways, as noted below.
Putin also said a nuclear response would be considered if Moscow receives “reliable information” about a “massive” missile, drone, or piloted aircraft strike against Russia or Belarus. What’s more, he declared that nuclear weapons might be used to blunt a “critical threat to either states’ sovereignty [even] through the use of conventional weapons” alone. This latter proposition is not actually new.
Existing doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons in several cases of conventional attack – not only existential challenges, but also those seeking to blunt Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capacity. (A relevant question: Does part of that retaliatory capacity now reside in Belarus?)
What’s not clear and demands clarification is, first, whether “reliable information” of a massive aerial attack will by the very fact of its perceived “massiveness” be taken to possible warrant a nuclear response even if the enemy may be using conventional means only? In other words, Putin may be warning: don’t attempt a massive conventional aerial attack because while underway it will be treated as a challenge to Russian nuclear retaliatory capacity or sovereignty – a challenge worthy of a nuclear riposte.
A second needed clarification pertains to whether a “massive” aerial attack launched by Ukraine alone might likewise warrant a nuclear response by virtue of its “massiveness” and the Ukraine-NATO link. This is a lower threshold for use than understood previously. Of course, if this is what Putin is implying, the fact of his saying it doesn’t necessarily make it more than another weak red line. Not necessarily. Ukraine has previously attacked Russia with well-over 100 drones simultaneously. What response would a much larger attack bring – especially if employing NATO ground-based missiles and F16-launched NATO-built cruise missiles?
