Wars & Military Operations

Ukraine: Options for a Confidence-Building Defense

by Lutz Unterseher, PDA guest publication, Berlin, LIT Publishing,  March 2024.  ➪ download (free) book: PDF

PDA is pleased to offer Lutz Unterseher’s book Ukraine: Options for a Confidence-Building Defense in English for the first time.

International politics looks grim for Ukraine — The country has lost the U.S. as its primary war sponsor.

Ukraine must discover and adopt new means to secure itself quickly.

This book offers a military security option for Ukraine that “helps people to help themselves.”

Untersher continues,

It is about self-sustaining, emphatically defensive military protection: without integration into a military alliance and suitable as a possible building block of an all-European security system.

For more about this book, see https://comw.org/pda/ukraine-a-future-with-a-self-sustaining-defense/

For a sketch of an all-European military security system see:  “European Army”: A Thought Experiment

 

Lift the Sanctions: The Principal Danger in Syria Today is Instability

Carl Conetta, 22 January 2025. Full text ⇒ HTML – PDF

The most critical international security goal regarding Syria today is the country’s stabilization – and that requires immediate and substantial aid and sanction relief. The question on which recognition of the new government should most hinge is whether it can achieve sovereign authority in the country and do so without the type of human rights abuses or cross-border militancy that pose a threat to regional peace. Given the urgency of stabilizing the country, the new government provisionally meets this criteria. Should it change course and pose a threat to regional peace, the international community can adjust policy accordingly.

Two outstanding challenges to sovereignty and legitimacy are the presence of foreign troops – Israeli, Turkish, and US – and the status of Kurdish areas. Especially acute is the triangular relationship among Damascus, Ankara, and Syria’s Kurdish community, which is among the issues addressed in this viewpoint. As for foreign troops: 15,000-20,000 currently occupy the country. Affirming Syrian sovereignty entails expeditiously withdrawing all those forces not explicitly invited by the new government.

A related concern is the remnants of the Islamic State (ISIL) in Syria, including the 40,000+ cadre, family members, and displaced persons interned in camps run by the Kurdish authorities. Going forward, the task of managing and combating IS remnants on Syrian territory should fall to Damascus, acting together with Kurdish and foreign partners as it sees fit. The threat that IS affiliates and aspirants pose to the United States and the broader international community have been and are most effectively addressed through measure of homeland security and law enforcement. Securing the US homeland does not require the ongoing deployment of US troops in Syria, which would inadvertently undermine the legitimacy of the new government

A Significant Change in Russian Doctrine on Nuclear Weapon Use

Carl Conetta, 26 Sept 2024. Full text ⇒ HTML

Speaking to the Russian Presidential Security Council on Sept 25, 2024, Vladimir Putin asserted that “Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state… supported by a nuclear power should be treated as their joint attack.” But what does this imply for the Ukraine war and more generally? Although the announcement reaffirms several long-standing provisions of Russian nuclear weapon doctrine, it does add something new and portentous. It asserts that Russia may reply to a massive aerial attack on the homeland while it is underway even if the attack is purely conventional. The perceived “massiveness” of the attack is held practically speaking to be equivalent to an existential attack. The new view may also imply that such an attack by Ukraine would be considered a joint UA-NATO attack and possibly warrant a similar response.

Putin verbatim: Ukraine’s Use of NATO Deep Strike Missiles Would Put West at War with Russia

14 Sept 2024. Full Text = HTML

Pres. Putin says that Ukraine’s use of Western long-range high-precision weapons to strike deep inside Russia would require Western satellite guidance and personnel support to “assign flight missions to these missile systems.” Thus, as he sees it, the West would be directly involved in such strikes, and this would put “NATO countries… at war with Russia.” Contains full official statement.

Why the Biden Cease-fire Proposal Will Not End the Gaza War Despite UN Approval

Carl Conetta, 12 June 2024. Full text ⇒ HTML

The proposal that the Biden administration attributes to Israel does not promise an end to the war, much less Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. While claiming to support the proposal, Prime Minister Netanyahu also asserts that “we have maintained the goals of the war, first of them the destruction of Hamas.” Is this consistent with the proposal? It is. How?

Brinkmanship and Nuclear Threat in the Ukraine War

Carl Conetta, 31 May 2023. Full text ⇒ HTML – PDF

Western leaders and Kyiv pledge to “stay the course” despite Russian nuclear threats. But does western brinkmanship in the Ukraine war depend on denying there is a brink? This short article examines “nuclear threat denialism” and its function in war policy. It explores Moscow’s most likely but occluded nuclear option and the unique danger it represents. And the post examines the relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the current conflict.

Catastrophe: The Global Cost of the Ukraine War

Carl Conetta, 02 May 2023. see article ⇒ HTML or PDF

The war has been a disaster for Ukraine, but also a calamity for the world. This brief article provides a concise overview of the war’s profound global effects, beginning with the combatants’ cost in lives and treasure. Beyond this it assesses the war’s impact on global trade and economy; energy and food price inflation and their effects on poverty, hunger, and mortality; the redirection of humanitarian and official development assistance; the total sum of aid to the Ukrainian war effort, and the estimated cost of postwar reconstruction and recovery. Also examined is the war’s effect on global defense spending. The article also provides copious citations to support further inquiry.

Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy

The probability of Russian nuclear use related to the Ukraine war is rising – but why?  Neither Washington nor Brussels fully apprehend the risk.

by Carl Conetta, 02 Feb 2023 – Full report: HTML or PDF  Summary: HTML or PDF

This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

The “Stable Nuclear Deterrent” collapses in the Ukraine War

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by Charles Knight, 17 October 2022

The Ukraine War presents a more dangerous nuclear risk than the Cuban Missile Crisis and demands more careful rationality and restraint by Russia and the US. Can we Iskender nuclear capable missiledepend on that rationality and restraint? Probably not.

However, there are some things that the US and NATO can do to reduce the probability that Moscow will opt to use nuclear weaponry. This article lists those steps.

The article also explains why any remaining “stable mutual deterrence” between the US and Russia is presently extremely fragile. It concludes:

The US/NATO war effort in Ukraine must remain deliberately limited. Beyond that, we must resist the usual war fevers (beset with visions of victory over evil) that take nations toward total war.

Did NATO expansion prompt the Russian attack on Ukraine?

The short answer is “no” – but there is more to the issue than that. A closer look at the road to war illuminates paths to a negotiated end

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by Carl Conetta, 10 June 2022

 

With no end in sight, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is an unfolding catastrophe for Ukraine, the region, and the world. Besides increasing battlefield death and destruction, the war and how it is being fought promise global economic recession, severe food crisis, a surging flow of refugees, pandemic revival, and a transnational flood of illicit military weapons and munitions.

This essay looks at the policies that shaped the contention leading to war, and that increased the likelihood of conflict. It looks at the effects of NATO expansion and military activism, the “color revolutions” in Ukraine, the disposition of Crimea, the rebellions in Ukraine’s east, the Minsk process, Putin’s revisionism, Russia’s security concerns, and how the USA and Europe responded to the intensifying friction between Moscow and Kyiv. Through closely examining the policies conditioning the conflict, this analysis aims to identify potential “exit ramps” for all involved.

Russia-Ukraine War: Estimating Casualties & Military Equipment Losses

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by Carl Conetta, updated 02 April 2022

How do the two sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict compare in terms of personnel and equipment losses?  These seemingly objective measures are subject to an intensive propaganda war. This brief analysis examines multiple sources of data to find that the combatants are actually not far apart in the percentage of equipment attrition they have suffered. And Russian personnel fatalities are likely in the range of 3,500 (April 2). Contrary to the messaging of the two sides, both would seem able to sustain combat for a considerable time longer. Unfortunately, as Russian forces have transitioned to a heavier, more firepower-dominant mode of warfare, Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure are suffering more death and destruction. While this might argue for increased emphasis on war containment and diplomatic efforts, the most evocative messaging on the western side emphasizes Russian miscalculation and fumbling, Ukraine’s adept resistance, and the promise of war termination via increased investment in the war.

And so now… It’s war?

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by Carl Conetta, 21 Feb 2022

The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. The short essay examines them both, asking how did we get here? It concludes with the question: Is it harder to live with autonomy for the Ukrainian rebel areas than it is to face regional war?

Putin’s Next, Best Move – The Logic and Limits of Russian Action on Ukraine

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Carl Conetta, 14 Feb 2022

Moscow will act when and if it declares that the West has escalated contention rather than responding positively to its entreaties – principally those regarding NATO expansion and implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Recent US/NATO troop deployments and weapon transfers to Ukraine may already count as relevant escalation. Russian forces surrounding Ukraine stand at an exceptionally high level of readiness and significantly exceed the scale of previous deployments. A full-scale invasion aiming to seize the whole of Ukraine seems unlikely. Indeed, Russian action may involve no more than large-scale conveyance of weapons and munitions to the rebel areas, possibly along with an influx of “volunteers.” Several other options ranging between these two are discussed in the essay.

Resolving the Ukraine Crisis

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by Carl Conetta, 26 Jan 2022


The basic elements of a solution to the Ukraine crisis are ready at hand – and have been since Feb 2015. These are the provisions of the Minsk II Protocol. This Reset Defense blog post reviews the impediments to Minsk II implementation and suggests a way forward. The key to progress is cooperation among the outside powers supporting the Ukraine contestants (i.e., Kyivv government and rebels). These benefactors must make their material support contingent on the near-term implementation of Minsk II. Another key element missing from the current agreement is the provision for a substantial peacekeeping and monitoring force to oversee the demilitarization of the area, temporarily control its external and internal borders, and secure an election.

 

To End America’s Longest War the US-Korea Alliance Must Change

➪ see full post: HTML   PDF

by Charles Knight, initially published by the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, 22 December 2021.

This article reports on South Korean President Moon’s latest peace initiative, which has achieved an agreement “in principle” by the U.S., North Korea, China, and South Korea to negotiate an “end-of-war declaration.”  Recently, the U.S. appeared to have modified its nuclear disarmament approach, accepting that “step by step” is the realistic way to proceed.  A few article excerpts:

A step-by-step approach requires give and take, [implying] that the U.S. might ultimately have to settle for some tempering of the North’s nuclear arsenal rather than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID.)

…a strategy of waiting patiently for sanctions to force Pyongyang’s capitulation…overlooks how existentially critical nuclear weaponry has become in North Korea’s strategic calculus. Without an adequate national security alternative, Pyongyang will most likely choose to suffer indefinitely under the economic pain of sanctions, however severe.

Alliances cannot and do not last forever. To endure from one era to another, they must adapt and change. If Washington returns to old habits of leveraging its hegemonic will to control affairs on the Korean Peninsula, it may reap the unintended consequence of hastening the end of the alliance.

Afghanistan: What Just Happened? What Comes Next?

Can the United States escape the vortex of its 20-year war?

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by Carl Conetta, 09 Sept 2021.

This article assesses the calamitous end of America’s 20-year war and the effort of US interventionists to use public distress about the airport chaos to blunt and distract from an adequate appraisal of the war that produced it.

The war was defined from the start by an impossible mission shrouded in misinformation. Intelligence agencies failed to give useful intelligence over a span of not just 4 months, but 20 years. And the article asks, Can we escape the political and strategic dynamics that produce and sustain such wars?

It concludes by examining how some Western powers are now looking to continue the conflict via other means. Against this, the author proposes a stability-oriented approach that would energetically explore areas of possible US-Taliban cooperation, a new positive context in which areas of difference might be productively addressed.

Afghanistan: The Fog at the End of the Tunnel

 

see full-text: HTML or PDF   

by Carl Conetta, 19 June 2021

What is causing the uncertainty about when US ground forces will exit Afghanistan?

The Biden administration insists that logistical factors explain its breach of the 2020 US-Taliban agreement, which reset the exit date from May to September. Logistical factors were also used to explain why the date may be moved back to July. Actually, logistical issues explain neither. Using current data and historical precedent, this short analysis shows why.

An alternative explanation for the delay is that it gave Washington more time to pursue some of its unfinished goals regarding Afghanistan. In this, the lingering troop presence serves as leverage.

What goals? Improve Kabul’s military posture, polish plans and preparations for US forces to “fight from afar,” and pursue dramatic new international initiatives aiming to lock the Taliban into a cease-fire, peace settlement, and government reform plan substantially defined by the USA. This high risk-gambit won’t succeed, but it might prolong the conflict and America’s involvement in it.

They made a desolation and called it “A Good War”

 

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By Carl Conetta, Reset Defense Blog, 04 February 2021.

This article (with extensive bibliography) surveys, at the 20-year mark, the consequences of the US regime change, occupation, and nation-building exercise in Afghanistan. Drawing on US DOD and congressional research agency reports, media investigations, and NGO analyses it anchors the broad public impression of full-spectrum failure. It reviews the human and financial costs of the war, the failures of reconstruction, and the ongoing dysfunction of Afghan governance.

America’s debacle in Afghanistan, which echoes the Soviet failure during the 1980s, indicates that nations are not the type of thing that can be built according to a foreign blueprint, and especially not at the point of a gun. Outsiders lack the knowledge, indigenous roots, legitimacy, and degree of interest to prevail. Indeed, their very presence is provocative, especially given differences in language, religion, and culture.

Why is withdrawal so difficult? The article concludes that domestic political and institutional considerations are more important than any strategic rationale or cost-benefit analysis. Once committed, no political or military leader, nor the Pentagon cares to own responsibility for failure. And hubris generates an endless succession of imagined “new paths” to success. But as success proves forever elusive, so does withdrawal. In a perverse sense, it is persistent failure that keeps America mired for decades in this and other desultory wars.

Michèle Flournoy reveals why US troops may stay in Afghanistan – indefinitely

by Carl Conetta, Reset Defense Blog, 3 December 2020

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“Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan,” USIP panel w/ Michèle Flournoy & Stephen Hadley. 18 Feb 2020

Commentary on “Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan: Washington Perspectives on a US-Taliban Agreement” – A US Institute of Peace panel w/ Michèle Flournoy and Stephen Hadley, February 18, 2020

Afghan Army Now Ready … to lose to the Taliban

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by Charles Knight, Lobe Log, 19 September 2015.

A review of the well-informed and insightful study by M. Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Security Forces will not hold, and the implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2015.

The most serious deficit of the Afghan National Security Forces…is its lack of motivation in comparison to the Taliban. One of the primary lessons unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that soldiers in the armies we create, train, and equip are simply not willing to fight and die for weak, corrupt, illegitimate governments.
~ M. Chris Mason

Kerry for Keeping Option to Use Ground Forces ‘In the Event Syria Imploded’

➪ HTML by Charles Knight, Huffington Post, 06 September 2013. “A punishment raid is one thing, but using armed force to attempt to prevent proliferation from Syria is very different sort of activity. In the event of a chaotic collapse of the Assad regime and the disintegration of the Syrian military U.S. air-strikes alone will not be able to stop proliferation of the chemical weapons.”

Helicopters in America’s post-9/11 wars

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, Sep 2008   HTML |  PDF

This article is a chapter in Lutz Unterseher, Military Intervention and Common Sense: Focus on Land Forces (Berlin-Greifswald: Ryckschau, 2008.)

Drawing on the experiences of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the article assesses the role played by helicopters, reviewing their strengths and limits. The author suggests that a dilemma shadows the use of these aircraft. On the one hand, they offer a unique combination of mobility, flexibility, and agility in working closely with ground forces, providing reconnaissance, fire, maneuver, and logistical support. However, helicopters prove acutely sensitive to environmental conditions, are relatively fragile, and can be countered by multiple, relatively-inexpensive weapon systems.

These problems can be partially mitigated, but only in ways that substantially increase costs while narrowing the scope of the crafts’ usability. This has undercut notions of using helicopters in deep attack roles and large-scale helicopter assaults.

The article concludes by examining cost-effective roles for helicopters in combat. And it asks, Do tilt-rotor aircraft offer a viable alternative?

 

Quickly, Carefully, and Generously: The Necessary Steps for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq

(printable PDF version) (HTML version) (summary) by Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq.  A Commonwealth Institute publication, 01 June 2008. Twenty-five initiatives the US can and should take to reduce violence and regional instability as the US leaves Iraq. Preface by U.S. Representative James P. McGovern (MA – 03).

Symposium: The Role of Force & the Armed Forces in US Foreign Policy — What have we learned?

Security Policy Working Group, 10 April 2008.

  • Andrew Bacevich, “The Origins and Demise of the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War”
  • Carl Conetta, “Out from the House of War: A Litmus for New Leadership in Security Policy” (printable .pdf)
  • David Gold, “How Much Defense Can We Afford? (printable .pdf), as republished in Challenge (Sept/Oct 2008)