Ukraine War

Carl Conetta, 12 January 2026

During 2025 multiple peace and cease-fire proposals addressing the conflict in Ukraine were advanced. Most prominent among them are several put forward by the Trump administration beginning in February (2/28), May (5/8), and November(11/19). The November proposal was a fully articulated 28-point “peace plan”. This plan inspired a quick 28-point rejoinder by the “E3″ nations (11/23) – France, Germany, and the UK – who perceived a pro-Russian tilt in Trump’s original. Subsequently, the USA and Ukraine developed a joint “20-point framework” (12/23) that re-balanced toward Ukraine. Alongside this was a statement by the leaders of ten European countries and the EU proposing, among other things, to form a European-led “multinational force, Ukraine.” (The November and December proposals are summarized in an Appendix.)

None of these proposals can count as a balanced effort that puts ending the war forthwith as its primary goal. And none reflect or correspond to the battlefield and strategic realities of the war. Rather than suggesting reality-based compromises, they are either veiled ploys for partisan victory outcomes or, in the case of Pres. Trump’s 28-point plan, a pretext for America to simply exit the war. In all cases, the various proposals are intended to elicit not agreement but disagreement. Their point is to paint one’s opponent (or even one’s own allies) as intransigent.

This short article examines how 2025’s main proposals fall short, and it will briefly present two proposals better aligned with battlefield realities. One entails guidelines for a “Near-term Ceasefire.” The other outlines essential elements of a “Long-term Stable Ceasefire.” The article also suggests one likely endpoint for the war that is too seldom explored: a frozen critical state – a new militarized Russia-NATO “central front” inside Ukraine.

A Disaster for the World

US President Trump’s commitment to having the US disengage from the war (and NATO generally) is one motivating factor for the 2025 effusion of Ukraine peace and cease-fire proposals. Against this, there are the contending “victory camps” who seek or counsel to “stay the course.” The Kremlin represents one victory camp; The other comprises Kyiv, NATO and EU security managers, and an array of liberal hawks and neo-cons on both sides of the Atlantic. Of course, political leaders on all sides must to some degree assuage public opinion and this has increasingly favored finding a way to end the war diplomatically as soon as possible. Commensurate with this has been fairly uniform public support for allocating less resources to the war.

While publics on both sides of the conflict may continue to “support the troops” as well as the declared goals of the fighting, war weariness springs from a perception that the war has become a protracted, high-cost, no-winner stalemate reminiscent of the First World War’s Western Front. There has been growing public sentiment on both sides over the past two years that the costs of the war have outstripped its goals. (USA, Europe1, Europer2, Europe3, Poland, Germany, Russia1, Russia2)

The Russia-Ukraine war has been a disaster not only for the two combatants but for the entire world. Total Ukrainian and Russian deaths, both civilian and combatant, may exceed 300,000 as of January 2026. A greater number may have died outside the conflict zone, especially in the Global South, due to the plight of refugees, the impact of sanctions affecting fuel, food, and agriculture, and also due to foreign aid realignment. (Tens of billions of dollars in development and humanitarian assistance has been redirected from the Global South to Ukraine war support and relief.)

The total cost of the war 2022-2025, encompassing increased internal war funding by Russia and Ukraine, plus outside support for Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, is almost $800 billion. This sum is roughly equivalent to all the Official Development Assistance (including humanitarian aid) offered by the world’s 30 leading contributor countries for those years. It also is 2.5 times greater than the budget for the UN and all its agencies for that period. The wars have also spurred increased allocation of scarce resources to military-industrial establishments outside Russia and Ukraine. NATO countries (including the USA) are today spending $300 billion more per year on their armed forces than in 2021, corrected for inflation.

That is the cost of moving the RU-UA front line 100 kilometers this way or that over four years.

The Decisive Factor: Battlefield and Sustainment Realities

Neither President Trump nor the prime opponents of his November Russia-Ukraine peace plan have advanced practical proposals for peace.

Trump’s earlier February and May 2025 proposals for a complete and unconditional ceasefire actually favored Ukraine, which was losing ground and suffering personnel and logistics shortages. And they disfavored Russia, which was gaining ground. The bias of Trump’s proposals was not intentional. He was narrowly focused on gaining credit for a halt in the fighting without attention to practical battlefield realities and how these would shape the responses of the contestants. There should be little surprise that President Zelenskyy eventually accepted the deal while President Putin refused it.

To summarize the battlefield and sustainment realities that determined the balance between the contestants:

■ The Russians are clearly advancing, albeit slowly. After having been pushed back in Spring 2022, Russian troops began to gain ground again in 2024 and 2025, winning as much as 9,000 sq km during those two years. This advance, although steady, has been slow and bloody. To date, Russian forces have been able to achieve 85% of Putin’s revised territorial goals. Putin’s hope for closure any time soon resides with the shifting balance of capability and resolve favoring the Russian side that is now underway.

■ Ukraine faces a serious mobilization crisis. It is presently unable to recruit enough troops to offset its casualties and desertion rates. This has compelled a halt to the formation of new brigades, the under-staffing of existing units, misallocation of personnel among units, and general exhaustion throughout the ranks.

■ Ukraine is under much greater pressure in the drone and missile war. Russia has substantially increased its rate of drone attacks from 200 per week in 2024 to over 1,000 in 2025. Despite additional assistance from the West, Ukraine’s drone interception rate has declined from 93% in 2024 to 88% in 2025. Together these developments mean that eight times as many Russian aerial attacks are now getting through.

These realities have affected Ukrainian public opinion. So has the staggering number of fatalities suffered since the war began – probably more than 85,000 soldiers and 30,000 civilians killed.

In 2022, 73% of Ukrainians had favored continuing to fight for as long as it took to drive out the Russians and reclaim all lost territory. Only 22% favored a negotiated resolution at the time. By July 2025, however, the preferences had reversed: 69% favored a negotiated end to the war ASAP, while only 24% wanted to continue to fight until total victory. Although a slight majority – 51% – continues to oppose ceding territory to Russia that position was expressed by many more Ukrainians in 2022: 71%. The softening support for fighting probably also plays a role in Ukraine’s mobilization crisis.

Russian popular support for negotiations has similarly grown but probably with less effect on mobilization efforts. Although 60% or more of Russians support negotiations, the support for the military operation also remains high: 78%; This, possibly because three-quarters of Russians believe they are winning on the battlefield – and they are (albeit slowly). It is relevant that, although the Russian military may have lost almost twice as many troops as has Ukraine’s armed forces, Russia’s population is nearly four times larger. What’s more, less than 1,000 Russian civilians have been killed. Given the two countries difference in size, this 1:30 civilian loss rate is very significant. Levels of war damage show an even greater disparity. (Also see: The “Reluctant Consensus: War and Russia’s Public Opinion” and “Conflict with Ukraine: Attention, Support, Attitude to Various Terms of a Peace Agreement“)

Trump’s November 28-point Plan: Peace or Exit?

In rejecting Trump’s February and May proposals Putin asserted that any negotiated settlement must go further than a simple ceasefire to address the root causes of the war. The Trump administration’s much more ambitious 28-point peace plan, which was made public in November, purported to do just that. But if the earlier proposal favored Ukraine, the November plan tilted in the other direction.

While offering Ukraine an ill-defined security guarantee and redevelopment package, it granted several core goals sought by Moscow: outright possession of three Ukrainian oblasts, effective control of two others, a blanket amnesty for war crimes, a limit on Ukrainian military strength, preclusion of Ukraine NATO membership, and a formal end to NATO expansion.

The plan was drafted in late October 2025 by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner working with Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev in Miami. This occurred shortly after the acceptance of the Gaza ceasefire plan by Israel and Hamas, gaining some impetus from it. It drew at least in part on a “non-paper” transmitted by a Russian government official. This doesn’t entail that the Kremlin was writing Trump administration policy, however – as some critics contend. Such documents are a common non-committal way of communicating government policy positions and options.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had already set out in early February the view that restoring Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders was an “unrealistic objective” which would only prolong the war. Overturning current battlefield realities would demand much greater US and allied commitments. Conversely, pressuring Kyiv to accept these realities would reduce demands on the USA in either of two ways: By resolving the war or, in the case that Kyiv refused these terms, by giving the White House a pretext to end cooperation. Still, the extent of Ukrainian concessions proposed in the November plan implied that Kyiv’s immediate plight was worse than it was actually.

Obviously the plan was unlikely to win agreement from Ukraine or America’s leading NATO and EU allies – and that may have been the point. Ukraine’s rejection of the plan could have served as a pretext for US exiting the war. In that case the proposal might have served more as a US exit plan than a practicable peace plan. However, while Zelenskyy predictably dissented, he did so only in provisional terms, wisely signaling an intent to continue negotiations, offering Trump no easy exit.

Whether viewed as an exit plan or a peace plan, Trump’s 28-point proposal inspired a firestorm of criticism from war hawks.(CAP, Foreign Policy, The Hill, Politico) It also precipitated an opposition alliance by America’s European partners. Top European NATO and EU security managers retain the liberal hawk perspective on the war characteristic of the previous US administration.

NATO Allies Fire Back: Stay the Course!

While Kyiv’s plight is indeed serious and immediate, the capacity of its European partners to counter-balance Russian power is prodigious. For various reasons, European material support has been limited so far and its direct combat support, marginal. But the degree and nature of European support is subject to political and strategic pressure and calculation. It increased significantly in 2025. It is more than plausible that leading NATO countries and especially those bordering Ukraine will not simply stand by and let the Ukrainian front collapse. Zelenskyy depends on this prospect, which undergirds his recalcitrant response to demands for concessions.

On Nov 23, just four days after the administrations offered its detailed proposal, the E3 nations (France, Germany, and the UK) offered a 28-point counter-proposal to the Trump plan. This was framed as a series of amendments but, in fact, involved a dramatic reversal of terms. The counter-proposal called for a permanent ceasefire along the current line of contact and protracted negotiations on the eventual disposition of occupied territories. Notably, unlike the administration’s plan, this E3 counter involved no immediate transfer of territories.

Both plans offered security guarantees, but the European one anchored these to NATO, while the US administration’s proposal relied on US initiative and a coalition of the willing. A more consequential difference concerned the specific outcome that each plan proposed to cement in place.

In the original proposal, the guarantee was a follow-on to Ukraine surrendering the occupied oblasts and closing the door on NATO membership – key Russian goals. In that case, the guarantee was supposed to relieve Ukrainian concerns about future Russian aggression. By contrast, in the E3 proposal, which does not grant Russia sovereignty over the oblasts, the guarantee blocks Russia’s return to war should negotiations break down and the deposition of the occupied territory remains forever undecided. In the meantime, sanctions would continue to bleed Russia, in prospect leading eventually to its bankruptcy.

In sum, the Euro proposal relieves the pressure on Ukraine by deterring RU military action while sustaining pressure on Russia. It is a slow-motion Ukraine victory plan carrying forward some elements of the proposal Kyiv advanced in the Istanbul Communiqué of March/April 2022. Under the Euro plan all Ukraine need do is hold steady while shielded from attack as Moscow is progressively sapped via sanctions. The Euro plan also leaves open the door to NATO membership, does not limit NATO expansion, allows a larger Ukrainian military, and retains the prospect of Russian war reparations and prosecution for war crimes.

It is easy to see why Russia would reject these terms given its more advantageous domestic situation and current battlefield realities, which favor Russian forces. In this light, the Euro proposal is not a “peace plan” but a form of lawfare or diplo-fare – the conduct of war by diplomatic means. Its true aim is public and elite opinion – especially American. The side that refuses an ostensibly honest ceasefire or peace plan is marked as the principal obstacle to ending the conflict, and this can help renew or increase public and elite support for the other side and for sustaining the fight.

The Euro rejoinder to Trump’s 28-point proposal created a dilemma for the President because it better corresponded with shifts in US public and elite opinion than did Trump’s own November plan. That was a dilemma of the President’s own making. It was his handling of the Ukraine contingency during the course of 2025 that increased support for Ukraine and strengthened the hand of US neo-cons and liberal hawks

Public Opinion and the Vicissitudes of Trump War Policy

President Trump’s shifting engagement with the war’s principal antagonists does not evince an erratic approach to the war. Nor does the fact that his proposals seem to tilt first one way and then the other show capriciousness. Trump is employing a flexible transactional approach aiming to walk the opponents toward a pause in fighting for which he can claim credit and/or create a justification for the USA to exit the war. In this approach it matters not much (if at all) who eventually exercises dominion over Crimea and the Donbas. What matters is self-aggrandizement and national disengagement. But the President’s idiosyncratic approach has had unintended effects on public opinion which have rebounded to the advantage of neo-cons and liberal hawks.

Prior to Donald Trump taking office US public opinion had been shifting toward greater support for seeking a quick end to the war even if this meant that Ukraine had to surrender territory. That changed soon after Trump’s election. By March, majorities again expressed support for staying the course “as long as it took.” In Gallup polls a plurality of Americans also said US support for Ukraine was insufficient, whereas in late 2024 a plurality had judged US support to be “too much.”

The change in sentiment partly reflected a backlash to the administration’s cutoff of Ukrainian arms and intelligence support in late-February. However, aid was partly restored in response to Ukraine’s acceptance of Trump’s proposed unconditional ceasefire in March – a plan that Moscow resisted. Following Zelenskyy’s acceptance and Putin’s rejection of Trump’s offer Gallup recorded a distinct rebound in support for the Ukrainian war effort; This, after several years of decline. Throughout the summer and into the fall, Trump was increasingly critical of Putin’s intransigence. In July he bluntly said “We get a lot of bullshit thrown at us by Putin, if you want to know the truth. He’s very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless.”

Not surprisingly, Trump’s turn had an impact on the Republican base and also amplified the views of GOP Russia hawks and neo-cons. Indeed, a late July 2025 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll found 51% Republicans then favoring US military aid to Kyiv – a 21-point shift since March. Overall, 62% of Americans were found to support sending military supplies to Kyiv – up from 52% in March. This corresponded well with Trump’s imposition of serious new sanctions on the Russian oil industry in October. It was less auspicious for the administration’s late-November 28-point peace plan, which was lambasted Left and Right as a surrender to Russian demands. The new plan seemed at odds not only with public opinion but with the 8-month anti-Putin drift of administration pronouncements. In fact, it was not at all at odds with the President’s fundamental orientation regarding the war.

President Trump primarily seeks to rollback America’s foreign obligations and especially its European security commitments. He rejects that America’s best interests are served by prosecuting the Ukrainian war, and he believes his transactional approach can bring it to a quicker (if not quick) conclusion.

One need not agree with Trump’s view to see how it might inform a seemingly erratic series of actions and statements as the President seeks leverage over the war’s contestants. Complicating this play are domestic developments and reactions that can affect his broader agenda. Trump’s overall program depends on a high level of at least tacit approval from GOP leaders and influencers. His 28-point peace proposal lacks that approval, although it corresponds with his disposition on European disengagement and the Ukraine war. The shift in US public opinion on the war and the administration’s other troubles compel some movement toward the European alternative approach to the war, which will make Moscow’s assent unlikely.

The December “Peace” Plan Kabuki: Bringing the USA Back In

During December 2025, US and UA negotiators settled on a joint 20-point negotiating position on the war while a group of European leaders produced a supportive plan. Soon after, European leaders and US representatives produced several draft statements outlining very substantial security guarantees, military assistance plans, and development packages for Ukraine. If the administration’s 28-point November plan tilted toward Russian concerns, the December plans and statements tilted much more heavily toward supporting Ukraine. Although less detailed than the November European rejoinder, the 20-point framework adopts most of its key planks, reflecting a significant Administration retreat from its earlier position – even though the administration’s lead architect in both cases was Steve Witkoff.

Unsurprisingly, the US-UA joint proposal asks Ukraine to commit to surrendering very little except temporarily, and it rewards Kyiv’s cooperation substantially with security and economic commitments. The 20-points, summarized below, give the impression that Russia needs a ceasefire more than does Ukraine, which was manifestly not true. Thus the proposal will not nearly gain Moscow’s assent, and Putin’s rejection seems to be part of the play. Reflecting on that eventuality, Zelenskyy has said, “I think America will apply sanctions pressure and give us more weapons if he (Putin) rejects everything.” In this way, the proposal may serve only to refuel the war effort.

The full-text of the 20-point plan is available in an Appendix. To summarize some key features:

• The proposal, if accepted, would stop Russia’s advance in its tracks. It also requires some immediate Russian troop withdrawals (albeit minor) and finalizes no de jure transfer of Ukrainian territory. The final disposition of occupied territories is to be decided in the course of negotiations, which may prove interminable.
• While prescribing a ceasefire-in-place where Russian and Ukrainian troops are in contact, it does not address the issue of Crimea. Presumably the disposition of Crimea is among the territorial issues to be discussed once a ceasefire takes hold.
• The framework does not address the issue of NATO membership or the peacetime presence of NATO troops in Ukraine. It does allow the possibility of an international inter-position force to separate the combatants. It also allows for a peacetime Ukrainian military comprising 800,000 troops and presumably allows outside military provisioning of Ukraine to continue unabated.
• Ukraine also would receive a development package, preferential access to the European market,” and “a clearly designated” deadline for EU membership.
• The framework makes no mention of Russia’s frozen assets. Nor does it prescribe lifting Russian sanctions. (Ancillary commentary suggests that phased conditional relief may occur.) In the meantime, the sanctions and the asset freeze may remain in place as bargaining chips while the final disposition of Ukrainian territory is negotiated.

The 14 Dec 2025 European “Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine” stands alongside the 20-point framework. Its most important addition is an envisioned “European-led ‘multinational force Ukraine’. This would, in prospect, draw on the 35-nation European “Coalition of the Willing” (which was formed in March 2025) and be supported by the USA “to assist in the regeneration of Ukraine’s forces, secure Ukraine’s skies, and support safe seas, including through operating inside Ukraine.” Elements of this might also serve as an inter-position force during the ceasefire period.

The series of mid-December meetings resulted in both Trilateral (US-UA-Europe) and Bilateral (US-UA, DE-UA) draft statements – prospective treaty-bound commitments. These involved Article-5-type security guarantees (including the USA in a distinct role), the 20-point peace plan, on-going military-to-military support to modernize an 800,000 person Ukraine military, and economic recovery assistance.

It is notable that America’s European partners – especially the E3 – have stepped up to reassure Kyiv and back-fill for the USA, at this time of difficulty for Ukraine. How far they will go, given domestic needs and sentiments, is unclear. Despite ventilating the idea of a European “multi-national” force for Ukraine, the European leaders’ statement is not a blueprint or solid commitment to form or deploy such a force. What is key is the Euro group’s commitment to stay the course despite America’s reduced role, Ukraine’s difficulties, and recent Russian battlefield advances. This is a counter to the anti-war drift of European public opinion. All this is intended to and may weigh against Putin’s confidence while giving Kyiv’s beleaguered troops hope.

The most remarkable of the December developments is the return – however tenuous – of the USA to the heart (and head) of the Ukraine war coalition. As the NYT reports “For the first time in months, European officials said they were working well with American negotiators and President Trump.” Measuring the import of this convergence is difficult, however. While the USA is “back in” giving security guarantees, pledging a cease-fire monitoring role, and offering development deals, the extent and nature of its routine military sustainment help is unclear. It will certainly be much less than that provided previously by the Biden administration; Reducing routine military burdens in Europe is a central plank of Trump’s foreign policy program. Moreover, most of the promised assistance will materialize only if Kyiv signs a peace deal. Nonetheless, by keeping the United States more involved than previously expected, the December meetings create the hope of bridging some relatively lean years until a more Atlanticist US administration takes office. And this matters in both Ukraine’s capital and along its front lines.

What brought America back into the pro-Ukraine war camp? The quick and concerted response of America’s European allies was key in several ways. First, it echoed and amplified the alarm of both liberal and conservative US hawks referencing “the lessons of Munich” and suggesting that Trump’s Nov 28-point proposal had communicated weakness, naivete, and deference to Putin. Second, the willingness of European allies to assume the financial lead in supporting Ukraine, buy US weapons, and propose a non-NATO European force for duty inside Ukraine signaled the type of “burden sharing” Trump advocates. This lowers the costs and risks of American leadership (although, in light of US security pledges, they remain considerable). Finally, the plan and related statements ensure a US economic foothold in Ukraine and prescribe a distinguished oversight role for President Trump as chair of a “Peace Council” involving the USA, Ukraine, Russia, and European institutions.

Getting to Yes. The Counsel of Realism

The type of proposal that would least excite existential fears and reflexes on all sides is a simple unconditional ceasefire in place – much like the one proposed by US President Trump on May 8, 2025, but with a critical difference. As noted previously, Trump’s March and May initiatives were non-starters because they failed to take into account current battlefield and sustainment realities, which were strongly trending against Ukraine. For this reason the proposal benefited Kyiv more than Moscow. Putin cited these factors when he rhetorically asked if Ukraine would use the ceasefire period “to continue forced mobilization, get weapons supplies, and prepare its mobilized units?” Of course, free to do so, it would. So could Moscow. But Ukraine needed the breather badly and Russia did not – quite the contrary: A ceasefire would take the wind out of Russia’s advance. In this light, the way forward would be to compensate Moscow for its loss of momentum and initiative, directly or indirectly. Certainly a distasteful choice for Kyiv, but better than losing ground and lives under fire while short on troops and supplies.

A Realistic Ceasefire Proposal would:

1. Freeze the Russian line while moving the Ukrainian line back 15 km, creating a demilitarized zone as large as any that Moscow might hope to occupy in the near future.

2. Insert neutral observers – not US or Coalition of the Willing troops – in the zone and bring it under air surveillance

3. Lift sanctions and blockades for the duration of the ceasefire; Open the Dnieper River to Ukrainian commercial traffic

For the Ukrainian side surrendering space will be onerous after such a costly fight against aggression. But its armed forces need time, material replenishment, and relief from fire.

On the Russian side, surrendering momentum may seem exceptionally imprudent after such a costly confrontation. Moreover, a pivotal goal – the full capture of four provinces – may feel within reach given mounting difficulties on the Ukrainian side. On the other hand, the progress of Russian forces has been agonizingly slow and costly. And the prospect of the USA remaining in the fight due to Russian intransigence favors acceptance.

The lifting of Russian sanctions, even temporarily, counter-balances the revival and re-stocking of Ukrainian units during negotiations, although it might be additionally necessary to briefly pause external Ukrainian supplies until Russian sanction relief takes hold. Keep in mind that the pause for resupply is critical for Kyiv’s effort, not Moscow’s. In this light, the temporary lifting of some sanctions would serve to counter-balance Kyiv’s critical sustainment relief. And what matters is when relief is felt on both sides; Simultaneous relief (or as close as reasonably possible) would seem most neutral.

Even if this proposed conditional ceasefire is accepted by both sides, moving forward to the type of comprehensive solutions demanded by Putin and envisioned by the November and December plans seems unlikely (for reasons discussed below). However, the conditional ceasefire proposal just outlined above might form the foundation for a truncated but stable longer-term agreement too.

Elements of a Stable Long-term Ceasefire would include:

1. Freeze the front line where it stands; Implement a small buffer zone.

2. Each contestant may claim the areas occupied by Russian troops as rightfully their own, but major powers East and West would agree that sovereignty is to be finally decided by peaceful negotiation between the contestants. In the meantime all would recognize that the area in dispute is administered by Russia, which is not to be challenged by force.

3. A balanced coalition of the powers (including the USA and China) would guarantee the arrangement, pledging to oppose a return to war by either party.

4. In all other respects, nations and international institutions will unconditionally restore normal relations, including the lifting of all sanctions and blockades

5. Both sides would proceed with reconstruction and revitalization of the areas under their supervision and joint or divided work on shared infrastructure. The immobilized assets of the Russian National Wealth Fund and Central Bank would be freed for reconstruction of the areas under Russian administration and for the Russian share of joint work. This allocation need not be designated as a penalty

6. NATO or leading NATO members including the USA would guarantee and declare that the question of Ukraine’s future NATO membership is tabled and moot until the sovereignty of Russian occupied areas is settled by agreement between the contestants. The contestants may also address the issue of NATO membership directly as part of their negotiations.

It is presumed that final agreement on the disposition of the occupied areas might never occur, and that these areas might remain under Russian administration in perpetuity.

Notably, this proposal incorporates some ideas first advanced by Ukraine in the Istanbul Communiqué (March/April 2022) – namely that the final status of the occupied areas be deferred. It also draws on US policy regarding the dispute between Japan and China over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands. In that case, the USA considers the conflicting claims to be a matter for the two parties to resolve while recognizing that Japan currently administers the islands. Moreover, the USA opposes any attempt to settle the matter unilaterally or by force, and considers Japan’s administration of the islands to be covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty.

The Senkaku/Diaoyudao framework has been essentially in place since 1972 – more than 50 years. And, make no mistake, the application of this framework to the Russia-Ukraine dispute would not likely lead to a resolution of the dispute unless one or both parties undergo substantial governmental change.

The Counsel of Munich

Weighing against the imperative to immediately end the conflict via negotiated compromise and instead seek a Ukrainian victory is the concern that any compromise with aggression will lead to more aggression. This concern is standard in international affairs and for good reason. But the danger of “conciliation” or “appeasement” admits degrees depending on the circumstances or genesis of the violation and the security arrangements that follow conflict. The counsel of Munich needs to be contextualized. Some cases are manageable and worth the risk when measured against a brutal interminable morass like the RU-UA war, which has deleterious effects worldwide.

It is relevant that the present case is a Pyrrhic or “no-winner” war. Much of what Moscow has “won” are shattered towns and a broken battlefield. Whatever Moscow may gain through diplomacy will be far less than what it sought in 2022 and at a much greater cost than anticipated. This was due to Russian weakness, now exposed, and a powerful cooperative defensive response that leaves behind a more ready bulwark against aggression. Russia’s experience is hardly a good brief for an ongoing campaign of conquest – and none has been seriously advanced.

Among the circumstances leading to Moscow’s Ukraine intervention were the steady march of an adversarial military alliance toward Russia’s border, steadfastly disregarding Moscow’s continuing complaint. Also there was 20-years of competitive Great Power interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs as well as irresolute pre-war efforts to mitigate Ukrainian competition and conflict, both internal and external. There were many opportunities in the past to sincerely pursue cooperative approaches, advocate and exercise restraint, and avoid war. And there will be more opportunities in the future. This is a war that could and should have been avoided had great powers on either side exercised restraint in their long march to war.

The complicating factor: How far will the Western alliance go?

A realistic appraisal of the RU-UA battlefield and strategic balance might illuminate a practicable approach to conflict mitigation and resolution. Complicating the Ukraine war, however, is the fact that the conflict is not simply a binary standoff between Russia and Ukraine. It is a quasi-coalition war also involving to some uncertain and varying extent the power of the USA and many European countries arrayed against Russia. The potential variability in the level of outside material support for Ukraine makes it hard to discern a “good deal” in peace negotiations. Part of every negotiation is an assessment of potential changes in outside involvement.

How to weigh the prospective commitment of Ukraine’s supporters in material terms is not straight forward. The approach of these powers reflect their own goals and cost-benefit calculus, which are not identical to Ukraine’s. And they shift with the winds of war and with changes in domestic conditions including public opinion.

What is an existential contest for Ukraine demanding maximum commitment is not so for its supporters. For them, commitment to the war must compete with more pressing national priorities, other foreign policy activities, and domestic political imperatives. That said, the alliance-wide commitment to Ukraine has been very modest, comprising about 1/4 of 1 percent of their aggregate national government spending. This means there is ample leeway for expansion before allies face serious domestic difficulties – should the alliance or some subset of it see an urgent and manageable need.

The Western alliance could potentially bring to the conflict a type and level of resources that would completely transform the war’s balance of power. Today Russia’s GDP is ten times larger than Ukraine’s (in Purchasing Power Parity or PPP terms). Its defense budget is twice as large. And its active-duty armed forces personnel roster is at least 50% larger. But these ratios are much more favorable for Ukraine today than in 2022 due to the efforts of the Ukrainian people and $400 billion in outside transfers. These transfers (of cash and goods) were equivalent to more than two years of the country’s pre-war GDP. But outside supporters could do much more if they chose, as noted above.

Today, the coalition of countries supporting Ukraine stand in aggregate wealth and power to Russia as Russia once stood to Ukraine. The aggregate GDP of NATO countries is nine times greater than Russia’s (in PPP terms). NATO armed forces field more than 2.5 as many active-duty personnel. And NATO defense spending is at least four-times greater than Russia’s (in PPP terms).

Some of the factors limiting foreign contributions have already been mentioned above: competing priorities and domestic politics. Public support for increasing war contributions has already been trending downward in most places. There is also concern about escalatory dynamics. At the extreme, there is concern about provoking a regional war with associated nuclear risks. Short of that, Russia has considerable potential to boost its own efforts in response to increased international support for Ukraine. And increased outside involvement in the war would substantiate the Kremlin’s effort to depict the war as a defensive one. So the prospective result might be, at best, a stalemate at a higher level of spending and destruction – and this war is already a catastrophe for the world.

How this war may end

Both Moscow and Kyiv are captured by this war and not presently seeing an acceptable exit via negotiation. Neither sees a way out except on terms that essentially amount to “victory.” Even the Stable Long-term Ceasefire proposal outlined above is unlikely to find mutual acceptance unless and until both sides are in crisis and perceiving an intractable stalemate.

Today, both capitals are gripped by the sunk costs of the war. And both are enthralled by what they see as an existential struggle: for Kyiv, it is a fight for national sovereignty and preservation of the Maiden revolution; For Moscow, it is a fight to preserve defensive depth, rebuff the encroachment of an adversarial military alliance, block regime change efforts, and preserve its status as a regional hegemon and global power. Also, both nations have become, in political-economic terms, “war states.” Among other things, this means that the fate of their leadership cohorts probably hinge on the outcome of the war. Neither Putin nor Zelenskyy can easily step back.

Given Ukraine’s current mobilization crisis, Putin may hope to secure his territorial objectives (and something more) within a year. It is feasible that the Ukrainian front may face an operational collapse in the next 15-18 months. And Ukraine’s economy is on continual life support. For Zelenskyy, the prospect of a substantial boost in the type and amount of Western aid seems key. And while Trump’s machinations make a big boost seem unlikely, it also seems unlikely that European NATO leaders will uniformly let the Ukrainian prospect simply collapse.

Despite the fact of European public opinion running increasingly against the option of deeper involvement, an operational fracture of the Ukrainian front could prompt direct intervention by a subset of European powers. These might set out to form a passive but strong defensive line in western Ukraine some distance from the Russian line. In that case this war might “end” with a standoff inside Ukraine between Russian forces and a coalition of Ukrainian and select European powers – a new East-West central front frozen by the risk of regional and possibly nuclear war. Short of this, a broader Western response to a crisis in Ukrainian’s posture might include Western troops entering to take up support roles, increased presence of foreign “volunteer” units, anti-missile and anti-drone operations conducted from or over Western territory, and a surge in Western material and financial support. Of course, a great deal depends on America’s stance.

US-NATO declaratory policy on the war has focused not only on defense of Ukrainian sovereignty, but more generally on a putative Russian threat to all of Europe and, indeed, the entire liberal world order. US-NATO official talk of a Russian attack or invasion threat to Europe has certainly amplified public fears, but this talk is greatly overwrought. There was no general invasion goal or plan in Russian strategy, and the Ukraine war itself showed the limits of contemporary Russian power. As for a threat to the liberal world order and the rule of law, these are found on both sides of the Russia-NATO divide, whether the issue is political values or international practice. What is real and perilous is Great Power Competition between Russia and the United States (and by extension much of NATO).

War of the Worlds

Great Power Competition (GPC) has been a driving force of East-West relations regarding Ukraine ever since NATO expansion got underway (1997-1999) and especially since the Orange Revolution took off (2004). Ukraine might have served as a bridge between Moscow and Washington-Brussels. Instead, it became first a political battleground and then a military one. One theater of Great Power conflict is being fought out and perhaps decided on this battleground. Failing to see this or discounting it entails failing to understand or accurately communicate the Ukrainian war and its dynamics.

In recent decades, Moscow has opposed numerous western international initiatives, beginning with the 1999 Kosova war. Major turning points in the relationship were the 2007 Munich Security Conference, where Putin vehemently criticized American unipolar dominance and NATO expansion, and the 2008 Russian military intervention in the Georgian civil conflict. Washington and Moscow have also been at loggerheads over Libya, the 2003 Iraq war, Syria, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. Recently, Russian private military companies have been displacing Western troop presence in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

Across the globe Moscow maintains close relations with 36 nations as a leading member of several security and geopolitical cooperation organization: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS – a virtual antipode to Western-led networks. Especially vexing to leaders of the Atlantic Alliance are Moscow’s relatively good relations with several NATO members: Hungary, Turkey, and Slovakia.

Perhaps most consequential is Moscow partnerships with China and India, and its special role in mediating relations between these two. This role was obvious during the 2020 China-India Ladakh standoff, but also more regularly in the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral meetings.

Recent US strategic policy has seen China and Russia as the nation’s principal strategic challenge.(NSS-2022, NSS-2017, US Mil Strategy-2018)  Similar views are stated in NATO and EU security documents. Russian destabilization or regime change would have a profound impact on China, opening a vulnerable flank in China’s northeast and favoring closer US-India coordination on China policy. Change in Russia would similarly have a profound impact on North Korea.

In sum, the USA and other leading NATO powers bring more to the Ukraine war than simple support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and the rule of law. The war and their role in it involves a broader coalescence of interests that puts them at odds with Moscow – at least in the view of US and NATO security policy managers.

Regardless of the war’s outcome, the USA and leading NATO countries see the depletion of Russian global power as a positive, even pivotal end. NATO has also experienced a related revival of its strength and relevance due to the Russian invasion. And the war has prompted a substantial boost in military budgeting across the Atlantic alliance. (Alliance military spending has grown 22% in real terms since 2022. NATO is today spending about $300 billion more per year on defense than it did in 2021.) All these factors argue against a negotiated peace before Russia is unsettled and substantially degraded. While this war is an ongoing disaster for the world, it also is a pivotal engagement in the contest of great powers. And that is why it is most likely to be fought to the end, regardless of the global cost and attendant risk of an even greater conflagration.

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APPENDIX: A Selection of 2025 Official Ukraine War Ceasefire and Peace Proposals