Carl Conetta

By Carl Conetta, 7 Nov 2017; updated 25 Oct 2020

Expanded excerpt from “Disappearing the Dead: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Idea of a ‘New Warfare,’ 18 February 2004 (pdf).

Even given perfect intelligence and accuracy, most guided weapons in the 500- to 2000-lb range are sufficiently powerful to routinely cause some degree of collateral damage. This, because they carry hundreds of pounds of enhanced high-explosives wrapped in hundreds of pounds of steel – an obvious point, but one that has been too often occluded or overlooked.

A 2,000-lb bomb typically contains 945 pounds of tritonal, a TNT derivative that is about 20 percent more powerful than TNT. By comparison, the bomb that destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995, comprised approximately 5,000 pounds of ammonia nitrate mixed with fuel oil — the equivalent of nearly 4,000 pounds of TNT. The portable devices used by suicide bombers typically weigh between 10 and 35 pounds; these can carry a punch equivalent to 40 pounds of TNT if a plastic explosive (C-4) is used.

Most everything will be severely damaged, injured, destroyed, or killed within 20 meters of a 500-lb bomb blast and 35 meters of a 2000-lb blast. This lethal radius can be partly mitigated by detonation inside a large, compartmentalized building – however, as a Rand study points out: “While structures surely have some shielding effect, building collapse and spalling are secondary yet major causes of injury.” (pdf)

Averaged across different types of surfaces, a 2000-lb bomb will carve a crater 50 feet across and 16 feet deep; a 500-lb bomb will carve one 25 feet across and 8.5 feet deep. The probability of incapacitating injury to unprotected troops within 100 meters of a 2000-lb bomb blast in the open is 83 percent; for those between 100 and 200 meters it is 55 percent. (pdf)

Safe distances for unprotected troops are approximately 1,000 meters for 2000-lb bombs and 500 meters for 500-lb ones. Even protected troops are not entirely safe within 240 meters of a 2,000-lb bomb or 220 meters of a 500-lb bomb. [For sources and more information on blast effects see the note at bottom.]

It is considered bold for a combat controller to bring down a strike within 800 meters of his/her position, and the 2001 Afghan strike that killed eight coalition troops and injured Hamid Karzai and 20 others is attributed to a JDAM hit within 100 meters of their position.  Commenting on the Karzai incident Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem of the Joint Staff rightly described the 2000-lb JDAM as a “devastating weapon”, adding that, “As a pilot, when I would drop a 2,000-lb weapon, I wanted at least 4,000 feet of separation from that weapon when it went off.” This distance would put an aircraft just beyond the reach of shrapnel and flying debris.

The brute destructive power of these weapons is not ancillary to the recent success of so-called precision attack, but central to it. A critical threshold in the development of US capabilities was passed when improvements in accuracy and precision helped insure that 50% or more of the weapons dropped would hit close enough to their targets so that the latter would be encompassed by the weapon’s destructive footprint. Of course, the area of deadly destruction is not small, but large – more than a acre for 2000-lb bomb. And this big footprint is pivotal to the success of “precision weapons.” An appropriate analogy is not a sharpshooter’s rifle shot, but a well-aimed double-barreled scatter gun firing a hail of slugs. In a sense, “precision” depends on which end of the weapon’s trajectory one sits.

Also relevant to the impact of “precision warfare” is the sheer number of bombs used since 2001: more than 70,000 in Afghanistan and more than 150,000 in Iraq and Syria (US munitions only). (See note at bottom for sources of bombing totals.)

It is certainly true that improvements in the accuracy and precision of air-dropped munitions has greatly reduced the numbers of aircraft and weapons required to destroy targets. Compared to bombing efforts during the Vietnam war era, it might take only 1/8 as many aircraft and 2% as many weapons to destroy a target today. A corollary of this is a capacity to significantly reduce the extent of death and destruction collateral to a bombing run. But capacity doesn’t necessarily determine actual outcomes, measured broadly. Several other variables weigh in:

(1) Does improved targeting lower the threshold for going to war and, thus, increase the frequency of wars and aggregate war fatalities?

(2) Does improved targeting encourage attacks on targets that carry a greater inherent or baseline risk of substantial collateral death and destruction? That is, do advanced air forces spend down “improved safety” by attacking less safe targets? And,

(3) Does improved targeting better enable attackers to comprehensively collapse an enemy nation’s government and critical infrastructure, producing fatal chaos on a wide scale.

The answer to all three queries is “yes” – and this upends the mystique of so-called “precision warfare.” America’s post-9/11 wars have not been low casualty events. To address the questions posed above in turn:

(1) Since the end of the Cold War, the USA has conduced air campaigns, some protracted, in a dozen nations – all outside the context of superpower contention, none involving existential threats, and most with only tenuous, remote, or indirect connection (if any) to attacks on US assets. Counter-terrorism efforts, once the province of discrete Special Operations units, have become a major employer of guided bombs in large quantities.

(2) Hubris, complex environments, and the fog of war have led to numerous, deadly “precision strikes” on wrong targets including attacks in residential neighborhoods, city centers, crowded towns, and government complexes resulting in many hundreds of civilian dead. Also mistakenly hit were mosques, hospital complexes, refugee encampments, farm workers, wedding parties, and even a neutral foreign embassy – this latter with potential strategic consequences. None of these strikes might have been attempted except for undue confidence in the promise of “precision warfare.”

(3) By any measure, US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan relied more on guided-weapons than ever before, quickly disintegrating governments in both places. And yet the product of these rapid victories was humanitarian crisis and chronic chaos. The same is true for operations in Libya, which have fed conflict across the Sahel. Indeed, with the partial exception of the mid-1990s intervention in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, none of America’s post-Cold War military operations produced conditions of reliable stability or security. As for the cost in lives of the war and chaos unleashed by “precision” victory: 160,000 dead in Afghanistan and 300,000 dead in Iraq – and still counting. This is the standard by which precision warfare should be judged.

Sources on blast effects and safe distances:

• FM 3-09.31 Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander (Fort Sill, OK: US Army Field Artillery School, 1 Oct 2003), “Appendix D: CAS Capabilities and Limitations”
• Close Air Support Newsletter No. 98-13 (Fort Leavenworth KS: US Army Combined Arms Center Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1998), “Appendix B: NTC CAS ROE”
• Vernon Loeb, “An Unlikely Super-Warrior Emerges in Afghan War; U.S. Combat Controllers Guide Bombers to Precision Targets,” Washington Post, 19 May 2002
• David Wood, “New Workhorse of US Military: A Bomb With Devastating Effects,” Newhouse News Service, 12 March 2003.

On blast effects also see:

• Explosive Weapon Effects Overview (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Feb 2017)
• Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: Technical considerations relevant to their use and effects (West Perth, Australia: Armament Research Services, May 2016)
• Areas of Harm: Understanding explosive weapons with wide area effects (London: Article 36; Utrecht: PAX, 2016)

US Bombing Data, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria – 2001-2020:

•  “Air Power Summaries,” US Air Forces Central, HQ, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina (accessed 25 Oct 2020)
• Combined Forces Air Component Commander, 2007-2010 Airpower Statistics (Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina: USAFCENT Public Affairs Directorate, 30 Aug 2010)
• Anthony H. Cordesman, US Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2007 (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 Dec 2007). PDF
• Operation Iraqi Freedom – By The Numbers (Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina: USCENTAF Assessment and Analysis Division, 30 Apr 2003)
• Carl Conetta, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties,” Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #13 (Cambridge MA: 24 Jan 2002)

By Carl Conetta, 19 Jan 2018

• JCS Chair Gen James Mattis, Summary of the US National Defense Strategy (Washington DC: US DOD, 2018) (pdf)
• USNI News, “Mattis Unveils New ‘Lethal’ National Defense Strategy Focused on Great Power Competition,” 19 Jan 2018.

It’s no surprise that, given the dominant role of military professionals in the Trump administration, DOD would craft an overweening “defense” strategy, guaranteed to pour fuel on the fires it perceives (and misperceives). In key respects it harkens back to the conceits of Dick Cheney’s 1992 Defense Guidance document, which have percolated just below the surface of Pentagon strategies ever since.

Some critical comments on the new strategy:

A central innovation is putting military contention with Russia and China at the center of US defense strategy: “The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition by… revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model…” Actually, neither Russia nor China base their foreign policy on crusades to alter the political-economic vision of other nations worldwide. However, both are more assertive than 10 years ago and their armed forces, more capable. But their military objectives have been limited in scope – partly aiming to push back against US and allied activity and advances over the past 20 years (albeit both of them transgressing intl law along the way).

The renewed centrality of the “rogue state” concept (applied explicitly to North Korea and Iran) is similarly consequential. It’s a framework that helps constrict the resort to normal diplomatic relations and means, while also sanctioning increased emphasis on coercion in dealing with these states who are judged to sit outside the law. And, of course, whether the US names nations as “revisionist powers” or “rogue states,” their central place in US military strategy creates an adversarial relationship as much as it simply recognizes one. US defense strategy is now avowedly about military confrontation with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Also noteworthy is increased focus of US military efforts on challenges in non-military domains: “Revisionist powers and rogue regimes are using corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxies, and the threat or use of military force to change facts on the ground.” The intention to escalate military ripostes to perceived non-military challenges is also evident in the new draft US nuclear posture, which implies possible nuclear responses to strategic cyber-assaults.

The strategy names the erosion of the “post-WWII international order” as a key concern. Of course, it sees the USA (and, specifically, US military power) as key in defending that order (and on a global scale). Naturally, the document elides the ways in which the USA has contributed to the weakening of that order and the abuse of it, through unilateral uses of force, military support for repressive governments, and expansion of exclusive military alliances. Indeed, the strategy downplays what should be the foundation stone of that order – the United Nations – substituting for it America’s network of regional alliances.

The strategy frets the erosion of America’s military edge, observing that “for decades the USA has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain is contested.” The sense of privilege apparent in this aspiration to employ forceful instruments everywhere unencumbered helps explain why others should challenge it. US military practice over the past 27 years has encouraged others to narrow the gap and helped legitimate their similar practices. America’s unusual margin of superiority – a singular consequence of Soviet collapse – was bound to recede as Russia recovered economically and the global balance of economic power shifted. Only a world order based on inclusive cooperation might have produced a different outcome. Today, nothing better represents unrealistic revisionist dreaming than does the Pentagon’s desire to regain uncontested superiority. It’s neither possible, nor necessary for US security.

The strategy reaffirms a set of hegemonic goals that are breathtaking in scope. It advances an imperative to “maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere” – a goal that implies that US security is contingent on America involving itself as a contestant in all the world’s regional power struggles. Let’s hope that other great powers don’t also see their security as contingent on hegemony. For the USA, the strategy says that this goal requires the Pentagon to (i) Expand Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships; (ii) Fortify the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance; (iii) Form enduring coalitions in the Middle East; (iv) Sustain advantages in the Western Hemisphere; (v) Support relationships to address significant terrorist threats in Africa. Is that all?

It’s not surprising that the strategy should rest on the hoary notion that “the surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.” This is boilerplate for Pentagon strategy docs – but also seriously ill-conceived. The “surest way” is not necessarily a realistic or achievable way; We could weaken or even bankrupt ourselves in the process of “being prepared” if our goals and commitments are unbounded. And is it really the “surest way”? Let’s restate the proposition: “The surest way to prevent war is to engage in open-ended arms races with all the potential competitors we can imagine worldwide.” This, I think, can only guarantee the opposite of what it intends.

by Carl Conetta, 1 July 2017

Although Duterte had a reputation as an effective (if crude) mayor of Davos, he began his 2016 campaign with no strong political base outside his home island of Mindanao. He lacked the support of either a major political party or a substantial chunk of the Philippine oligarchy (outside Mindanao, at least). His electoral coalition was a hodge-podge of smaller, mostly conservative-nationalist formations but also religious groups and some leftists.

His own party, the Philippine Democratic Party, had a history of strong anti-Marcos activism and nationalism, having been the platform for Cory Aquino’s election in 1986, but having since dwindled to a small regional formation. Duterte gained some broader left-wing support based on his relationship with the former leader of Philippines Communist Party, his self-description as a socialist (which he is not), his ‘common man’ image, and his pledge to seek peace with communist and Moro insurgents.

So how did he win? Image, issues, and social media were key. Those three ingredients plus a bump from social movements and a Filipino majority disenchanted with recent ruling parties won him the election.

The Duterte campaign relied on social media to build a “coalition of the aggrieved” by hammering at a range of salient issues: crime, drug use, urban congestion, underdeveloped infrastructure, exploitation of contract workers, the dominance of urban over agricultural areas, and the domination of ‘imperial” Manila/Luzon over other cites and islands. This occurred in a context where years of economic growth had delivered nothing to the poor and little to the middle-classes, also a context in which crime was rampant and infrastructure dilapidated despite economic growth.

Against the elite and well-spoken reformism of previous parties, Duterte campaigned as a ‘doer,’ a law and order candidate, a son of the poor, and a nationalist (in a political context where nationalism had a leftist anti-colonial appeal).

Once he won, legislators poured into his party. Some social movements had more-or-less supported him, and he rewarded them by giving four cabinet portfolios to leftists. But his economic program? It’s strictly neo-liberal with social programs added. He aims to create a more friendly business environment for both domestic and foreign capital, while also promising to direct more government spending to urban and rural infrastructure, education, healthcare, social protection, and job training.

Bibliography:
• Mong Palatino, “Is the Philippines’ Duterte Really a Leftist?”, The Diplomat, 02 May 2017.
• Malcolm Cook and Lorraine Salazar1, “The Differences Duterte Relied Upon to Win” (pdf), ISEAS Perspective (Singapore: Yusof Ishak Institute, 22 Jun 2016).
• Julio C. Teehankee, “Duterte’s Resurgent Nationalism in the Philippines: A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis,”  The Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs (1 Dec 2016).
• Pierre Rousset, “The left currents in the Philippines and the Duterte presidency” (Eurioe Solidaire Sans Frontieres, 25 Sep 2016).

By Carl Conetta, 21 Dec 2015

The current [2015] war hysterics began years ago, 2011 – soon after Congress turned to cap discretionary spending. Successive Pentagon leaders began warning that rolling back the DoD budget to the level of 2008 or 2009 (inflation adjusted) would have devastating, even catastrophic effects on the US military. It would make America weaker and inhibit our ability to respond to threats (SecDef Hagel), hasten instability in Asia and put “the nation at greater risk of coercion” (JCS Chair Gen. Dempsey), and even invite aggression (SecDef Panetta). Various leaders, democratic and republican, began seeing Hitler reincarnated in the form of Putin, Assad, or both. In ISIS they saw an apocalyptic threat “unlike anything we’ve seen” (Hagel). And many worried aloud about a new American isolationism. (For sources, see A Short Tour of Pentagon Hysterics.)

From every direction, the warnings came. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper: “In almost 50 years in intelligence, I don’t remember when we’ve had a more diverse array of threats and crisis situations around the world to deal with.” Others concurred: The global security environment is “more dangerous than it has ever been” (Gen. Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs), it’s “the most uncertain I’ve seen in my thirty-six years of service” (Gen. Odierno, Army Chief of Staff), there’s “greater turmoil than at any time in my lifetime” (Sen. John McCain).

No wonder Americans are worried. Well, ISIS is real enough as is the Syrian civil war, Russian actions in Ukraine, and Chinese assertiveness in the South China Seas. But are they exceptional and indicative of a world gone wild? (Here, I argue that what’s exceptional today are domestic partisan political dynamics.)

The crises represented today as unprecedented are anything but. The emergence and spread of ISIS and Boko Haram, for instance, recall the Taliban both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It also recalls the Iraqi insurgency and communal slaughter of 2004-2009. And the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah (1985). The foreign fighter phenomenon is not new, nor is the practice of militant groups seeking to affiliate with their more successful analogs. It’s true that ISIS uniquely stages its atrocities for maximum media exposure. But this does not make them qualitatively more threatening then were their Iraqi precursors (both Sunni and Shia) or the Taliban or Al Qaeda (which, after all, struck hard at America several times). The terrorist attacks in Paris were horrific, but they mirror attacks in Europe during the 2000’s: the 2005 London bombing and the 2004 Madrid train bombing (which together claimed 243 lives and injured 2,750).

Perspective is also due in weighing the Syrian civil war, the wars in Sub-Saharan Africa, and recent Russian and Chinese behavior. The Syrian conflict replays Iraq, Afghanistan, Algeria (1992-99), Chechnya (1991-2009), Lebanon (1975-90), Somalia (1988-present), Sri Lanka (1983-2009), Sudan (2003-09), Tajikistan (1992-96), the former Yugoslavia (1992-1999), and Yemen (1994-present). Today’s civil wars in East, West, and Central Africa recall the much worse conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s. Overall, conflict deaths are down from the 1965-1998 period. And, although conflict deaths have jagged somewhat upwards in recent years, this is mostly due to conflict in one place: Syria

Recent Russian and Chinese actions of concern also have their near equivalents in the not distant past: Russia in Georgia (2008), China and the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, and recurrent Taiwan Straits crises. The rise (or resurgence) of Russia and China are not new. They’ve been underway for 17 years.

Any argument for the especially dire state of the world today must also take into account the cyclical crises involving North Korea, India-Pakistan, and Israel that dot the past 20 years. Of course, none of today’s interstate wars compare with those of the 1980s.

Two concluding points: 1. The 1990-2010 period of US unipolar dominance is now ending, as it was bound to end; it was exceptional. This is hard for official Washington to countenance. 2. While hawks and the defense establishment always argue that US restraint leads to global instability, they are blind to the possibility that US military activism contributes to instability that reverberates for years to come. In fact, we are today living in the backwash of our post-9/11 wars.

By Carl Conetta, 21 Dec 2015

There’s ample global storm and stress these days, and the cries of alarm will get worse over the next months as we approach the 2016 election. It’s an old story – to paraphrase: “With America in retreat overseas, exceptional threats and crises are looming. Decisive action is needed, but the White House has gone wobbly. And our armed forces – overtaxed and cut to the bone – are unready.”

This trope has gained prominence three times in the past 40 years, always to great effect. Its resurgence depends on the intersection of three conditions: 1. A troubled Democratic presidency, suffering a decline in popularity (initially for domestic reasons); 2. A period of reduced defense spending; and 3. A pending and hotly-contested presidential election. Carter faced it as did Clinton (in 1998-2000). Now Obama faces it. (A fuller analysis of this dynamic can be found in my 2014 report, Something in the Air: ‘Isolationism,’ Defense Spending, and the US Public Mood. A relevant excerpt is here. Both links are PDFs.)

Hawks are always ready to peddle the “America weak and endangered” trope, but it doesn’t gain traction absent the three conditions mentioned above. The dynamic works like this: Given a weakened Presidency, military leaders feel freer to exit the White House narrative and argue their institutional interests unalloyed: “Boost our budget, the nation is at risk!” This feeds the partisan mill and begins moving public debate and opinion rightward. (For a chart covering 50 years of US public opinion on Pentagon spending see Gallup’s Military and National Defense page.)

With an eye on the polls and sensitive to the drop in presidential popularity, some congressional Democrats follow suit, seeking to protect their right flank. The White House, too, tries to get ahead of the curve, adopting a more bellicose stance and pumping up the Pentagon budget. (Indeed, the administration itself many splinter, with some luminaries jumping ship.  Rather than stemming the tide, the hawkish turn among Democrats creates the impression of a new hawkish “consensus.” Many point to firebrands like McCain and Lindsey Graham, but it’s the Democrats in retreat that precipitate the stampede to the Right.

Obama has differed from Clinton and Carter in one respect: He’s accommodated the Pentagon from the start, hoping to avoid the dilemma that snared his predecessors. He boosted the DoD budget above Bush levels and kept it there for three years. As sequestration loomed, he argued against it and also allowed DoD and the Chiefs to lash out. Yes, he partially withdrew troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, but slowly – and not before an Afghan surge. As troops came home, drone strikes increased and the administration enacted a “muscular” shift to Asia, an AirSea Battle strategy, and new military initiatives all across Africa.

But the gambit didn’t work. As soon as sequestration bit into the Pentagon and the President stumbled domestically (it was the economy, stupid), the hawks jumped. Now the President is left scampering after his hawkish critics. Whatever he says – bombs, troops, billions – they just say “more.” It’s not a pretty sight, nor one likely to win public confidence.

But aren’t today’s global crises real? ISIS, Russia in Ukraine, Chinese “assertiveness”? Well, yes to a degree, but certainly not exceptional, see: Our World Gone Wild? What *is* special about today are the three conditions mentioned at the top. But these reflect domestic political dynamics, not global strategic ones – and they’re shaping both popular perceptions and attitudes.

By Carl Conetta, 21 Dec 2015

● Washington Free Beacon. Dempsey: The Global Security Environment Is As Uncertain As I’ve Ever Seen It. Jul 2015.

● Defense News. Military Chiefs Warn Anew About Sequester Cuts. Feb 2015.

● Christopher Preble. The Most Dangerous World Ever? Sep/Oct 2014.

● Spencer Ackerman. ‘Apocalyptic’ ISIS beyond anything we’ve seen, say US defense chiefs. Aug 2014.

● Business Insider. 12 Prominent People Who Compared Putin To Hitler. May 2014.

● Business Insider. Chuck Hagel: Isolationism Won’t Protect Us From The World’s Troubles. May 2014.

● Bill Gertz. Dempsey: Threat of Conflict in Asia Increasing; US Military decline hastens global instability. Mar 2014.

● Military.com. Force Cuts Mean Army Can’t Fight Two Land Wars. Mar 2014.

● Media-ite. Harry Reid Likens Assad to Hitler. Sep 2013.

● NY Post. Assad is like Hitler: Kerry. Sep 2013.

● Joseph I. Lieberman and Jon Kyl. The regrets of U.S. isolationism. Apr 2013.

● Breaking Defense. Gen. Amos: Marines Can’t Fight Major War If Sequestered. Apr 2013.

● Michael Cohen. America’s military can handle anything – except a budget cut. Feb 2013.

● Micah Zenko. Most – Dangerous – World – Ever. Feb 2013.

● Foreign Policy Initiative. The Dangers of Deep Defense Cuts: What America’s Civilian and Military Leaders are Saying. May 2012.

● Politico. Panetta paints doomsday scenario. Nov 2011.