Appendix: A Selection of 2025 Official Ukraine War Ceasefire and Peace Proposals

[main article: The Ukraine War Prospect: How Peace Plans Might Work and Why They Will Fail]

20-point US-UA framework peace proposal – 23 Dec 2025
European “Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine” – 14 Dec 2025
US-UA “19-point Framework,” Geneva – 24 Nov 2025
E3 Ukraine War Cease-fire Proposal – 23 Nov 2025
Trump 28-Point Ukraine Peace Plan – 20-21 Nov 2025.

20-point US-UA framework peace proposal – 23 Dec 2025

1. The signatories affirm that Ukraine is a sovereign state.

2. The document constitutes a full and unquestionable non-aggression agreement between Russia and Ukraine. A monitoring mechanism will be set up to oversee the conflict line using satellite-based unmanned surveillance, ensuring early detection of violations.

3. Ukraine will receive security guarantees.

4. The size of Ukraine’s Armed Forces will remain at 800,000 personnel during peacetime.

5. The U.S., NATO, and European signatory states will provide Ukraine with “Article 5–like” guarantees. Following points apply:

(a) If Russia invades Ukraine, a coordinated military response will be launched, and all global sanctions against Russia will be reinstated.

(b) If Ukraine invades Russia or opens fire at Russian territory without provocation, the security guarantees will be considered void. If Russia opens fire on Ukraine, the security guarantees will come into effect.

(c) Bilateral security guarantees are not excluded under this agreement

6. Russia will formalize its non-aggression stance towards Europe and Ukraine in all necessary laws and documents, ratifying them by Russia’s State Duma.

7. Ukraine will become an EU member at a clearly designated time and will receive a short-term preferential access to the European market.

8. Ukraine will receive a strong global development package, detailed in a separate agreement, This will cover a broad range of economic areas, including but not limited to:

(a) The establishment of a Ukraine Development Fund for investing in fast-growing industries, including technology, data centers, and artificial intelligence.

(b)The USA and US companies will work with Ukraine to jointly invest in the restoration, modernization, and operation of Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage facilities.

(c) Joint efforts will be made to rebuild war-torn areas, focusing on restoring and modernizing cities and residential neighborhoods.

(d) Infrastructure development will be prioritized.

(e) Extraction of minerals and natural resources will be expanded.

(f) The World Bank will provide a special funding package to support the acceleration of these efforts.

(g) A high-level working group will be established, including the appointment of a leading global financial expert as the prosperity administrator to oversee the implementation of the strategic recovery plan and future prosperity.

9. Several funds will be established to address the recovery of Ukraine’s economy, the reconstruction of damaged areas and regions, and humanitarian issues.

(a) The United States and European countries will establish a capital and grants fund with a target size of $200 billion for transparent and effective investment in Ukraine.

(b) A broad range of capital investments and other financial instruments will be deployed for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. Global reconstruction institutions will use mechanisms to bolster and facilitate these efforts.

(c)Ukraine will implement best global standards to attract foreign direct investment.

(d) Ukraine reserves the right to compensation for the damage inflicted.

10. Ukraine will accelerate the process of negotiating a free trade agreement with the U.S.

11. Ukraine reaffirms its commitment to remaining a non-nuclear state, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

12. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be jointly operated by three countries: Ukraine, the United States, and Russia.

13. Ukraine and Russia will introduce school courses that promote understanding and tolerance of different cultures, fight racism and prejudice. Ukraine will approve EU rules on religious tolerance and minority language protection.

14. In Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts, the line of military positions on the date of signing will be recognized as the de facto front line.

(a). A working group will convene to determine the redeployment of forces necessary to end the conflict, as well as to define parameters for potential future special economic zones.

(b) After an equivalent basis for the movement of forces, international forces will be deployed along the line of contact to monitor compliance with this agreement. (President Zelensky has proposed that both sides will withdraw an equivalent amount from the point of contact to create a zone where international forces will deploy.) Should a decision be made to establish such a zone, it will require special approval by the Ukrainian parliament or a referendum.

(c) The Russian Federation must withdraw its troops from the Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv regions for this agreement to take effect.

(d) The parties agree to adhere to the rules, guarantees, and obligations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, which apply in full to the territory, including universally recognized human rights.

15. Russia and Ukraine commit to refraining from using force to alter territorial arrangements and will resolve any disputes through diplomatic means.

16. Russia will not obstruct Ukraine’s use of the Dnipro River and the Black Sea for commercial purposes. A separate maritime agreement will ensure freedom of navigation and transport, with the Russian-occupied Kinburn Spit being demilitarized.

17. Establishment of a humanitarian committee that will ensure the following:

(a) All-for-all prisoner exchange.
(b) All detained civilians, including children and political prisoners, will be freed.
(c) Actions will be taken to address the problems and alleviate the suffering of conflict victims.

18. Ukraine must hold presidential elections as soon as possible after the deal is signed.

19. The deal will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored by the Peace Council, chaired by U.S. President Donald Trump. Ukraine, Europe, NATO, Russia, and the U.S. will be part of this process. Violations will lead to sanctions.

20. The ceasefire will take effect immediately once all parties agree to the deal.
European “Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine” – 14 Dec 2025


Dec 14 Statement on Ukraine by leaders of Germany, UK, France, Italy, Poland, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, European Council, and European Commission
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_3086

Summary of Main Points:

1. UA armed forces should remain at a peacetime level of 800,000.

2. The Coalition of the Willing should establish a European-led ‘multinational force Ukraine’ supported by the US to assist in the regeneration of Ukraine’s forces, secure Ukraine’s skies, support safe seas, including through operating inside Ukraine.

3. There should be a US led cease-fire monitoring and verification mechanism and early conflict warning effort

4. There should be a legally binding multi-national commitment to restore peace and security in the case of a future armed attack. These measures may include armed force, intelligence and logistical assistance, economic and diplomatic actions.

5. Europe should invest in the future prosperity of Ukraine, including making major resources available for recovery and reconstruction, mutually beneficial trade agreements

6. Postwar plans should take into account the need for Russia to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused, using Russian sovereign assets.

7. The leadership group strongly support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.
US-UA “19-point Framework,” Geneva – 24 Nov 2025


US-UA “19-point Framework,” Geneva – 24 Nov 2025

This amended most elements of the Trump 28-point Plan drawing on the E3 alternative. Below are those key features and revisions publicly available circa 20 Dec 2025:

1. The revised framework drops the 600,000 personnel limit on the armed forces and in some summaries adopts the 800,000 peacetime force level proposed in the E3 plan.

2. Removes language barring Ukraine from ever joining NATO

3. Includes stronger security guarantees backed by the USA and European partners.

4. Does not include territorial concessions by Kyiv. Sets the front line as the basis for future discussions between Pres Trump and Pres Zelensky on disposition of territory.

5. Drop the provision in the US 28-point plan for full amnesty for acts committed during the war and adds a requirement to address “the grievances of those who suffered in the war”.

6. Reportedly drops the specific plan for handling the frozen Russian assets set out previously in the 28-point plan

7. Reports indicate that the new framework makes no clear statement about NATO or European coalition troops stationed in or deploying to Ukraine.

8. Drops the plan to allocate frozen Russian assets to US-led reconstruction and investment efforts in Ukraine.

9. Defers to future US-UA talks a variety of decisions on key political, economic, and security issues that had been addressed in both the original 28-point plan and the E3 rejoinder


E3 Ukraine War Cease-fire Proposal – 23 Nov 2025

1. Ukraine’s sovereignty to be reconfirmed.

2. There will be a total and complete non-aggression agreement reached between Russia and Ukraine and NATO. All ambiguities from the last 30 years will be resolved.

(Point 3 of U.S. plan is deleted. A draft of that plan seen by Reuters said: “There will be the expectation that Russia will not invade its neighbors and NATO will not expand further.”)

4. After a peace agreement is signed, a dialogue between Russia and NATO will convene to address all security concerns and create a de-escalatory environment to ensure global security and increase the opportunity for connectivity and future economic opportunity.

5. Ukraine will receive robust Security Guarantees

6. Size of Ukraine military to be capped at 800,000 in peacetime.

7. Ukraine joining NATO depends on consensus of NATO members, which does not exist.

8. NATO agrees not to permanently station troops under its command in Ukraine in peacetime. (This leaves open deployment during war, temporary deployment during peace, and European member state deployments that are not under NATO command.)

9. NATO fighter jets will be stationed in Poland

10. US guarantee that mirrors Article 5

(a) US to receive compensation for the guarantee

(b) If Ukraine invades Russia, it forfeits the guarantee

(c) If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a robust coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be restored and any kind of recognition for the new territory and all other benefits from this agreement will be withdrawn.

11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will get short-term preferred market access to Europe while this is being evaluated

12. Robust Global Redevelopment Package for Ukraine including but not limited to:

(a) Creation of Ukraine Development fund to invest in high growth industries including technology, data centers and Al efforts

(b) The United States will partner with Ukraine to jointly restore, grow, modernize and operate Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, which includes its pipeline and storage facilities

(c) A joint effort to redevelop areas impacted by the war to restore, redevelop and modernize cities and residential areas

(d) Infrastructure development

(e) Mineral and natural resource extraction

(f) A special financing package will be developed by the World Bank to provide financing to accelerate these efforts.

13. Russia to be progressively re-integrated into the global economy

(a) Sanction relief will be discussed and agreed upon in phases and on a case-by-case basis.

(b) The United States will enter into a long-term Economic Cooperation Agreement to pursue mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, AI, datacenters, rare earths, joint projects in the Arctic, as well as various other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.

(c) Russia to be invited back into the G8

14. Ukraine will be fully reconstructed and compensated financially, including through Russian sovereign assets that will remain frozen until Russia compensates damage to Ukraine.

15. A joint Security taskforce will be established with the participation of US, Ukraine, Russia and the Europeans to promote and enforce all of the provisions of this agreement

16. Russia will legislatively enshrine a non-aggression policy towards Europe and Ukraine

17. The United States and Russia agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation and control treaties, including the Start I Treaty.

18. Ukraine agrees to remain a non-nuclear state under the NPT

19. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant will be restarted under supervision of the IAEA, and the produced power shall be shared equitably in a 50-50 split between Russia and Ukraine.

20. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities.

21. Territories: Ukraine commits not to recover its occupied sovereign territory through military means. Negotiations on territorial swaps will start from the Line of Contact.

22. Once future territorial arrangements have been agreed, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply if there is a breach of this obligation

23. Russia shall not obstruct Ukraine’s use of the Dnieper River for purposes of commercial activities, and agreements will be reached for grain shipments to move freely through the Black Sea

24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve open issues:

(a) All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on the principle of All for All

(b) All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children

(c) There will be a family reunification program

(d) Provisions will be made to address the suffering of victims from the conflict

25. Ukraine will hold elections as soon as possible after the signing of the peace agreement.

26. Provision will be made to address the suffering of victims of the conflict.

27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Board of Peace, chaired by President Donald J. Trump. There will be penalties for violation.

28. Upon all sides agreeing to this memorandum, a ceasefire will be immediately effective upon both parties withdrawing to the agreed upon points for the implementation of the agreement to begin. Ceasefire modalities, including monitoring, will be agreed by both parties under US supervision. Trump


28-Point Ukraine Peace Plan – 20-21 Nov 2025

1. Ukraine’s sovereignty to be reconfirmed.

2. There will be a total and complete comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered resolved.

3. There will be the expectation that Russia will not invade its neighbors and NATO will not expand further.

4. A dialogue between Russia and NATO, moderated by the United States, will convene to address all security concerns and create a de-escalatory environment to ensure global security and increase the opportunities for connectivity and future economic opportunity.

5. Ukraine will receive robust security guarantees.

6. The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be capped at 600,000.

7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to pass in its bylaws not to accept Ukraine at any point in the future.

8. NATO agrees not to station any troops in Ukraine.

9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.

10. The U.S. guarantee:

(a) The U.S. to receive compensation for the guarantee

(b) If Ukraine invades Russia, it forfeits the guarantee

(c) If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a robust coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be restored and recognition for the new territory and all other benefits from this agreement will be withdrawn

(d) If Ukraine fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg then, the security guarantee will be considered null and void.

11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will get short-term preferred market access to the European market while this issue is being evaluated.

12. Robust Global Redevelopment Package for Ukraine including but not limited to:

(a) Creation of Ukraine Development Fund to invest in high-growth industries including technology, data centers, and AI efforts

(b) The United States will partner with Ukraine to jointly restore, grow, modernize, and operate Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, which includes its pipelines and storage facilities

(c) A joint effort to redevelop areas impacted by the war to restore, redevelop and modernize cities and residential areas

(d) Infrastructure development

(e) Mineral and natural resource extraction

(f) A special financing package will be developed by The World Bank to provide financing to accelerate these efforts

13. Russia to be re-integrated into the global economy:

(a) Sanction relief will be discussed and agreed upon in phases and on a case-by-case basis.

(b) The United States will enter into a long-term Economic Co-operation Agreement to pursue mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, rare earth metal projects in the Arctic as well as other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.

(c) Russia to be invited back into the G8.

14. Frozen funds will be used as follows:

(a) $100 billion of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a US-led effort to reconstruct and invest in Ukraine.

(b) The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture.

(c) Europe will match this $100 billion contribution to increase the investment available to rebuild Ukraine.

(d) The European funds that are frozen will be released.

(e) The balance of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russia investment vehicle that will pursue joint United States Russia projects in areas to be defined. This fund will aim to strengthen the relationship and increase joint interests to build a strong motivation not to return to conflict.

15. A joint US-Russian Security taskforce will be established to promote and enforce compliance with all of the provisions of this agreement.

16. Russia will legislatively enshrine a non-aggression policy towards Europe and Ukraine.

17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation control treaties, including the START I Treaty.

18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state under the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).

19. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be restarted under supervision of the IAEA, and the produced power shall be equitably in a 50-50 split between Russia and Ukraine.

20. Both countries commit to education programs in schools and throughout their society that promotes the understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminates racism and bias:

(a) Ukraine will adopt EU rules of religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities.

(b) Both countries agree to repeal all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.

(c) All Nazi ideology or activity should be renounced and forbidden.

21. Territories:

(a) Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk to be recognized De-Facto as Russian, including by the United States.

(b) Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to be frozen at the contact line, which would mean a De-Facto recognition at the contact line.

(c) Russia to give up other agreed upon territories they control outside of the five regions.

(d) Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk region that they currently control, and this withdrawal area will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.

22. Once future territorial arrangements have been agreed, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this obligation.

23. Russia shall not obstruct Ukraine’s use of the Dnieper River for purposes of commercial activities and agreements will be reached for grain shipments to move freely through the Black Sea.

24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve open issues:

(a) All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on the principle of ‘all for all’.

(b) All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children.

(c) There will be a family reunification program

(d) Provisions will be made to address the suffering of victims from the conflict.

25. Ukraine to hold elections in 100 days.

26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for wartime actions during the war and agree not to pursue claims or further settle grievances.

27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Board of Peace, Chaired by President Donald J. Trump. There will be penalties for violation.

28. Upon all sides agreeing to this memorandum, a ceasefire will be immediately effective upon both parties withdrawing to the agreed upon points for the implementation of the agreement to begin.

Variables of War

By Lutz Unterseher, guest publication, 01 January 2026.  ➪ see full-text:  PDF

This essay argues that wars do not result from immutable human nature but from political motives, cultural dispositions, and calculations of military opportunity.  Wars are, therefore, preventable. The essay presents a succinct causal model of war’s outbreak.

The formal causal argument:

  • War’s outbreak is treated as the dependent variable; the independent variable is a mix of expansionist or preventive motives and a supportive war culture that glorifies offensive action and soldierly virtues (the “cult of the offensive”).

  • Because such motives and cultures often do not lead to war, a further “sufficient condition” is posited: leaders must judge that a rapid victory is feasible, casualties acceptable, and domestic opposition manageable, typically by identifying structural vulnerabilities or “open flanks” in the opponent’s posture.

  • This feasibility variable is an intermediate link between motives/culture and war and is filtered through perceptions often distorted by ideology, institutional dysfunction, or poor intelligence.

Empirical illustrations of opportunity and miscalculation:

  • Drawing on John Mearsheimer’s study of deterrence failure, the text notes that conventional deterrence often fails when states concentrate on offensive or counteroffensive preparations and neglect robust territorial defense, thereby offering exploitable weak points.

  • The German offensive through the Ardennes in 1940 exemplifies this: France’s incomplete Maginot Line and the misdeployment of its most modern forces created an open flank that German armored units exploited, enabling a rapid breakthrough.

Policy lesson: defense posture and gendered perceptions:

  • The author’s policy inference is that states should avoid inviting attack by concentrating forces for offensives and instead establish “defensive control of space”: dispersed, resilient, terrain‑using dispositions that leave no open flanks and sap an intruder’s speed and momentum, an idea linked to Confidence‑Building Defense concepts.

  • Such structurally deterrent postures may be undervalued because of the gendered coding of offense as active and initiative‑rich masculinity, versus the coding of defense as inactive and passive femininity, leading offensive‑minded and sexist elites to discount the real capacity of defensive systems to frustrate attacks.

And so now… It’s war?

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by Carl Conetta, 21 Feb 2022

The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. The short essay examines them both, asking how did we get here? It concludes with the question: Is it harder to live with autonomy for the Ukrainian rebel areas than it is to face regional war?

Resolving the Ukraine Crisis

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by Carl Conetta, 26 Jan 2022


The basic elements of a solution to the Ukraine crisis are ready at hand – and have been since Feb 2015. These are the provisions of the Minsk II Protocol. This Reset Defense blog post reviews the impediments to Minsk II implementation and suggests a way forward. The key to progress is cooperation among the outside powers supporting the Ukraine contestants (i.e., Kyivv government and rebels). These benefactors must make their material support contingent on the near-term implementation of Minsk II. Another key element missing from the current agreement is the provision for a substantial peacekeeping and monitoring force to oversee the demilitarization of the area, temporarily control its external and internal borders, and secure an election.

 

To End America’s Longest War the US-Korea Alliance Must Change

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by Charles Knight, initially published by the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, 22 December 2021.

This article reports on South Korean President Moon’s latest peace initiative, which has achieved an agreement “in principle” by the U.S., North Korea, China, and South Korea to negotiate an “end-of-war declaration.”  Recently, the U.S. appeared to have modified its nuclear disarmament approach, accepting that “step by step” is the realistic way to proceed.  A few article excerpts:

A step-by-step approach requires give and take, [implying] that the U.S. might ultimately have to settle for some tempering of the North’s nuclear arsenal rather than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID.)

…a strategy of waiting patiently for sanctions to force Pyongyang’s capitulation…overlooks how existentially critical nuclear weaponry has become in North Korea’s strategic calculus. Without an adequate national security alternative, Pyongyang will most likely choose to suffer indefinitely under the economic pain of sanctions, however severe.

Alliances cannot and do not last forever. To endure from one era to another, they must adapt and change. If Washington returns to old habits of leveraging its hegemonic will to control affairs on the Korean Peninsula, it may reap the unintended consequence of hastening the end of the alliance.

They made a desolation and called it “A Good War”

 

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By Carl Conetta, Reset Defense Blog, 04 February 2021.

This article (with extensive bibliography) surveys, at the 20-year mark, the consequences of the US regime change, occupation, and nation-building exercise in Afghanistan. Drawing on US DOD and congressional research agency reports, media investigations, and NGO analyses it anchors the broad public impression of full-spectrum failure. It reviews the human and financial costs of the war, the failures of reconstruction, and the ongoing dysfunction of Afghan governance.

America’s debacle in Afghanistan, which echoes the Soviet failure during the 1980s, indicates that nations are not the type of thing that can be built according to a foreign blueprint, and especially not at the point of a gun. Outsiders lack the knowledge, indigenous roots, legitimacy, and degree of interest to prevail. Indeed, their very presence is provocative, especially given differences in language, religion, and culture.

Why is withdrawal so difficult? The article concludes that domestic political and institutional considerations are more important than any strategic rationale or cost-benefit analysis. Once committed, no political or military leader, nor the Pentagon cares to own responsibility for failure. And hubris generates an endless succession of imagined “new paths” to success. But as success proves forever elusive, so does withdrawal. In a perverse sense, it is persistent failure that keeps America mired for decades in this and other desultory wars.

Michèle Flournoy reveals why US troops may stay in Afghanistan – indefinitely

by Carl Conetta, Reset Defense Blog, 3 December 2020

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“Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan,” USIP panel w/ Michèle Flournoy & Stephen Hadley. 18 Feb 2020

Commentary on “Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan: Washington Perspectives on a US-Taliban Agreement” – A US Institute of Peace panel w/ Michèle Flournoy and Stephen Hadley, February 18, 2020

Sustainable Defense: More Security, Less Spending

Final Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force of The Center for International Policy, June 2019. ➪ full report  PDF

Carl Conetta contributed analysis of the economic and climate change challenges, details of the threat assessment, the strategy, and the calculation of savings from recommended changes to force structure.

The United States must partner with other nations in addressing challenges like climate change, epidemics of disease, nuclear proliferation, and human rights and humanitarian crises. None of these challenges are best dealt with by military force. Rather, they will depend on building non-military capacities for diplomacy, economic assistance, and scientific and cultural cooperation and exchange which have been allowed to languish in an era in which the military has been treated as the primary tool of U.S. security policy.

Transactional diplomacy isn’t working with North Korea – relational diplomacy might

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by Charles Knight, a version of this article appeared in The National Interest on 19 February 2019. This is a modestly revised version.

Complemented by:

A Path to Reductions of Conventional Forces on the Korean Peninsula” by Charles Knight, 2020.

➪  full English text:  PDF    or   ➪ Korean auto-translation (DeepL)

DPRK soldiers

The status quo is a failed approach to Korean conflict and tension; a failed policy that is at least partially responsible for North Korea becoming a small but real nuclear power.

Rather than continue to isolate North Korea, the new realities require America to bring nuclear North Korea into as close a relationship as possible—so that there are opportunities to influence the North in regards to responsibly and safely managing its nuclear weaponry. It is hard to imagine such trust between North Korea and the United States at this time, but the United States can encourage China to play a role in persuading North Korea.  Chinese and American interests align very closely regarding nuclear safety and restraint.

Choosing war & decline … or not

by Charles Knight, Huffington Post, 03 February 2016   HTML

“A cold war framework for our relations with China, Russia, and any other powers that might eventually align with them will almost certainly result in the addition of $200 to 300 billion in annual U.S. security expenditures. It would also very significantly divert the energies of Americans from many social and environmental goals. The U.S. will end up deferring domestic investments needed to sustain its economic strength.”

Vietnam Memorial

Image by Photopin

Afghan Army Now Ready … to lose to the Taliban

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by Charles Knight, Lobe Log, 19 September 2015.

A review of the well-informed and insightful study by M. Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Security Forces will not hold, and the implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2015.

The most serious deficit of the Afghan National Security Forces…is its lack of motivation in comparison to the Taliban. One of the primary lessons unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that soldiers in the armies we create, train, and equip are simply not willing to fight and die for weak, corrupt, illegitimate governments.
~ M. Chris Mason

Not a common global home, but a fine mess

Presentation by Carl Conetta on the “World Security Situation – Russia, Iraq, Syria, and Beyond” panel of the Economists for Peace and Security (EPS) symposium in Washington, DC, 17 November 2014. The panel included Richard Kaufman, Bill Hartung, and Heather Hurlburt.

 
HTML transcript
 
Audio immediately below

 
panel one EPS 1114

Something in the Air: ‘Isolationism,’ Defense Spending, and the US Public Mood

by Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, Center for International Policy, 14 October 2014.

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Something in the Air Is “neo-isolationism” captivating the American public? Or is interventionism back? Will the public continue to support reductions in defense spending?
 
The report offers a comprehensive and critical analysis of current and historical US public opinion polls on global engagement, military intervention, and defense spending. Significant fluctuation in public sentiments is evident. So is an enduring divide between elite opinion and the general public. The report assesses these in light of changes in US policy, strategic conditions, and the economy. It also examines the effect of partisan political dynamics on public debate and opinion. Seven tables and graphs.

The US “Asia Pivot” and “Air-Sea Battle” Concept: Toward Conflict with China?

by Carl Conetta. Originally published as “Will the QDR Pivot for Air-Sea Battle with China?” in Reset Defense Bulletin, 03 March 2014.

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Asia Pivot

Will China come to pose a peer military threat to the United States?  The Obama administration’s 2012 Strategic Defense Review and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) turn on this eventuality. Both the so-called “Asia pivot” and the evolving Air-Sea Battle (ASB) operational concept are meant to preclude it. But they may serve to precipitate it, instead.

US Policy on Syria: War or Diplomacy?

➪ HTML by Carl Conetta, editor, Project on Defense Alternatives Resource Compilation. Updated: 23 September 2013.    A Selection of Critical Views & Proposals:   ● War or diplomacy?   ● Intelligence   ● International Law   ● International & Domestic Support   ● Congressional War Authorization   ● A broader purpose, a wider war?  ● Military Factors  ● Collateral Effects of War  ● Cost Factors & Budget   ● Alternatives to war  ● General Background

Kerry for Keeping Option to Use Ground Forces ‘In the Event Syria Imploded’

➪ HTML by Charles Knight, Huffington Post, 06 September 2013. “A punishment raid is one thing, but using armed force to attempt to prevent proliferation from Syria is very different sort of activity. In the event of a chaotic collapse of the Assad regime and the disintegration of the Syrian military U.S. air-strikes alone will not be able to stop proliferation of the chemical weapons.”

Defense Sense – Fiscal Year 2014 Update: Options for National Security Savings

➪ PDF Project on Defense Alternatives, 26 June 2013. Outlines 16 recommendations that, taken together, achieve more than $22 billion in Pentagon savings in Fiscal Year 2014. Leading the list of savings options are reductions in military end strength, missile defense spending, and purchases of the F-35 Lightning II, Littoral Combat Ship, and Virginia-class submarine.

Military Intervention in Syria? — American People Show Greater Wisdom Than Washington

➪ HTML by Charles Knight, Huffington Post, 07 May 2013. Advocates for U.S. military intervention in Syria are presently confounded by wide and deep opposition from the American public to additional military interventions abroad. When strong majorities hold opinions opposing military intervention in Syria there is something other than isolationism going on. Indeed, a majority of Americans are far ahead of Washington in learning the hard lessons of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Three Leadership Steps for Peace in Korea

➪ HTML by Charles Knight, Huffington Post commentary, 15 April 2013.If you want China’s help on restraining the Nort Korean state you must make a credible promise to them that you will withdraw all U.S. forces and leave all bases on the peninsula after the old Stalinist regime collapses — as everyone expects it will sometime in the next twenty years. Otherwise, it is in China’s national interest to keep the North Korean regime limping along … as long as possible.”

Obama Getting Ready to Reduce Nukes: A Step in the Right Direction

➪ HTML by Charles Knight, Huffington Post, 28 February 2013. As the deployed force gets smaller it makes sense to reduce the complexity of the force structure. There is nothing magic about the triad created at the height of the Cold War. PDA has argued for moving to a dyad made up of submarines and land-based ICBMs. Ending the strategic nuclear role of bombers would reduce the requirement for (and the cost of) the new bomber currently in development and also allow the remaining bomber fleet to more effectively focus on a conventional role.

Striking a New Deal for Defense

➪ HTML by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, Government Executive, 13 February 2013. Whether or not the sequester goes into effect — or lasts only a couple of months — the Pentagon’s budget is surely coming down another notch or two. That’s simply the reality of the current economic and strategic circumstance. It’s time for defense leaders to plan accordingly. The surest way to make smaller Pentagon budgets work is to cut end strength and structure — fewer troops, brigades, ships and aircraft. In the near term this might be managed by reducing the number of soldiers and the size of units routinely stationed or rotated abroad.

President Obama Must Prepare for the Sequester Squeeze Play

➪ HTML by Charles Knight, Huffington Post, 01 February 2013. The squeeze play that is now underway will force a disruptive and self-limiting drawdown at the Pentagon that plays nicely to the “hollowing” narrative of hawks like McCain. It will be easy to use the “dire circumstances” at the Pentagon to make President Obama appear to be an ineffective and irresponsible Commander in Chief. To avoid this Obama must move now to set forth the vision and reasoning for a decisive drawdown which will sustain a top notch military with a lighter and smaller global footprint. That is the best strategy for America… and the best play for the White House.

Reasonable Defense: A Sustainable Approach to Securing the Nation

by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Report #21, 14 November 2012. 9 tables. The appendix provides an additional 18 tables and charts addressing personnel, force structure, and budgets.
PDF  ➪ summary PDF  ➪ appendix of tables and charts PDF.

sustainable defense Argues for a new balance among the various instruments of national power reflecting today’s strategic conditions.  Taking a realistic view of security needs, the report advocates a military 20% smaller than today’s. It advances a “discriminate defense” strategy that would focus the military on cost-effective missions and save $550 billion more than official plans over the next decade.