Iraq War

Afghan Army Now Ready … to lose to the Taliban

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by Charles Knight, Lobe Log, 19 September 2015.

A review of the well-informed and insightful study by M. Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Security Forces will not hold, and the implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2015.

The most serious deficit of the Afghan National Security Forces…is its lack of motivation in comparison to the Taliban. One of the primary lessons unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that soldiers in the armies we create, train, and equip are simply not willing to fight and die for weak, corrupt, illegitimate governments.
~ M. Chris Mason

Helicopters in America’s post-9/11 wars

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, Sep 2008   HTML |  PDF

This article is a chapter in Lutz Unterseher, Military Intervention and Common Sense: Focus on Land Forces (Berlin-Greifswald: Ryckschau, 2008.)

Drawing on the experiences of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the article assesses the role played by helicopters, reviewing their strengths and limits. The author suggests that a dilemma shadows the use of these aircraft. On the one hand, they offer a unique combination of mobility, flexibility, and agility in working closely with ground forces, providing reconnaissance, fire, maneuver, and logistical support. However, helicopters prove acutely sensitive to environmental conditions, are relatively fragile, and can be countered by multiple, relatively-inexpensive weapon systems.

These problems can be partially mitigated, but only in ways that substantially increase costs while narrowing the scope of the crafts’ usability. This has undercut notions of using helicopters in deep attack roles and large-scale helicopter assaults.

The article concludes by examining cost-effective roles for helicopters in combat. And it asks, Do tilt-rotor aircraft offer a viable alternative?

 

Quickly, Carefully, and Generously: The Necessary Steps for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) (summary) by Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq.  A Commonwealth Institute publication, 01 June 2008. Twenty-five initiatives the US can and should take to reduce violence and regional instability as the US leaves Iraq. Preface by U.S. Representative James P. McGovern (MA – 03).

Symposium: The Role of Force & the Armed Forces in US Foreign Policy — What have we learned?

Security Policy Working Group, 10 April 2008.

  • Andrew Bacevich, “The Origins and Demise of the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War”
  • Carl Conetta, “Out from the House of War: A Litmus for New Leadership in Security Policy” (printable .pdf)
  • David Gold, “How Much Defense Can We Afford? (printable .pdf), as republished in Challenge (Sept/Oct 2008)

Military Intervention and Common Sense: Focus on Land Forces

by Lutz Unterseher, Berlin-Greifswald: Ryckschau, 2008. Foreward by Charles Knight. Includes a chapter by Carl Conetta, Helicopters in the US wars since 9/11.   PDF  |  order paperback

book cover

[from the Foreward]
“This book…makes a major contribution to undoing the confusion for one class of increasingly likely 21st Century uses of military force. That is, internationally sanctioned military intervention using greater force than traditional peace-keeping and less than ‘war-fighting’.”

No good reason to boost Army, Marine Corps end strength

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Report #20, 31 January 2007. The proposal to add 92,000 personnel to US ground forces will combine with other initiatives to greatly increase America’s capacity to sustain large, protracted ground operations overseas. And it will enable an indefinite stay in Iraq. The rationale for this capability misconstrues the lessons of the Iraq war and America’s true security requirements. The memo also reviews recent and possible future deployment patterns.

Resolving Iraq: Progress depends on a short timeline for US troop withdrawal

(printable PDF version) by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Memo #40, 18 January 2007.  The memo argues that the large-scale US military presence in Iraq makes sustainable progress toward peace and stability there impossible. It advances an alternative approach to stabilizing Iraq that hinges on a short timeline for US troop withdrawal and a new international effort including Iraq’s neighbors.

War & Consequences: Global Terrorism has Increased Since 9/11 Attacks

(HTML version) (printable PDF version) by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Memo #38, 25 September 2006. The memo analyzes the change in the incidence of terrorism since 11 September 2001, finding a distinct increase. It also summarizes the findings of various studies on the relationship between the Iraq war and terrorism which show that in the words of one, the Iraq war “has reinforced the determination of terrorists who were already committed to attacking the West and motivated others who were not.”

Fighting on Borrowed Time: The Effect on US Military Readiness of America’s post-9/11 Wars

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Report #19, 11 September 2006. To sustain today’s wars, the Bush administration has adopted a policy of “risk displacement”. High optempo is maintained in Iraq and Afghanistan at the expense of readiness elsewhere and for other missions. The policy also saps future readiness. It may take the US military half a decade to recover.

Pyrrhus on the Potomac: How America’s post-9/11 wars have undermined US national security

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Report #18, 05 September 2006.  A net assessment of America’s post-911 security policy shows it to be “pyrrhic” in character: although progress has been made in disrupting Al Qaeda, the broader effect has been to increase the threat to the United States, while weakening the nation’s capacity to respond effectively.

More troops for Iraq? Time to just say “No”

(printable PDF version) (HTML version)  by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Memo #39, 09 January 2006.  There is no reason to believe that a marginal increase in the US troop presence in Iraq will turn the tide there. The memo reviews relevant data on troop strength, insurgent activity, and Iraqi public opinion. It traces America’s troubles in Iraq to the nature of the mission, which it concludes is founded on strategic error.

400 Days and Out: A Strategy for Solving the Iraq Impasse

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta. PDA Briefing Memo #34, 19 July 2005.The memo outlines a strategy for substantially defusing the Iraqi insurgency, de-escalating the inter-communal conflict there, and enabling near-total US troop withdrawal by September 2006.

Appendix: The Iraqi Insurgency & Iraq Security Force Development: Selected Bibliography

Vicious Circle: The Dynamics of Occupation and Resistance in Iraq, Part One. Patterns of Popular Discontent

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) (summary) by Carl Conetta. PDA Research Monograph #10, 18 May 2005. An analysis of Iraqi public opinion data and interviews suggests that coalition military activity is contributing substantially to anti-coalition sentiments. A “vicious circle” is indicated, whereby counter-insurgent operations create support for the insurgency. The report tracks coalition military activity and relates it to Iraqi discontent and insurgent activity. Differences among Iraqi communities are also assessed.

Agonizing Issue: is torture ever justified in military interrogations of terror suspects?

(HTML version) (printable PDF version) interview with Charles Knight, co-director, Project on Defense Alternatives and Alfred P. Rubin, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Law, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, transcript edited by Jim Cronin, The Boston Globe Magazine, 30 January 2005.  The United States is now training hundreds, maybe thousands, of new interrogators.  Abusive relationships traumatize both the victim and the abuser. We are training and having our own people experience this abuse, and they will be returning home to our communities. We know from studies of domestic abuse that this abusive pattern can be replicated through generations.