Carl Conetta, 26 Sept 2024. Full text ⇒ HTML
Speaking to the Russian Presidential Security Council on Sept 25, 2024, Vladimir Putin asserted that “Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state… supported by a nuclear power should be treated as their joint attack.” But what does this imply for the Ukraine war and more generally? Although the announcement reaffirms several long-standing provisions of Russian nuclear weapon doctrine, it does add something new and portentous. It asserts that Russia may reply to a massive aerial attack on the homeland while it is underway even if the attack is purely conventional. The perceived “massiveness” of the attack is held practically speaking to be equivalent to an existential attack. The new view may also imply that such an attack by Ukraine would be considered a joint UA-NATO attack and possibly warrant a similar response.
Carl Conetta, 12 June 2024. Full text ⇒ 
Carl Conetta, 31 May 2023. Full text ⇒ 
by Carl Conetta, 30 May 2023.
Carl Conetta, 02 May 2023. see article ⇒ 
by Carl Conetta, 02 Feb 2023 – Full report: 
depend on that rationality and restraint? Probably not.
How do the two sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict compare in terms of personnel and equipment losses? These seemingly objective measures are subject to an intensive propaganda war. This brief analysis examines multiple sources of data to find that the combatants are actually not far apart in the percentage of equipment attrition they have suffered. And Russian personnel fatalities are likely in the range of 3,500 (April 2). Contrary to the messaging of the two sides, both would seem able to sustain combat for a considerable time longer. Unfortunately, as Russian forces have transitioned to a heavier, more firepower-dominant mode of warfare, Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure are suffering more death and destruction. While this might argue for increased emphasis on war containment and diplomatic efforts, the most evocative messaging on the western side emphasizes Russian miscalculation and fumbling, Ukraine’s adept resistance, and the promise of war termination via increased investment in the war.
The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. The short essay examines them both, asking how did we get here? It concludes with the question: Is it harder to live with autonomy for the Ukrainian rebel areas than it is to face regional war?
Moscow will act when and if it declares that the West has escalated contention rather than responding positively to its entreaties – principally those regarding NATO expansion and implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Recent US/NATO troop deployments and weapon transfers to Ukraine may already count as relevant escalation. Russian forces surrounding Ukraine stand at an exceptionally high level of readiness and significantly exceed the scale of previous deployments. A full-scale invasion aiming to seize the whole of Ukraine seems unlikely. Indeed, Russian action may involve no more than large-scale conveyance of weapons and munitions to the rebel areas, possibly along with an influx of “volunteers.” Several other options ranging between these two are discussed in the essay.
The basic elements of a solution to the Ukraine crisis are ready at hand – and have been since Feb 2015. These are the provisions of the Minsk II Protocol. This 
The most serious deficit of the Afghan National Security Forces…is its lack of motivation in comparison to the Taliban. One of the primary lessons unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that soldiers in the armies we create, train, and equip are simply not willing to fight and die for weak, corrupt, illegitimate governments.
Drawing on the experiences of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the article assesses the role played by helicopters, reviewing their strengths and limits. The author suggests that a dilemma shadows the use of these aircraft. On the one hand, they offer a unique combination of mobility, flexibility, and agility in working closely with ground forces, providing reconnaissance, fire, maneuver, and logistical support. However, helicopters prove acutely sensitive to environmental conditions, are relatively fragile, and can be countered by multiple, relatively-inexpensive weapon systems.