Carl Conetta, 4 Feb 2026
Summary Excerpts from “The Ukraine War Prospect: How Peace Plans Might Work and Why They Will Fail,” Project on Defense Alternatives, 12 Jan 2026
Throughout 2025, the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine advanced various ceasefire and peace proposals. Pres Trump proposed simple unconditional ceasefire plans early in the year. These were followed by US, European, and Ukrainian comprehensive peace proposals (and counter proposals) in November and December. (The main proposals are summarized here)
None of these proposals put ending the war forthwith as its primary goal, however. And none corresponded to the battlefield and strategic realities of the war. Rather than suggesting reality-based compromises, they were either veiled efforts for partisan victory outcomes or, in the case of Trump’s November proposal, a pretext for America to simply exit the war. All exemplify “diplo-fare”- war by means of diplomacy. Most share the aim of painting one’s opponent as intransigent and, in this way, boost home support for continuing the fight. But what should be the primary concern is something else.
The Russia-Ukraine war has become a disaster for the world – a consumptive Pyrrhic conflict that has so far claimed 300,000 Ukrainian and Russian lives as well as claiming that many lives again outside the conflict zone due to its knock on effects. These realities underpin the imperative to end the war forthwith by negotiated compromise.
A pivotal fact driving the conflict is that state managers on both sides see existential interests at risk. For Kyiv, it is obviously a fight for national sovereignty, Western alignment, and preservation of the Maiden revolution. For Moscow, it is a fight to preserve defensive depth, rebuff the encroachment of an adversarial military alliance, block regime-change efforts, and preserve its status as a regional hegemon and global power.
The type of proposal that would least excite existential fears and reflexes on all sides is a simple ceasefire – somewhat like the ones proposed by President Trump early last year, but with a critical difference. Trump’s unconditional ceasefire initiative was a non-starters because it failed to take into account current battlefield and sustainment realities, which were strongly trending against Ukraine. For this reason, the proposal was partisan; It benefited Kyiv more than Moscow. Intentionally or not, it was a move within war, not against it.
Putin cited these factors when he rhetorically asked if Ukraine would use the ceasefire period “to continue forced mobilization, get weapons supplies, and prepare its mobilized units?” Of course, free to do so, it would. So could Moscow. But Ukraine needed the breather badly and Russia did not – quite the contrary: A ceasefire would take the wind out of Russia’s advance. In this light, the way forward would be to compensate Moscow for its loss of momentum and initiative, directly or indirectly. Certainly a distasteful choice for Kyiv, but better than losing ground and lives under fire while short on troops and supplies.
A Realistic Ceasefire Proposal would:
- Freeze the Russian line while moving the Ukrainian line back 15 km, creating a demilitarized zone as large as any that Moscow might hope to occupy in the near future.
- Insert neutral observers – not US or other NATO member troops – in the zone and bring it under air surveillance
- Lift all sanctions and blockades for the duration of the ceasefire; Open the Dnieper River to Ukrainian commercial traffic. In this way, incentivize a ceasefire.
For the Ukrainian side surrendering even a small slice of space will be onerous after such a costly fight against aggression. But its armed forces need time, material replenishment, and relief from fire.
On the Russian side, surrendering momentum may seem exceptionally imprudent after such a costly confrontation. Moreover, for Moscow a pivotal goal – the full capture of four provinces – may feel within reach given mounting difficulties on the Ukrainian side. On the other hand, the progress of Russian forces has been agonizingly slow and costly. And the prospect of the USA remaining in the fight due to Russian intransigence favors acceptance.
The lifting of Russian sanctions, even temporarily, would counter-balance the revival and re-stocking of Ukrainian units during negotiations, although it might be additionally necessary to briefly pause external Ukrainian supplies until Russian sanction relief takes hold. Keep in mind that the pause for resupply is critical for Kyiv’s effort, not Moscow’s. In this light, the temporary lifting of some sanctions would serve to counter-balance Kyiv’s critical sustainment relief. And what matters is when relief is felt on both sides; Simultaneous relief (or as close as reasonably possible) would seem most neutral.
Even if this proposed conditional ceasefire is accepted by both sides, moving forward to the type of comprehensive solutions demanded by Putin and envisioned by the November and December plans seems unlikely. However, the conditional ceasefire proposal just outlined might form the foundation for a truncated but stable longer-term agreement too.
Elements of a Stable Long-term Ceasefire would include:
- Freeze the front line where it stands; Implement a small buffer zone and surveil it, as above.
- Each contestant may claim the areas occupied by Russian troops as rightfully their own, but major powers East and West would agree that sovereignty is to be finally decided by peaceful negotiation between the contestants. In the meantime all would recognize that the area in dispute is being administered by Russia, which is not to be challenged by force.
- A balanced coalition of the powers (including the USA and China) would guarantee the arrangement, pledging to oppose a return to war by either party.
- In all other respects, nations and international institutions will unconditionally restore normal relations, including the lifting of all sanctions and blockades
- Both sides would proceed with reconstruction and revitalization of the areas under their supervision and joint or divided work on shared infrastructure. The immobilized assets of the Russian National Wealth Fund and Central Bank would be freed for reconstruction of the areas under Russian administration and for the Russian share of joint work. This allocation need not be designated as a “penalty” – what matters is the allocation, not what it is called.
- NATO or leading NATO members including the USA would guarantee and declare that the question of Ukraine’s future NATO membership is tabled and moot until the sovereignty of Russian occupied areas is settled by agreement between the contestants. The contestants may also address the issue of NATO membership directly as part of their negotiations.
It is presumed that final agreement on the disposition of the occupied areas might never occur, and that these areas might remain under Russian administration in perpetuity. Such a state would also preclude NATO membership for Ukraine.
Notably, this proposal incorporates some ideas first advanced by Ukraine in the Istanbul Communiqué (March/April 2022) – namely that the final status of the occupied areas be deferred. It also draws on US policy regarding the dispute between Japan and China over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands. In that case, the USA considers the conflicting claims to be a matter for the two parties to resolve while recognizing that Japan currently administers the islands. Moreover, the USA opposes any attempt to settle the matter unilaterally or by force, and considers Japan’s administration of the islands to be covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty.
The Senkaku/Diaoyudao framework has been essentially in place since 1972 – more than 50 years. And, make no mistake, the application of this framework to the Russia-Ukraine dispute would not likely lead to a resolution of the dispute unless one or both parties undergo substantial governmental change.
Complicating factors: How this war might actually end
Weighing against the pressure for a ceasefire anytime soon is the hope that America or Europe may dramatically increase their support for Ukraine. For Zelenskyy, this prospect is key to his resisting the pressure to settle, regardless of current battlefield realities. Uncertainty regarding potential outside intervention or support makes it hard to discern a “good deal” in peace negotiations.
Given Ukraine’s personnel and sustainment crises, Putin may hope to secure his territorial objectives (and something more) within a year or so. And there is a fair likelihood that the Ukrainian front may face an operational collapse in the next 15-18 months. Also, Ukraine’s economy is on continuous life support. That said, would the West allow the Ukraine prospect to simply collapse? Western rhetoric, sunk costs, and political commitments suggest not.
European public opinion is running against spending more on the war; Already $400 billion in Western aid has been diverted to support the fight and care for refugees. And there is both public and official concern about escalatory dynamics. At the extreme, there is concern that direct Western involvement might spark a regional war with associated nuclear risks. Short of that, Russia has considerable potential to boost its own efforts in response to increased international support for Ukraine. Indeed, Russia could more than double its war effort in terms of personnel and defense expenditure without suffering half the economic and personnel pressure that Ukraine has endured for four years. So the prospective result of increased Western involvement might be, at best, a stalemate at a higher level of spending and destruction.
Nonetheless, should an operational fracture of the Ukrainian front seem likely, European security policy managers will be inclined to substantially boost support. In addition to a surge in material provisions, this might involve anti-missile and anti-drone operations conducted from or over Western territory, the increased presence of foreign “volunteer” units in Ukraine, or Western troops entering the country to take up non-combat support roles. Direct combat intervention is also possible; Although controversial, this option is being routinely ventilated in public.
Direct intervention by a subset of European powers – the Coalition of the Willing – might aim to form a passive but strong defensive line in western Ukraine some distance from the Russian front. In that case this war might “end” with a standoff inside Ukraine between Russian forces and a coalition of Ukrainian and select European powers – a new East-West “central front” frozen by the risk of regional and possibly nuclear war. Should it happen, this recreation of the past in miniature would testify to the failure of the post-Cold War order, its architects and practices.
