Iraq War
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The Wages of War: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict
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Catastrophic Interdiction: Air Power and the Collapse of the Iraqi Field Army in the 2003 War
Burning Down the House: How the Iraq War Will Affect the International System
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Inspecting Iraq: A Record of the First 40 Days
First Strike Guidelines: the case of Iraq
Bush Raises the Stakes in Iraq
Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to combat al-Qaeda and the new terrorism
Rotocraft for War: Descending on a Military Dilemma
Air Power Promises and Modernization Trends after Operation Desert Storm
by Alan Bloomgarden and Carl Conetta, Dec 1994.
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This article first appeared in 1994 in a slightly edited form in Hawk Journal, the annual publication of the Royal Air Force Staff College.
The expectation of an airpower revolution began in earnest soon after victory in the first US-Iraq Gulf War, 1990-1991. Drawing extensively on official and outside expert assessment of airpower in “Operation Desert Storm,” this article critically reviews the evidence for an airpower revolution while summarizing a range of contemporary opinions on the issue.
Specifically, the article examines three claims advanced by airpower enthusiasts at the dawn of the post-Cold War period: that the Gulf War experience suggests greatly expanded options for limited-aims “raiding missions,” strategic bombing campaigns, and airpower dominance over the ground battle (using improved battlefield interdiction and close air support.)
Included are summaries of the extensive Gulf War Air Power Survey and other surveys of the war which provide an unsurpassed view of the war’s dynamics. It also examines the technologies, contemporary and in development, central to the putative airpower revolution.