Principles for Building Confidence and Stability into National Defenses and International Security – toward sufficient, affordable, robust, and reliable defense postures

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by Charles Knight and Carl Conetta, 01 February 2021 (revised 15 March 2022.)  

Adapted from Carl Conetta, Charles Knight, and Lutz Unterseher, “Building Confidence into the Security of Southern Africa,” PDA Briefing Report #7. Commonwealth Institute, 1996.

balanced & stable

By bringing military structures into line with defensive political goals, the non-provocation standard facilitates the emergence of trusting, cooperative, peaceful political relations among nations. In contrast, any doctrine and force posture oriented to project power into other countries is provocative — unless reliably restrained by political and organizational structures.

Korea versus Korea: Conventional Military Balance and the Path to Disarmament

by Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher, Lit Verlag, Munster, Germany, April 2020.

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Chapter: “A Path to Reductions of Conventional Forces on the Korean Peninsula” by Charles Knight.

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korea vs korea cover

Varied incremental steps that embody and signal the accumulating commitment to a minimally acceptable common political future for Korea are key to this process. Progressive reduction of cross-border invasion threats through mutual confidence building force restructuring will constitute a virtuous circle of reinforcement for a changed relationship. [Through the] accumulation of the sunk costs of iterative reciprocity North and South Korea will arrive at a point where the demonstrated commitment to smaller restructured military postures is sufficient to allow rapid progress toward a stable level and disposition of arms compatible with a new peaceful political relationship.   ~ Knight

Die Konfrontation auf der Halbinsel, mit offensivir Oreintierung und Bereitschaft zur Praemption, impliziert Stabilitatsrisiken. Diese werden noch erhoht durch Entwicklung und Einfuhrung prazier ballistischer Raketen, welche die Illusion nahren, den Gegner im Konfilktfall ‘enthaupten’ zu konnen.   ~ Unterseher

Transactional diplomacy isn’t working with North Korea – relational diplomacy might

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by Charles Knight, a version of this article appeared in The National Interest on 19 February 2019. This is a modestly revised version.

Complemented by:

A Path to Reductions of Conventional Forces on the Korean Peninsula” by Charles Knight, 2020.

➪  full English text:  PDF    or   ➪ Korean auto-translation (DeepL)

DPRK soldiers

The status quo is a failed approach to Korean conflict and tension; a failed policy that is at least partially responsible for North Korea becoming a small but real nuclear power.

Rather than continue to isolate North Korea, the new realities require America to bring nuclear North Korea into as close a relationship as possible—so that there are opportunities to influence the North in regards to responsibly and safely managing its nuclear weaponry. It is hard to imagine such trust between North Korea and the United States at this time, but the United States can encourage China to play a role in persuading North Korea.  Chinese and American interests align very closely regarding nuclear safety and restraint.

Pleasant Lunches: Western Track-Two Influence on Gorbachev’s Conventional Forces Initiative of 1988

by Lutz Unterseher, PDA Guest Publication, August 2018. ➪ PDF

Secretary-General Gorbachev’s astounding and pivotal speech to the UN General Assembly in December of 1988 announced substantial reductions and defensive restructuring of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe.

Lutz Unterseher, living at that time in Bonn, West Germany, was a leading developer of the concepts of the confidence-building restructuring of armed forces intended to reduce East-West military tensions and improve crisis stability. There is no doubt that some of these concepts were influential with Soviet officials in Gorbachev’s closest circles. This article is Lutz Unterseher’s recollection of some of his most consequential interactions with Soviet analysts and diplomats in the several years before Gorbachev’s announcement of the force reductions and restructuring.

Military Intervention and Common Sense: Focus on Land Forces

by Lutz Unterseher, Berlin-Greifswald: Ryckschau, 2008. Foreward by Charles Knight. Includes a chapter by Carl Conetta, Helicopters in the US wars since 9/11.   PDF  |  order paperback

book cover

[from the Foreward]
“This book…makes a major contribution to undoing the confusion for one class of increasingly likely 21st Century uses of military force. That is, internationally sanctioned military intervention using greater force than traditional peace-keeping and less than ‘war-fighting’.”

A Few Thoughts on the Evolution of Infantry: Past, Present, Future

by Lutz Unterseher, Guest Publication, Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik, Berlin, Germany, May 2006.  PDF  | HTML 
Subduing resistance and guarding the peace in modern interventions requires high-quality infantry, but it is erroneous to think the job could be done by elite SOF forces because there can never be enough of these. The vast majority of the all-volunteer armies in the industrial West face a problem when it comes to attracting sufficient personnel: relatively few recruits are good enough to receive the more demanding training needed — creating a dilemma that has rarely been addressed and one that certainly is yet to be solved by today’s armies.

Rotocraft for War: Descending on a Military Dilemma

(HTML version) by Dr. Lutz Unterseher, PDA Briefing Memo #19, May 2001. Offers a critical assessment of the value of combat helicopters in modern war with examination of the technical characteristics and limits of combat helicopters, the doctrine for their use, and issues of cost. Case studies include the Gulf War, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.

Interventionism Reconsidered: Reconciling Military Action With Political Stability

(HTML version) by Lutz Unterseher, September 1999. When troops trained, structured, and equipped for traditional peacekeeping are employed in missions such as the protection of humanitarian sanctuaries and convoys under acute threat they are not prepared for forceful measures sufficient to deal with and discourage military challenges. This paper discusses what would constitute “adequacy” of force that does not have a character or magnitude that compromises the primacy of political conflict resolution. A revised version of a paper was contributed to a 1999 workshop held at the University of Melbourne’s Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues on the topic, The Ethics of Armed Intervention.

Defense Sufficiency and Cooperation: A US Military Posture for the post-Cold War Era

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives briefing report, 01 March 1998.  ⇒ HTML  ⇒ PDF
This study presents a comprehensive and coherent US military posture option for a fifteen-year period beginning in 1998. While maintaining continuity of key aspects of US security strategy, it finds ample opportunity for further reductions in forces size and consequently in budget. Includes specification of force structure, equipment holdings, deployment, modernization plans, and defense budgets.

Building Confidence into the Security of Southern Africa

by Carl Conetta, Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher. PDA Briefing Report #7, July 1996 (revised November 1996). ➪ HTML
Appendix: A Confidence-Building and Affordable South African Defence in 2001.

 

 

This report offers guidelines for the development of cooperative regional security and specifies a South African defense posture that would support and encourage cooperation. It includes specifications of the fundamentals of a confidence-building defense posture for the region.

Defensive Restructuring in the Successor States of the former-Yugoslavia

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta, Charles Knight, and Lutz Unterseher, PDA Briefing Report #8, March 1996.
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This report offers an alternative to “balancing” the arms in the former Yugoslavia by way of transfers and military aid. Instead, it illustrates the restructuring of the region’s militaries toward greater stability with “mutual defensive superiority.” This study was initiated at the request of Ambassador Jonathan Dean who serves on PDA’s Research Advisory Board.

Design for a 15,000-person UN Legion

(HTML version) by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, Briefing Report 8, October 1995. Prepared for members of the UN Military Force Study Group of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, this report presents a design for a streamlined UN Legion capable of deploying rapidly for a wide range of peace operations. It addresses operational requirements, command and unit structure, equipment, basing, and budget. It is published as Appendix: Design for a Streamlined UN Legion in Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer UN Military Force, Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1996.

Vital Force: A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for the Creation of a UN Legion

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, PDA Research Monograph #4, October 1995. 141 pp. 11 figures. 13 tables.
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Reviews the problems of contemporary peace operations, recent reform proposals, and the requirements for successful operations. Includes a detailed proposal for enhancing and reorganizing the capacities of the UN to support and direct peace operations and for establishing a UN legion of three brigades.


Selections from Vital Force are also available in HTML format:

Nonoffensive Defense and the Transformation of US Defense Posture: Is Nonoffensive Defense Compatible with Global Power?

by Carl Conetta, July 1995. Paper presented at the Nonoffensive Defence in a Global Perspective Seminar in Copenhagen, 04-05 February 1995. Originally published in NOD and Conversion, no. 33, July 1995.

 

Discusses the application of nonoffensive defense concepts to a revision of US military policy and as a design principle for global system transformation. Regarding US power, it looks specifically at the potential for reorientation of power projection forces and military assistance programs.

Confidence-Building Defense: a comprehensive approach to security and stability in the new era

by Carl Conetta and Lutz Unterseher. May 1994.
Newly published in ➪ PDF.

Originally, this primer was written and then published in spiral-bound book format for a series of seminars sponsored by the Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS) and the Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA).  These seminars were held in 1994 in several of the newly sovereign states of Europe: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Belarus.

In 1994 no suitable seminar host was found in Ukraine.  Although confidence-building defenses can not solve all of Ukraine’s strategic dilemmas during the present war with Russia, initial evidence strongly suggests that its military has made successful use of some of the principal aspects of a confidence-building defense.

The primer remains one of the most comprehensive presentations of the concepts of Confidence-Building Defense (C-BD), including details of their application to the structuring and operations of national armed forces.  It totals 116 pages with 94 charts and tables.

Although some details of arms and tactics change over time, the fundamentals remain relevant to present-day international security, military planning, and the furthering of peaceful relations.

 

Defensive Military Structures in Action: Historical Examples

➪ PDF ➪ HTML by Carl Conetta, Charles Knight, and Lutz Unterseher, May 1994.

 

Winter War FinlandExamines three significant cases in the last 90 years where defensive preparations, structures, and tactics were of decisive importance in major military operations. Published initially in Confidence-Building Defense: A Comprehensive Approach to Security & Stability in the New Era, Study Group on Alternative Security Policy and Project on Defense Alternatives, 1994.

Fundamental Design Principles of Confidence-Building Defense

by Carl Conetta and Lutz Unterseher, 1994.  ➪PDF

A selection of slides as prepared for seminars held in Holland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Belarus in 1994. These were used in presentations and included in the seminar briefing book, Confidence-Building Defense: a comprehensive approach to security and stability in the new era.

The seminars were organized and co-sponsored by the Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS) and the Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA).

The principles of Confidence Building Defense remain relevant to the aspirations and strategic interests of nations that have suffered mutual enmity and military standoff and now seek to create the conditions for lasting peace and to reduce the size of their militaries while advancing their essential national security.

Confidence Building Defense

Toward Defensive Restructuring in the Middle East

by Carl Conetta, Charles Knight, and Lutz Unterseher, PDA Research Monograph #1, February 1991.
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Examines the character of force structure and military conflict in the Middle East and outlines a nonoffensive defense posture for nations in the region. It also draws the implications of such a posture for arms transfers and arms control policy. An appendix reviews the pertinent lessons of the 1990-91 Gulf War.

An edited version of this article appeared in the 01 April 1991 issue of The Bulletin of Peace Proposals (now Security Dialogue).

How Low Can NATO Go?

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, Defense and Disarmament Alternatives, Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies, 13 February 1990.  ➪ PDF

For a summary of the contemporary European conventional arms control situation see Thomas K. Longstreth, “The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe,” FAS Public Interest Report Vol. 41 No. 2, February 1988  ➪ PDF

spider in web

Defensive Restructuring of Ground Forces in Europe – workshop report

rapporteur, Carl Conetta. A workshop co-sponsored by the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies and the RAND Corporation featuring a presentation by Lutz Unterseher, a response by Barry Posen, and participant discussion, Washington, DC, 17 January 1989. PDF

In his presentation Unterseher warned that unless conventional arms reductions in Europe are combined with defensive reductions, they could actually undermine rather than improve stability by increasing both sides’ vulnerability to surprise attack. Posen agreed but judged that any significant shift toward a SAS-type alternative is not now feasible.  Instead, a step-by-step process of bilateral reductions and restructuring might work.

Joint US-Soviet Seminar on Conventional Arms Reductions in Europe

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by Carl Conetta, Conference Report, in Defense and Disarmament Alternatives, the newsletter of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), January 1989.

Jonathan Dean in MoscowReport on the September 1988 conference, co-hosted by the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), of  Soviet and US arms control and military policy specialists. The report summarizes the exchange regarding problems and prospects for conventional force reductions in Europe.

These meetings happened a little less than two months before President Gorbachev’s historic announcement at the UN in December of 1988 of substantial unilateral reductions and defensive restructuring of Soviet troops in eastern Europe – one of the most significant policy shifts in the process of ending the European Cold War. This international conference likely had more import than most.

The Sometimes You Win and Sometimes You Lose Hypothesis: Some Comments on the Use of Models in Force Comparisons

by Charles Knight, 18 March 1988. PDF

In this previously unpublished paper from 1988, the author reviews various models for simulating war along the Central Front in Germany and their relevance for finding a stable conventional force balance in Europe (and elsewhere.)  Force structures that tend to produce stable outcomes in battlefield simulations are likely to have more deterrent value in the real world.

battle simulation

 

“[C]omplex models [can] be very useful in distinguishing the conditions (i.e. force structures, tactics, and armaments) that produce chaotic, oscillating, or unstable outcomes from those that produce stable outcomes.
“The outcome of a conflict between balanced forces as currently structured is unknowable and unpredictable. This would seem to support the position that no stable conventional deterrent to war can be built, short of overwhelming superiority.  If that was as far as our analysis went, we [might] end up giving support to flexible response doctrine with its fundamentally unstable nuclear deterrent component. Of course, the favored option is to model restructured conventional forces that can take us out of the chaotic conventional battlefield and give us stable outcomes.”