War? Only If We Want It
Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, 26 Jan 2022.
Anatol Lieven offers a way out of the current impasse in Ukraine: The Most Dangerous Problem in the World. Essentially, he reviews the 2015 Minsk II agreement, how implementation might have averted the current crisis, and the roadblocks to its implementation. But it remains relevant and it points to an exit from the crisis. Drawing on Lieven’s analysis, here is my view and prescription:
The current crisis began with disagreement on how to proceed with the Minsk II Protocol. The issue was the sequencing of its steps and how this affected reversibility. Of course, the 2018 adoption by the Ukrainian parliament of a law on “Ensuring Ukraine’s State Sovereignty over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions” didn’t help. It sidestepped the Minsk agreement, redefined the conflict as one purely between Ukraine and Russia, and it privileged a military solution. More than sidestepping the agreement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has sought to exit and revise the hard won agreement since late 2019 – and, more recently, in April 2021. And why?
The “problem” generally was that the Protocol lends some legitimacy to both sides. Quarrelsome, perhaps, to both sides, but a modicum of mutual respect and the practice of quid pro quo is the essence of diplomacy. (So, the “problem” is actually the formula for a solution – that is, diplomacy.) Now, practically or politically the problem is the Ukrainian parliament’s refusal to go forward with a change to the constitution allowing autonomy for the Donbass region – at least, not until after Kiev has regained control of the region and of the border with Russia. However, on the Russian and rebel side, this approach makes the promised autonomy too easily reversible. Tuesday’s vote can undo Monday’s.
How to move forward? The first step is for benefactors on all sides to motivate progress. The United States, EU, and Russia should initiate a joint effort making all aid to Kiev and to the eastern rebels contingent on near-term compliance with Minsk II.
Some provisions of Minsk II are easily reversible, others less so. Begin with the easily reversible provisions which at least can serve as confidence-building measures. Pivotal among these is a change to the Ukrainian constitution allowing for the autonomy of the Donbass region within a federated Ukraine. While this could be quickly undone, the involvement of outside sponsors should give some confidence that the measure will not be reversed unless other elements of the Protocol are violated. The next steps would be to demilitarize the Donbass and supplant both Russian and Ukrainian troops with a large contingent of European peacekeepers. These also would gain control of the region’s borders. Subsequently, local elections could be held under the supervision of outside monitors.
Here’s the hitch:
Allowing for true Donbass autonomy within a future federated Ukraine accepts that the 2014 regime-change did not represent a large portion of the country and that the way forward grants both sides legitimacy. It might also imply, although not necessarily, that the international community accepts that if the division of the country resulted from outside intervention, the intervention came from *both* east and west. Finally, this solution might preclude NATO membership for Ukraine – and not because Moscow would object. Also, a stable solution would probably necessitate some sort of EU-Russia accommodation on economic relations with Ukraine. Overall, the result could advance cooperation between east and west rather than war, hot or cold.