History does not teach lessons. Lessons are distilled at best, often selectively. The standard lesson of the 1938 Munich Agreement is that any compromise with aggression will lead to more aggression. But the danger of “conciliation” or “appeasement” admits degrees depending on the circumstances or genesis of the violation and the security arrangements that follow conflict. The counsel of Munich needs to be contextualized, as the following articles argue:
Stephen M. Walt, “Appeasement Is Underrated,” Foreign Policy (29 April 2024)
Mark Episkopos, “It’s time to retire the Munich analogy,” Responsible Statecraft, 13 Dec 2024.
Andrew Latham, “This is not 1938 — so stop talking about appeasement,”The Hill (16 Dec 2021)
Tom Switzer, “In defence of (occasional) appeasement,” The Quadrant, US Studies Center, University of Sydney, 6 Oct 2015.
Geoffrey Wheatcroft, “On the Use and Abuse of Munich,” TNR (3 Dec 2013).
Fredrik Logevall and Kenneth Osgood, “The Ghost of Munich: America’s Appeasement Complex,” World Affairs Journal (July / August 2010)
Marisa Morrison, “The Misappropriation of Munich,” The National Interest (3 Nov 2006)
Jeffrey Record, Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s (Carlisle PA: US Army War College, 2005) h
Samuel Azubuike, “To Appease or to Concede? Contrasting Two Modes of Accommodation in International Conflict,” International Relations, Vol 20, No 1 (Mar 2006)
Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement,” International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 2004)
Jeffrey Record, Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy: Munich, Vietnam, and American Use of Force since 1945, Occasional Paper No. 4 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air University, March 1998) – PDF file
How do the two sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict compare in terms of personnel and equipment losses? These seemingly objective measures are subject to an intensive propaganda war. This brief analysis examines multiple sources of data to find that the combatants are actually not far apart in the percentage of equipment attrition they have suffered. And Russian personnel fatalities are likely in the range of 3,500 (April 2). Contrary to the messaging of the two sides, both would seem able to sustain combat for a considerable time longer. Unfortunately, as Russian forces have transitioned to a heavier, more firepower-dominant mode of warfare, Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure are suffering more death and destruction. While this might argue for increased emphasis on war containment and diplomatic efforts, the most evocative messaging on the western side emphasizes Russian miscalculation and fumbling, Ukraine’s adept resistance, and the promise of war termination via increased investment in the war.
Argues for a new balance among the various instruments of national power reflecting today’s strategic conditions. Taking a realistic view of security needs, the report advocates a military 20% smaller than today’s. It advances a “discriminate defense” strategy that would focus the military on cost-effective missions and save $550 billion more than official plans over the next decade.
Drawing on the experiences of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the article assesses the role played by helicopters, reviewing their strengths and limits. The author suggests that a dilemma shadows the use of these aircraft. On the one hand, they offer a unique combination of mobility, flexibility, and agility in working closely with ground forces, providing reconnaissance, fire, maneuver, and logistical support. However, helicopters prove acutely sensitive to environmental conditions, are relatively fragile, and can be countered by multiple, relatively-inexpensive weapon systems.
by Carl Conetta
Carl Conetta, EPS Quarterly, Nov 2005 – Full Text: 