Asia-Pacific

To End America’s Longest War the US-Korea Alliance Must Change

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by Charles Knight, initially published by the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, 22 December 2021.

This article reports on South Korean President Moon’s latest peace initiative, which has achieved an agreement “in principle” by the U.S., North Korea, China, and South Korea to negotiate an “end-of-war declaration.”  Recently, the U.S. appeared to have modified its nuclear disarmament approach, accepting that “step by step” is the realistic way to proceed.  A few article excerpts:

A step-by-step approach requires give and take, [implying] that the U.S. might ultimately have to settle for some tempering of the North’s nuclear arsenal rather than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID.)

…a strategy of waiting patiently for sanctions to force Pyongyang’s capitulation…overlooks how existentially critical nuclear weaponry has become in North Korea’s strategic calculus. Without an adequate national security alternative, Pyongyang will most likely choose to suffer indefinitely under the economic pain of sanctions, however severe.

Alliances cannot and do not last forever. To endure from one era to another, they must adapt and change. If Washington returns to old habits of leveraging its hegemonic will to control affairs on the Korean Peninsula, it may reap the unintended consequence of hastening the end of the alliance.

Korea versus Korea: Conventional Military Balance and the Path to Disarmament

by Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher, Lit Verlag, Munster, Germany, April 2020.

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Chapter: “A Path to Reductions of Conventional Forces on the Korean Peninsula” by Charles Knight.

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korea vs korea cover

Varied incremental steps that embody and signal the accumulating commitment to a minimally acceptable common political future for Korea are key to this process. Progressive reduction of cross-border invasion threats through mutual confidence building force restructuring will constitute a virtuous circle of reinforcement for a changed relationship. [Through the] accumulation of the sunk costs of iterative reciprocity North and South Korea will arrive at a point where the demonstrated commitment to smaller restructured military postures is sufficient to allow rapid progress toward a stable level and disposition of arms compatible with a new peaceful political relationship.   ~ Knight

Die Konfrontation auf der Halbinsel, mit offensivir Oreintierung und Bereitschaft zur Praemption, impliziert Stabilitatsrisiken. Diese werden noch erhoht durch Entwicklung und Einfuhrung prazier ballistischer Raketen, welche die Illusion nahren, den Gegner im Konfilktfall ‘enthaupten’ zu konnen.   ~ Unterseher

Why Security Guarantees Are the Key to Solving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

by Henri Féron and Charles Knight, The National Interest, 27 June 2019.  ➪ PDF   ➪ HTML

NK women march

[To begin a process of reciprocal iterative conventional forces reductions] South Korea might announce that it would put into reserve status a few thousand of its Marines and then look for a reciprocating move by the North. It is not important that the move is of like kind. It could consist, say, in the standing down of a class of missiles or artillery. The point is that the move should signal something of value which can then be read to encourage another move by the other side.

North Korea’s Conventional Military Forces: Relative Strength and Options

by Lutz Unterseher, PDA Guest Publication, April 2019.
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This paper by German military analyst Lutz Unterseher first assesses the relative conventional military power and potential of North and South Korea, then suggests a number of military restructuring steps the U.S. and South Korea can take to reassure North Korea of its security in the context of denuclearization. Unterseher calls for “…a genuine structural change, shifting the capabilities of the [allied] forces in the direction of a stable, non-provocative defense.”

If we can assume that the drive to generate unconventional [nuclear] instruments of deterrence is a response to the lack of options in the conventional realm, it would make sense to come up with policy recommendations aiming to lessen northern concerns.

DPRK Soldiers Patrol the Yalu

DPRK soldiers patrol the Yalu River shore. Image by WZ Still WZ from Pixabay.

Transactional diplomacy isn’t working with North Korea – relational diplomacy might

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by Charles Knight, a version of this article appeared in The National Interest on 19 February 2019. This is a modestly revised version.

Complemented by:

“A Path to Reductions of Conventional Forces on the Korean Peninsula” by Charles Knight, 2020.

➪  full English text:  PDF    or   ➪ Korean auto-translation (DeepL)

DPRK soldiers

The status quo is a failed approach to Korean conflict and tension; a failed policy that is at least partially responsible for North Korea becoming a small but real nuclear power.

Rather than continue to isolate North Korea, the new realities require America to bring nuclear North Korea into as close a relationship as possible—so that there are opportunities to influence the North in regards to responsibly and safely managing its nuclear weaponry. It is hard to imagine such trust between North Korea and the United States at this time, but the United States can encourage China to play a role in persuading North Korea.  Chinese and American interests align very closely regarding nuclear safety and restraint.

Noted: What North Korea wants in nuclear arms negotiations

by Charles Knight. This was a comment to an article by Duyeon Kim, “How to tell if North Korea is serious about denuclearization,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 October 2018, midway between the Singapore Summit and the Hanoi Summit.  ➪ HTML

Kim meets with Trump

… productive negotiations must take account of North Korea’s de-facto status as a nuclear weapon state and its core security interests.

What to Look For in the Pyongyang Inter-Korean Summit

by Charles Knight, The Diplomat, 14 September 2018.  HTML

“Denuclearization, if it occurs, is a long-term project. It will not happen in the case of Korea unless there are very substantial reductions and redeployments of conventional weaponry and military units on the peninsula.
“Just think of North Korea’s long-time substitute for nuclear weapons — its thousands of artillery pieces dug in and aimed toward Seoul. And these days South Korea has hundreds of conventionally-armed rockets aimed at key facilities in the North. All of this has to change, in a step-by-step reciprocal and verified process as trust builds. This is the hard part of making peace. It takes time and persistent will.”

Pyongyang monument

Image by Peter Anta from Pixabay.

The Inter-Korean Summit Declaration of April 27, 2018: a review in detail

by Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives, 01 May 2018. ➪ PDF

prayers for peaceThe April 27, 2018 Inter-Korean Summit was a visibly cordial event. At its conclusion, North and South Korea released a Declaration of Peace, Prosperity, and Unification. This paper reviews a selection of key sections and phrases in ‘The Declaration’ with attention to understanding their implications for the goal declared by both parties of ending ‘division and confrontation’ on the peninsula and for addressing the overhanging issue of denuclearization. Notably, both parties strongly assert their rights as Koreans to take leadership in this task.

What Will Success at the Inter-Korean Summit Look Like?

HTML by Anastasia O. Barannikova, English edits by Charles Knight, The Diplomat, 24 April 2018.
 

“Much will depend on U.S. readiness to negotiate and its willingness to adapt to the changing international conditions in northeast Asia. With an improvement of U.S.-North Korea relations, tensions in the region will not disappear, but instability will be more manageable and there will be less risk of a war engulfing Korea and beyond.”

A Russian Perspective On Korean Denuclearization

an interview with Anastasia O. Barannikova by Charles Knight, Lobe Log, 18 March 2018. HTML

“In the past periods of temporary normalization of relations, the two Koreas separately and jointly tried to promote denuclearization initiatives. Many people across the globe have mistakenly thought about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as only pertaining to nuclear disarmament of North Korea. But what about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea [withdrawn in 1991], the inclusion of nuclear weapons in joint exercises, and the nuclear umbrella guarantee extended to South Korea by the U.S. ever since the Korean War? A nation that enjoys (or suffers from) such nuclear-umbrella guarantees does not qualify as “non-nuclear.” From this perspective, South Korea has long been nuclear, and it was the U.S. that first made the Korean peninsula nuclear.”

Reality Check on North Korea. How can the U.S. stop this march to war with North Korea? Open our eyes.

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by Charles Knight, U.S.News & World Report, 20 February 2018.

“North Korea is most likely to agree to verifiable arms limitations if there is a credible path for them to significantly improve their national security, end sanctions and achieve international political normalcy, including ultimately diplomatic recognition from the U.S.
“This is a rare moment in international relations when the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea have a common interest in limiting the further development of North Korea’s nuclear force. Every reasonable avenue should be explored for making common cause to prevent war while also achieving a realistic degree of limitations on North Korea’s nuclear and missile arms.”

8 Key findings regarding the Korea nuclear arms crisis from recent discussions with experts in China, Russia and Korea

by Charles Knight, Center for International Policy, 02 February 2018. ➪ read full post  PDF

Most interlocutors thought that there is almost no chance that the presently stringent sanctions can force the DPRK to agree to disarm. The Chinese and the Russians generally believe that the maximal concession that sanctions can win from the DPRK is an agreement to freeze their warhead and missile development — particularly inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development — in return for some combination of confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and progress toward political normalization. The North Koreans will not give up the nuclear weapons they already have… at least not until there is permanent peace on the peninsula and the US is no longer understood to be an enemy.

Win-Win Steps to Prevent a New Korean War

by Charles Knight, U.S. News and World Report, 06 April 2017. HTML

“[T]he basis of regional cooperation that can make North Korean denuclearization possible… is the interest shared by the United States and China in a stable peaceful Korean Peninsula and in halting and then reversing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. With the stakes for millions of people in the region so extraordinarily high, our leaders and our diplomats must be prepared to work with keen will and open minds to identify the paths to peace and mutual security – and then leaders must boldly walk them.”

Choosing war & decline … or not

by Charles Knight, Huffington Post, 03 February 2016   HTML

“A cold war framework for our relations with China, Russia, and any other powers that might eventually align with them will almost certainly result in the addition of $200 to 300 billion in annual U.S. security expenditures. It would also very significantly divert the energies of Americans from many social and environmental goals. The U.S. will end up deferring domestic investments needed to sustain its economic strength.”

Vietnam Memorial

Image by Photopin

The US “Asia Pivot” and “Air-Sea Battle” Concept: Toward Conflict with China?

by Carl Conetta. Originally published as “Will the QDR Pivot for Air-Sea Battle with China?” in Reset Defense Bulletin, 03 March 2014.

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Asia Pivot

Will China come to pose a peer military threat to the United States?  The Obama administration’s 2012 Strategic Defense Review and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) turn on this eventuality. Both the so-called “Asia pivot” and the evolving Air-Sea Battle (ASB) operational concept are meant to preclude it. But they may serve to precipitate it, instead.

Three Leadership Steps for Peace in Korea

➪ HTML by Charles Knight, Huffington Post commentary, 15 April 2013. “If you want China’s help on restraining the Nort Korean state you must make a credible promise to them that you will withdraw all U.S. forces and leave all bases on the peninsula after the old Stalinist regime collapses — as everyone expects it will sometime in the next twenty years. Otherwise, it is in China’s national interest to keep the North Korean regime limping along … as long as possible.”

Alleged ‘Carrier Gap’ is Out to Sea

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, PDA Briefing Memo #15, 30 April 1999. The April 1999 re-routing of aircraft carriers to support operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans inspired alarm about the effect of the move on America’s military presence in the Pacific. However, the assertions of a serious gap in carrier coverage are groundless. Alarmism about redeployment misjudges the effect of the move on the military balance in Northeast Asia and betrays a disregard for the one feature of aircraft carriers — their flexibility — that is supposed to give them unique strategic value worthy of their prodigious cost.

Asia Pacific Tilts to West: Limit Offensive Weaponry, Boost Arms Control

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, commentary originally published in Defense News, 31 March – 06 April 1997.
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Examines the pattern of military spending in the Asia Pacific region since the Cold War and makes recommendations for U.S. policy. Based on data and analysis from Post-Cold War US Military Expenditure in the Context of World Spending Trends.